Emergency Notification System

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__NOCACHE__ [RSS - Reactor Events]

06-16-2022

Region 1 1 [Region 1 Events] [RSS]
Region 2 1 [Region 2 Events] [RSS]
Region 3 3 [Region 3 Events] [RSS]
Region 4 4 [Region 4 Events] [RSS]
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by company

... further results
Allied-General Nuclear Services 0 [Allied-General Nuclear Services events] [RSS]
AmerGen 0 [AmerGen events] [RSS]
Ameren 1 [Ameren events] [RSS]
American Electric Power 0 [American Electric Power events] [RSS]
Arizona Public Service 1 [Arizona Public Service events] [RSS]
Carolina Power & Light Company 0 [Carolina Power & Light Company events] [RSS]
Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company 0 [Cincinnati Gas & Electric Company events] [RSS]
Cleveland Electric 0 [Cleveland Electric events] [RSS]
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co 0 [Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co events] [RSS]
Constellation 1 [Constellation events] [RSS]
Consumers Energy 0 [Consumers Energy events] [RSS]
DTE Energy 1 [DTE Energy events] [RSS]
Dominion 0 [Dominion events] [RSS]
Duke Energy 1 [Duke Energy events] [RSS]
Duquesne Light Company 0 [Duquesne Light Company events] [RSS]
EDF Energy 0 [EDF Energy events] [RSS]
Energy Northwest 2 [Energy Northwest events] [RSS]
Entergy 2 [Entergy events] [RSS]
Eversource Energy 0 [Eversource Energy events] [RSS]
Exelon 0 [Exelon events] [RSS]
FirstEnergy 4 [FirstEnergy events] [RSS]
GEH Hitachi 0 [GEH Hitachi events] [RSS]
GPU Nuclear 0 [GPU Nuclear events] [RSS]
Houston Lighting and Power Company 0 [Houston Lighting and Power Company events] [RSS]
Illinois Power Company 0 [Illinois Power Company events] [RSS]
Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation 0 [Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corporation events] [RSS]
Long Island Lighting Company 0 [Long Island Lighting Company events] [RSS]
Luminant 0 [Luminant events] [RSS]
NextEra Energy 0 [NextEra Energy events] [RSS]
Niagara Mohawk 0 [Niagara Mohawk events] [RSS]
Northeast Nuclear Energy 0 [Northeast Nuclear Energy events] [RSS]
Omaha Public Power District 0 [Omaha Public Power District events] [RSS]
Ontario Power Generation 0 [Ontario Power Generation events] [RSS]
PSEG 0 [PSEG events] [RSS]
Pacific Gas & Electric 0 [Pacific Gas & Electric events] [RSS]
Pennsylvania Power and Light Company 0 [Pennsylvania Power and Light Company events] [RSS]
Portland General Electric 0 [Portland General Electric events] [RSS]
Power Authority of the State of New York 0 [Power Authority of the State of New York events] [RSS]
Progress Energy 0 [Progress Energy events] [RSS]
Rochester Gas and Electric 0 [Rochester Gas and Electric events] [RSS]
STP Nuclear Operating Company 0 [STP Nuclear Operating Company events] [RSS]
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company 0 [South Carolina Electric & Gas Company events] [RSS]
Southern California Edison 0 [Southern California Edison events] [RSS]
Southern Nuclear 0 [Southern Nuclear events] [RSS]
Talen Energy 0 [Talen Energy events] [RSS]
Tennessee Valley Authority 0 [Tennessee Valley Authority events] [RSS]
WEC Energy Group 0 [WEC Energy Group events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation 0 [Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation events] [RSS]
Xcel Energy 1 [Xcel Energy events] [RSS]
ZionSolutions 0 [ZionSolutions events] [RSS]

