ML20129A730: Difference between revisions
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
StriderTol (talk | contribs) (StriderTol Bot change) |
||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
{{Adams | |||
| number = ML20129A730 | |||
| issue date = 07/09/1985 | |||
| title = Insp Rept 50-454/85-25 on 850604-0701.Violation Noted: Failure to Perform Required Tech Spec Surveillances Re RCS Average Temp | |||
| author name = Forney W | |||
| author affiliation = NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) | |||
| addressee name = | |||
| addressee affiliation = | |||
| docket = 05000454 | |||
| license number = | |||
| contact person = | |||
| document report number = 50-454-85-25, NUDOCS 8507150374 | |||
| package number = ML20129A680 | |||
| document type = INSPECTION REPORT, NRC-GENERATED, INSPECTION REPORT, UTILITY, TEXT-INSPECTION & AUDIT & I&E CIRCULARS | |||
| page count = 10 | |||
}} | |||
See also: [[see also::IR 05000604/2007001]] | |||
=Text= | |||
{{#Wiki_filter:. | |||
. | |||
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION | |||
REGION III | |||
Report No.: 50-454/85025 | |||
Docket No.: 50-454 License No.: NPF-37 | |||
Licensee: Commonwealth ~ Edison Company | |||
Post Office Box 767 | |||
Chicago, JL 60690 | |||
-Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1 | |||
Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL | |||
Inspection-Conducted: June 4.- July 1, 1985 | |||
Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, Jr. | |||
K.'A. Connaughton | |||
P. G. Brochman | |||
Approved By: .' - - --- | |||
Reactor Projects Section 1A Date | |||
Inspection Summary | |||
Inspection on June 4 - July 1, 1985 (Report No. 50-454/85025(DRP)) | |||
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident | |||
inspectors-of licensee action on previous ~ inspection findings; LERs;. location | |||
of manual trip circuit in solid-state protection system; maintenance; | |||
surveillance; operational safety; startup testing; Headquarters requests; | |||
Region III requests; event followup; allegations; and other activities. The | |||
~ inspection consisted of 137 inspector-hours onsite by 3 NRC inspectors | |||
including 27 inspector-hours during off-shifts. | |||
Results: Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were | |||
identified in 10 areas; one violation was identifed in the remaining area | |||
(failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillances when reqired - | |||
Paragraph 3.b). The violation' cites 2 instances of missed surveillances which | |||
were required by Technical Specifications; however, examination of the strip | |||
chart records indicated that the parameters were maintained within their | |||
Technical-Specification limits at all times; therefore, the public health and | |||
safety were not affected. | |||
. | |||
8507150374 850709 | |||
PDR ADOCK 05000454 | |||
G PDR | |||
. | |||
. | |||
DETAILS | |||
1. Persons Contacted | |||
Commonwealth Edison Company | |||
*T. Maiman, Manager of Projects | |||
*R. Querio, Station Superintendent | |||
*R. Pleniewicz, Assistant Superintendent Operations | |||
*D. St. Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor | |||
R. Chrazanowski, Security Administrator, Byron | |||
*A. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor | |||
H. Erickson, Master Mechanic | |||
P. Johnson, Master Instrument Mechanic | |||
*F. Hornbeak, Unit 2 Testing Supervisor | |||
*R. Gruber, Quality Assurance | |||
*A. Britton, Quality Assurance | |||
H. Krist, Security Assistant | |||
G. Buettner, Security Assistant | |||
C. Kilbride, Technical Staff | |||
M. Snow, Technical Staff | |||
*J. Langan, Technical Staff Compliance | |||
The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and | |||
contractor personnel during the course of this inspection. | |||
* Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 1, 1985. | |||
2. Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92702) | |||
a. (Closed) Violation (454/85009-03(DRP)): Failure to implement | |||
administrative controls on overtime work for individuals who perform | |||
safety related functions. The inspector reviewed the licensee's | |||
training session on the control of overtime and interviewed | |||
maintenance supervisors to verify their understanding of the | |||
requirements for control of overtime. | |||
b. (Closed) Violation (454/85016-03(DRP)): Failure to follow Technical | |||
Specification Action Requirements. The inspector reviewed the | |||
licensee's response to the 3 examples of violation and interviewed | |||
licensed operators and licensed supervisory operators to verify | |||
their understanding of the intent of Technical Specification Action | |||
requirements which were exceeded. | |||
3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712 & 92700) | |||
a. (Closed) LEP.s (454/85051-LL; 454/85052-LL; 454/85053-LL; | |||
454/85054-LL; 454/85055-LL; 454/85056-LL; 454/85057-LL; | |||
454/85058-LL; 454/85059-LL): An in-office review was conducted for | |||
the following LERs to determine that the reporting requirements were | |||
fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and | |||
corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in | |||
accordance with Technical Specifications. | |||
2 | |||
. _ . | |||
. | |||
. | |||
'LER No.- Title | |||
~454/85051 Reactor Trip From Turbine Trip During | |||
Presynchronization Checks | |||
454/85052 Reactor Trip From 345KV Fault | |||
454/85053 Reactor Trip Due to Instrument Power | |||
Inverter Failure | |||
~ | |||
454/85054 Reactor Trip Due to Low Lube Oil | |||
Reservoir. | |||
454/85055 Inoperability of Containment Isolation | |||
Valves 1 RF026 and 1RF027 | |||
454/85056 Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Aux | |||
Building Environment | |||
454/85057 Missed Fire Watches Due to Aux Bldg | |||
Airborne Activity | |||
454/85058 Missed Hourly Fire Watch | |||
454/85059 Hourly Fire Watch Delayed Due to | |||
Security Computer Failure | |||
Licensee installation of a temperature monitoring system to | |||
automatically isolate the steam generator blowdown and auxiliiary | |||
steam systens, per LER 85056, will be tracked as an open item | |||
(454/85025-01(DRP)). | |||
The events described in LERs 454/85051,454/85052,454/85053,and | |||
454/85054 were reviewed in Inspection Report (454/85021(DRP)). | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
b. (Closed) LER (454/85050-LL): This LER described an qvent from | |||
February 24 to May 5,1985, while in Mode 1. Technical | |||
Specification 4.2.5 required that Indicated Reactor Coolant System | |||
Average Temperature (T ) and Indicated Pressurizer Pressure (P | |||
L be verified within theiE* limits of Table 3.2-1 at least once per P if) | |||
hours. This is accomplished by performance of Byron Operating | |||
Surveillance 1B0S 0.1-1,2,3, Step 6. The licensee identified in the | |||
LER that this surveillance had not been performed since initial | |||
