Emergency Notification System

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[RSS - Reactor Events]

01-10-2021

Region 1 1 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 2 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 1 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 0 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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by company

Allied-General Nuclear Services 0 [Allied-General Nuclear Services events] [RSS]
AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 0 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 0 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 0 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 0 [Constellation events] [RSS]
Consumers Energy 0 [Consumers Energy events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 0 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 0 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 1 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
Duquesne Light Company 0 [Duquesne Light Company events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 0 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 2 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Eversource Energy 0 [Eversource Energy events] [RSS]
Exelon 1 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 0 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Houston Lighting and Power Company 0 [Houston Lighting and Power Company events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Long Island Lighting Company 0 [Long Island Lighting Company events] [RSS]
Luminant 0 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 1 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Northeast Nuclear Energy 0 [Northeast Nuclear Energy events] [RSS]
Omaha Public Power District 0 [Omaha Public Power District events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 1 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 1 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 0 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 1 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 0 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
WEC Energy Group 0 [WEC Energy Group events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 0 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 0 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
ZionSolutions 0 [ZionSolutions events] [RSS]
Électricité de France 0 [Électricité de France events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 0 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 0 Department of Defense [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute events] [RSS]
Barnwell 0 Allied-General Nuclear Services [Barnwell events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 0 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Big Rock Point 0 Consumers Energy [Big Rock Point events] [RSS]
Braidwood 1 Exelon [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 0 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Exelon [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 0 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 0 Exelon [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 0 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Exelon [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 0 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 0 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Consolidated Interim Storage Facility 0 Consolidated Interim Storage Facility [Consolidated Interim Storage Facility events] [RSS]
Cook 0 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 1 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Exelon [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Farley 0 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 0 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 0 Exelon [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Omaha Public Power District [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
General Atomics 0 [General Atomics events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Exelon [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 1 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 0 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 0 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Holtec 0 [Holtec events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Exelon [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 0 Bechtel [Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 0 Exelon [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Lee 0 Duke Energy [Lee events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Exelon [Limerick events] [RSS]
Lynchburg Research Center 0 [Lynchburg Research Center events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 0 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
National Bureau of Standards Reactor 0 [National Bureau of Standards Reactor events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 0 Exelon [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 0 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oregon State University 0 [Oregon State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 0 Exelon [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 0 [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 0 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Parr 0 [Parr events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 0 Exelon [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania State University 0 Pennsylvania State University [Pennsylvania State University events] [RSS]
Perry 0 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 1 Entergy [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Plum Brook 0 [Plum Brook events] [RSS]
Point Beach 0 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 0 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 0 Exelon [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
Reed College 0 Reed Research Reactor [Reed College events] [RSS]
River Bend 0 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 1 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
SHINE Medical Technologies 0 [SHINE Medical Technologies events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 1 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shippingport 0 [Shippingport events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
South Texas 1 STP Nuclear Operating Company [South Texas events] [RSS]
Summer 0 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Surry 0 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 0 Exelon [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 PGE [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 0 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
Tuxedo 0 Union Carbide Company [Tuxedo events] [RSS]
University of Buffalo 0 [University of Buffalo events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Lowell 0 [University of Lowell events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of New Mexico 0 [University of New Mexico events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vanowen 0 Vanowen [Vanowen events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Vogtle 1 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Waterford 0 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 0 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Yankee Rowe 0 [Yankee Rowe events] [RSS]
Zion 0 ZionSolutions [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

B&W-L-LP 0 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CE 1 [CE events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 1 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 0 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 0 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 1 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark I 0 [TRIGA Mark I events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark II 0 [TRIGA Mark II events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 1 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 4 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5507921 January 2021 17:10:00RobinsonNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopService water
Emergency Diesel Generator
Residual Heat Removal
This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead. All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5507820 January 2021 21:48:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2CESteam Generator
Feedwater
Steam Bypass Control System
Main Condenser
Automatic ScramOn 1/20/2021 at 1822 EST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Motor Control Center 2B2. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Auxiliary feed-water automatically actuated on the 2A Steam Generator post trip. Current decay heat removal is the 2B main feedwater pump to both steam generators and the Steam Bypass Control System to the main condenser.

