Emergency Notification System

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[RSS - Reactor Events]

09-01-2021

Region 1 1 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 6 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 0 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 2 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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[list]

by company

Allied-General Nuclear Services 0 [Allied-General Nuclear Services events] [RSS]
AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 0 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 0 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 1 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 0 [Constellation events] [RSS]
Consumers Energy 0 [Consumers Energy events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 1 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 2 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 1 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
Duquesne Light Company 0 [Duquesne Light Company events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 1 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 4 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Eversource Energy 0 [Eversource Energy events] [RSS]
Exelon 2 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 1 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Houston Lighting and Power Company 0 [Houston Lighting and Power Company events] [RSS]
Illinois Power Company 0 [Illinois Power Company events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Long Island Lighting Company 0 [Long Island Lighting Company events] [RSS]
Luminant 0 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 2 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Northeast Nuclear Energy 0 [Northeast Nuclear Energy events] [RSS]
Omaha Public Power District 0 [Omaha Public Power District events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 0 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 1 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 1 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 3 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 1 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
WEC Energy Group 0 [WEC Energy Group events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 1 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 0 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
ZionSolutions 0 [ZionSolutions events] [RSS]
Électricité de France 0 [Électricité de France events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 0 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 0 Department of Defense [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute events] [RSS]
Barnwell 0 Allied-General Nuclear Services [Barnwell events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 1 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Bellefonte 0 Nuclear Development LLC [Bellefonte events] [RSS]
Berkeley Research Reactor 0 University of California [Berkeley Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Big Rock Point 0 Consumers Energy [Big Rock Point events] [RSS]
Braidwood 0 Exelon [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Breazeale Nuclear Reactor 0 Breazeale Nuclear Reactor [Breazeale Nuclear Reactor events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 0 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Exelon [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 0 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 0 Exelon [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 0 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Exelon [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 1 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 0 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Consolidated Interim Storage Facility 0 Consolidated Interim Storage Facility [Consolidated Interim Storage Facility events] [RSS]
Cook 0 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 0 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dow Chemical Company 0 [Dow Chemical Company events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Exelon [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Elk River 0 [Elk River events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Farley 1 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 1 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 1 Exelon [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Omaha Public Power District [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
General Atomics 0 [General Atomics events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Exelon [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 1 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
HI-STORE 0 Holtec [HI-STORE events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 0 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 2 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Holtec 0 [Holtec events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kansas State University 0 [Kansas State University events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Exelon [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 0 Bechtel [Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 0 Exelon [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Lee 0 Duke Energy [Lee events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Exelon [Limerick events] [RSS]
Los Alamos National Laboratory 0 [Los Alamos National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Lynchburg Research Center 0 [Lynchburg Research Center events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 1 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
National Bureau of Standards Reactor 0 [National Bureau of Standards Reactor events] [RSS]
National Renewable Energy Lab 0 [National Renewable Energy Lab events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 0 Exelon [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 1 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 0 [Oak Ridge National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oregon State University 0 [Oregon State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 0 Exelon [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 0 [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 1 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Parr 0 [Parr events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 0 Exelon [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Perry 0 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 0 Entergy [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Plum Brook 0 [Plum Brook events] [RSS]
Point Beach 2 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 0 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 0 Exelon [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
Reed College 0 Reed Research Reactor [Reed College events] [RSS]
River Bend 0 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 0 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
SHINE Medical Technologies 0 [SHINE Medical Technologies events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 0 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Sandia National Laboratories 0 [Sandia National Laboratories events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 1 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shippingport 0 [Shippingport events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
South Texas 1 STP Nuclear Operating Company [South Texas events] [RSS]
Summer 1 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Sundesert 0 San Diego Gas & Electric Compnay [Sundesert events] [RSS]
Surry 1 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 1 Exelon [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 PGE [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 0 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
Tuxedo 0 Union Carbide Company [Tuxedo events] [RSS]
U.S. Geological Survey 0 [U.S. Geological Survey events] [RSS]
University of Buffalo 0 [University of Buffalo events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Lowell 0 [University of Lowell events] [RSS]
University of Maryland 0 [University of Maryland events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of New Mexico 0 [University of New Mexico events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vanowen 0 Vanowen [Vanowen events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Victoria 0 Exelon [Victoria events] [RSS]
Vogtle 0 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Washington State University 0 [Washington State University events] [RSS]
Waterford 3 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 1 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Yankee Rowe 0 [Yankee Rowe events] [RSS]
Zion 0 ZionSolutions [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 0 [Advanced Boiling Water Reactor events] [RSS]
B&W-L-LP 1 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CANDU-9 0 [CANDU-9 events] [RSS]
CE 4 [CE events] [RSS]
CP0 0 [CP0 events] [RSS]
CP1 0 [CP1 events] [RSS]
CP2 0 [CP2 events] [RSS]
Economic and Simplified Boiling Water Reactor 0 [Economic and Simplified Boiling Water Reactor events] [RSS]
Evolutionary Power Reactor 0 [Evolutionary Power Reactor events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 0 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 4 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 1 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 1 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
P4 REP 1300 0 [P4 REP 1300 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark I 0 [TRIGA Mark I events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark II 0 [TRIGA Mark II events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark III 0 [TRIGA Mark III events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 2 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 5 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 4 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5546215 September 2021 11:30:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0658 CDT on 09/15/2021 a non work-related death occurred of a site employee. The individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5545913 September 2021 23:47:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopEmergency Diesel GeneratorOn September 13, 2021, at 1822 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. Specifically, it was determined that some Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) cables may be susceptible to a hot short/spurious operation to the close circuit. A spurious closure of the emergency bus normal supply breakers after the EDG is powering the bus could result in non-synchronous paralleling, EDG overloading, or EDG output breaker tripping due to faulted power cable from normal supply breaker. The spurious closure of the normal supply breakers is not currently addressed in the Appendix R Report or previous Multiple Spurious Operations (MSO) analysis.

