Emergency Notification System

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[RSS - Reactor Events]

06-27-2020

Region 1 0 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 1 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 1 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 0 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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[list]

by company

AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 0 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 0 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 0 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 0 [Constellation events] [RSS]
Consumers Energy 0 [Consumers Energy events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 1 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 0 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 1 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
Duquesne Light Company 0 [Duquesne Light Company events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 0 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 0 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Eversource Energy 0 [Eversource Energy events] [RSS]
Exelon 0 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 1 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Houston Lighting and Power Company 0 [Houston Lighting and Power Company events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Luminant 0 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 1 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Northeast Nuclear Energy 0 [Northeast Nuclear Energy events] [RSS]
Omaha Public Power District 0 [Omaha Public Power District events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 0 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 0 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 0 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 0 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 1 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
WEC Energy Group 0 [WEC Energy Group events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 0 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 0 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
Électricité de France 0 [Électricité de France events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 0 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 0 Department of Defense [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 1 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Braidwood 0 Exelon [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 0 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Exelon [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 0 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 0 Exelon [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 1 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Exelon [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 0 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 0 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Consolidated Interim Storage Facility 0 Consolidated Interim Storage Facility [Consolidated Interim Storage Facility events] [RSS]
Cook 0 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 0 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Exelon [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Farley 0 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 1 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 0 Exelon [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Omaha Public Power District [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
General Atomics 0 [General Atomics events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Exelon [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 0 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 0 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 0 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Holtec 0 [Holtec events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Exelon [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 0 Bechtel [Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 0 Exelon [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Lee 0 Duke Energy [Lee events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Exelon [Limerick events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 0 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 0 Exelon [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 0 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 0 Exelon [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 0 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 0 Exelon [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania State University 0 Pennsylvania State University [Pennsylvania State University events] [RSS]
Perry 0 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 0 Entergy [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Point Beach 0 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 0 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 0 Exelon [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
Reed College 0 Reed Research Reactor [Reed College events] [RSS]
River Bend 0 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 0 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
SHINE Medical Technologies 0 [SHINE Medical Technologies events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 0 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
Summer 0 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Surry 0 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 0 Exelon [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 PGE [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 1 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
Tuxedo 0 Union Carbide Company [Tuxedo events] [RSS]
University of Buffalo 0 [University of Buffalo events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vanowen 0 Vanowen [Vanowen events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Vogtle 0 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Waterford 0 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 1 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 0 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Zion 0 Exelon [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

B&W-L-LP 0 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CE 0 [CE events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 0 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 0 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 0 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 0 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 0 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 547625 July 2020 23:05:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Auxiliary FeedwaterReactor trip caused by turbine trip due to voltage regulator issues. Plant is stable. Exited the Emergency Operating Procedure Network.

Auxiliary Feedwater automatically actuated and was subsequently restored to standby.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 547612 July 2020 02:01:00FermiNRC Region 3Emergency Diesel Generator
Shutdown Cooling
Residual Heat Removal
At 2305 EDT on July 1, 2020, while in Mode 5 for Refueling Outage 20 with no core alterations in progress, Fermi 2 experienced a loss of Division 2 offsite power (345 kV) which resulted in a valid automatic initiation of the Division 2 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 13 and 14. EDG 13 and 14 started as expected to supply their associated busses. Division 1 offsite power remains operable and powering the Division 1 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in Shutdown Cooling (SDC) mode of operation. Division 1 EDGs 11 and 12 remain operable and available.

The cause of the loss of Division 2 offsite power is under review and has preliminarily been determined to be caused by Mayfly accumulation in and around the Division 2 (345 kV) switchyard. Actions have been put in place to minimize and deter Mayflies from gathering near plant switchyards. All systems responded as expected for the loss of Division 2 offsite power and no loss of SDC occurred. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), as a valid specified system actuation.
ENS 5475322 June 2020 13:45:00Watts BarNRC Region 2At 1304 EDT on June 22, 2020, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) Units 1 and 2 initiated voluntary communication to the State of Tennessee and local officials as part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) Groundwater Protection Initiative (GPI), after receiving analysis results for one on-site monitoring well that indicated tritium activity above the GPI voluntary communication threshold. WBN identified and corrected the cause. This condition did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5475222 June 2020 01:00:00CatawbaNRC Region 2HVACAt 2100 on June 21, 2020, a condition was discovered which will require corrective maintenance activities to be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work will include repair of the Condensing Unit system. The estimated duration of repair is unknown at this time.