entry into Mode 1 on February 24. During discussions with licensee | |||
staff the inspector identified 2 discrepancies in the LER. The | |||
cause of the surveillance not being performed was that the | |||
verification was deleted when Revision 1 to IBOS 0.1-1,2,3 was | |||
issued on March 28. Since the original version of IBOS 0.1-1,2,3 | |||
performed this sur~veillance, Technical Specification ' ,2.5 was only | |||
* | |||
exceeded after March 27. | |||
3 | |||
i | |||
- | |||
, | |||
. | |||
. | |||
Failure to perform surveillances within the required time interval | |||
is an example of a violation (454/85025-02a(DRP)). | |||
Technical Specification 4.0.4 required that entry into Mode 1 should | |||
not be made unless Technical Specification Surveillance 4.2.5 had | |||
been performed within the last 12 hours. T and P were not | |||
a | |||
verified within their limits prior to entry l8to ModPS on March 29 | |||
and April 3, 13, 16 and 21. These instances were not explicitly | |||
identified in the LER. | |||
Failure to perform a surveillance as required prior to entry in Mode | |||
1 is an example of a violation (454/85025-02b(DRP)). | |||
Since this event occured before the licensee presented their Conduct | |||
of Operations Improvement Program (COIP), described in Inspection | |||
Report (454/85021(DRP)), and the licensee took immediate corrective | |||
action upon discovery of this problem; the inspectors have no | |||
further concerns regarding this violation and it is considered | |||
closed. The inspectors will follow up the COIP as part of the | |||
permanant corrective action. The licensee agreed to revise the LER | |||
to correct the 2 discrepancies and this will be followed as'an | |||
unresolved item (454/85025-03(DRP)). | |||
4. Inspection of the Location of the Manual Trip Circuit in Westinghouse | |||
Designed Plants With a Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (25014) | |||
a. Background | |||
The effects of short-circuit failures of the output transistors in | |||
the UV output circuit of the Westinghouse SSPS were highlighted in | |||
recently issued Information Notice No. 85-18. A short-7ircuit | |||
failure of the type described in the notice would prevent the | |||
automatic tripping of the associated reactor trip breaker (RTB) on a | |||
valid reactor trip demand. | |||
During NRC review of this matter, another potential deficiency | |||
involving the SSPS was discovered. Namely, the use of erroneous | |||
controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS at an operating facility. | |||
Except for the drawings being used by the I&C technicians, the | |||
controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS being used in this | |||
facility erroneously depicted the manual trip circuit for the RTBs | |||
as being upstream of two particular output transistors. If such | |||
were the case, and if one of the output transistors was shorted as | |||
described in Information Notice 83-18, then the manual trip action | |||
associated with the UV portion of the trip circuit would also be | |||
ineffective. | |||
Temporary Instruction TI 2500/14 was therefore issued to require NRC | |||
inspector verification that the SSPS normal trip circuits were | |||
downstream of the undervoltage output transistors and tilus the | |||
manual undervoltage trip functions were not vulnerable to shorting | |||
of the output transistors. | |||
b. Inspection | |||
4 | |||
. _-___ | |||
. | |||
.. | |||
The inspector reviewed electrical drawings 6E-1-4030EF29, " Schematic | |||
Diagram, Reactor Protection, Part-2, Train A," Revision D, dated | |||
January 2,1985, and 6E-1-4030EF73, " Schematic Diagram Reactor | |||
Protection Part-2 Train B," Revision D, dated January 2,1985. | |||
These drawings correctly specified that the manual undervoltage trip | |||
circuits were downstream of output transistors Q3 and Q4 on the | |||
undervoltage driver cards. | |||
To further verify that the foregoing schematics accurately reflected | |||
the as-installed SSPS equipment the inspector contacted licensee | |||
technical staff personnel and was provided with: an identical | |||
schematic (applicable to both trains) from the Byron Station SSPS | |||
vendor manual; Westinghouse Electric Corporation Instrumentation and | |||
Control Drawings 2379A59 Sheet 6, Revision D and 2374A56 Sheet 9, | |||
Revision AC; Drawing 6E-1-4114F, " External Wiring Diagram, Solid | |||
State (RX&ESF) Protection System Cabinet, Train A (Logic Section) | |||
Part 3 (IPA 09J)", Revision J, dated March 5, 1984; Drawing | |||
6E-1-4052AA, " Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Reactor and | |||
Chemical Volume Control Section B2, Part 11 (1PM05J)," Revision D, | |||
dated September 3, 1982; Drawing 6E-1-4054P, " Internal-External | |||
Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered Safety Features Section A2, Part 6 | |||
(1PM06J)," Revision E, dated May 10, 1983; Drawing 6E-2-4054P, | |||
" Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered Safety Features | |||
Section A2 Part 2 (1PM06J)," Revision V, dated January 3, 1985, and; | |||
Drawing 6E-1-4208B, " Internal-External Wiring Diagram Reactor Trip | |||
Switchgear Cabinet 1RD05E," Revision K dated June 21, 1984. | |||
The above listed wiring diagrams and drawings traced wiring from the | |||
Undervoltage Output Cards, Pins 29 and 30, through the manual | |||
reactor trip and manual safety injection control switches to the | |||
termination points on the reactor trip switchgear cubical which were | |||
connected to the undervoltage trip coil. Based upon review of the | |||
foregoing " Approved for Use" design and construction drawings the | |||
inspector concluded that the Byron Unit 1 SSPS was configured such | |||
that shorting of output transistors Q3 and/or Q4 on the undervoltage | |||
output card would not defeat the manual undervoltage reactor trip | |||
function. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726) | |||
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance | |||
i testing on a Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Channel, the Reactor | |||
Coolant Pump Bus Undervoltage Relays, and Component Cooling Pump 1CC01PA | |||
and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate | |||
procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting | |||
conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the | |||
affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with | |||
technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by | |||
personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any | |||
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and | |||
resolved by appropriate management personnel. | |||
5 | |||
, | |||
* | |||
. \ | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703) | |||
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components | |||
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted | |||
in acccordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry | |||
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications. | |||
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting | |||
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were | |||
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the | |||
work; activities were accomplished'using approved procedures and were | |||
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were | |||
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality | |||
controi records were maintained; activities were accomplished by | |||
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified; | |||
radiolooical controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls | |||
were implemented. Work' requests were reviewed to determine status of | |||
outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety | |||
related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance. | |||
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed: | |||
Replacement of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitter 1FT-AF016 | |||
Following completion of maintenance on the flow transmitter, the | |||
inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service | |||
properly. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
7. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System | |||
Walkdown (71707 & 71710) | |||
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs | |||
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of | |||
June 1985. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors | |||
ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions, | |||
atttentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when | |||
appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected | |||
emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to | |||
service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, turbine and | |||
rad-waste buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions, | |||
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibration and | |||
to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in | |||
need of maintenance. | |||
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and | |||
verifed implementation of radiation protection controls. During the | |||
mor.th of June 1985, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of | |||
the Diesel Generator and Safety Injection Systems to verify operability. | |||
6 | |||
I | |||
. | |||
. | |||
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility | |||
operations were in accordance with the requirements established under | |||
technical specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
8. Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302) | |||
The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following startup | |||
test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in | |||
accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test | |||
data was properly recorded and performance of licensee personnel | |||
conducting the tests demonstrated an understanding of assigned duties and | |||
responsibilities. | |||
2.47.31 -Power Coeficient Determination | |||
2.47.32 Thermal Power Measurement | |||
2.52.37 Load Swing Test | |||
2.64.34 Large Load Reduction | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
9. Response to Headquarters Requests (92704) | |||
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to Information Notice | |||
84-06 in accordance.with Temporary Instruction 2515/67, Item 03.02b and | |||
forwarded this information to the Regional Office. Submission of this | |||
information and that of Item 03.02a,_ covered in Inspection Report | |||
454/85021(DRP), completes all action required by this instruction. | |||
10. Response to Region III Requests (92705) | |||
The inspectors reviewed licensee files to determine the amount of | |||
experience for senior station personnel in the following areas: | |||
professional, utility, and nuclear plants and forwarded this-information | |||
to the Regional Office. | |||
11. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702) | |||
a. General | |||
The inspector performed onsite followup activities for an event | |||
which occurred during June 1985. This followup included reviews of | |||
operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event | |||
Reports (where available) and interviews with licensee personnel. | |||
For the event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the | |||
functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed | |||
licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license | |||
conditions and the nature of the event. Additionally the inspector | |||
verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of | |||
equipment malft1ctions and/or personnel error and had taken | |||
appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Details of | |||
the event and licensee corrective actions developed through | |||
inspector followup are provided in Paragraph b below. | |||
7 | |||
i | |||
. | |||
b. Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level on June 24, 1985 | |||
While in Mode 1 with reactor power at 98% the reactor tripped on | |||
steam generator 1A low-low level when the 1C main feedwater pump | |||
(MFP) (steam driven) was inadvertently tripped. Licensee personnel | |||
manuallly ran back the turbine and started the 1A MFP (motor driven) | |||
but were unable to maintain steam generator level. | |||
Licensee's investigation determined that the 1C MFP trip was caused | |||
by the microphone cord of an equipment operator's radio. This cord | |||
became entangled with the MFP's overspeed test lever, causing the | |||
test device to actuate. | |||
Corrective action taken by the licensee included briefing operators | |||
to exercise caution when working near the MFPs and the installation | |||
of protective covers around the test levers. The licensee is also | |||
evaluating other equipment for similar problems. Final review and | |||
closure of this event will be accomplished in a subsequent | |||
inspection after the LER is issued. | |||
No violations or deviations were identified. | |||
12. Allegations Provided by the Licensee Regarding Drug Use at Byron | |||
a. Allegation 1: On June 17, 1985, the licensee' notified the inspector | |||
of an allegation related to drug use. This allegation was verbally | |||
received on June 16, 1985, by a corporate manager from a concerned | |||
citizen at a social function. The citizen identified an employee at | |||
the Byron Statin whom the alleger had reason to believe may be using | |||
drugs off-site in a recreational manner. The corporate manager | |||
relayed this information to the Byron Site Superintendent who | |||
subsequently notified the inspector. | |||
. Findings: In keeping with the licensee's drug awareness program, on | |||
June 17, 1985, the individual was relieved of all duties at Byron | |||