Unit 1 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5507118 January 2021 17:31:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3On January 18, 2021 at 1600 hours (EDT), Holtec Decommissioning International (HDI) made an off-site notification to the Environmental Protection Agency's Enforcement and Compliance Assurance Division in accordance with Section B of the station's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. 0003557. The event was associated with an underground sewage water system holding tank. The specific details of the occurrence are as follows:

On January 13, 2021 at 1000 hours (EDT) site personnel identified what appeared to be water bubbling up from an unidentified cover within the security protected area of the site. The water emanating from the cap had no visible color or solid material and no odor. The water estimated at 25 gallons per hour or less was flowing to a site storm drain connected to permitted outfall number 007. Initial indication was that the water was potable water as part of the station's fire protection system. Further investigation determined that a back-up in an underground sewage holding tank inlet was the source of the leakage. By 1400 hours (EDT) when bathrooms including toilets on site were shutdown and removed from service, efforts were underway to pump the tank and remove the blockage, and the bubbling from the cover had stopped.

The licensee has notified the Massachusetts Environmental Protection Agency, the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5506612 January 2021 20:26:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA corporate supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plants has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspectors will be notified.
ENS 550587 January 2021 18:51:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 550567 January 2021 03:18:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Reactor Coolant SystemAn Unusual Event was declared at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station at 0124 (CST) on 01/07/2021 due to Unidentified Drywell Leakage exceeding 10 GPM for 15 minutes. Unidentified leakage has reduced to less than 0.44 GPM as of 0213 CST on 01/07/2021.

The cause of the increase leakage rate is under investigation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 01/07/21 AT 0619 EST FROM LEROY PURDY TO BRIAN LIN * * *

At 0356 CST, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station terminated the Unusual Event following plant parameters returning to normal. The current leakage rate is 0.3 gallons per minute and stable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R4DO (Kozal), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 550553 January 2021 08:33:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1414 EST on 12/31/2020, a planned maintenance outage commenced on the Vogtle 1and 2 Seismic Monitoring System. The work was to address abnormal indications on the uninterruptable power supply, and was scheduled for an eight (8) hour duration. During the restoration activities, the system did not respond properly and has remained Non-Functional. Compensatory measures for seismic event classification were implemented in accordance with Vogtle procedures prior to removing the system from service. Based upon the troubleshooting conducted, the system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours from the start of the planned outage.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Seismic Monitoring System is the method for evaluating that an Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event in accordance with Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Compensatory measures implemented include having a phone number to call to verify if an earthquake has occurred.
ENS 5505330 December 2020 20:30:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn December 30, 2020 at 1550 CST, South Texas Project (STP) received a report that two Emergency Notification System sirens inadvertently actuated. The sirens were heard by residents in the area who contacted the Matagorda County Sheriff's office, which notified the Emergency Response Division at STP of the siren actuation at 1557 CST.

Both sirens were initially restored, however siren #24 subsequently actuated again at 1735 CST. Siren #24 has been disconnected. Siren #27 remains available. Thirty-one of thirty-two sirens are available. This notification is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as an event where other government agencies were notified. The sirens are no longer alarming. A social media release is planned. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the event.

The licensee believes the sirens actuated due to significant rain in the area but will be investigating the cause of the inadvertent actuation.
ENS 5504924 December 2020 16:14:00CallawayNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopFeedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
At 1235 CST on December 24, 2020, Callaway Plant was in Mode 1 at approximately 90 percent power when a turbine trip/reactor trip, from a vital main generator trip signal, occurred. All safety systems responded as expected with exception of an indication issue with the 'B' Feedwater Isolation Valve, which was confirmed closed, and one intermediate range nuclear instrumentation channel which failed off-scale low following the trip. A valid Feedwater Isolation Signal and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation Signal were also received as a result of the plant trip. The plant is being maintained stable in Mode 3.