If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5474918 June 2020 20:37:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1On June 18, 2020, Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 1 determined that leakage from an outside out-of-service liquid waste pipe that is within a radiologically controlled area contains several isotopes. Analysis indicates greater than 2,000 picoCuries per liter of tritium, and isotopes of Mn-54, Co-58, Co-60, and Cs-137 are above the lower limit of detection. At 1725 EDT, in accordance with site procedures and NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative,' notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was planned. At 1930 EDT notification to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was completed. The leak is currently contained. The leakage did not exceed any NRC regulations or reporting criteria.

This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 547428 June 2020 18:52:00SummerNRC Region 2At 1725 EDT on 6/8/2020, V.C. Summer Nuclear Station reported a transmission fluid spill to the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. The spill was the result of a hydraulic hose leak during equipment testing. This spill did not violate any NRC regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The spill resulted in 1 - 2 ounces of transmission fluid being released into the Monticello Reservoir.
ENS 547418 June 2020 01:08:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4On June 7, 2020, at 2238 CDT Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was notified by Claiborne County that one Emergency Notification Siren located on US Hwy 61 South had actuated. Claiborne County was informed that no emergency exists at GGNS.

The alarming siren has since been secured. Notification is being provided to the NRC in regards to the potential for media inquiry.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 547406 June 2020 12:25:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Steam Generator
Feedwater
Main Condenser
Manual ScramAt 0920 (EDT), with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to group 1 of control rod bank 'B' fully inserting into the core. All systems responded normally post trip. Operations has stabilized the plant in mode 3 at NOP/NOT (normal operating pressure and temperature). Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser.

Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected.

This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)

The senior NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The plant response to the trip was uncomplicated. All safe shutdown equipment is available. There were no reliefs or safeties actuated during the transient.

The licensee manually tripped eight days ago for the same condition. See EN #54731.
ENS 547385 June 2020 10:39:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Control Room Emergency VentilationEN Revision Text: CONTROL ROOM BOUNDARY DOOR FAILURE

On June 5, 2020, at 0320 (EDT) a loss of control room envelope (CRE) was declared inoperable due to failure of door 204-36-007. The door was repaired at 0322 (EDT), restoring the CRE to operable. The NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local authorities were notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/09/2020 AT 1443 EDT FROM GERALD A. BAKER TO OSSY FONT * * *

The purpose of this call is to retract a report made on June 5, 2020, NRC Event Number EN54738. NRC Event Report number EN54738 describes a condition at Millstone Power Station Unit 2 (MPS2) in which a control room envelope boundary door was discovered to not be able to fully close due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position. The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(3)(v)(D) via an 8 hour prompt report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Upon further review, MPS2 determined that there was no loss of safety function. An engineering evaluation determined that even with the control room boundary door unable to be fully closed due to the latching mechanism being stuck in the extended position, control room air in-leakage would not have been sufficient to prevent the control room emergency ventilation system from performing its safety function. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number EN54738 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R1DO (Dimitriadis).
ENS 547353 June 2020 17:10:00McGuireNRC Region 2A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.
ENS 547332 June 2020 19:41:00BrunswickNRC Region 2On June 2, 2020, at 1905 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), Brunswick Steam Electric Plant (BSEP) made a report to the Department of Transportation (DOT) concerning the identification during receipt inspection of removable contamination in excess of 49 CFR 173.443(a) limits on an empty Type 'A' transportation shipping cask received at BSEP. All smears taken on the cask rain cover, trailer bed, and tires were less than minimum detectable activity for removable contamination.