Station, his site security clearance was revoked and he was notified | |||
of a review board to be convened on June 18, 1985. On June 18, | |||
1985, a board consisting of Byron Station managers and union | |||
representatives reviewed the allegation.with the individual. As a | |||
result of the Board's evaluation and recommendations, the individual | |||
was escorted to the Chicago General Office medical facility where | |||
the individual was interviewed by a senior coordinator of the | |||
Commonwealth Edison Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The | |||
individual also submitted to an observed specimen urinalysis | |||
following the interview. The test results of the urinalysis were | |||
negative. Based on the negative test results, recommendations of | |||
the EAP coordinator, and endorsement by the ccmpany physician, the | |||
individual was restored to security status and returned to full duty | |||
on June 20, 1985. | |||
The licensee's management and supervisory personnel and the | |||
inspectors have monitored the individual's performance and no | |||
abnormal behavior during current work day observations have been | |||
observed. This allegation is considered closed. | |||
8 | |||
l | |||
, | |||
& | |||
. | |||
b. Allegation 2: On June 13, 1985, the licensee notified the | |||
inspectors of an allegation related to alcohol and drug use at Byron | |||
Station in parking lots and areas of the plant. This allegation was | |||
received in the form of a telephone call on June 12, 1985, at 2100 | |||
to the Byron Site Security Administrator at his home. The caller | |||
identified himself as a long time contractor employee and provided | |||
sufficient detailed information to the Security Administrator to | |||
establish reasonable creditability. The caller also identified 10 | |||
individuals, including some badge numbers-and three contractor | |||
shops, whom he had reason to believe were using drugs and/or alcohol | |||
in the south parking lot during the lunch period and implied certain | |||
other site areas and times. The caller further stated that he may, | |||
in the future,; elect to become further involved by coming forth with | |||
additional specific information and revealing his identity pending | |||
his first hand observations of the licensee's corrective measures to | |||
resolve this issue. The licensee has had no further contact from | |||
this individual as of the closing date of this report. | |||
Findings: Based on the information received from the alleger, the | |||
licensee contacted the 10 individuals identified and arranged for | |||
them to report to the station security gate house at 1000 on June | |||
20, 1985. At the gate house the individuals, together with union | |||
representatives, were met by security officers and escorted to an | |||
isolation area inside the gate house. Inside the gate house four | |||
teams consisting of two CECO security managers each, began | |||
individual interviews of the identified individuals. The interview | |||
teams used a battery of questions designed to gain information from | |||
the individuals related to the Byron Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy | |||
awareness, personal information, including type of work and | |||
location, and to specifically address the use or sale of drugs or | |||
alcohol on and off CECO property including observations or rumors of | |||
the use or sale of drugs or alcohol at Byron. | |||
Simultaneously with the interviews the licensee conducted meetings | |||
with Project Construction Department (PCD), contractor supervisors, | |||
and station supervisors. The purpose of these meetings was to | |||
reitcrate the CECO position-as related to the Ceco Drug and Alcohol | |||
Abuse Policy and to disseminate information, of a general nature, | |||
concerning the allegations and the Byron Station corrective measures | |||
to resolve these issues. | |||
In addition, while the interviews were in progress, a search of the | |||
plant was made. Three teams, each consisting of a handler and a | |||
narcotics detection trained dog, made searches of a number of work | |||
site areas'inside the plant buildings and other contractor | |||
controlled work site buildings on the grounds inside the security | |||
fence. The search areas included tool, equipment and material | |||
storage boxes, field desks and lockers, and lunch areas. During the | |||
search procedure, each team demonstrated the effectiveness of the | |||
animal by hiding a drug sample and proving the dog could find it in ' | |||
both previously unsearched and searched areas. | |||
9 | |||
. I | |||
,, | |||
.- | |||
The_ inspectors participated in the dog team searches, the policy | |||
meetings and the interviews. During the dog team searches no drugs | |||
were detected in any of the areas searched. | |||
The CECO interview teams are preparing a report on the interviews | |||
and will provide a copy of the report to the inspectors. This | |||
allegation is an unresolved item pending the inspectors receipt and | |||
review of-the interview team report (454/85025-04(DRP)). | |||
13. Presentation of Licenses to Reactor Operators | |||
On June 28, 1985, Messrs. E. Greenman, Deputy Director, Reactor Projects | |||
Division; L. Reyes, Chief, Reactor Safety Operations Branch; R. Warnick, | |||
Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1; and J. Hinds, Senior Resident | |||
Inspector, Byron, presented licenses to reactor operators for Byron Unit | |||
1. | |||
14. Open Items | |||
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which | |||
vi D reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action | |||
c part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed | |||
dui the_ inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.a. | |||
15. Unresolved Items | |||
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in | |||
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or | |||
~ | |||
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are | |||
discussed in Paragraphs 3.b and 12.b. | |||
16. Exit interview (30703) | |||
The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 | |||
at the conclusion of the inspection on July 1, 1985. The inspectors | |||
summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The | |||
inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the | |||
inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the | |||
inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such | |||
documents / processes as proprietary. | |||
10 | |||
}} |
Revision as of 08:45, 23 July 2020
ML20129A730 | |
Person / Time | |
---|---|
Site: | Byron |
Issue date: | 07/09/1985 |
From: | Forney W NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION III) |
To: | |
Shared Package | |
ML20129A680 | List: |
References | |
50-454-85-25, NUDOCS 8507150374 | |
Download: ML20129A730 (10) | |
See also: IR 05000604/2007001
Text
.