This condition is associated with the Appendix R safe-shutdown function of the Emergency Power System. The Emergency Power System is considered operable but not fully qualified for its safety-related design function. The following fire areas are impacted: 1) Fire Area 13, Unit 1 Normal Switchgear Room 2) Fire Area 46, Unit 1 Cable Tray Room 3) Fire Area 3, Unit 1 Emergency Switchgear and Relay Room 4) Fire Area 2, Unit 2 Cable Vault and Tunnel Until this condition is analyzed, Surry has implemented mitigating actions in the above fire areas. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR (condition report) 1180502. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

Mitigating actions include posting fire watches in the affected areas.
ENS 5545813 September 2021 05:53:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAuxiliary FeedwaterAt 0011 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown), actuations of the 2B Diesel Generator (DG) and the 2B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump occurred during Engineered Safety Features Actuation Periodic Testing while resetting the 2B DG Load Sequencer. The 2B DG was running unloaded following test actuation, and during realignment from the test, a blackout condition was experienced when the breaker opened supplying the 4160 Volt Essential Power System 2ETB from the Standby Auxiliary Power Transformer SATB. Sequencer actuation closed the emergency breaker to 2ETB and loaded the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump onto the bus. Steam supply valves to the Turbine Driven AFW Pump were open from the previous test configuration.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the 2B DG and the 2B Motor Driven AFW Pump.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5545712 September 2021 22:41:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopOn September 12, 2021, at 1728 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) while performing inspections of the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 reactor vessel head flange area, a weld leak was identified on the reactor vessel flange leak-off line that connects to the flange between the inner and outer head o-rings. Entered TRM 3.4.6 Condition B for ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components. With known leakage past the inner head o-ring, this condition is reported since the fault in the tubing is considered pressure boundary (Reactor Coolant System) leakage.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.

The NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5545510 September 2021 14:45:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1B&W-L-LPThis is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of another government agency. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 72.75(b)(2).

At 1055 EDT on 9/10/21, an employee of a site contractor that was performing work under a contract and in possession of the immediate area where the work was being performed, was involved in a material handling accident in the owner controlled area at Three Mile Island. Londonderry Township EMS and Fire responded to render assistance to the individual. Upon arrival to the site, medical personnel declared the individual deceased.