All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal, and decay heat is being removed via the Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5504623 December 2020 12:28:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5High Pressure Core SprayAt 0653 CST on 12/23/20, it was discovered the single train of high pressure core spray was inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). All other emergency core cooling systems were operable during this time.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The high pressure core spray is inoperable because the water lake pump tripped. This inoperability puts the licensee in a 14-day limiting condition for operability.
ENS 5504017 December 2020 22:03:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopReactor Coolant SystemOn December 17, 2020 at 1539 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 preparing for entry into Mode 4, the Reactor Coolant System was pressurized greater than 1000 psig for approximately 15 minutes with all three Cold Leg Injection Accumulator Discharge Valves closed. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Both Low Head and High Head Safety Injection Systems were operable at this time. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503816 December 2020 12:19:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSteam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Automatic ScramOn December 16, 2020 at 0851 EST, with Harris Nuclear Plant Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 80 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to lockout of the main generator. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The initial assessment of this event indicates that there was a ground fault on the 'B' train of the non-safety electrical distribution system that caused the main generator lockout. Steam generator levels are being maintained by normal feedwater through the feedwater regulator bypass valves. Decay heat is being removed by using the condenser steam dump flow path.

Due to the unplanned Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

All rods inserted into the core during the trip. The electrical grid is stable and all safe shutdown equipment is available for service. No reliefs lifted during the transient.
ENS 5503716 December 2020 12:09:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEA plant employee, after being selected for a random fitness-for-duty test, admitted to use of a controlled substance. The employee's unescorted access to the facility has been placed on hold pending an investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503614 December 2020 20:21:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1240 EST on 12/14/20, it was determined that all Unit 4 Charging Pumps and Boration Flowpaths were simultaneously inoperable.

This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503514 December 2020 15:00:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program.

As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503211 December 2020 17:38:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEOn October 13, 2020, at approximately 02:25 (MST), an automatic start of the Unit 1 'A' Train EDG and SP systems occurred following the restoration of power to the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Class Bus. The station was conducting a surveillance test during a Unit 1 refueling outage to verify the proper responses of the EDG and the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems to simulated design basis events. During the test, technicians installed a jumper across incorrect relay points that caused the running Unit 1 'A' Train EDG to trip, resulting in a loss of power to the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Class Bus.

Following restoration of normal offsite power to the 'A' Train 4160 Volt Class Bus, the Loss of Power Actuation signal was reset, however, EDG start relay logic was not reset at the EDG Local Panel. This resulted in the Unit 1 'A' Train EDG and SP system actuations with the EDG running unloaded. The system actuations did not occur as a result of valid plant conditions or parameters and are therefore invalid. The Unit 1 'A' Train EDG and SP system actuations were complete and the systems started and functioned successfully. The event was attributed to a human performance error and entered into the corrective action program. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 5503011 December 2020 15:15:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Main Turbine
Control Rod
Automatic ScramOn December 11, 2020 at 1204 CST, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) experienced an Automatic Reactor Scram from 100 percent Reactor Power after a Main Turbine and Generator Trip.

All Control Rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. Reactor pressure is being maintained with Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Reactor water level is being maintained in normal band with the condensate system. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.

The NRC Branch Chief has been notified.
ENS 5502810 December 2020 20:43:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CESteam Generator
Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramOn December 10, 2020 at 1608 CST, Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 2 (ANO-2) experienced an automatic reactor scram from 100 percent power due to Low Steam Generator Water Level in 2E-24A Steam Generator. Emergency Feedwater actuated automatically due to low water level in the A Steam Generator. Due to inadequate control of the B Main Feedwater Control System, water level in the B Steam generator rose to a level requiring manual trip of the B Main Feedwater pump. Emergency Feedwater responded as designed to feed both steam generators automatically.

All other systems responded as designed. All electrical power is being supplied from offsite power and maintaining unit electrical loads as designed. Unit 2 is currently stable in Mode 3 (Hot Standby) maintaining pressure and temperature via Emergency Feedwater and secondary system steaming. There are no indications of a radiological release on either unit as a result of this event. This report satisfies the reporting criteria of both 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(6) for the Reactor Protection System actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System. The Arkansas Nuclear One NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN LINDSEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1605 EST ON 12/11/2020 * * *

The purpose of this (report) is to provide an update to NRC Event Number 55028. The cause of the inadequate control of the B Main Feedwater Control System to control B Steam Generator Level was verified to be associated with the failure that led to the A Steam Generator low level condition. After taking action to trip the B Main Feedwater Pump, Emergency Feedwater was manually actuated for the B Steam Generator and the Emergency Feedwater System was verified to maintain proper automatic control of both Steam Generator levels. At the time of the initial event notification, plant temperature and pressure control had been transferred from Emergency Feedwater to Auxiliary Feedwater along with secondary system steaming. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Kellar).
ENS 5502610 December 2020 10:58:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Emergency Diesel Generator
This 60-day telephone notification is being submitted in accordance with paragraphs 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to report an invalid actuation of the 'B' train High Head Safety Injection Pump (3SIH*P1B), the 'B' train Low Pressure Safety Injection Pump (3RHS*P1B) and four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves at Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3.

