Emergency Notification System

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[RSS - Reactor Events]

11-02-2019

Region 1 2 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 4 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 1 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 2 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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[list]

by company

AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 0 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 0 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 0 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 0 [Constellation events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 0 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 0 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 1 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 0 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 4 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Eversource Energy 0 [Eversource Energy events] [RSS]
Exelon 6 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 3 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Luminant 1 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 1 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 0 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 1 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 0 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 1 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 4 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 0 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 0 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
Électricité de France 0 [Électricité de France events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 1 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 0 Department of Defense [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 3 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Big Rock Point 0 Consumers Power [Big Rock Point events] [RSS]
Braidwood 1 Exelon [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 2 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 0 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Exelon [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 0 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 0 Exelon [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 0 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Exelon [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 0 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 1 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Cook 0 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 0 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Exelon [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Farley 0 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 0 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 0 Exelon [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Exelon [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Exelon [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 1 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 1 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 0 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Exelon [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 1 Exelon [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Exelon [Limerick events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 0 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 1 Exelon [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 0 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 1 Exelon [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 0 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 1 Exelon [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania State University 0 [Pennsylvania State University events] [RSS]
Perry 0 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 0 Entergy [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Point Beach 0 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 0 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 1 Exelon [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
Reed College 0 Reed Research Reactor [Reed College events] [RSS]
River Bend 2 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 0 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 1 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 1 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
South Texas 1 STP Nuclear Operating Company [South Texas events] [RSS]
Summer 0 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Surry 0 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 0 Exelon [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 PGE [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 0 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Vogtle 1 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Waterford 0 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 1 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 0 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Yankee Rowe 0 [Yankee Rowe events] [RSS]
Zion 0 Exelon [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

B&W-L-LP 0 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CE 0 [CE events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 0 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 0 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 0 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 0 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5438412 November 2019 18:23:00LaSalleNRC Region 3This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi), "News Release or Notification of Other Government Agency". The Main Control Room received a report from on-site Maintenance personnel performing diving activities at the lake screen house that communications with a diver had been lost. Onsite and offsite emergency responders were dispatched. The diver was removed from the water but was unresponsive. At 1601 (CST), the LaSalle County Station Operating Department was notified by emergency responders on-site that the individual was deceased. The Grundy County Sheriff, LaSalle County Sheriff, Seneca Emergency Services, and NRC Senior Resident Inspector have been notified. A press release is planned
ENS 5438212 November 2019 10:32:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OUT OF SERVICE

On November 12, 2019, the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) was removed from service for a planned facility upgrade project. The CECC is a common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the TVA Nuclear sites (Browns Ferry / Sequoyah / Watts Bar). The duration of the upgrade project is approximately 75 days. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, an alternate CECC will be used. During this period, the alternate CECC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the CECC will be unavailable for more than 72 hours. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the CECC will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate CECC in the event of an emergency. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1316 EST ON 11/14/19 FROM BARUCH CALKIN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The event information was updated to indicate that the event occurred at 0700 EST. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified the R2DO(Musser).
ENS 5438012 November 2019 08:28:00SequoyahNRC Region 2On November 12, 2019, the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) was removed from service for a planned facility upgrade project. The CECC is a common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the TVA Nuclear sites (Browns Ferry / Sequoyah / Watts Bar). The duration of the upgrade project is approximately 75 days.

If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, an alternate CECC will be used. During this period, the alternate CECC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the CECC will be unavailable for more than 72 hours. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the CECC will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate CECC in the event of an emergency. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant employees.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5437912 November 2019 07:57:00Watts BarNRC Region 2On November 12, 2019, the Central Emergency Control Center (CECC) was removed from service for a planned facility upgrade project. The CECC is a common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for the TVA Nuclear sites (Browns Ferry / Sequoyah / Watts Bar). The duration of the upgrade project is approximately 75 days.

If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, an alternate CECC will be used. During this period, the alternate CECC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the CECC will be unavailable for more than 72 hours. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the CECC will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate CECC in the event of an emergency. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant employees.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 543789 November 2019 13:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2At November 9, 2019, at 0635 EST, it was discovered that both source range instrumentation channels were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A). The neutron flux monitoring system was OPERABLE during this time period.

NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified.

It was determined that with one of two source range instruments out of service for planned maintenance, an operator found the other operable source range instrument out-of-calibration. Upon further investigation, the out-of-calibration instrument had a bad potentiometer with its power supply, thus rendering both instruments inoperable.
ENS 543716 November 2019 01:17:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Service water
Emergency Diesel Generator
High Pressure Core Spray
On November 5, 2019 at 1811 CST, station service water A and the Division 1 diesel generator (DG) were declared inoperable based on the results of an engineering evaluation of a Class 3 piping leak. This was determined to be a potential inability to fulfill a safety function due to concurrent inoperability of two emergency diesel generators. Division 3 DG was inoperable due to planned maintenance on November 4, 2019 at 0000 CST.

This event is being reported an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (Accident Mitigation). Division 3 DG and high pressure core spray have been restored, and the fulfillment of the accident mitigation safety function has been restored. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 11/11/19 AT 1739 EST FROM GABRIEL HARGROVE TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

This was initially reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). However, subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the condition did not affect safety system operability. The evaluation determined that the leakage was within allowable limits and piping structural integrity was not challenged at this time nor in the past three years. The Division 1 DG and SSW A were at the time of discovery OPERABLE and EN54371 is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Drake).
ENS 543694 November 2019 09:06:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Reactor Protection SystemManual ScramAt 0535 (EST) on November 4, 2019, with Unit 1 in mode 1 at 15 (percent) power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the lifting of an 'A' Main Steamline Safety Valve following a Condenser Steam Dump transient. The trip response was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip, and all control rods fully inserted into the core.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the Main Condenser by using the Condenser Steam Dump Valves. Offsite power is available and is currently supplying Normal and Emergency busses. The plant is currently stable in mode 3. Unit 2 is unaffected by this event and remains at 100 (percent) power in mode 1. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543673 November 2019 09:23:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4At 0800 CST on November 3, 2019, Comanche Peak began a planned modification on the Unit 2 Plant Computer System. During this modification, the ability to perform emergency assessment in the Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) will be impacted. Since the ability to perform emergency assessment is not expected to be restored within 72 hours, this is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as an event that results in a loss of emergency assessment capability.

During this modification, the Control Room will continue to have the ability to perform emergency assessment. If an Alert, Site Area Emergency, or General Emergency is declared during this modification, communicators dedicated to performing emergency assessment will be stationed in the Control Room, TSC, and EOF. The Plant Computer System modification is scheduled to be completed on November 24, 2019 and a follow-up ENS notification will be made once the Unit 2 Plant Computer System is declared functional.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 543641 November 2019 10:03:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1High Pressure Core SprayOn November 1, 2019 at 0316 EDT, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received Control Room annunciation for HPCS SYSTEM INOPERABLE and inoperable status light indication for TRIP UNITS OUT OF FILE/POWER FAIL. Initial investigation has identified a potential failed 24 vdc power supply which supplies power to the HPCS trip units for system initiation and control. The HPCS system has been declared inoperable per TS 3.5.1 resulting in an unplanned 14 day LCO.

All other plant systems functioned as required. NMP2 is currently at 100 percent power in Mode 1. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as, 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5436230 October 2019 01:20:00Saint LucieNRC Region 2On 10/30/19 at 0026 EDT, an Unusual Event (HU3) was declared due to a release of flammable gas to the Unit 1 Pipe Penetration area (Reactor Auxiliary Building). The hydrogen supply valve to the area has been isolated. The area is being ventilated and follow-up air sampling will be performed.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM FRED POLLAK TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 0521 EDT ON 10/30/2019 * * *

The Notice of Unusual Event was terminated at 0454 EDT on 10/30/19. The area has been purged and normal access restored. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (McCoy), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD (Grant). Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 5436029 October 2019 13:58:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3At approximately 0945 CDT, on 10/29/2019, the Braidwood Station main control room was notified of the inadvertent actuation of 17 full sounding sirens affecting Braidwood Station in Will County, Illinois. Will County notified Exelon of the inadvertent actuation that occurred on 10/29/2019, at 0919 CDT, during the performance of regular maintenance on the siren equipment at the Laraway Communication Center at the Will County Sheriff Dispatch Center.