The fatality was work related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area.
ENS 554519 September 2021 04:19:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
High Pressure Core Spray
At 0033 CDT on September 9, 2021, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was operating at 70 percent power when the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) was declared inoperable. The inoperability determination was made due to control room annunciations. In accordance with GGNS Technical Specification 3.5.1.B.1, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system was verified to be operable. Troubleshooting is in progress.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 554508 September 2021 17:12:00SummerNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 1337 (EDT) on 9/8/2021, V.C. Summer reported the overflow of the Nuclear Operations Building Lift Station (LS-3) to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The lift station overflow was due to a broken discharge pipe from Pump 1 to the common discharge header. The overflow was contained in the valve vault, basin gravel, and the nearby concrete surface. None of the overflow reached any storm drains or waters of the state. This release did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 554488 September 2021 08:40:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
At 0159 EDT on 09/08/2021, the HPCI pump discharge valve failed to reopen during a valve surveillance, resulting in the HPCI system being declared INOPERABLE. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system and low pressure Emergency Core Cooling Systems were OPERABLE during this time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 554441 September 2021 03:07:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

On 8/31/21 at 2050 (MST), the Seismic Monitoring System was discovered Non-Functional. This constitutes an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability for an operational basis earthquake. There is currently no seismic activity in the area according to the U.S. Geological Survey.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the loss of seismic monitoring capability.
ENS 5544331 August 2021 20:52:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEAt 1340 CDT on August 31, 2021, Waterford 3 Nuclear Generating Station discovered a condition impacting functionality of the ENS and commercial telephone lines. This issue was evaluated and determined to be a major loss of communications capability because the condition affected the ability to directly communicate between the NRC and the Control Room. Satellite phone capability was established at 1410 CDT. Additional communication capability was restored at 1609 CDT. Communication capability via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) was reestablished at 1923 CDT.

This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5544031 August 2021 16:00:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn August 4, 2021 a Licensed Reactor Operator violated the station's FFD policy. The employee's unescorted access to South Texas has been terminated. The event was determined to be reportable under 10 CFR 26.719(b)(2)(ii). The NRC Resident Inspector will be been notified.
ENS 5543630 August 2021 01:50:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CESteam Generator
Reactor Coolant System
Feedwater
Emergency Diesel Generator
Shutdown Cooling
At 1804 CDT on 8/29/2021, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station (WF3) experienced a Loss of Off Site Power event due to Hurricane Ida. This event caused an automatic actuation of Emergency Diesel Generators Trains A and B. Both Emergency Diesel Generators started as designed and both are currently operating normally supplying power to their respective Class 1E Safety Busses. This automatic actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Prior to the loss of offsite power, WF3 was in progress of performing a plant cooldown in accordance with procedural guidance. As part of this cooldown and after entering Mode 4, all Safety Injection Tanks were isolated. As a result of losing offsite power, Reactor Coolant System Temperature increased above 350F which is above the temperature requirements for Mode 4. Safety Injection Tanks are required to be unisolated and OPERABLE in Mode 3. Therefore, with no Safety Injection Tanks OPERABLE, this constituted an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function and the unit entered Technical Specification 3.0.3. The unit was in Technical Specification 3.0.3 for approximately 43 minutes from 1805 CDT until 1848 CDT when Mode 4 conditions were re-established. This event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a Safety Function is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

While continuing to perform the Reactor Coolant System Cooldown and prior to placing Shutdown Cooling Train in service, it became necessary to start one train of Emergency Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater Train A was manually started at 1847 CDT to feed the Steam Generators and was secured at 1947 CDT. Emergency Feedwater Train A started and operated normally during this period. This manual actuation is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5543529 August 2021 19:49:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEEmergency Diesel GeneratorWaterford 3 shut down the reactor in preparation for Hurricane Ida landfall prior to this event.