At 1908 EST on November 6, 2020, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, a partial invalid actuation of 'B' train Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) components occurred. The 'B' train SIH pump and the 'B' train RHS pump had started, and ran successfully on recirculation. Four Steam Generator Blowdown Containment isolation valves also closed. Due to this condition the 'B' Emergency Diesel Generator and the 'B' Emergency Generator Load Sequencer (EGLS) were declared inoperable and the required Technical Specification action statements were entered. Troubleshooting determined that this actuation was caused by a failure of one of the circuit boards in the 'B' train EGLS that caused a partial 'B' train 'SIS only' signal. Other 'B' Train components received the 'SIS only' signal but did not start because they were already running or were a backup to an already running component. Troubleshooting discovered a failed NAND gate on the 'B' Train EGLS XA93 circuit card. The card was replaced, retested, and the Technical Specification action statements were exited. The pumps and valves responded in accordance with plant design. No other equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into the station's corrective action program. The actuation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for an ECCS actuation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 550203 December 2020 17:10:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEEmergency Diesel GeneratorAt 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening.

The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.
ENS 550171 December 2020 17:00:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5501230 November 2020 14:16:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5500217 November 2020 03:40:00ClintonNRC Region 3GE-6At 1918 CST on 11/16/2020, it was discovered both required trains of the Main Control Room Ventilation and Air Conditioning systems were simultaneously inoperable. Due to these inoperabilities, the systems were in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

Subsequent post-maintenance testing demonstrated that the Division 1 Main Control Room Ventilation system was available at the time of the event and was restored to operable status at 2036 CST on 11/16/2020. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5500016 November 2020 12:13:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4High Pressure Coolant InjectionDuring normal plant start up on Limerick Unit 1, reactor pressure was raised above 200 psig prior to unisolating the Unit 1 high pressure coolant injection system (HPCI) which remained inoperable. Per TS 3.5.1, HPCI is required to be operable in Mode 2 above 200 psig. HPCI has since been restored to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499715 November 2020 06:11:00Watts BarNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopEmergency Diesel GeneratorAt 0144 EST on November 15, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power and Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) system occurred while transferring the 2A-A 6.9 kV Shutdown Board (SDBD) from the maintenance feed to its normal power supply. The reason for the 2A-A 6.9 kV SDBD failing to transfer to the normal power supply is under investigation. The EDGs automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499613 November 2020 05:32:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Primary containment
Main Condenser
Automatic ScramAt 0245 EST on November 13, 2020, the Limerick Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed on a valid Reactor High Pressure signal (1096psig). The Reactor High Pressure signal was caused by the closure of the 1B Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV), causing reactor pressure to rise, exceeding the Reactor Protection System (RPS) setpoint of 1096psig.

The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass Valves to the Main Condenser and normal level control using the Feedwater System. The closure of the 1B Inboard MSIV appears to have been caused by a loss of Primary Containment Instrument Gas (PCIG) pneumatic supply to the valve.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying Berks, Chester, and Montgomery Counties, as well as the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5499512 November 2020 21:14:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1732 EST on November 12, 2020, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a turbine trip. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generators through the steam dumps into the condenser. Unit 1 is not affected.

An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as well as in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499411 November 2020 16:11:00Watts BarNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Coolant System
At 1311 EST on November 11, 2020, it was determined, after evaluation of the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Unit 2 Steam Generator (SG) tube eddy current test data collected during the on-going refueling outage, that the WBN Unit 2 Reactor Coolant System pressure boundary did not meet the performance criteria for SG tube structural integrity. Specifically, SG number 3 failed the condition monitoring assessment for conditional burst probability. WBN has completed tube plugging and additional corrective actions are in progress. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5499110 November 2020 22:06:00River BendNRC Region 4GE-6On November 10, 2020, at 1827 CST, River Bend Station (RBS) received a report of a single inadvertent and malfunctioning siren which is part of the Emergency Notification System. The siren was heard by residences in the area and they contacted local agencies, who in turn contacted RBS.