This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. The Braidwood NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The siren equipment has been repaired and restored to service.
ENS 5435929 October 2019 13:25:00VogtleNRC Region 2A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's badge has been confiscated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5435527 October 2019 22:36:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3Control Room Emergency VentilationOn October 27, 2019, at 1605 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) was declared inoperable due to finding water in the system's Air Filtration Unit (AFU) filter enclosure. Technical Specification 3.7.4, Condition A, was entered which requires the CREV system to be restored to an operable status in seven days. No other systems were out of service at the time this was declared inoperable.

The CREV system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), "Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function," because the CREV system is a single train system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5435125 October 2019 03:24:00South TexasNRC Region 4Emergency Diesel GeneratorOn October 24, 2019, at 2051 Central Time, while performing Train C Sequencer maintenance, a valid undervoltage actuation signal was sent to Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) 23. The ESF Train C bus loads were shed but EDG 23 did not automatically start because it had been placed in Pull-To-Stop to support the sequencer maintenance activities. EDG 23 was taken out of Pull-To-Stop by Control Room staff to allow it to auto start and load the bus. As a result of the bus strip signal, the in service Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump secured. Spent Fuel Pool Cooling was restored with no measurable increase in pool temperature.

The reactor was not critical and reactor decay heat removal was not challenged throughout the event. This actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the automatic actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5434824 October 2019 16:25:00River BendNRC Region 4Automatic Depressurization SystemAt 1035 CDT the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) was rendered inoperable due to the failure of the 'A' Safety Vent Valve (SVV) Compressor (SVV-C4A) to manually start with SVV-C4B tagged out. System pressure slowly dropped below 131 psig (normal pressure is 165 psig). This caused the ADS safety relief valves to be declared inoperable. The station entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G. The Required Action was to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. As a result, the station was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

The breaker for SVV-C4B was reset and the clearance for SVV-V4B was released. System pressure was restored to greater than 131 psig at 1116 CDT which allowed exit of the action statement to be in Mode 3 in 12 hours. System parameters are currently stable in the normal pressure range. Investigation for the cause of the system failure is ongoing. No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5434724 October 2019 16:24:00Oyster CreekNRC Region 1Holtec Decommissioning International has notified the State of New Jersey that during the conduct of Industrial Site Remediation Act (ISRA) non-radiological site investigation field sampling and analysis activities at the Oyster Creek site, soil and groundwater exceedances to New Jersey Default Impact to Groundwater Soil Levels, Residential Direct Contact Soil Remediation, Non-Residential Direct Contact Soil Remediation and Class IIA Groundwater Quality Standards were identified. These exceedances are reportable under New Jersey Administrative Code NJAC 7:26C. That notification was made at 1524 EDT. The NRC Regional Inspector and the State of New Jersey were notified.
ENS 5434121 October 2019 15:52:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Reactor Water Cleanup
Reactor Building Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On December 29, 2018, at approximately 0220 Central Standard Time (CST), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 3 experienced an unexpected loss of power to the 3A Reactor Protection System (RPS) Bus due to the trip of the 3A RPS motor generator (MG) set. This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Trains A, B, and C and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train A. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

This event is being reported as a late 60 day non-emergency notification. This missed notification was identified on August 23, 2019. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The cause of the trip of the RPS MG Set was a failure of the motor winding insulation of all three phases. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 1478564 and 1543534.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5434021 October 2019 01:23:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1Manual ScramWhile Unit 3 was shutting down for 3R22 refueling outage, the mode switch was taken to shutdown position which is a manual scram signal. The manual scram signal was not received from the mode switch. A subsequent manual scram was inserted with the use of the manual scram push buttons. The Unit 3 reactor is shutdown with all rods inserted.

Unit 2 was unaffected by the event and remains in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Pennsylvania and Maryland State Agencies, local government. A media press release is planned. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FEMA Region 3 Watch Office (email).

  • * * UPDATE AT 0316 EDT ON 10/21/19 FROM KEVIN GROMANN TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

Conditions no longer meet an Emergency Actuation Level and will not deteriorate. Unit 3 reactor is shutdown with all control rods fully inserted. The NOUE was terminated at 0230 EDT." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, Pennsylvania and Maryland State Agencies, local government.