.
U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
Report No.: 50-454/85025
Docket No.: 50-454 License No.: NPF-37
Licensee: Commonwealth ~ Edison Company
Post Office Box 767
Chicago, JL 60690
-Facility Name: Byron Station, Unit 1
Inspection at: Byron Station, Byron, IL
Inspection-Conducted: June 4.- July 1, 1985
Inspectors: J. M. Hinds, Jr.
K.'A. Connaughton
P. G. Brochman
Approved By: .' - - ---
Reactor Projects Section 1A Date
Inspection Summary
Inspection on June 4 - July 1, 1985 (Report No. 50-454/85025(DRP))
Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection by the resident
inspectors-of licensee action on previous ~ inspection findings; LERs;. location
of manual trip circuit in solid-state protection system; maintenance;
surveillance; operational safety; startup testing; Headquarters requests;
Region III requests; event followup; allegations; and other activities. The
~ inspection consisted of 137 inspector-hours onsite by 3 NRC inspectors
including 27 inspector-hours during off-shifts.
Results: Of the 11 areas inspected, no violations or deviations were
identified in 10 areas; one violation was identifed in the remaining area
(failure to perform Technical Specification Surveillances when reqired -
Paragraph 3.b). The violation' cites 2 instances of missed surveillances which
were required by Technical Specifications; however, examination of the strip
chart records indicated that the parameters were maintained within their
Technical-Specification limits at all times; therefore, the public health and
safety were not affected.
.
8507150374 850709
PDR ADOCK 05000454
G PDR
.
.
DETAILS
1. Persons Contacted
Commonwealth Edison Company
- T. Maiman, Manager of Projects
- R. Querio, Station Superintendent
- R. Pleniewicz, Assistant Superintendent Operations
- D. St. Clair, Technical Staff Supervisor
R. Chrazanowski, Security Administrator, Byron
- A. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor
H. Erickson, Master Mechanic
P. Johnson, Master Instrument Mechanic
- F. Hornbeak, Unit 2 Testing Supervisor
- R. Gruber, Quality Assurance
- A. Britton, Quality Assurance
H. Krist, Security Assistant
G. Buettner, Security Assistant
C. Kilbride, Technical Staff
M. Snow, Technical Staff
- J. Langan, Technical Staff Compliance
The inspectors also contacted and interviewed other licensee and
contractor personnel during the course of this inspection.
- Denotes those present at the exit interview on July 1, 1985.
2. Action On Previous Inspection Findings (92702)
a. (Closed) Violation (454/85009-03(DRP)): Failure to implement
administrative controls on overtime work for individuals who perform
safety related functions. The inspector reviewed the licensee's
training session on the control of overtime and interviewed
maintenance supervisors to verify their understanding of the
requirements for control of overtime.
b. (Closed) Violation (454/85016-03(DRP)): Failure to follow Technical
Specification Action Requirements. The inspector reviewed the
licensee's response to the 3 examples of violation and interviewed
licensed operators and licensed supervisory operators to verify
their understanding of the intent of Technical Specification Action
requirements which were exceeded.
3. Licensee Event Report (LER) Followup (90712 & 92700)
a. (Closed) LEP.s (454/85051-LL; 454/85052-LL; 454/85053-LL;
454/85054-LL; 454/85055-LL; 454/85056-LL; 454/85057-LL;
454/85058-LL; 454/85059-LL): An in-office review was conducted for
the following LERs to determine that the reporting requirements were
fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished and
corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in
accordance with Technical Specifications.
2
. _ .
.
.
'LER No.- Title
~454/85051 Reactor Trip From Turbine Trip During
Presynchronization Checks
454/85052 Reactor Trip From 345KV Fault
454/85053 Reactor Trip Due to Instrument Power
Inverter Failure
~
454/85054 Reactor Trip Due to Low Lube Oil
Reservoir.
454/85055 Inoperability of Containment Isolation
Valves 1 RF026 and 1RF027
454/85056 Unanalyzed Condition Affecting Aux
Building Environment
454/85057 Missed Fire Watches Due to Aux Bldg
Airborne Activity
454/85058 Missed Hourly Fire Watch
454/85059 Hourly Fire Watch Delayed Due to
Security Computer Failure
Licensee installation of a temperature monitoring system to
automatically isolate the steam generator blowdown and auxiliiary
steam systens, per LER 85056, will be tracked as an open item
(454/85025-01(DRP)).