At 1812 CDT, Waterford 3 declared a notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1 due to a loss of offsite power as a result of hurricane Ida. Plant power is being provided via emergency diesel generators. The NRC Activated at 2016 EDT with Region IV in the lead. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/1/21 AT 0132 EDT FROM ALEX SANDOVAL TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

At 2345 CDT on 8/31/21, Waterford 3 terminated their notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1. Offsite power has been restored to both safety-related electrical buses. The NRC remains Activated with Region IV in the lead while reviewing additional criteria to exit Activation.

Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), R4DO (Josey), IR MOC (Kennedy), NRR EO (Miller), R4 (Lantz).
ENS 5542724 August 2021 16:51:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4During an extent of condition review of DC control circuits, it was identified there are additional unprotected DC control circuits which are routed between separate Appendix R fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. Design modifications in the affected control circuits are being developed and will be scheduled to correct this condition.
ENS 5542624 August 2021 12:31:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following was received from the Point Beach Station Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) via phone call to the Headquarters Operations Officer: Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), the Point Beach Station RPM reported to the NRC receipt of a package of radioactive material (new fuel shipment) with removable surface contamination greater than NRC reporting limits. The package was received Tuesday, August 24, 2021, at 0645 CDT. The package was surveyed and it was determined that the external surface of the package contained removable contamination that exceeded the regulatory limit of 240 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters. The measured level of removable contamination was 337.3 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters and contained Cobalt 60. The licensee's corrective actions were to conduct additional smears of the package, trailer, and truck, and to frisk the truck driver to ensure no further contamination. No contamination has been identified.
ENS 5542523 August 2021 23:20:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Service waterOn August 22, 2021, Columbia Generating Station determined that no more than approximately eight (8) gallons of silicone oil was inadvertently released into a plant service water system due to a failed heat exchanger on a plant installed air compressor. The plant service water system returns water to a water basin that contains at a minimum 300,000 gallons of water. The water basin is connected to the Columbia River via a blowdown line. Although not confirmed, it is suspected that an unknown quantity of silicone oil may have been released to the Columbia River. A visual inspection of the basin did not identify any oil sheen or film, and there are no additional actions needed to mitigate this issue. It does not appear the oil release poses a threat to human health or the environment, however because there could have been a discharge of an unknown quantity of silicone oil into the Columbia River this matter is immediately reportable under RCW 90.56.280 to the US Coast Guard National Response Center and Washington State Department of Ecology. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) for news release or notification of other government agencies concerning an event related to the health and safety of the public or protection of the environment. Notifications to off-site agencies were performed at 1825 PDT on 8/23/2021. The NRC resident has been informed.
ENS 5542322 August 2021 12:10:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4High Pressure Coolant Injection
Emergency Diesel Generator
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
At 0529 EDT on August 22, 2021, HPCI ((High Pressure Coolant Injection System)) was declared inoperable due to receiving the HPCI Inverter Circuit Failure annunciator. The cause of the annunciator was a fuse failure. The cause of the fuse failure is unknown at this time and is under investigation. Concurrent with the HPCI fuse failure was a similar fuse failure within the Division 2 EDG ((emergency diesel generators)) Load Sequencer which renders the Division 2 EDGs inoperable. Relation to the HPCI issue is unknown and is part of the investigation.

The RCIC ((Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System)) was verified operable per Tech Spec 3.5.1 E.1. In addition, offsite circuits were verified operable per Tech Spec 3.8.1.B. Division 1 EDGs remain operable. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The Senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5542120 August 2021 16:00:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSecondary containment
Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System
At 0905 EDT, it was discovered both trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) were simultaneously INOPERABLE due to the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) being inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

ABSCE and ABGTS were returned to operable.
ENS 5542020 August 2021 12:53:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4A licensed operator failed a pre-access authorization test specified by the FFD testing program test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5541819 August 2021 18:14:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopA covered employee had a confirmed positive during a for-cause fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5541618 August 2021 13:51:00Wolf CreekNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
At 1036 CDT on 8/18/2021, Wolf Creek experienced a reactor trip due to low level in B Steam Generator. Auxiliary feedwater system actuated as designed. All systems actuated as expected. Decay heat is currently being removed by the auxiliary feedwater system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. All control rods fully inserted, and offsite power remained available.
ENS 5541318 August 2021 01:07:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopAt 0024 EDT on 8/18/21, an unusual event was declared (EAL HU 4.1) due to receipt of multiple fire alarms and halon discharge in the cable tunnel. At 0036, the fire brigade verified no signs of fire. Unit 1 remained at 100 percent power and stable.