Notified the R1DO (Jackson), NRR EO (Miller), IRDMOC (Gott), R1RA (Lew via email), NRR (Nieh via email), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, DHS NICC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), FEMA Region 3 Watch Office (email).
ENS 5433920 October 2019 19:21:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4At 1030 CDT, it was discovered that the loop seal on the condensate drain was empty for VUC-9 Control Room AC Unit. This creates a breach in the Control Room envelope. Unit 2 entered (Technical Specification) T.S. 3.7.6.1 Action D. Unit 1 is in Mode 6; therefore, not in a mode of applicability.

Compensatory action were being performed and the licensee was in the process of sealing the loop. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM DONNA BOYD TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1336 EDT ON 10/24/2019 * * *

This report is being retracted. The Control Room Envelope (CRE) provides a safety function which limits radiological dose to occupants to no more than 5 rem for 30 days post-accident. The dose limitation assumes the occupants are stationed within the CRE 24 hours a day for the entire 30-day period. The CRE also functions to protect occupants from potential hazards such as smoke or toxic chemicals. The CRE is declared inoperable when a potential breach is identified, regardless of the ability to seal the breach. With respect to the event of October 20, 2019, the water level in a loop seal could not be maintained at the desired level. Subsequent evaluation determined that sufficient water was maintained in the loop seal to prevent a breach of the CRE. The subject reporting criterion is based on the assumption that safety-related systems, structures, and components (SSCs) may no longer be capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. In accordance with NUREG 1022, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,' a report may be retracted based on a revised operability determination. The CRE remained operable; therefore, this report may be retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Young).
ENS 5433818 October 2019 10:45:00River BendNRC Region 4At 0207 (CDT), the Bypass Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) system was secured for planned maintenance. When the Bypass EHC pumps were secured, both of the Main Turbine Bypass Valves unexpectedly opened to approximately 4.5 percent. Plant parameters indicated no impact to Turbine Control Valve position, Reactor Pressure, Turbine First Stage Pressure, or Main Steam Line flows. There were no other abnormal indications noted. With the Turbine Bypass Valves partially open, there is a potential to affect instrumentation that trips on high Turbine First Stage Pressure. Therefore, this event is being reported as a potential loss of Safety Function. At 0256, the Bypass EHC system pumps were restored and the Turbine Bypass Valves Closed.

No radiological releases have occurred due to this event from the unit.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5433718 October 2019 02:28:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Reactor Coolant SystemAt 1951 (EDT) on October 17, 2019, fretting indications on the reactor coolant system pressure boundary piping (pressurizer spray line) were identified. This condition does not appear to meet original construction code, ANSI B31.1, 1967 Edition thru summer 1971 Addenda. The condition will be resolved prior to plant startup. This event is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This condition will be corrected prior to the plant entering Mode 4.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 10/31/19 AT 1450 EDT FROM JIM SCHWER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

An engineering evaluation has determined that the subject fretting is not considered a flaw, but instead is considered wear. Appendix F of Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was applied and it was determined that the pressurizer spray line piping maintained its required design safety functions in the as-found condition. The wear has been repaired during the current refueling outage in accordance with the original construction code (ANSI B3l.l, 1967 Edition through summer 1971 Addenda) as well as Owner's Requirements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R1DO (Young).
ENS 5433316 October 2019 14:28:00HarrisNRC Region 2On October 16, 2019, at 0829 (EDT), an individual was transported for treatment to an offsite facility to address a personal medical issue. Due to the nature of the medical condition, only a partial survey could be completed prior to transport. Follow-up surveys performed by radiation protection technicians identified no radiological contamination of the worker or of the ambulance and response personnel. This event is being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.' The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."
ENS 5433216 October 2019 10:22:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Reactor Water Cleanup
Reactor Building Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On August 20, 2019, at approximately 1133 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 2 experienced an unexpected loss of the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS). This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Trains A, B, and C and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train A. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The cause of the RPS MG Set trip was dirty potentiometer windings on an Over Voltage Relay. The dirt prevented the potentiometer's wiper from contacting its windings, resulting in erratic setpoint values. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Reports 1542603, 1542608, and 1542569.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5433015 October 2019 19:14:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1High Pressure Coolant InjectionOn 10/15/19 at 1210 (EDT) Peach Bottom discovered a degraded spring hanger (23DBN-H39) associated with Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The hanger is located downstream of MO-3-23-14 HPCI Steam Supply Valve before the HO-3-23-4513 Turbine Stop Valve. A review of the piping and support design analysis were performed and concluded the U3 HPCI turbine inlet nozzle would potentially exceed its allowable stresses. Following Engineering review, U3 HPCI was declared inoperable at 1743 (EDT).