The events described in LERs 454/85051,454/85052,454/85053,and
454/85054 were reviewed in Inspection Report (454/85021(DRP)).
No violations or deviations were identified.
b. (Closed) LER (454/85050-LL): This LER described an qvent from
February 24 to May 5,1985, while in Mode 1. Technical
Specification 4.2.5 required that Indicated Reactor Coolant System
Average Temperature (T ) and Indicated Pressurizer Pressure (P
L be verified within theiE* limits of Table 3.2-1 at least once per P if)
hours. This is accomplished by performance of Byron Operating
Surveillance 1B0S 0.1-1,2,3, Step 6. The licensee identified in the
LER that this surveillance had not been performed since initial
entry into Mode 1 on February 24. During discussions with licensee
staff the inspector identified 2 discrepancies in the LER. The
cause of the surveillance not being performed was that the
verification was deleted when Revision 1 to IBOS 0.1-1,2,3 was
issued on March 28. Since the original version of IBOS 0.1-1,2,3
performed this sur~veillance, Technical Specification ' ,2.5 was only
exceeded after March 27.
3
i
-
,
.
.
Failure to perform surveillances within the required time interval
is an example of a violation (454/85025-02a(DRP)).
Technical Specification 4.0.4 required that entry into Mode 1 should
not be made unless Technical Specification Surveillance 4.2.5 had
been performed within the last 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. T and P were not
a
verified within their limits prior to entry l8to ModPS on March 29
and April 3, 13, 16 and 21. These instances were not explicitly
identified in the LER.
Failure to perform a surveillance as required prior to entry in Mode
1 is an example of a violation (454/85025-02b(DRP)).
Since this event occured before the licensee presented their Conduct
of Operations Improvement Program (COIP), described in Inspection
Report (454/85021(DRP)), and the licensee took immediate corrective
action upon discovery of this problem; the inspectors have no
further concerns regarding this violation and it is considered
closed. The inspectors will follow up the COIP as part of the
permanant corrective action. The licensee agreed to revise the LER
to correct the 2 discrepancies and this will be followed as'an
unresolved item (454/85025-03(DRP)).
4. Inspection of the Location of the Manual Trip Circuit in Westinghouse
Designed Plants With a Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (25014)
a. Background
The effects of short-circuit failures of the output transistors in
the UV output circuit of the Westinghouse SSPS were highlighted in
recently issued Information Notice No. 85-18. A short-7ircuit
failure of the type described in the notice would prevent the
automatic tripping of the associated reactor trip breaker (RTB) on a
valid reactor trip demand.
During NRC review of this matter, another potential deficiency
involving the SSPS was discovered. Namely, the use of erroneous
controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS at an operating facility.
Except for the drawings being used by the I&C technicians, the
controlled schematic diagrams of the SSPS being used in this
facility erroneously depicted the manual trip circuit for the RTBs
as being upstream of two particular output transistors. If such
were the case, and if one of the output transistors was shorted as
described in Information Notice 83-18, then the manual trip action
associated with the UV portion of the trip circuit would also be
ineffective.
Temporary Instruction TI 2500/14 was therefore issued to require NRC
inspector verification that the SSPS normal trip circuits were
downstream of the undervoltage output transistors and tilus the
manual undervoltage trip functions were not vulnerable to shorting
of the output transistors.
b. Inspection
4
. _-___
.
..
The inspector reviewed electrical drawings 6E-1-4030EF29, " Schematic
Diagram, Reactor Protection, Part-2, Train A," Revision D, dated
January 2,1985, and 6E-1-4030EF73, " Schematic Diagram Reactor
Protection Part-2 Train B," Revision D, dated January 2,1985.
These drawings correctly specified that the manual undervoltage trip
circuits were downstream of output transistors Q3 and Q4 on the
undervoltage driver cards.
To further verify that the foregoing schematics accurately reflected
the as-installed SSPS equipment the inspector contacted licensee
technical staff personnel and was provided with: an identical
schematic (applicable to both trains) from the Byron Station SSPS
vendor manual; Westinghouse Electric Corporation Instrumentation and
Control Drawings 2379A59 Sheet 6, Revision D and 2374A56 Sheet 9,
Revision AC; Drawing 6E-1-4114F, " External Wiring Diagram, Solid
State (RX&ESF) Protection System Cabinet, Train A (Logic Section)
Part 3 (IPA 09J)", Revision J, dated March 5, 1984; Drawing
6E-1-4052AA, " Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Reactor and
Chemical Volume Control Section B2, Part 11 (1PM05J)," Revision D,
dated September 3, 1982; Drawing 6E-1-4054P, " Internal-External
Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered Safety Features Section A2, Part 6
(1PM06J)," Revision E, dated May 10, 1983; Drawing 6E-2-4054P,
" Internal-External Wiring Diagram MCB Engineered Safety Features
Section A2 Part 2 (1PM06J)," Revision V, dated January 3, 1985, and;
Drawing 6E-1-4208B, " Internal-External Wiring Diagram Reactor Trip
Switchgear Cabinet 1RD05E," Revision K dated June 21, 1984.