This siren activation was not related to any condition or event and no emergency has occurred at RBS. RBS has notified the appropriate authorities and the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness of the inadvertent siren activation. RBS has sent a team to locally disable the siren to prevent any further inadvertent sounding and it is now disabled. A press release from Entergy is not planned at this time. The NRC resident has been notified of the event.

The licensee also notified the East and West Feliciana Parish Authorities. If an emergency notification were required, there is overlap of working sirens to cover the area of the siren that is out of service.
ENS 549888 November 2020 10:10:00MillstoneNRC Region 1CE
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop
Millstone Units 2 & 3 declared an Unusual Event at 0921 EST after an earthquake was felt onsite. The earthquake monitoring instrumentation did not actuate, and there were no station system actuations. No damage has been detected at this time.

Millstone has initiated their Abnormal Operating Procedure for an earthquake and performing station walkdowns. The State of Massachusetts has been notified. The Waterford Police and U.S. Coast Guard have contacted the station. The NRC resident has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/09/2020 AT 0715 EST FROM JASON HARRIS TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

At 1510 EST on November 8, 2020, Millstone Units 2 & 3 exited the Unusual Event due to the earthquake following plant walkdowns that revealed no damage to plant structures, systems, or components. Station and System walkdowns identified no issues due to the earthquake. Millstone notified the State and local authorities, and the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco), IRD (Grant), NRR (Nieh), R1RA (Lew), NRR EO (Miller), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 549866 November 2020 05:00:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Main Turbine
Control Rod
Automatic ScramOn November 6, 2020, at 0239 CST, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) experienced an Automatic Reactor Scram from 84 percent Reactor Power after a Main Turbine and Generator Trip.

All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. Reactor pressure is being maintained with Main Turbine Bypass Valves. Reactor water level is being maintained in normal band with the condensate system. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.

The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 549835 November 2020 06:32:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4High Pressure Coolant InjectionAt 2150 CST on 11/04/2020, it was discovered that Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was INOPERABLE; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

During performance of 1-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI Main and Booster Pump Set Developed Head and Flow Rate Test at Rated Reactor Pressure, Unit 1 HPCI was manually tripped by the control room operator due to local report of excessive shaking of the cooling water supply from the booster pump line. There was no impact to the safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. CR 1650042 documents this condition in the Corrective Action Program. The Unit is in a 14-day LCO 3.5.1(c). The RCIC System is operable.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM MARK ACKER TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1607 EST ON 12/29/2020 * * *

ENS Event number 54983, made on 11/05/2020 is being retracted. NRC notification 54983 was made to ensure that the Eight-Hour Non-Emergency reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 were met when Unit 1 HPCI was manually tripped by the control room operator due to a local report for excessive shaking of the cooling water supply from the booster pump line. A subsequent engineering evaluation concluded on 11/06/2020 there was reasonable assurance of operability with no additional intrusive maintenance performed and that the condition was bounded by a previous evaluation documented in (Condition Report) CR 1347736. As such, the circumstances discussed in the report did not result in any condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures of the system that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). TVA's evaluation of this event is documented in the corrective action program. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Miller).
ENS 549793 November 2020 08:00:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1CEAt 0011 EST on 11/03/20, it was discovered that BOTH trains of salt water were simultaneously INOPERABLE. While in a planned (limiting condition for operation) LCO window with the 21 salt water train INOPERABLE for post-maintenance testing, debris intrusion in the 22 salt water header rendered the redundant salt water train INOPERABLE.

Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). One train of salt water was restored to operable at time 0026 EST. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This event did not affect Unit 1.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/20/2020 AT 1218 EST FROM BRIAN FOVEAUX TO OSSY FONT * * *

Following the eight hour 10 CFR 50.72 notification made on 11/03/2020 (EN 54979), further engineering analysis determined that 22 Saltwater subsystem flow remained at levels sufficient to fulfill its safety function based on the conditions existing at the time of the event. Despite flow in 22 Saltwater subsystem falling below the short term (four hour) minimum value for approximately 15 minutes, engineering analysis was able to determine the increased heat removal capacity associated with the lower bay temperatures was sufficient to offset the reduced heat removal capacity associated with the lower 22 Saltwater subsystem flow. This demonstrated that actual heat transfer to the saltwater subsystem was sufficient to ensure all safety functions were fulfilled during the event. Therefore, this event notification is being retracted as it is not reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), (B) and (D). The NRC Resident has been informed.