This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432915 October 2019 19:10:00Comanche PeakNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorAt time 0911 (CDT), Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RUK-2325/2327 (MAIN STEAM LINE 2-01/2-03 RADIATION

MONITOR) was removed from service for planned maintenance. Compensatory measures were in place prior to removing the monitor from service to assure adequate monitoring capability available to implement the CPNPP emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL (Main Steam Line) 2-01 and MSL 2-03. With this radiation monitor non-functional, with compensatory measures in place, and the monitor NOT expected to be returned to service within 72 hours, the condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is negligible safety significance to the current condition with respect to the public health and safety perspective. Corrective actions are being pursued to complete maintenance and restore 2-RUK-2325/2327 to functional status.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432812 October 2019 15:54:00Diablo CanyonNRC Region 4One unopened can of beer was discovered in a break room refrigerator within the plant's Protected Area. The individual that brought in the can of beer was identified. That individual is a Pacific Gas and Electric employee but does not normally work at Diablo Canyon. That individual was brought in to support work during the Unit 2 refueling outage. When questioned, the individual stated that the can of beer had been brought in to give to another person to see if that person liked that brand of beer (the beer was apparently from a small specialty brewery). A behavioral observation was performed on the individual who brought in the can of beer. There was no indication of alcohol use by the individual. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended pending further investigation.
ENS 5432511 October 2019 14:22:00Calvert CliffsNRC Region 1At 1300 EDT, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1. Technical Specification Action 3.1.4.C (Restore Control Element Assembly (CEA) alignment) was entered on 10/11/2019 at 1100 EDT, with a Required Action to reduce thermal power to less than 70 percent Rated Thermal Power and restore CEA alignment within 2 hours. This Required Action was not completed within the Completion Time; therefore, a Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated, and this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).

At 1345 EDT, CEA alignment was restored and Technical Specification 3.1.4 (Control Element Assembly Alignment) was met. Reactor Power is being stabilized.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432210 October 2019 12:14:00BrunswickNRC Region 2At 1122 EDT, on October 10, 2019, Duke Energy initiated voluntary notification of North Carolina State and local officials per the guidance in Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 07-07, 'Industry Groundwater Protection Initiative - Final Guidance Document,' due to release of tritiated water in excess of 100 gallons.

On October 8, 2019, at approximately 1300 EDT, Brunswick plant personnel drilling as part of an ongoing site project, damaged a storm drain discharge line. The resulting leak was isolated and water around the impacted area was sampled for gamma emitters and tritium. No gamma emitters were detected. The tritium concentration was below the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) drinking water limit of 20,000 pCi/L. The leak has been stopped and excavation and repair efforts are in progress. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5432010 October 2019 02:17:00FarleyNRC Region 2At 2340 CDT, on October 09, 2019, a site contractor was transported offsite for treatment at an offsite medical facility. Due to the nature of the medical emergency, the individual was not thoroughly surveyed prior to being transported offsite. This is an eight-hour notification, non-emergency for the transportation of a contaminated person offsite. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii).

Following the individual being transported offsite, but prior to the individual arriving at the offsite medical facility, the individual was confirmed to not be contaminated. This occurred at approximately 2350 CDT, on October 09, 2019.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543189 October 2019 12:48:00VogtleNRC Region 2Emergency Diesel Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
At 1023 EDT, on October 9, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems occurred. The reason for the Emergency Diesel Generator auto-start was the loss of power to the 4160V 1E electrical bus 2AA02 due to a fault at an offsite electrical switchyard. The Emergency Diesel Generator started and energized the 4160V safety bus, and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems automatically started as designed when the undervoltage condition on the safety bus was detected.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified."
ENS 543125 October 2019 16:29:00Arkansas NuclearNRC Region 4At 0850 CDT, on 10/5/2019, the control room was notified of a personnel injury in the Unit 1 containment building. The individual was considered potentially contaminated since a complete frisk could not be performed prior to transport to a local hospital. At 1234 CDT, a radiological survey determined that the individual and their clothing had trace amounts of activity that was easily removed. The employee did not sustain any life threatening injuries.