by site

Site#CompanyEvent lists
Aerotest 0 [Aerotest events] [RSS]
Arkansas Nuclear 0 Entergy [Arkansas Nuclear events] [RSS]
Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute 0 Department of Defense [Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute events] [RSS]
BWX Technologies 0 BWX Technologies [BWX Technologies events] [RSS]
Barnwell 0 Allied-General Nuclear Services [Barnwell events] [RSS]
Beaver Valley 2 FirstEnergy [Beaver Valley events] [RSS]
Berkeley Research Reactor 0 University of California [Berkeley Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Big Rock Point 0 Consumers Energy [Big Rock Point events] [RSS]
Braidwood 0 Constellation [Braidwood events] [RSS]
Breazeale Nuclear Reactor 0 Breazeale Nuclear Reactor [Breazeale Nuclear Reactor events] [RSS]
Browns Ferry 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Browns Ferry events] [RSS]
Brunswick 0 Duke Energy [Brunswick events] [RSS]
Byron 0 Constellation [Byron events] [RSS]
Callaway 1 Ameren [Callaway events] [RSS]
Calvert Cliffs 0 Constellation [Calvert Cliffs events] [RSS]
Catawba 0 Duke Energy [Catawba events] [RSS]
Chattanooga 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Chattanooga events] [RSS]
Clinton 0 Constellation [Clinton events] [RSS]
Columbia 2 Energy Northwest [Columbia events] [RSS]
Comanche Peak 0 Luminant [Comanche Peak events] [RSS]
Consolidated Interim Storage Facility 0 Consolidated Interim Storage Facility [Consolidated Interim Storage Facility events] [RSS]
Cook 0 American Electric Power [Cook events] [RSS]
Cooper 0 Entergy [Cooper events] [RSS]
Crystal River 0 Duke Energy [Crystal River events] [RSS]
Davis Besse 0 Cleveland Electric [Davis Besse events] [RSS]
Diablo Canyon 0 Pacific Gas & Electric [Diablo Canyon events] [RSS]
Dow Chemical Company 0 [Dow Chemical Company events] [RSS]
Dresden 0 Constellation [Dresden events] [RSS]
Duane Arnold 0 NextEra Energy [Duane Arnold events] [RSS]
Elk River 0 [Elk River events] [RSS]
Entergy Headquarters 0 Entergy [Entergy Headquarters events] [RSS]
Erwin 0 Nuclear Fuel Services [Erwin events] [RSS]
Farley 0 Southern Nuclear [Farley events] [RSS]
Fermi 1 DTE Energy [Fermi events] [RSS]
FitzPatrick 0 Constellation [FitzPatrick events] [RSS]
Fort Calhoun 0 Omaha Public Power District [Fort Calhoun events] [RSS]
Fort Saint Vrain 0 Xcel Energy [Fort Saint Vrain events] [RSS]
Framatome ANP Richland 0 [Framatome ANP Richland events] [RSS]
General Atomics 0 [General Atomics events] [RSS]
Ginna 0 Constellation [Ginna events] [RSS]
Grand Gulf 1 Entergy [Grand Gulf events] [RSS]
HI-STORE 0 Holtec [HI-STORE events] [RSS]
Haddam Neck 0 Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co [Haddam Neck events] [RSS]
Hallam 0 [Hallam events] [RSS]
Harris 0 Duke Energy [Harris events] [RSS]
Hatch 0 Southern Nuclear [Hatch events] [RSS]
Holtec 0 [Holtec events] [RSS]
Hope Creek 0 PSEG [Hope Creek events] [RSS]
Humboldt Bay 0 Pacific Gas and Electric [Humboldt Bay events] [RSS]
Idaho State University 0 [Idaho State University events] [RSS]
Indian Point 0 Entergy [Indian Point events] [RSS]
Kansas State University 0 [Kansas State University events] [RSS]
Kennett Square 0 Constellation [Kennett Square events] [RSS]
Kewaunee 0 Dominion [Kewaunee events] [RSS]
Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory 0 Bechtel [Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory events] [RSS]
La Crosse 0 Dairyland Power Cooperative [La Crosse events] [RSS]
LaSalle 0 Constellation [LaSalle events] [RSS]
Lee 0 Duke Energy [Lee events] [RSS]
Limerick 0 Constellation [Limerick events] [RSS]
Los Alamos National Laboratory 0 [Los Alamos National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Lynchburg Research Center 0 [Lynchburg Research Center events] [RSS]
MIT Nuclear Research Reactor 0 [MIT Nuclear Research Reactor events] [RSS]
Maine Yankee 0 Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company [Maine Yankee events] [RSS]
McGuire 1 Duke Energy [McGuire events] [RSS]
Millstone 0 Dominion [Millstone events] [RSS]
Monticello 0 Xcel Energy [Monticello events] [RSS]
NRC Region 1 0 NRC [NRC Region 1 events] [RSS]
NRC Region 4 0 NRC [NRC Region 4 events] [RSS]
National Bureau of Standards Reactor 0 [National Bureau of Standards Reactor events] [RSS]