This notification is being made as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5473129 May 2020 16:41:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Steam Generator
Feedwater
Main Condenser
Manual ScramAt 1403 EDT, with the unit in Mode 1 and 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to Group 1 of Control Rod Bank 'B' unexpectedly inserting. All systems responded normally post-trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3 at 557 degrees Fahrenheit. Decay heat removal is being accomplished via the steam dumps in the steam pressure mode to the main condenser. Emergency feedwater actuated due to low low steam generator level as expected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5472927 May 2020 11:35:00CookNRC Region 3On 5/27/20 at approximately 0912 EDT, the Operations Shift Manager was made aware that the Berrien County Sheriff's Department (BCSD) inadvertently actuated the emergency sirens during a planned weekly test. BCSD notified Cook Nuclear Plant that an audible test was initiated instead of a silent test. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. No press release is planned by the licensee at this time.

This notification is being made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification, as a four (4) hour report.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5472726 May 2020 15:55:00SurryNRC Region 2A contract foreman had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5472626 May 2020 13:17:00FermiNRC Region 3A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5472525 May 2020 08:44:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Emergency Diesel Generator
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Automatic ScramAn (automatic) reactor SCRAM occurred at 0433 CDT, on 05/25/2020, from 66 percent core thermal power. The cause of the SCRAM was due to a Main Turbine Trip. The cause of the Turbine Trip is under investigation.

All systems responded as designed. No loss of offsite power or (Emergency Safety Feature) (ESF) power occurred. No (Emergency Core Cooling System) (ECCS) or Emergency Diesel Generator initiations occurred. Main Steam Isolation valves remained open and no radioactive release occurred due to this event. The plant is stable in mode 3. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), as any event or condition that results in actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS), when the reactor is critical. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

Decay heat removal is through the Feedwater and Condensate System.
ENS 5472421 May 2020 17:38:00WaterfordNRC Region 4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a pre-access fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated.
ENS 5472020 May 2020 12:07:00Watts BarNRC Region 2Emergency Diesel GeneratorAt 0521 EDT on May 20, 2020, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and Unit 1 defueled, an actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) System occurred while transferring the 1B-B 6.9kV Shutdown Board (SDBD) from the maintenance feed to its normal power supply. The reason for the 1B-B 6.9kV SDBD failing to transfer to the normal power supply is under investigation. The EDGs automatically started as designed when a valid actuation signal was received.

The event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the EDGs.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471819 May 2020 19:57:00Watts BarNRC Region 2At 1329 EDT on May 19, 2020, it was discovered that the main control room (MCR) envelope was inoperable due to a control room envelope (CRE) door being found ajar; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The CRE door was closed, restoring the MCR envelope to operable at 1331 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471615 May 2020 13:25:00SalemNRC Region 1At 0947 (EDT) on 5/15/20, Salem reported to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection a sheen on the Delaware River. This discovery did not violate any NRC (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) regulations or reporting criteria. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

The licensee will be notifying the National Response Center and Lower Alloways Creek Township. The substance spilled was less than one pint of hydraulic oil.
ENS 5471414 May 2020 19:28:00South TexasNRC Region 4At 1535 CDT, on 5/14/2020, it was determined that approximately 10 gallons of hydraulic oil was spilled during dredging activities into the STP Intake Basin (adjacent to the Colorado River). Cleanup using oil booms is underway and there is no longer a visible sheen. The cause of the hydraulic oil spill is under investigation.

The Texas General Land Office was notified at 1610 CDT.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471214 May 2020 18:36:00CatawbaNRC Region 2At approximately 1430 (EDT) on May 14, 2020, Catawba Nuclear Station (CNS) requested offsite transport for treatment of a contractor to an offsite medical facility. Upon arrival of the coroner, the individual was declared deceased at 1630 (EDT) on May 14, 2020.

The fatality was not work-related and the individual was outside of the Radiological Controlled Area. No news release by CNS is planned. Notifications are planned to the South Carolina Division of Occupational Safety and Health.