Notified R1DO (Greives)
ENS 549782 November 2020 08:10:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CESteam Generator
Feedwater
Control Rod
Automatic ScramOn November 2, 2020, at 0419 CST, Waterford 3 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to a Control Element Drive Mechanism Control System timer failure while attempting to synchronize a second motor generator set. All control rods fully inserted.

The plant is currently in Mode 3 and stable with normal feedwater feeding and maintaining both Steam Generators. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

The cause of the failure is still under investigation.
ENS 549771 November 2020 11:04:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0556 EST on 11/01/2020, Sequoyah received unexpected alarms for seismological recording initiated and (Units) 1/2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra exceeded. No seismic event was felt on site, the National Earthquake Information Center was contacted to confirm there was no seismic activity, and this was also confirmed on the U.S. Geological Survey website. The alarms were determined to be invalid, and they occurred due to a failure in the seismic monitoring system. This failure results in loss of ability to assess the Emergency Action Level for Initiating Condition HU2 'Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels' per procedure EPIP-1.

If an actual seismic event occurred, HU2 could not be assessed. However, compensatory measures have been implemented and include assessing OBE criteria based on alternative criteria contained in procedure AOP-N.05 'Earthquake' which provides conservative guidance when seismic instruments are unavailable.

This is an eight hour, non-emergency notification for an event resulting in a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549761 November 2020 09:34:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn November 1, 2020, at 0534 CST the reactor was manually scrammed due to an un-isolable leak on the Turbine High Pressure Fluid System. Initial power level when the leak was identified was 100 percent. Power was lowered commencing at 0525 in accordance with shutdown procedures. The Reactor Operator scrammed the reactor at 0534 from approximately 75 percent power. Following the scram, Reactor vessel water level lowered to approximately -20 inches on the Wide Range Instruments, and was subsequently recovered to normal post scram range (approximately 36 inches) using the Reactor Feedwater system. Group 2 Isolation occurred due to Reactor vessel level reaching the isolation setpoint (3 inches). The plant is stable in MODE 3 and proceeding to cold shutdown. The Main Condenser remained available throughout the evolution and condenser vacuum is currently being maintained by the Mechanical Vacuum Pumps. Pressure is being controlled using the steam line drains to the main condenser.

All control rods fully inserted and there were no complications. All systems responded as designed. The Turbine High Pressure Fluid System has been secured. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) due to RPS Actuation-Critical and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) Valid Specified System Actuation.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5497129 October 2020 15:12:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4Reactor Coolant System
Reactor Pressure Vessel
At 1030 EDT on Thursday, October 29, 2020, during the performance of Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station leakage testing of the reactor pressure vessel and associated piping, a through-wall leak (non-isolable) was identified on an instrument line connected to the N16A nozzle.

The reactor will be maintained shutdown until pipe repairs and testing are complete.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed.
ENS 5496827 October 2020 21:43:00Wolf CreekNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopEmergency Response Data SystemAt 1608 CDT on 10/27/2020, Wolf Creek Unit 1, operating at 100 percent rated thermal power in Mode-1, experienced a loss of the on-site wired corporate network. During actions to restore, it was discovered the ability to access the dose assessment software was compromised due to a security program. Access to the program was established after some time using Wi-Fi connectivity, but was not able to be accessed without network access. Actions are being taken to rectify.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee believes this was not a cyber-event and that the Emergency Response Data System was available, but couldn't verify. Should the Wi-Fi network access be lost, there's no capability to perform a dose assessment. Standalone laptops are being provided but have not been placed onsite yet. That should restore the ability to have dose assessment capability at all times.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/27/2020 AT 2220 FROM JOHN WEBER TO OSSY FONT * * *

The licensee notified the NRC that the network has been restored to the Technical Support Center building and the emergency plan dose assessment group was capable of performing dose assessment. The licensee also noted that the group is able to perform dose assessment without the network, if needed. The network is still unavailable in the control room. The licensee confirmed that ERDS is available. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Pick).
ENS 5496321 October 2020 14:10:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000In accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) as described in NEI 08-01, Industry Guideline for the ITAAC Closure Process Under 10 CFR Part 52, Vogtle Units 3 and 4 Construction is making this notification to the NRC for determining that Inspections, Tests, Analyses and Acceptance Criteria (ITAAC) 2.3.05.13a.ii (Index No. 344) for Unit 4 requires additional actions to restore the completed status. The ITAAC Closure Notifications for Unit 4 ITAAC 344 was submitted on July 22, 2020 (ML20204B029).