National Renewable Energy Lab 0 [National Renewable Energy Lab events] [RSS]
Nine Mile Point 0 Constellation [Nine Mile Point events] [RSS]
North Anna 0 Dominion [North Anna events] [RSS]
North Carolina State University 0 [North Carolina State University events] [RSS]
Oak Ridge National Laboratory 0 [Oak Ridge National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Oconee 0 Duke Energy [Oconee events] [RSS]
Ohio State University 0 [Ohio State University events] [RSS]
Oregon State University 0 [Oregon State University events] [RSS]
Oyster Creek 0 Holtec [Oyster Creek events] [RSS]
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 0 [Pacific Northwest National Laboratory events] [RSS]
Palisades 0 Entergy [Palisades events] [RSS]
Palo Verde 1 Arizona Public Service [Palo Verde events] [RSS]
Parr 0 [Parr events] [RSS]
Peach Bottom 0 Constellation [Peach Bottom events] [RSS]
Perry 2 FirstEnergy [Perry events] [RSS]
Pilgrim 0 Holtec [Pilgrim events] [RSS]
Plum Brook 0 [Plum Brook events] [RSS]
Point Beach 0 NextEra Energy [Point Beach events] [RSS]
Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant 0 [Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant events] [RSS]
Prairie Island 1 Xcel Energy [Prairie Island events] [RSS]
Purdue University 0 [Purdue University events] [RSS]
Quad Cities 1 Constellation [Quad Cities events] [RSS]
Rancho Seco 0 Sacramento Municipal Utility District [Rancho Seco events] [RSS]
Reed College 0 Reed Research Reactor [Reed College events] [RSS]
Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission 0 [Rhode Island Atomic Energy Commission events] [RSS]
River Bend 0 Entergy [River Bend events] [RSS]
Robinson 0 Duke Energy [Robinson events] [RSS]
SHINE Medical Technologies 0 [SHINE Medical Technologies events] [RSS]
Saint Lucie 0 NextEra Energy [Saint Lucie events] [RSS]
Salem 0 PSEG [Salem events] [RSS]
San Onofre 0 Southern California Edison [San Onofre events] [RSS]
Sandia National Laboratories 0 [Sandia National Laboratories events] [RSS]
Saxton 0 GPU Nuclear [Saxton events] [RSS]
Seabrook 0 NextEra Energy [Seabrook events] [RSS]
Sequoyah 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Sequoyah events] [RSS]
Shippingport 0 [Shippingport events] [RSS]
Shoreham 0 Long Island Lighting Company [Shoreham events] [RSS]
South Texas 0 STP Nuclear Operating Company [South Texas events] [RSS]
Summer 0 South Carolina Electric & Gas Company [Summer events] [RSS]
Sundesert 0 San Diego Gas & Electric Compnay [Sundesert events] [RSS]
Surry 0 Dominion [Surry events] [RSS]
Susquehanna 0 Talen Energy [Susquehanna events] [RSS]
Texas A&M University 0 [Texas A&M University events] [RSS]
Three Mile Island 0 Constellation [Three Mile Island events] [RSS]
Trojan 0 Portland General Electric [Trojan events] [RSS]
Turkey Point 0 NextEra Energy [Turkey Point events] [RSS]
Tuxedo 0 Union Carbide Company [Tuxedo events] [RSS]
U.S. Geological Survey 0 [U.S. Geological Survey events] [RSS]
University of Buffalo 0 [University of Buffalo events] [RSS]
University of California - Irvine 0 [University of California - Irvine events] [RSS]
University of Illinois 0 [University of Illinois events] [RSS]
University of Lowell 0 [University of Lowell events] [RSS]
University of Maryland 0 [University of Maryland events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Columbia 0 [University of Missouri-Columbia events] [RSS]
University of Missouri-Rolla 0 [University of Missouri-Rolla events] [RSS]
University of New Mexico 0 [University of New Mexico events] [RSS]
University of Texas at Austin 0 [University of Texas at Austin events] [RSS]
University of Utah 0 [University of Utah events] [RSS]
University of Wisconsin 0 [University of Wisconsin events] [RSS]
Vallecitos 0 GEH Hitachi [Vallecitos events] [RSS]
Vanowen 0 Vanowen [Vanowen events] [RSS]
Vermont Yankee 0 Entergy [Vermont Yankee events] [RSS]
Victoria 0 Exelon [Victoria events] [RSS]
Vogtle 0 Southern Nuclear [Vogtle events] [RSS]
Washington State University 0 [Washington State University events] [RSS]
Waterford 1 Entergy [Waterford events] [RSS]
Watts Bar 0 Tennessee Valley Authority [Watts Bar events] [RSS]
Wolf Creek 0 Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation [Wolf Creek events] [RSS]
Yankee Rowe 0 [Yankee Rowe events] [RSS]
Zion 0 ZionSolutions [Zion events] [RSS]