This is a four-hour notification, non-emergency for a notification of other government agency. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5471013 May 2020 18:01:00ByronNRC Region 3At 1000 CDT on May 13, 2020, the Byron Station Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency ventilation system inlet isolation damper would not open as required to support system operation. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC were unaffected by this condition. If an emergency was declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC became uninhabitable, the Station Emergency Director would relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures. The TSC emergency ventilation system inlet isolation damper has been repaired and is now functional. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5470913 May 2020 13:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Primary Containment Isolation System
Shutdown Cooling
Residual Heat Removal
Reactor Water Cleanup
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system.

On March 16, 2020, at approximately 0102 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant (BFN), Unit 3 received motor trip-out alarms and diagnosed Group 2 and 3 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Isolations, 3C Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump tripping and Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) system isolating. All affected safety systems responded as expected. BFN, Unit 3, was nearing the end of the U3R19 refueling outage at the time of the event, and was still dependent on the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) system. Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist: therefore, the PCIS actuation was invalid. The event was determined to have been caused by clearance restoration activities in an unprotected control panel. A fuse re-installation inadvertently created a fault condition between two different plant 120 VAC power sources when the fuse holder's lower spring clip contacted a different fuse. This was a result of age-related degradation of the fuse holder, its close proximity to other fuses, and the lack of insulating isolation barriers between fuses. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1594925.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5470813 May 2020 05:38:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Steam Generator
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 0208 EDT on 05/13/2020, Sequoyah Unit 1 was at 100% power when an automatic reactor trip signal was received concurrent with a low steam line pressure safety injection signal.

The low steam line pressure safety injection signal was actuated from the steam pressure rate of decrease feature. Main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) automatically closed as designed and steam generator pressures stabilized following the isolation. All other safety-related equipment operated as designed, with the exception of 1-FCV-61-122 Glycol inboard containment isolation valve which failed to automatically isolate on a Phase A containment isolation signal. The corresponding outboard containment isolation valve, 1-FCV-61-110, automatically isolated as designed which isolated penetration X-114. Safety injection was terminated at 0221 EDT 5/13/20, and Unit 1 is currently being maintained in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure with auxiliary feedwater supplying the steam generators and decay heat removal via steam generator atmospheric relief valves. There is no indication of any primary to secondary leakage. The electrical alignment is normal with shutdown power supplied from off-site power. There is no current operational impact to Unit 2. There is no impact on public health or safety. Post safety injection actuation investigation is in progress.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5470713 May 2020 01:14:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Reactor Coolant SystemDuring the performance of reactor vessel closure head (RVCH) inspections, at 2220 EDT on May 12, 2020, it was determined that the Unit 1 RVCH penetration nozzle number 18 did not meet ASME code case N-729-4 requirements. A surface examination (penetrant test) identified a linear indication on nozzle number 18. The indication was not through-wall as determined by ultrasonic testing. The condition of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head penetration nozzle number 18 will be resolved prior to re-installation of the Unit 1 reactor vessel head. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5470111 May 2020 13:07:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Service water
Spray Pond
The following event descriptions are based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of these events additional information is identified that is pertinent to the events or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73.

This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe invalid actuations of both trains of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 3 essential spray pond (SP) system, which serves as an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink as described in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9). This notification covers two similar, but separate invalid actuations occurring in Unit 3 on March 14, 2020 at 12:44 (MST) and again on April 25, 2020 at 12:10 (MST). On each day, an invalid actuation of the Unit 3 train "B" Fuel Building Essential Ventilation Actuation Signal (FBEVAS) occurred during performance of the Balance of Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System weekly auto test. The auto/manual pushbutton was depressed to initiate the test and the sequencer immediately tripped FBEVAS train "B" with subsequent cross trip of FBEVAS train "A". These actuations resulted in complete and successful actuations of both trains of essential spray pond pumps. The events were entered into the PVNGS corrective action program and a station evaluation is in progress. There was no adverse impact to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

The NRC resident inspectors have been informed.
ENS 546976 May 2020 14:11:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2Reactor Protection System
Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Building Ventilation
Reactor Water Cleanup
Control Room Emergency Ventilation
This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of a general containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On March 8, 2020, at approximately 2021 CDT, Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant Unit 2 experienced an unexpected loss of the 2A Reactor Protection System (RPS). This resulted in Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) groups 2, 3, 6, and 8 isolations, and the initiation of Standby Gas Treatment Trains A and B, and Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Train A. All affected safety systems responded as expected.