The above listed wiring diagrams and drawings traced wiring from the
Undervoltage Output Cards, Pins 29 and 30, through the manual reactor trip and manual safety injection control switches to the
termination points on the reactor trip switchgear cubical which were
connected to the undervoltage trip coil. Based upon review of the
foregoing " Approved for Use" design and construction drawings the
inspector concluded that the Byron Unit 1 SSPS was configured such
that shorting of output transistors Q3 and/or Q4 on the undervoltage
output card would not defeat the manual undervoltage reactor trip
function.
No violations or deviations were identified.
5. Monthly Surveillance Observation (61726)
The inspector observed technical specifications required surveillance
i testing on a Refueling Water Storage Tank Level Channel, the Reactor
Coolant Pump Bus Undervoltage Relays, and Component Cooling Pump 1CC01PA
and verified that testing was performed in accordance with adequate
procedures, that test instrumentation was calibrated, that limiting
conditions for operation were met, that removal and restoration of the
affected components were accomplished, that test results conformed with
technical specifications and procedure requirements and were reviewed by
personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any
deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and
resolved by appropriate management personnel.
5
,
. \
No violations or deviations were identified.
6. Monthly Maintenance Observation (62703)
Station maintenance activities of safety related systems and components
listed below were observed / reviewed to ascertain that they were conducted
in acccordance with approved procedures, regulatory guides and industry
codes or standards and in conformance with technical specifications.
The following items were considered during this review: the limiting
conditions for operation were met while components or systems were
removed from service; approvals were obtained prior to initiating the
work; activities were accomplished'using approved procedures and were
inspected as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were
performed prior to returning components or systems to service; quality
controi records were maintained; activities were accomplished by
qualified personnel; parts and materials used were properly certified;
radiolooical controls were implemented; and, fire prevention controls
were implemented. Work' requests were reviewed to determine status of
outstanding jobs and to assure that priority is assigned to safety
related equipment maintenance which may affect system performance.
The following maintenance activities were observed / reviewed:
Replacement of Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Transmitter 1FT-AF016
Following completion of maintenance on the flow transmitter, the
inspector verified that these systems had been returned to service
properly.
No violations or deviations were identified.
7. Operational Safety Verification and Engineered Safety Features System
Walkdown (71707 & 71710)
The inspectors observed control room operation, reviewed applicable logs
and conducted discussions with control room operators during the month of
June 1985. During these discussions and observations, the inspectors
ascertained that the operators were alert, cognizant of plant conditions,
atttentive to changes in those conditions, and took prompt action when
appropriate. The inspectors verified the operability of selected
emergency systems, reviewed tagout records and verified proper return to
service of affected components. Tours of the auxiliary, turbine and
rad-waste buildings were conducted to observe plant equipment conditions,
including potential fire hazards, fluid leaks and excessive vibration and
to verify that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in
need of maintenance.
The inspectors observed plant housekeeping / cleanliness conditions and
verifed implementation of radiation protection controls. During the
mor.th of June 1985, the inspectors walked down the accessible portions of
the Diesel Generator and Safety Injection Systems to verify operability.
6
I
.
.
These reviews and observations were conducted to verify that facility
operations were in accordance with the requirements established under
technical specifications, 10 CFR and administrative procedures.
No violations or deviations were identified.
8. Startup Test Witnessing and Observation (72302)
The inspectors witnessed performance of portions of the following startup
test procedures in order to verify that testing was conducted in
accordance with the operating license and procedural requirements, test
data was properly recorded and performance of licensee personnel
conducting the tests demonstrated an understanding of assigned duties and
responsibilities.
2.47.31 -Power Coeficient Determination
2.47.32 Thermal Power Measurement
2.52.37 Load Swing Test
2.64.34 Large Load Reduction
No violations or deviations were identified.
9. Response to Headquarters Requests (92704)
The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to Information Notice
84-06 in accordance.with Temporary Instruction 2515/67, Item 03.02b and
forwarded this information to the Regional Office. Submission of this
information and that of Item 03.02a,_ covered in Inspection Report
454/85021(DRP), completes all action required by this instruction.
10. Response to Region III Requests (92705)
The inspectors reviewed licensee files to determine the amount of
experience for senior station personnel in the following areas:
professional, utility, and nuclear plants and forwarded this-information
to the Regional Office.
11. Onsite Followup of Events at Operating Reactors (93702)
a. General
The inspector performed onsite followup activities for an event
which occurred during June 1985. This followup included reviews of
operating logs, procedures, Deviation Reports, Licensee Event
Reports (where available) and interviews with licensee personnel.
For the event, the inspector developed a chronology, reviewed the
functioning of safety systems required by plant conditions, reviewed
licensee actions to verify consistency with procedures, license
conditions and the nature of the event. Additionally the inspector
verified that licensee investigation had identified root causes of
equipment malft1ctions and/or personnel error and had taken
appropriate corrective actions prior to plant restart. Details of
the event and licensee corrective actions developed through
inspector followup are provided in Paragraph b below.
7
i
.
b. Reactor Trip on Low-Low Steam Generator Level on June 24, 1985
While in Mode 1 with reactor power at 98% the reactor tripped on
steam generator 1A low-low level when the 1C main feedwater pump
(MFP) (steam driven) was inadvertently tripped. Licensee personnel
manuallly ran back the turbine and started the 1A MFP (motor driven)
but were unable to maintain steam generator level.
Licensee's investigation determined that the 1C MFP trip was caused
by the microphone cord of an equipment operator's radio. This cord
became entangled with the MFP's overspeed test lever, causing the
test device to actuate.