by Reactor type

Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 0 [Advanced Boiling Water Reactor events] [RSS]
B&W-L-LP 0 [B&W-L-LP events] [RSS]
B&W-R-LP 0 [B&W-R-LP events] [RSS]
CANDU 0 [CANDU events] [RSS]
CANDU-6 0 [CANDU-6 events] [RSS]
CANDU-9 0 [CANDU-9 events] [RSS]
CE 2 [CE events] [RSS]
CP0 0 [CP0 events] [RSS]
CP1 0 [CP1 events] [RSS]
CP2 0 [CP2 events] [RSS]
Economic and Simplified Boiling Water Reactor 0 [Economic and Simplified Boiling Water Reactor events] [RSS]
Evolutionary Power Reactor 0 [Evolutionary Power Reactor events] [RSS]
GE Pool 0 [GE Pool events] [RSS]
GE-1 0 [GE-1 events] [RSS]
GE-2 0 [GE-2 events] [RSS]
GE-3 1 [GE-3 events] [RSS]
GE-4 1 [GE-4 events] [RSS]
GE-5 2 [GE-5 events] [RSS]
GE-6 3 [GE-6 events] [RSS]
P4 REP 1300 0 [P4 REP 1300 events] [RSS]
Pool 0 [Pool events] [RSS]
TRIGA 0 [TRIGA events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark I 0 [TRIGA Mark I events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark II 0 [TRIGA Mark II events] [RSS]
TRIGA Mark III 0 [TRIGA Mark III events] [RSS]
VVER-1000 0 [VVER-1000 events] [RSS]
W-AP1000 0 [W-AP1000 events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop 1 [Westinghouse PWR 2-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop 2 [Westinghouse PWR 3-Loop events] [RSS]
Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop 2 [Westinghouse PWR 4-Loop events] [RSS]

Recent Notifications

 Entered dateSiteRegionReactor typeSystemScramEvent description
ENS 5597330 June 2022 18:07:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6Feedwater
Service water
Reactor Protection System
Control Rod
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