Plant conditions which initiate PCIS Group 2 actuations are Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. The PCIS Group 3 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3) or Reactor Water Cleanup Area High Temperature. The PCIS Group 6 actuations are initiated by Reactor Vessel Low Water Level (Level 3), High Drywell Pressure, or Reactor Building Ventilation Exhaust High Radiation (Reactor Zone or Refuel Zone). The PCIS Group 8 actuations are initiated by Low Reactor Vessel Water Level (Level 3) or High Drywell Pressure. At the time of the event, these conditions did not exist; therefore, the actuation of the PCIS was invalid. The RPS MG Set trip was believed to have been caused by an intermittent short across a spike suppressor, which led to a loss of generator output signal to a voltage regulator. The affected components have been replaced. There were no safety consequences or impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event. This event was entered into the Corrective Action Program as Condition Report 1593265.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 546934 May 2020 23:40:00LaSalleNRC Region 3High Pressure Core SprayEN Revision Text: DIESEL GENERATOR COOLING WATER SYSTEM DECLARED INOPERABLE

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. A through wall leak was found on piping connected to the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water Strainer. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 DG Cooling Water System has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 DG Cooling Water System is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency DG and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON MAY 8, 2020 AT 1709 EDT FROM JOE MESSINA TO BRIAN LIN * * *

This update retracts Event Notification #54693, which reported a condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An evaluation of the flaw on the piping connected to the Unit 2 Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water strainer concluded that the system would have remained operable. The High Pressure Core Spray system, supported by the operable DG Cooling Water system, remained operable and capable of performing its safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO (Stone).
ENS 546923 May 2020 22:28:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement.

At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546913 May 2020 11:43:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1Reactor Protection System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Main Turbine
Reactor Recirculation Pump
Automatic ScramAt 0821 EDT on May 3, 2020, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine.

The Unit 1 reactor was operating at 76 percent reactor power following a ramp schedule to full power subsequent to a maintenance outage. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of the Reactor Protection System actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on End of Cycle - Recirculation Pump Trip. Reactor water level lowered to -1 inch causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No Emergency Core Cooling System or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling actuations occurred. The operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. No Steam Relief Valves opened. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and press release will occur.

This event requires a 4-hour Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 546901 May 2020 15:34:00CooperNRC Region 4Secondary containmentAt 0831 CDT, the Main Control Room received a 'Reactor Building 903 ft. Access Both Doors Open' alarm. Investigation found the interlock between the inner and outer doors did not prevent the opening of both doors while personnel were accessing the Reactor Building. The doors were immediately closed. Based on alarm times, both doors were open for less than one second. With both doors open, SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. This unplanned Secondary Containment inoperability constitutes a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and (d), 'An event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.'

Secondary Containment was declared operable at 0836 CDT after independently verifying at least one Secondary Containment access door was closed.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 546881 May 2020 13:16:00SummerNRC Region 2At approximately 1238 EDT on May 1, 2020, an alarm indicated smoke on a non-safety related electrical switchgear bus in the turbine building. Plant personnel were dispatched to investigate. Smoke and heat were found coming from the bus. At 1253 EDT, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared. At 1308 EDT the fire was declared out and fire watches posted.