The area is currently being ventilated. Unit 2 was not affected by this event. The licensee has notified State and local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector. R1 Public Affairs (Screnci) was notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT KLINDWORTH TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 0414 EDT ON 8/18/21 * * *

At 0401 EDT, Beaver Valley terminated their notification of unusual event. The basis for termination was that there was no indication of fire. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector and has notified State and local authorities.

Notified R1DO (Jackson), IRD MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Felts), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 5540311 August 2021 11:32:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4At 0634 EDT on August 11, 2021 (high pressure coolant injection) HPCI was declared inoperable due to a pump flow controller problem. The cause of the controller problem is unknown at this time and is under investigation.

(Reactor core isolation cooling) RCIC was verified operable per Tech Spec 3.5.1 E.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 553985 August 2021 17:30:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 553963 August 2021 19:48:00DresdenNRC Region 3GE-3At approximately 1539 CDT on 8/3/2021, the Dresden Station Main Control was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 full sounding emergency response sirens affected Dresden Station in Will County Illinois, while testing other sirens. Will County EMA inadvertently actuated the sirens on 8/3/2021 at 1440 CDT.

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b )(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement. The Dresden NRC Resident has been notified.

See related Event Notification #55395.
ENS 553953 August 2021 19:35:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt approximately 1539 CDT on 8/3/2021, the Braidwood Station Main Control Room was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 Full Sounding sirens affecting Braidwood Station in Will County Illinois while testing other sirens. Will County EMA inadvertently actuated the sirens on 08/03/2021 at 1440 CDT.

This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), News release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4 Hour Reporting requirement. The Braidwood NRC Resident has been notified.

See related Event Notification #55396.
ENS 553943 August 2021 13:18:00HatchNRC Region 2GE-4High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Protection System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Main Condenser
At 1026 EDT on 8/3/21, with Unit 1 in MODE 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to low reactor water level. The low reactor water level condition was due to a loss of both reactor feed pumps. The cause of the loss of feed pumps is under investigation. Additionally, the low reactor water level resulted in the automatic actuation of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) systems, and Containment Isolation Valves (CIVs) in multiple systems. All safety systems responded normally.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level is being maintained via RCIC system. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Unit 2 is not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). It is also reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the HPCI and RCIC systems and CIVs. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant.

The Licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The Unit will proceed to Mode 4 while the cause of the loss of feed pumps is under investigation.
ENS 5539031 July 2021 21:37:00Point BeachNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Manual ScramAt 1646 (CDT) on 7/31/21, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to control board indications of a Unit 1 'B' Main Feed Pump trip. After the reactor trip, one of the Condenser Steam Dump valves cycled to intermediate and remained stuck. The Condenser Steam Dump Valve was isolated locally using manual isolation valves. The 'B' Feed Regulating Bypass Valve did not control in automatic and was taken to manual to control the level in 'B' Steam Generator. The Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically actuated as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves due to condenser unavailability. Unit 2 is unaffected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

During the transient, all control rods inserted into the core. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. During the transient, no relief valves or safeties lifted. The plant is currently maintaining normal operating temperature and pressure with all safety equipment available. The plant is in its normal shutdown electrical lineup.
ENS 5538530 July 2021 00:16:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Secondary containmentAt 0922 PDT, on 07/28/21, the reactor building roof hatch was opened to support maintenance activities on the roof. Secondary containment differential pressure lowered and was recovered by the operating crew. Secondary containment differential pressure was maintained negative during the transient and was verified to have met technical specification requirements the whole time, however it was not identified at the time that the secondary containment was inoperable due to the roof hatch exceeding the allowable containment breech size and as such a TS 3.6.4.1.A entry was warranted.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) when it was identified that the secondary containment was inoperable while the roof hatch was open and a report should have been made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D) for loss of safety function. There were no radiological releases, system actuations, or isolations associated with this event.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5538428 July 2021 16:30:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA licensed employee had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been suspended. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5537925 July 2021 16:00:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 1238 EDT on July 25, 2021, the Unit 2 Ice Bed became INOPERABLE due to SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.12.1 exceeding its surveillance interval. LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.6.12 was declared not met as required by SR 3.0.1.