At 1445 (CDT) on June 30, 2022, with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of balance of plant (BOP) transformer 23. All control rods fully inserted into the core and all systems responded appropriately. Reactor level is being maintained with condensate and feedwater. Reactor pressure is being maintained with turbine bypass valves. The cause of the loss of BOP transformer 23 is under investigation at this time. Standby Service Water 'A' and 'B' were manually initiated to supply cooling to Control Room A/C, ESF switchgear room coolers, and plant auxiliary loads. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event or condition that resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the actuation of Standby Service Water.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5597230 June 2022 14:21:00CallawayNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopService waterThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report the occurrence of an invalid automatic actuation satisfying the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), specifically for the actuation of one train of the Essential Service Water (ESW) system that occurred on May 1, 2022. On May 1, 2022, with the plant shut down and the core offloaded, control room personnel were performing a fast power transfer from Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) transformer XNB02 to ESF transformer XNB01. In anticipation of this activity, the `B' load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) had been removed from service. Also, at the time, a portion of the `A' ESW train was isolated to support performance of a local leak rate test (LLRT) of a containment isolation valve in the affected portion of `A' ESW train piping. Service Water was supplying cooling water flow to `A' train loads (in lieu of ESW cooling water). When the power transfer was performed, an unexpected automatic start of the `A' ESW pump, along with some associated, automatic valve repositioning, occurred. The actuation occurred due to inadvertent satisfaction of automatic start logic for the ESW pump. The logic is intended to detect loss of ESW flow when the opposite train LSELS isolates Service Water during an undervoltage condition on a safety bus. The flow transmitter involved in the actuation is situated in a portion of the ESW piping that was isolated for the LLRT. The low-flow signal from the transmitter was consequently not reflective of low cooling water flow to plant loads in light of the fact that cooling water flow was being supplied to plant loads and the transmitter was locally isolated. In regard to the ESW train actuation, therefore, although the undervoltage signal was considered a valid signal due to the voltage drop caused by the fast transfer activity, the low-flow signal from the noted transmitter was considered to be invalid. For this invalid actuation, it was concluded that the actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence, that the affected system was not properly removed from service during the occurrence, and that the safety function had not already been performed relative to the occurrence.

(The) NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and an email of this report has been sent to hoo.hoc@nrc.gov.
ENS 5596828 June 2022 18:03:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5596425 June 2022 01:00:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4Reactor Protection System
Primary containment
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Main Steam
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 2338 EDT, on June 24, 2022, with the unit in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically scrammed due to an RPS actuation following a Main Turbine Trip. The cause of the turbine trip is not known at this time. The scram was not complex, with systems responding normally post-scram. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Reactor water level has been recovered and maintained at the normal level. Decay Heat is being removed by the Main Steam system to the main condenser using the Turbine Bypass Valves. All Control Rods inserted into the core. The transient occurred with no surveillances or activities in progress. Investigation into the cause of the Turbine Trip is in progress.

Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The low reactor water level caused an isolation of Primary Containment (Groups 4/13/15) as expected. The Primary Containment Isolation Event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified.
ENS 5596325 June 2022 00:44:00WaterfordNRC Region 4CEFeedwater
Reactor Protection System
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 2012 CDT, Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station, Unit 3 was operating at 100 percent power when an automatic reactor trip occurred due to Main Steam Isolation Valve MS-124B going closed unexpectedly. Subsequently, both main feedwater isolation valves shut. Emergency Feedwater (EFW) was automatically actuated. Preliminary evaluation indicates that all plant systems functioned normally after the reactor trip. The unit is currently stable in Mode 3. All control rods fully inserted as expected and all other plant equipment functioned as expected. This was an uncomplicated scram. This event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and as an 8-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as valid actuation of the EFW system.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5596224 June 2022 16:28:00PerryNRC Region 3GE-6Core SprayThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone:

At 1257 EDT on June 24, 2022, it was discovered the Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS) was INOPERABLE. At Perry, the Low Pressure Core Spray System is considered a single train system in Modes 1, 2, and 3; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Inoperability of the Low Pressure Core Spray system was caused by a loss of power to the LPCS Minimum Flow Valve during surveillance activities. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5595522 June 2022 02:26:00McGuireNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 2240 on 06/21/2022, it was discovered that both required trains of Control Room Ventilation and Control Area Chilled Water System were simultaneously inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(d). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The 'B' train was restored at 2315.
ENS 5595321 June 2022 16:52:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

At 1547 EDT on June 21, 2022, it was determined that Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 experienced a reportable chemical leak. Approximately 261 gallons of a Sodium Hypochlorite/Sodium Bromine mixture reached the ground and approximately 130.5 gallons (of the 261 gallons) progressed to the Ohio River (via storm drain). The source of the leakage has been isolated and absorbent material has been placed to contain the leakage. Following confirmation of this leakage, notifications were made to the following offsite agencies starting at 1615 EDT: National Response Center (Incident Report # 1339391) Pennsylvania Department Of Environmental Protection Beaver County Emergency Management