On October 19, 2020, it was determined that maintenance activities for the Unit 4 Polar Crane auxiliary hoist holding brake used a different approach for Post Work Verification (PWV) than the original test described in the ICN (ITAAC Closure Notification) for ITAAC 344. The alternate PWV used a test method that is standard industry practice and in accordance with ASME B30.2 to demonstrate that the Acceptance Criteria was met. An ITAAC Post Closure Notification will be submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 52.99(c)(2) and NEI 08-01.

The 10 CFR 52.99(c)(4) All lTAAC Complete Notification has not been submitted for VEGP (Vogtle Electric Generating Plant) 4. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5495419 October 2020 07:20:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4CE
B&W-L-LP
On October 18, 2020 at 2313 CDT, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) discovered that 2VRA-1B (2VSF-9 outside air damper reserve bottle) was below 600 psig. This condition caused the control room envelope to be inoperable in accordance with OP-2104.007 Attachment L. ANO Unit 1 entered TS 3.7.9 Condition B for inoperable control room boundary. ANO Unit 2 entered TS 3.7.6.1 Action D for inoperable control room boundary. A procedurally controlled temporary modification was implemented to install a blank flange on the 2VSF-9 outside air damper. Both Units declared the control room boundary operable at 2358 CDT. The associated control room emergency recirculation fan remains inoperable with the blank flange installed. This is a 7-day shutdown-LCO for both units.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM AARON TOSCH TO HOWIE CROUCH ON 10/24/2020 AT 1657 EDT * * *..

Previously, Entergy notified the NRC that ANO control room envelope was inoperable due to 2VRA-1B (2VSF-9 outside air damper reserve bottle) was below required pressure of 600 psig. After additional engineering evaluation, it was determined the control room boundary remained intact for this condition. As documented in version 2 operability determination for condition report ANO-C-2020-2818, the control room ventilation boundary remained intact for the condition identified and was able to fulfill its function for the required 30-day mission time. In accordance with NUREG-1022, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,' a report may be retracted based on a revised operability determination. The CRE remained operable; therefore, this report may be retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

Notified R4DO (Pick).
ENS 5494412 October 2020 03:46:00CookNRC Region 3Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
At 0026 (EDT) on October 12, 2020, D.C. Cook Unit 2 tripped automatically on low-low level of #24 steam generator which occurred after a lowering of main condenser vacuum.

The reason for the lowering main condenser vacuum and the reason for the low steam generator #24 level is under investigation. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report. Notification is also being made as an eight (8) hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW). The D.C. Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.

Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started as required and are operating properly. Decay heat is being removed via steam generator power operated relief valves (PORVs) due to condenser steam dump unavailability from low main condenser vacuum. All four Reactor Coolant Pumps remain running. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the reactor trip. D.C. Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.
ENS 5494311 October 2020 10:25:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At 0315 (EDT) on October 11, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. At the current leakage (approximately 3.2 gpm), the dose analysis indicates dose to TSC inhabitants would exceed the 30 days REM TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) limit should leakage continue for the entire duration. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC.

If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility,

There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549388 October 2020 13:14:00MonticelloNRC Region 3GE-3At 1125 CDT on 10/8/20 Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant declared a Notification of an Unusual Event (NOUE) due to a Security Condition that did not involve a hostile action, due to a helicopter that hovered over the site for approximately 10 minutes.

The unit remained at 100 percent power during the event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Minnesota State Duty Officer and the Wright County and Sherburne County Sherriff departments of the event. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/8/2020 AT 2013 EDT FROM JEFF OLSON TO JEFFREY WHITED * * *

At 1715 CDT Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant terminated the Notice of Unusual Event (HU1.1), upon confirmation through federal law enforcement and conversation with the aircraft owner that the aircraft in question was performing power line inspections for a different utility and was not a threat to the plant. Monticello determined that this condition did not meet the 1-hour reporting requirements of 10 CFR 73.71. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Gott). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 10/28/20 AT 1436 EDT FROM JACOB BURSKI TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) is retracting this event notification based on subsequent information received that was not available at the time of the original notification. Following review of the additional information collected by the site through an investigation performed with input from local and federal law enforcement, Xcel Energy determined the helicopter did not constitute a credible threat or compromise site safety or security. There was no impact to public health or safety. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will notify the State and county.