SR 3.6.12.1 to verify maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27 degrees F could not be completed due to a failed temperature recorder. The results of the backup method of temperature verification were verified satisfactory at 1258 EDT and the LCO condition was then exited. The ice bed is a single train system which functions to control radiation release and mitigate the consequences of an accident by scrubbing radioactive iodine and providing a heat sink to limit containment pressure within design limits, therefore the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (v) (C) and (D) were met.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5537723 July 2021 12:06:00Prairie IslandNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopAt approximately 1040 CDT, July 23, 2021, the Minnesota State Duty Officer was notified by Xcel Energy Environmental Services of a fish kill in the Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant discharge canal. The fish kill resulted from a change in temperature due to the loss of power to the plant cooling tower pumps. The cause of the power loss is under investigation.

This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5537522 July 2021 20:28:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopEmergency Diesel GeneratorOn July 20, 2021, at 1707 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. This issue was initially categorized as not affecting train separation or the ability of the equipment to perform their Design Basis functions. The original concern was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR1177199.

Subsequently, on July 22, 2021, at 1751 EDT, a further review of the affected control circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breakers and emergency bus feeder breakers identified a concern that breaker position interlocks routed to or through non-safety related components or spaces may affect the ability to provide emergency power on the affected unit due to impacts on the control power circuits during an Appendix R fire associated with a loss of offsite power. The following are the affected fire areas: - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Buildings - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Spreading Rooms - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal (307) Switchgear Rooms This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR 1177399.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5537021 July 2021 20:50:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Main Turbine
Reactor Recirculation Pump
Main Condenser
Control Rod
At 1826 EDT on July 21, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine.

Unit 1 reactor was operating at 100 percent reactor power with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on EOC-RPT (end of cycle recirculation pump trip). Reactor water level lowered to +8 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) or RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system) actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 with main condenser available. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made.

This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 5536520 July 2021 13:06:00FarleyNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopA non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5536319 July 2021 18:27:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated.
ENS 5535715 July 2021 21:36:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4While preparing for the June 2021 Discharge Monitoring Report (DMR), Environmental was entering data per the lab results that were sent from Pace Analytical for the June DMRs. On June 1, 2021, a National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) sample was collected at outfall 001A to test for copper, there is a NPDES permit condition to monitor for copper on a quarterly basis. The lab report was returned to Fermi Environmental on June 15, 2021. The results came back at 41.2 micrograms/liter. Fermi's NPDES permit maximum limit is 40 micrograms/liter for outfall 001A. Due to the June 1, 2021 sample exceeding the permit limit, a second sample was collected on June 21, 2021 as a verification sample and the copper results came back July 13, 2021. Those results came back at 5.9 micrograms/liter which is within the permit limit. Environmental was aware of the June 1, 2021 copper exceedance limit but failed to recognize the reporting requirement at the time of the discovery because it was thought that the exceedance would be reported through the DMR submittal. The June DMRs are due on July 20, 2021.