This condition is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5594315 June 2022 09:47:00Beaver ValleyNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0724 EDT on 6/15/2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering Steam Generator levels due to a secondary plant perturbation in the Heater Drain System. All control rods fully inserted into the core and the Auxiliary Feedwater System automatically started as designed in response to the full power reactor trip. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. There was no equipment inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the reactor trip or adversely impacted plant response. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the condenser steam dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected and remains at 100 percent power and stable. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Additionally, this event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5594214 June 2022 15:57:00Prairie IslandNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 2-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

A licensed operator supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant is on hold in accordance with the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5593813 June 2022 18:21:00ColumbiaNRC Region 4GE-5Reactor Protection System
Primary containment
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing lncore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to an unplanned valid actuation of a system pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2). Additionally, this is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration. The NRC resident was notified by the licensee.

  • * * UPDATE FROM SIMEON MORALES TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1547 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *

The following information was received via email: This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) only for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. The containment isolation was not due to actual plant conditions or parameters meeting design criteria for containment isolation. Therefore, this is considered an invalid actuation. Updated ENS Text: During thermography of a reactor protection system (RPS) distribution panel, a circuit breaker (RPS-CB-7B) was inadvertently opened. This resulted in a partial loss of power to RPS Division B, which caused containment isolations to occur in multiple systems (Reactor Water Clean Up, Equipment Drains Radioactive, Floor Drains Radioactive, Reactor Recirculation, and Traversing Incore Probe). Specifically, RWCU-V-1, FDR-V-3, EDR-V-19, RRC-V-19, and TIP-V-15 all closed. All actuations occurred as designed upon the partial loss of RPS power. This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a major loss of emergency assessment capability due to the inability to assess primary containment identified and unidentified leakage rates. Emergency assessment capability was restored at 1008 PDT upon system restoration. The plant is stable, and all effected systems have been restored. There was no impact to the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC resident has been notified.

Notified R4DO (Azua).
ENS 559263 June 2022 20:32:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEAuxiliary Feedwater
Spray Pond
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

The following event description is based on information currently available. If, through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe invalid actuations of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 B Train Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system and Essential Spray Pond (ESP) system that occurred while in a refueling outage. On April 11, 2022, at approximately 2045 Mountain Standard Time, an automatic start of the Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP systems occurred during restoration from a surveillance test. The station was conducting a surveillance test during a Unit 1 refueling outage to verify the proper responses of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems to simulated design basis events. The test portion was completed satisfactorily; however, during the restoration portion, the load sequencer inadvertently cycled between Mode 0 and Mode 1 three times in immediate succession. At the time of the system actuations, one of the actuation signals associated with this portion of the test had been reset per procedure. Another actuation signal was still in while restoration steps were ongoing, but the sequencer was not expected to cycle between Modes. The system actuations did not occur as a result of actual plant conditions or parameters and are therefore invalid. The Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP system actuations were complete and the systems started and functioned successfully. For the systems that did not actuate, the reasons are clearly understood as those systems were in an overridden condition due to test configuration. The spurious actuation was not able to be replicated and a direct cause was not identified. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 559221 June 2022 13:58:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email followed by phone call:

At approximately 1043 CDT, the Quad Cities Main Control Room was notified that the Scott County Iowa warning sirens were activated in error at 1001 CDT. The sirens were not intentionally activated to notify the public of severe weather or pending emergency. This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), News Release or Notification of Other Government Agencies. This is a 4-Hour Reporting requirement.