This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xii). Additionally, at 1135 CDT contact was made with the Arkansas Department of Health about transport of the potentially contaminated individual. This is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of an offsite agency.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543094 October 2019 15:45:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4On March 3, 2019, during overhaul activities of the medium voltage power (Magne-blast) circuit breakers, three General Electric Hitachi (GEH) Stationary Primary Contact Fingers Q0114C5382P002 were identified as having contact surfaces with a finish that was rough and unlike the typically smooth finish provided on electrical contact surfaces. These Stationary Primary Contact Fingers are the primary current carrying device for the circuit breaker.

On October 1, 2019, Arizona Public Service Company (APS) completed an evaluation of a deviation, and concluded the condition represented a defect under 10 CFR 21. On October 4, 2019, the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Vice President, Nuclear Engineering, was notified of a defect of GEH Stationary Primary Contact Fingers which met the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 21.21. There are no medium voltage power (Magne-blast) circuit breakers with stationary primary contact fingers impacted by this condition installed in the plant. APS concluded this condition, if installed, could result in the breaker failing to perform its safety function and thus could create a substantial safety hazard.

The NRC resident inspector has been informed."
ENS 543072 October 2019 11:50:00CatawbaNRC Region 2On October 2, 2019, at 0415 EDT, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0 percent power, an actuation of the Unit 2 containment spray system occurred during valve strokes of the 2A train containment spray header isolations while the 2B train containment spray pump was in recirculation. The reason for the containment spray actuation was due to a conflicting procedural alignment with the 2B containment spray recirculation procedure. The containment spray system does not have an automatic function, and only receives manual actuation. The Unit 2 containment spray actuation was secured at 0416.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the containment spray system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 543021 October 2019 07:05:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Intermediate Range Monitor
Automatic ScramOn 10/1/2019, at 0307 CDT, Unit 2 was conducting a normal reactor startup and received a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) scram. The reactor was critical in MODE 2 at the Point of Adding Heat. Operators began withdrawing Source Range Monitor (SRM) Instrumentation per procedure. When the operator depressed the SRM Drive Out pushbutton to withdraw the last two SRMs (C and D), an unexpected full Reactor Scram was received. Annunciator indication in the Main Control Room indicated a Neutron Monitoring Scram. The Intermediate Range Monitors (IRM) D, E, F, H and G all indicated Upscale High High. There were no Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) or Containment Isolation System actuations. All other systems functioned as designed.

The cause of the Reactor Scram is still under investigation. This event requires a 4-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' This event also requires an 8-hour report per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B), (1) Reactor protection system (RPS) including: reactor scram or reactor trip, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5430030 September 2019 10:28:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Primary Containment Isolation System
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
Reactor Building Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

On July 31, 2019, at approximately 1650 hours Central Daylight Time (CDT), Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 1 experienced a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 isolation during performance of surveillance procedure 1-SR-3.3.6.2.3(A), Reactor/Refueling Zone Ventilation Radiation Monitor 1-RM-90-140/142 Calibration and Functional Test. The Group 6 isolation caused the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) Trains A, B, and C, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystem B. Unit 1 H2O2 Analyzer and Drywell Radiation Monitor CAM, 1-RM-90-256, were declared Inoperable and Technical Specifications (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.4.5 Condition B was entered. All affected safety systems responded as expected. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 6 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. This condition was the result of two cleared fuses in the alarm logic. The apparent cause is a ground fault on the A6 Open Drain Input/Output Module. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Acton Program as Condition Report 1537358.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
ENS 5429930 September 2019 01:22:00FermiNRC Region 3Secondary containment
HVAC
On September 29, 2019 at 2228 EDT, during a planned swap of Reactor Building HVAC trains, the exhaust fan discharge damper for the train being removed from service failed to close when the train was shutdown, which resulted in the Technical Specification (TS) for secondary containment pressure not being met for approximately 2 minutes and 15 seconds. The maximum secondary containment pressure observed during that time was approximately 0.1 inches of water gauge (positive).