Offsite assistance was requested during the event and the Jenkinsville, SC fire department responded to the site. There were no plant personnel injuries or impact to the health and safety of the public. The cause of this event is unknown at the present time. The electrical bus has been de-energized. The unit is currently in a planned refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE SHEALY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1754 EDT * * *

The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1737 EDT on May 1, 2020. The cause of the event is currently being investigated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Miller). NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
ENS 546871 May 2020 11:53:00CookNRC Region 3Reactor Coolant SystemEN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE

At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit. At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, inspections inside containment identified the leak as pressure boundary leakage from a pressurizer spray line which also requires entry into LCO 3.4.13, Condition B. At 1059 EDT on May 1, Unit 2 was tripped from 15 percent power. All systems functioned normally. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 5/15/2020 AT 1442 EDT FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage. There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction.

Notified R3DO (Stone).
ENS 5468024 April 2020 07:00:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Reactor Coolant SystemAt 0130 (EDT) on April 24, 2020, during the Beaver Valley Power Station, Unit 2 refueling outage, while performing examinations of the 66 reactor vessel head penetrations, it was determined that one penetration could not be dispositioned as acceptable per ASME Code Section XI. Penetration 37 will require repair prior to returning the vessel head to service. The indication was not through wall and there was no evidence of leakage based on inspections performed on the top of the reactor vessel head. The examinations were being performed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(6)(ii)(D) and ASME Code Case N-729-4 to find potential flaws/indications before they grow to a size that could potentially jeopardize the structural integrity of the reactor vessel head pressure boundary. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5467822 April 2020 18:46:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's unescorted access has been terminated.
ENS 5467722 April 2020 14:52:00HatchNRC Region 2High Pressure Coolant InjectionAt 1015 (EDT), on 04/22/2020, while Unit 2 was at approximately 0.4 percent power in MODE 2, reactor pressure was increased to 150 psig while HPCI was INOPERABLE due to not having been placed in standby. HPCI does not have a redundant system; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). ADS (Automatic Depressurization System) and low pressure ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) systems were OPERABLE during this time. HPCI was returned to OPERABLE status at 1109 hrs. on 04/22/2020.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5467522 April 2020 10:43:00BrunswickNRC Region 2Primary containmentThis 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER (licensee event report) submittal as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B).

At approximately 1025 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 5, 2020, with Unit 1 shutdown in Mode 5 for refueling, an invalid actuation of Group 6 Primary Containment Isolation Valves (PCIVs) (i.e., Containment Atmospheric Control/Monitoring and Post Accident Sampling isolation valves) occurred. The invalid actuation occurred when power was lost as a result of the Inboard Isolation Logic Fuse being removed per a planned clearance hang to support maintenance.

The PCIVs functioned successfully and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. This event did not result in any adverse impact to the health and safety of the public.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5466614 April 2020 23:36:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3Control Room Emergency VentilationOn April 14, 2020 at 1645 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, both units entered Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause and corrective actions of the RCU feed breaker trip.

The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions.

This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
ENS 5466313 April 2020 19:33:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Steam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Automatic ScramAt 1550 EDT on 4/13/2020, with Millstone Power Station Unit 3 operating at approximately 82 percent reactor power, an automatic reactor trip occurred following a turbine trip due to low condenser vacuum caused by the trip of multiple circulating water pumps. Due to the loss of the circulating water pumps, decay heat removal was established by the steam generator atmospheric dump valves. All other systems responded as expected to the trip.

Auxiliary feedwater actuated automatically as expected following the trip due to low-low levels in the steam generators. There was no risk to the public. There was no impact to Millstone Unit 2. The Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. This event is being reported as a four hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a condition that resulted in actuation of the reactor protection system while the reactor was critical, and as an eight hour report under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B) for actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.

The licensee also notified the state of Connecticut, the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the city of Waterford.
ENS 5466111 April 2020 01:03:00OconeeNRC Region 2Feedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Condenser
Manual ScramAt 2125 EDT on April 10, 2020, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 32 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to a tube leak in the 3F1 feedwater heater. The trip occurred during a planned shutdown for a refueling outage.