At approximately 1740 EDT on July 15, 2021, a Fermi environmental engineer was preparing and reviewing the Discharge Monitoring Report and identified that a recent sample result for outfall 001A was outside of the NPDES permit limit for Copper. The Copper sample result was 41.2 micrograms/liter with a limit of 40 micrograms/liter. Subsequent discussions with Environmental personnel determined that this issue should be reported to the state of Michigan Department of Environment, Great Lakes and Energy (EGLE). A discussion is planned with EGLE on July 16, 2021. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) based on the planned notification to EGLE.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 553469 July 2021 00:44:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3B&W-R-LPSteam Generator
Reactor Coolant System
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Decay Heat Removal
Main Condenser
Automatic ScramAt 2154 EDT on 7/8/2021, with the Unit in Mode 1 at 100% power, the reactor automatically tripped due to trip of the main turbine, caused by failure of a non-safety related breaker during functional testing. Following the reactor trip the Steam Feed Rupture Control System automatically initiated on low Steam Generator 1 level, actuating both turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps. The operators subsequently started the high pressure injection pumps manually per procedure in response to overcooling indications.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat was initially being removed via the Main Condenser. During post-trip response actions, while attempting to shut down the Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps, a low pressure condition was experienced in Steam Generator 2, resulting in isolation of the Main Condenser and steam being discharged through the Atmospheric Vent Valves for decay heat removal. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) as a four-hour, non-emergency notification of emergency core cooling system (ECCS) discharge into the reactor coolant system, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification of an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 553458 July 2021 20:07:00LimerickNRC Region 1GE-4Primary Containment Isolation System
HVAC
Standby Gas Treatment System
Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System
This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On May 13, 2021, during the restoration of the Unit 2 Refuel Floor High Radiation Isolation Logic an invalid isolation signal was received. The condition requiring an isolation signal was verified not to be present prior to restoring the logic; however, it was not recognized that a previous isolation signal was latched in and had not been reset. When the isolation logic was restored, the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolated on the invalid signal. The systems successfully completed the isolation per the plant design and plant configuration.

The following systems actuated due to the Unit 2 PCIS Group 6C Isolation: - Isolation of Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Valves, - Start of the 2A Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System, - Trip of the Units 1 and 2 Refuel Floor HVAC, - Start of the A and B Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Systems.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 553394 July 2021 15:59:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopAt 0911 EDT on July 4, 2021, a failure occurred on 2 out of 3 of the required seismic monitoring instruments that feed the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) annunciator. The failure would prevent an OBE EXCEEDED alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel in the Control Room. This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the seismic monitoring instruments. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the unplanned failure of the required seismic instruments affects the ability to assess a seismic event greater than the OBE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 553383 July 2021 17:44:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopOn July 03, 2021, at approximately 1011 CDT, a Security Force Supervisor at South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) was informed by a security officer that they had located what appeared to be drug paraphernalia inside the Protected Area. At 1033 CDT Local Law Enforcement was contacted and responded to STPEGS. At 1130 CDT the Matagorda County Sheriff's office took the item into evidence for testing to determine if there was any presence of a controlled substance. At 1311 CDT, the Matagorda County Sheriff's office notified STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) that the item tested positive for the presence of a controlled substance. At 1330 CDT the Unit 1 Shift Manager was notified. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) for discovery or presence of illegal drugs within the protected area. STPNOC is continuing to investigate this incident. The Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5532825 June 2021 15:27:00VogtleNRC Region 2W-AP1000The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail:

The individual informing the Commission is Michael J. Yox, 7825 River Road, Waynesboro, GA 30830. The activities which fail to comply include construction processes including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment at the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. The primary construction firm for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project is Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). This report is being provided based on construction nonconformances including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances affect cable separation and other raceway structural elements. The extent of condition for the measuring and test equipment issue is under evaluation and may impact additional safety-related work. The identified construction nonconformances are a small fraction of the overall structures and components. There is no specifically identified substantial safety hazard (SSH) for these nonconformances. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that the issues could be related to an SSH. These issues were discovered while the facility is under construction. The identified conditions will be corrected prior to completion of the facility. The evaluation for this report was completed on June 24, 2021. As stated above, there are no specifically identified basic components that have been identified to contain a defect for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that these conditions involve a failure to comply that could be related to an SSH.

The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken include: Comprehensive extent-of-condition reviews and correction of identified conditions are being conducted. The actions to identify and resolve the nonconforming conditions are in process and will be completed in accordance with the site corrective action program. Bechtel, and other subcontractors as needed, will implement actions to correct the identified conditions and ensure that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is the organization responsible for ensuring Bechtel and the other subcontractors complete the required actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and ensuring that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences.
ENS 5532524 June 2021 14:56:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThis is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) supply fan belt had failed, which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

Corrective maintenance activities will be performed to restore functionality. The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC supply fan. The work duration is approximately 8 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. (The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.)