Secondary containment pressure was returned to within the TS operability limit of greater than or equal to 0.125 inches of vacuum water gauge (TS SR 3.6.4.1.1) by restarting the train of RBHVAC. Secondary containment pressure is currently stable. Secondary containment was declared Operable at 2235 EDT. There were no radiological releases associated with this event. Declaring secondary containment inoperable is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5429325 September 2019 15:30:00FermiNRC Region 3High Pressure Coolant Injection
Service water
Emergency Equipment Cooling Water
At 1203 EDT, on September 25, 2019, during a Division 2 Emergency Equipment Service Water (EESW) pump and valve surveillance test, the Division 2 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (EECW) Temperature Control Valve was found to be approximately 80 percent open rather than in its required full open position during fail safe testing. The Division 2 EESW system is required to support operability of the Division 2 EECW system. The Division 2 EECW system cools various safety related components, including the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system room cooler. An unplanned HPCI inoperability occurred based on a loss of the HPCI Room Cooler. An investigation is underway into the cause of the failure. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

The licensee is in 72-hour shutdown action statement.
ENS 5429225 September 2019 08:26:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4High Pressure Core Spray
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
At 2338 PDT on September 24, 2019, the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was declared inoperable due to a leak on DSA-PCV-2C (2 inch Diesel Starting Air Pressure Control Valve). With one of two air headers isolated and being drained for maintenance, this leak caused the remaining starting air header for HPCS-GEN-DG3 (HPCS Diesel Generator) to lower to less than the operability limit.

Upon declaring the HPCS system inoperable, TS 3.5.1 Action B was entered. In accordance with Action B, the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system was verified to be operable. Action B provides a 14 day completion time to restore HPCS to an operable status. All other Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) were operable during this event. This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function credited for mitigating the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The HPCS system is a single train system at Columbia. The leak was isolated and starting air header pressure restored to the HPCS diesel generator at 0104 PDT on September 25, 2019, and all associated Technical Specifications were exited.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."
ENS 5429124 September 2019 15:02:00CookNRC Region 3On September 24, 2019, at 0930 EDT, a non-licensed employee contract supervisor had a confirmed positive test result for illegal drugs during a random test. The employee's access to the plant has been denied. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
ENS 5428923 September 2019 14:15:00BraidwoodNRC Region 3Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1106 CDT Braidwood Unit 1 experienced an automatic reactor trip due to lowering steam generator water levels following closure of the 1B steam generator feed water regulating valve.

The cause of the 1B steam generator feedwater regulating valve failing closed is unknown at this time and is under investigation.

Both trains of auxiliary feedwater started automatically following the reactor trip to maintain steam generator water levels.

All systems responded as expected with the exception of intermediate range nuclear instrument N-36 which was identified as being undercompensated following the reactor trip. Both source range nuclear instruments were manually energized in accordance with station procedures. Steam generator power operated relief valves lifted momentarily and reseated as designed in response to the secondary transient due to the reactor trip. The main steam dump valves are in service to the main condenser to provide heat sink cooling. The plant is being maintained at normal operating pressure and temperature. AC power is being provided by offsite power with the diesel generators in stand by and all safety systems available. There is no impact to Unit 2. This report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for a RPS actuation, 4 hour notification, and per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for an automatic actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system, 8 hour notification.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5428721 September 2019 10:28:00FarleyNRC Region 2Auxiliary Feedwater
Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Manual ScramAt 0800 (CDT), with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent (power), the reactor was manually tripped due to elevated vibration indication on the 2C reactor coolant pump exceeding annunciator response procedure trip criteria. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post trip. Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) auto actuated as expected following the manual reactor trip.

Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed via the use of AFW and subsequent steaming of the steam generators to the main condenser. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b(2)(iv)(B). In addition, this event report is being reported as an eight-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR50.72(B)(3)(iv)(A) for a specified system actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident inspector has been notified.