The Quad Cities NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5591827 May 2022 22:53:00South TexasNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

On 5/25/2022 at 1354 (CDT), during the replacement of two detectors, a halon actuation occurred which resulted in an unintentional release of approximately 384 pounds of halon gas into an enclosed room in the Unit 1 Electrical Auxiliary Building. There was no impact to plant operations or plant personnel. The room was verified by station Safety Personnel to be safe for normal access. On 5/27/2022 at 2038 (CDT), Region 12 (Houston) of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was notified of an event which met the requirements of "Emission Event" for the TCEQ of a halon release that exceeded the reportable quantity threshold of 100 pounds in a 24 hour period. The halon discharge was contained within the site protected area. Therefore, this event is not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5591526 May 2022 10:34:00Grand GulfNRC Region 4GE-6The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

On May 26, 2022, at 0753 CDT, the Grand Gulf Nuclear Station was notified of a spurious actuation of a single Alert Notification System siren in Tensas Parish, Louisiana. The actuation occurred during siren testing conducted at approximately 0630 CDT - no emergency conditions are present at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station. A press release from Entergy is not planned at this time. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a notification of an offsite government agency.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5591024 May 2022 06:49:00CookNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Turbine
Main Condenser
Control Rod
Main Steam
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

On May 24, 2022, at 0414 EDT, while rolling the Unit 1 main turbine during the Unit 1 Cycle 31 refueling outage, the Unit 1 main turbine experienced high vibrations and the main turbine was manually tripped with reactor power at 12 percent. Main turbine vibrations persisted and the reactor was manually tripped, Main Steam Stop Valves were closed, and main condenser vacuum was broken. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation as a four (4) hour report, and under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. The DC Cook Resident NRC Inspector has been notified.

Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. All control rods fully inserted. Both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps started properly. Decay heat is being removed via Steam Generator Power Operated Relief Valves. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event.
ENS 5590923 May 2022 21:01:00SusquehannaNRC Region 1GE-4Feedwater
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 1716 hours EDT on May 23, 2022, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed. Unit 1 reactor was being operated at approximately 100 percent (Rated Thermal Power) RTP. The Control Room received indication that both divisions of (Reactor Protection System) RPS actuated from (Reactor Pressure Vessel) RPV high pressure signals and all control rods fully inserted. The Main Turbine bypass valves opened automatically to control reactor pressure. Reactor water level lowered to -42 inches causing Level 3 and Level 2 isolations. (High Pressure Coolant Injection) HPCI (Emergency Core Cooling System) ECCS actuation occurred as designed at -38 inches and injected to the Reactor Vessel. No other ECCS system actuations occurred. (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling) RCIC automatically initiated as designed at -30 inches. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Feedwater pumps. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. An investigation is in progress into the cause of the Automatic SCRAM. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to (Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency) PEMA will be made.

This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A) & 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
ENS 5590823 May 2022 19:15:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

At 1256 CST on 05/23/2022, it was discovered both trains of Control Room Area Ventilation Air Conditioning Systems were simultaneously INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5590723 May 2022 11:23:00CooperNRC Region 4GE-4Secondary containmentThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

On May 23, 2022, at 0455 CST, Cooper Nuclear Station experienced a spike in Secondary Containment differential pressure which exceeded the Technical Specifications Surveillance Requirements 3.6.4.1.1 limit of -0.25 inches of water gauge. Secondary Containment differential pressure restored to Technical Specification limits within two minutes and further investigation is ongoing. This unplanned Secondary Containment inoperability constitutes a condition reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D).

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5590520 May 2022 17:39:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0905 CST on 05/20/2022, it was discovered both trains of Control Room Area Filtration and Area Ventilation Air Conditioning Systems were simultaneously INOPERABLE. Due to this INOPERABILITY, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5589916 May 2022 19:51:00Peach BottomNRC Region 1GE-4Feedwater
High Pressure Coolant Injection
Main Steam Isolation Valve
Primary containment
Main Steam Line
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

Unit 2 experienced multiple electrical transients resulting in a Group I Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) isolation and subsequent unit reactor scram. Low reactor water level during the automatic scram caused PCIS Group II and III isolation signals. Following the PCIS Group I isolation, all main steam lines isolated. All control rods inserted and all systems operated as designed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee via phone in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Peach Bottom Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to an electrical transient and subsequent PCIS Group I isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure). Unit 2 lost main feedwater due to the PCIS Group I isolation, however, all other systems responded as expected following the scram. High Pressure Coolant Injection is maintaining pressure control while Condensate Pumps are maintaining inventory. The unit is currently stable and in Mode 3. Peach Bottom Unit 3's Adjustable Speed Drives were impacted by the electrical transients and the unit reduced power to 98 percent power.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5589613 May 2022 17:47:00MonticelloNRC Region 3GE-3Steam Jet Air EjectorThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