Notified R3DO (Peterson).
ENS 549357 October 2020 10:25:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 549346 October 2020 20:16:00HarrisNRC Region 2A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549325 October 2020 14:25:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Building Ventilation
Reactor Water Cleanup
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1749 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced a loss of Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus 2A. Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolated in response to this event. The PCIS isolations caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem A. Unit 2 declared RCS leakage detection instrumentation inoperable and entered TS LCO 3.4.5 condition A, B, and D with required action D.1 to enter LCO 3.0.3 immediately. Unit 2 entered TS LCO 3.0.3 with required actions to be in Mode 2 within 10 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Upon investigation, it was discovered that an age-related overheating condition resulted in the failure of the 2A RPS Motor Generator (MG) set, causing the feeder beaker from the 2A 480v Remote Motor-Operated Valve distribution board to trip. On August 6, 2020, at approximately 1808 CDT, Operations personnel commenced restoration of Unit 2 to normal after transferring 2A RPS to its alternate power supply. The 2A RPS MG Set drive motor was replaced on August 24, 2020. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 3 actuations are RV Low Water Level or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are RV Low Water Level, High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 8 actuations are Reactor Vessel (RV) Low Water Level or Drywell High Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid.

All affected safety systems responded as expected. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1628707. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 549315 October 2020 13:51:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Service water
Core Spray
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of an emergency service water system component that does not normally run and which provides an ultimate heat sink.

On August 6, 2020, at approximately 0128 CDT, the A3 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) pump received an auto-start signal while performing Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT) on the 3C Core Spray pump. Normally, the involved EECW pump would be started prior to testing to prevent an auto-start; however, in this case the pump was not running prior to the test. When the 3C Core Spray pump breaker was closed while in the test position, an unanticipated actuation of the A3 EECW pump occurred. Work was stopped and the workers reported to the Control Room to evaluate the condition. Based on a review of this event, individuals involved were coached on understanding system response prior to performing work.

The A3 EECW pump responded in accordance with the plant design. No other plant equipment was affected during this event. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. Reference corrective action document CR 1628479. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 549303 October 2020 15:07:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Steam Generator
Reactor Coolant System
During a scheduled refueling outage, a walkdown inside containment to investigate leakage revealed a pressure boundary leak upstream of 1RC-526B, HX-1B Steam Generator Channel Head Drain. This location would be considered part of the reactor coolant system as defined under 10 CFR 50.2. As such, this event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A). Unit 1 is currently in mode 4. Repairs for the condition are being determined.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The leak rate was determined to be 0.138 gpm.
ENS 549293 October 2020 11:48:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorAt time 0815 (CDT) on 09/30/20, Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RUK-2325/2327 (Main Steam Line 2-01/2-03 Radiation Monitor) was removed from service for planned maintenance.

Compensatory measures were in place prior to removing the monitor from service to assure adequate monitoring capability available to implement the CPNPP (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-01 and MSL 2-03. With this radiation monitor non-functional, compensatory measures in place and the monitor not restored to service within 72 hours, the condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is negligible safety significance to the current condition with respect to the public health and safety perspective. Corrective actions are being pursued to complete maintenance and restore 2-RUK-2325/2327 to functional status.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 549272 October 2020 12:35:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Secondary containmentAt 0945 hours (EDT) on 10/02/2020, with Millstone Unit 3 in Mode 4, Operations discovered a door in the Secondary Containment boundary blocked open. Investigation determined the door was blocked open at 1842 (EDT) on 10/01/2020, rendering Secondary Containment inoperable. The door was closed at 1002 ((EDT) on 10/02/2020), restoring Secondary Containment to operable status.

Since Secondary Containment was rendered inoperable, Dominion Energy is reporting this as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. This condition is being reported as an eight hour report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and (D). There was no release of radioactivity to the public. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

With the door blocked open, the plant was in a 24-hour shutdown action statement. The state of Connecticut and local towns were notified.
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