Farley reported that there was no increase in containment unidentified leakage or fluctuations with RCP seal flow during this event.
ENS 5428418 September 2019 13:42:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 0750 CDT, on September 18, 2019, South Texas Project Electric Generating Station (STPEGS) experienced an unplanned loss of the Integrated Computer System (ICS) to the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). The loss of ICS resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability to the STPEGS EOF for greater than 90 minutes. Assessment capability has been verified to be available in the Unit 2 Technical Support Center (TSC) and the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Control Rooms. ICS was restored to the EOF at 0932 CDT on September 18, 2019.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as any event that resulted in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5428317 September 2019 14:08:00Three Mile IslandNRC Region 1Event of Public Interest performed to notify State and Local agencies for emergency vehicle response required due to an on-site non-work related illness. The individual was unresponsive and was unable to be resuscitated due to the medical issue. The individual was outside the Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) and no radioactive material or contamination was involved.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Responding to the site were emergency medical services, fire, and police.

The licensee notified Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Dauphin County Emergency Management Agency, Cumberland County Emergency Management Agency, Lancaster County Emergency Management Agency, York County Emergency Management Agency, and Lebanon County Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5428116 September 2019 14:35:00ClintonNRC Region 3Reactor Water CleanupOn 9/16/19 at 0817 CDT, the Division 1 and Division 2 reactor water cleanup (RT) system differential flow instrumentation was declared inoperable due to failing downscale caused by flashing in the sensing lines that occurred during reactor cooldown for refueling outage C1R19. The Division 1 and Division 2 RT differential flow instrumentation were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1 Conditions D and E which require restoring at least one division of instruments to operable status within one hour. This condition renders the leakage detection system incapable of performing its safety function, thus it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

In response to the above, system alignment was changed to increase subcooling to restore indication. Division 1 and 2 Division RT differential flow instrumentation were declared operable at 0852 on 9/16/19.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
ENS 5427813 September 2019 12:23:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0427 CDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1334 EDT FROM NEEL SHUKLA TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427713 September 2019 12:21:00Watts BarNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/19/2019 AT 1341 EDT FROM DEAN BAKER TO ANDREW WAUGH * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427613 September 2019 11:57:00SequoyahNRC Region 2EN Revision Text: EMERGENCY OPERATING FACILITY UNAVAILABLE DUE TO ACCESS ISSUES

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. A condition impacting access to the Emergency Operating Facility, Central Emergency Control Center (CECC), located in the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex occurred on September 13, 2019 at 0527 EDT. Fire suppression capabilities for the TVA Chattanooga Office Complex are currently impacted by a water main failure rendering access to the facility unsafe for personnel. If an emergency is declared requiring CECC activation during this period, other emergency response centers will be activated and staffed using existing emergency planning procedures and have the capability to perform the functions normally performed by the CECC. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The condition does not affect the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE ON 09/16/2019 AT 1148 EDT FROM SCOTT THOMAS TO BRIAN LIN VIA PHONE * * *

Water lines impacting the Chattanooga Office Complex were repaired, and as of time 0734 EDT on 9/16/19, the CECC was returned to a functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event update.

Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).
ENS 5427212 September 2019 03:25:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Steam GeneratorThe following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

Radiation monitor RU-140 (#2 Steam Generator Main Steam Line radiation monitor) experienced a communication failure on both ports A and B. The RU-140 monitor is off line and non-functional at this time. At least one channel of RU-140 is required to perform a Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) dose assessment. This represents an unplanned loss of radiological assessment capability for the inability to perform dose assessments that require the radiation monitor. The ability to make emergency classifications from other radiological data collection methods such as field sampling remains available. Actions have been initiated to restore the radiation monitor.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed."
ENS 5427112 September 2019 00:49:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Primary containmentOn September 11, 2019 at 1719 CDT, plant personnel identified a condition in which the 208 foot elevation inner primary containment airlock door was not in its fully seated and latched position while the 208 foot elevation outer primary containment airlock door was opened. The 208 foot elevation outer containment airlock door was subsequently closed by the individual exiting the area. The time that both 208 foot elevation containment airlock doors were not in their fully seated and latched positions was less than 1 minute. Following this occurrence, maintenance personnel inspected the 208 foot elevation inner containment airlock door and re-positioned this door to its fully seated and latched position. There was no radioactive release as a result of this event.

This condition requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
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