The trip was not complicated, with all systems responding normally post-trip. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 2 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5465710 April 2020 10:58:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1On April 10, 2020, at 0300 (EDT), an oil leak from 23PCV-12, HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) Trip System Pressure Control Valve (PCV), resulted in the system being declared inoperable. This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546529 April 2020 03:37:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Reactor Coolant SystemOn April 9, 2020 at 0100 EDT, while performing a containment walkdown due to a small increased Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage, a leak was identified on the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection piping. The source of the leakage cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. At that time, Condition B of Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage' was entered due to pressure boundary leakage. TS 3.4.4 'RCS Loops - Mode 1 and 2' and Technical Requirement (TR) 3.4.6 'ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components' are also applicable. Unit 2 is projected to be taken to Mode 5 for repairs.

This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for 'Initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.'

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. There is no effect on Unit 1
ENS 546518 April 2020 17:23:00HarrisNRC Region 2On April 8, 2020, at 0945 EDT, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered. The issue involved a loss of TSC habitability due to failure of outside air intake fans. These fans were

returned to service at 1237 EDT and the TSC is currently functional.

This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility.

This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspectors have

been notified.
ENS 546508 April 2020 17:03:00VogtleNRC Region 2A licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546394 April 2020 05:31:00CallawayNRC Region 4Steam Generator
Feedwater
Auxiliary Feedwater
At 0114 (CDT) on April 04, 2020 the plant was in Mode 1 at 100 percent power when a Digital Feedwater Trouble alarm was received unexpectedly. Operators identified a full feedwater demand signal and lowering level in the 'C' Steam Generator. At 0115 a Reactor Trip signal for Low Steam Generator Level was received. All systems responded as expected. A Feedwater Isolation signal was received due to the reactor trip with RCS average temperature less than 564 degrees Fahrenheit. Auxiliary Feedwater started on a valid actuation signal to restore and maintain Steam Generator levels. The Plant is being maintained stable in Mode 3 with no complications.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the Reactor Trip.

All control rods fully inserted from the reactor trip signal, and decay heat is being removed via the Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems.
ENS 546321 April 2020 21:05:00WaterfordNRC Region 4On April 1, 2020, a licensed senior reactor operator, returning from a leave of absence, disclosed a Fitness-For-Duty policy violation, which occurred on July 29, 2019. The individual's site access has been removed. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 546311 April 2020 19:11:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Main CondenserAutomatic ScramOn April 1, 2020, at 1625 EDT, Milllstone Unit 3 was in Mode 1, at 100 percent power, when an automatic reactor trip occurred following a main generator trip. The cause was due to a circuit fault between the main generator breaker and the offsite switchyard. The reactor trip was not complicated and the reactor remains stable in Mode 3. One of the two offsite electrical sources remain inoperable with an investigation of the circuit fault underway. Decay heat removal is maintained by the main condenser. There was no effect on Unit 2. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. The licensee notified State and local government agencies.
ENS 546301 April 2020 19:07:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5462127 March 2020 15:18:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4Shutdown Cooling
Steam Bypass Control System
The following is a summary of information obtained from Palo Verde via email:

During pre-installation testing, five Masoneilan Model transducers were identified as unable to be calibrated prior to installation. These transducers were received by the vendor as safety-related components and are used to provide remote control operation of the Atmospheric Dump Valves (ADVs). The ADVs provide a safety grade method for cooling the unit to Shutdown Cooling System entry conditions, should Palo Verde's preferred heat sink via the Steam Bypass Control System to the condenser and/or atmosphere not be available. The transducer receives a 4-20 mA signal and translates it to a 3-15 psi output to the ADV positioner. This is accomplished by varying the supply air from 23-30 psi down to the appropriate 3-15 psi signal. Palo Verde provided an Interim 10 CFR 21 Report for the five Masoneilan Model 8005N transducers, Part 21 log number 2019-36-00, ML 19323C971, which was submitted by Arizona Public Service (APS) Company on November 15, 2019. An evaluation of the transducers was completed on March 19, 2020. The evaluation concluded that the inability of the transducers to be calibrated represented a defect. The licensees affected are undetermined at this time. Palo Verde has been in communication with the vendor. The vendor has currently not provided an extent of condition.

Point of Contact: Lorraine Weaver (602) 448-5915
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