Corrective action taken by the licensee included briefing operators
to exercise caution when working near the MFPs and the installation
of protective covers around the test levers. The licensee is also
evaluating other equipment for similar problems. Final review and
closure of this event will be accomplished in a subsequent
inspection after the LER is issued.
No violations or deviations were identified.
12. Allegations Provided by the Licensee Regarding Drug Use at Byron
a. Allegation 1: On June 17, 1985, the licensee' notified the inspector
of an allegation related to drug use. This allegation was verbally
received on June 16, 1985, by a corporate manager from a concerned
citizen at a social function. The citizen identified an employee at
the Byron Statin whom the alleger had reason to believe may be using
drugs off-site in a recreational manner. The corporate manager
relayed this information to the Byron Site Superintendent who
subsequently notified the inspector.
. Findings: In keeping with the licensee's drug awareness program, on
June 17, 1985, the individual was relieved of all duties at Byron
Station, his site security clearance was revoked and he was notified
of a review board to be convened on June 18, 1985. On June 18,
1985, a board consisting of Byron Station managers and union
representatives reviewed the allegation.with the individual. As a
result of the Board's evaluation and recommendations, the individual
was escorted to the Chicago General Office medical facility where
the individual was interviewed by a senior coordinator of the
Commonwealth Edison Employee Assistance Program (EAP). The
individual also submitted to an observed specimen urinalysis
following the interview. The test results of the urinalysis were
negative. Based on the negative test results, recommendations of
the EAP coordinator, and endorsement by the ccmpany physician, the
individual was restored to security status and returned to full duty
on June 20, 1985.
The licensee's management and supervisory personnel and the
inspectors have monitored the individual's performance and no
abnormal behavior during current work day observations have been
observed. This allegation is considered closed.
8
l
,
&
.
b. Allegation 2: On June 13, 1985, the licensee notified the
inspectors of an allegation related to alcohol and drug use at Byron
Station in parking lots and areas of the plant. This allegation was
received in the form of a telephone call on June 12, 1985, at 2100
to the Byron Site Security Administrator at his home. The caller
identified himself as a long time contractor employee and provided
sufficient detailed information to the Security Administrator to
establish reasonable creditability. The caller also identified 10
individuals, including some badge numbers-and three contractor
shops, whom he had reason to believe were using drugs and/or alcohol
in the south parking lot during the lunch period and implied certain
other site areas and times. The caller further stated that he may,
in the future,; elect to become further involved by coming forth with
additional specific information and revealing his identity pending
his first hand observations of the licensee's corrective measures to
resolve this issue. The licensee has had no further contact from
this individual as of the closing date of this report.
Findings: Based on the information received from the alleger, the
licensee contacted the 10 individuals identified and arranged for
them to report to the station security gate house at 1000 on June
20, 1985. At the gate house the individuals, together with union
representatives, were met by security officers and escorted to an
isolation area inside the gate house. Inside the gate house four
teams consisting of two CECO security managers each, began
individual interviews of the identified individuals. The interview
teams used a battery of questions designed to gain information from
the individuals related to the Byron Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy
awareness, personal information, including type of work and
location, and to specifically address the use or sale of drugs or
alcohol on and off CECO property including observations or rumors of
the use or sale of drugs or alcohol at Byron.
Simultaneously with the interviews the licensee conducted meetings
with Project Construction Department (PCD), contractor supervisors,
and station supervisors. The purpose of these meetings was to
reitcrate the CECO position-as related to the Ceco Drug and Alcohol
Abuse Policy and to disseminate information, of a general nature,
concerning the allegations and the Byron Station corrective measures
to resolve these issues.
In addition, while the interviews were in progress, a search of the
plant was made. Three teams, each consisting of a handler and a
narcotics detection trained dog, made searches of a number of work
site areas'inside the plant buildings and other contractor
controlled work site buildings on the grounds inside the security
fence. The search areas included tool, equipment and material
storage boxes, field desks and lockers, and lunch areas. During the
search procedure, each team demonstrated the effectiveness of the
animal by hiding a drug sample and proving the dog could find it in '
both previously unsearched and searched areas.
9
. I
,,
.-
The_ inspectors participated in the dog team searches, the policy
meetings and the interviews. During the dog team searches no drugs
were detected in any of the areas searched.
The CECO interview teams are preparing a report on the interviews
and will provide a copy of the report to the inspectors. This
allegation is an unresolved item pending the inspectors receipt and
review of-the interview team report (454/85025-04(DRP)).
13. Presentation of Licenses to Reactor Operators
On June 28, 1985, Messrs. E. Greenman, Deputy Director, Reactor Projects
Division; L. Reyes, Chief, Reactor Safety Operations Branch; R. Warnick,
Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 1; and J. Hinds, Senior Resident
Inspector, Byron, presented licenses to reactor operators for Byron Unit
1.
14. Open Items
Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which
vi D reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action
c part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed
dui the_ inspection is discussed in Paragraph 3.a.
15. Unresolved Items
Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in
order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, violations or
~
deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are
discussed in Paragraphs 3.b and 12.b.
16. Exit interview (30703)
The inspectors met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1
at the conclusion of the inspection on July 1, 1985. The inspectors
summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings. The
inspectors also discussed the likely informational content of the
inspection report with regard to documents or processes reviewed by the
inspectors during the inspection. The licensee did not identify any such
documents / processes as proprietary.
10