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been notified.
ENS 5532223 June 2021 01:55:00CookNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopReactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Manual ScramOn June 22, 2021, at 2331 EDT, DC Cook Unit 2 Reactor was manually tripped due to a large steam leak in a crossover pipe of the Moisture Separator Re-heater (MSR) to the low pressure turbine.

This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified. Unit 2 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. All Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via the Steam Dump System. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 2 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.

Unit 1 was not affected.
ENS 5532122 June 2021 16:55:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3B&W-R-LPAuxiliary FeedwaterAt 1208 (EDT) on 6/22/2021, the high-energy line break door separating Auxiliary Feedwater Train Rooms 1 and 2 was not able to be latched following normal usage. The door was able to be closed, protecting Train 1 equipment from a break in Room 2. However, it is assumed a break in Room 1 would push the unlatched door open and allow high-energy fluids to enter Room 2. This condition is not bounded by existing design and licensing documents; however, it poses no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The door was able to be latched at 1215 (EDT) on 6/22/2021 following repairs to the door latch interlocking mechanism. Therefore, this event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). No other equipment was inoperable during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5532021 June 2021 03:06:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
At 0051 CDT Braidwood Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to a generator lockout relay trip and subsequent turbine trip and reactor trip.

The cause of the generator lockout relay trip is unknown at this time and is under investigation. Numerous lightning strikes were present in the area during the time of the generator lockout relay trip. Both trains of auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels. All systems responded as expected with the exception of failure of source range nuclear instruments to automatically re-energize following the reactor trip. Both source range nuclear instruments were manually energized in accordance with station procedures. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by Offsite Power with the 1B Diesel Generator in standby. 1A Diesel Generator is out of service for planned maintenance. All other safety systems are available. There is no impact to Unit 2. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4 hr. notification, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater system, 8 hr. notification.

The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been informed.
ENS 5531116 June 2021 23:41:00PalisadesNRC Region 3CEOn June 16, 2021, at 1550 EDT, Palisades Nuclear Plant was operating in Mode 1 at 100% power. At that time, operations identified an acrid odor in the control room. Investigation revealed that the steam dump control relay had failed, rendering all four atmospheric steam dump valves inoperable.

The loss of function of all four atmospheric steam dump valves is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Troubleshooting and replacement of the relay are in progress. The plant remains stable in Mode 1 at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Unit 1 is in a 24 hour LCO for Tech Spec 3.7.4.b, atmospheric steam dump valve inoperability. The Unit is in a normal offsite power line-up.
ENS 5530615 June 2021 15:38:00Fort CalhounNRC Region 4Emergency Diesel GeneratorAt 1230 CDT a report was made to the State of Nebraska Department of Environment and Energy (NDEE) based on the analytical report for soil samples from the area surrounding the removed FO-1, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank, and the removed FO-32, TSC/Security Fuel Oil Tank. The tanks were removed as part of Fort Calhoun Station decommissioning and soil samples were tested due to soil discoloration at the time the tanks were pulled. The soil contamination levels are from the historic use of the tank. The contamination levels are above the lab reporting limits and thereby reportable to the State of Nebraska Department of Environment and Energy. The NDEE will determine what, if any, remediation may be required. The state NDEE requested the District utilize their Spill Form because this is the simplest method of State notification for tanks exempted due to 40CFR280.10(c)(4).

No active petroleum spills are in progress and appropriate remediation actions will be taken in accordance with Nebraska State regulation and guidance.

The licensee notified the NRC Region IV Office.
ENS 5530512 June 2021 23:57:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam GeneratorAt time 2227 CDT on 06/12/21, Main Steam Line 2-01 Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2325 was declared to be non-functional. With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in Steam Generator 2-01 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-01. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2325 to functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5530412 June 2021 22:00:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam GeneratorAt time 1725 CDT on 06/12/21, Main Steam Line 2-03 Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2327 was declared to be non-functional. With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in Steam Generator 2-03 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-03. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2327 to functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
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