On 5/13/22 at 1111 CDT the station entered LCO 3.7.4 Condition B for Control Room Envelope being inoperable. This was due to results from an inspection in the Steam Jet Air Ejector room that identified steam leakage exceeding the leakage rate assumptions made in the Alternate Source Term (AST) dose analysis calculation. Therefore, this is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

There is no impact to the health and safety of the public. NRC Resident has been notified.
ENS 5589411 May 2022 22:25:00FermiNRC Region 3GE-4High Pressure Coolant InjectionManual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

During performance of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump and Valve Operability surveillance in accordance with procedure 24.202.01, the turbine tripped without operator action. The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 10 percent power with the HPCI turbine running in a test mode at 5100 gpm with all surveillance criteria met. The surveillance was near completion at the point where the HPCI turbine is manually tripped. Before the manual trip was performed, the HPCI turbine tripped without operator action. Prior to performance of the surveillance, HPCI was provisionally operable with only satisfactory completion of Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) surveillance remaining to declare HPCI operable. HPCI surveillance testing was performed at low reactor pressure (165 psig) in Mode 2 satisfactorily. Investigation into the cause of this trip is in progress. HPCI has been declared inoperable from the time of release of the surveillance. Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was verified to be operable prior to and after the surveillance in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 condition E.1.

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5589311 May 2022 18:12:00MillstoneNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant is on hold in accordance with the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5589110 May 2022 23:42:00Quad CitiesNRC Region 3GE-3Core SprayThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

At 1359 CDT on May 10, 2022, the 1B LPCI Loop Upstream Injection valve (1-1001-28B) was found to have a motor operated torque switch issue and inadequate lubrication. This issue called into question the ability of the valve to close when required. At 1746 CDT on May 10, 2022, both trains of Unit 1 LPCI were made simultaneously inoperable. TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A required de-activation of 1B LPCI Loop Downstream Injection valve (1-1001-29B) which was completed at 1746 CDT. Because of the de-activation of the 1B LPCI Loop downstream injection valve and LPCI Loop select logic, both trains of LPCI were made inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V). Unit 1 HPCI and both loops of Core Spray are operable. After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 12:32 EDT ON 05/11/22 FROM MARK HUMPHREY TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: The last sentence in the second paragraph, "After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required," has been deleted. The licensee is continuing to follow up on the issue and believes that sentence to be unclear and premature.

Notified R3DO (Skokowski).
ENS 558887 May 2022 04:37:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPSteam Generator
Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

At 2310 EDT on May 6, 2022, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System occurred while entering a planned refueling outage. The reason for the EFW auto-start was a loss of all Main Feedwater (MFDW) Pumps which occurred when the 3A MFDW Pump tripped on steam generator (SG) overfill protection due to high level in the 3B SG. The high level in the 3B SG occurred when a Startup Feedwater Control Valve (3FDW-44) malfunctioned, resulting in excessive feedwater flow to the 3B SG. Investigation and repairs are in progress. Units 1 and 2 were not affected. This event is being reported as an 8-hr non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EFW system.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 558785 May 2022 04:30:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CESteam Generator
Feedwater
Emergency Diesel Generator
Auxiliary Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 1955 on May 4, 2022, a start-up transformer de-energized, resulting in a loss of power to the Unit 2 Train A 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus and the Unit 3 Train B 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus. The Unit 2 Train A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Unit 3 Train B EDG automatically started and energized their respective 4.16 kV Class 1E Buses. As a result of the Loss of Power on the Unit 3 Train B 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus, the B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump automatically started, as expected. The B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not needed for steam generator level control and no auxiliary feedwater valves repositioned. The B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump did not supply feedwater to the steam generators.

This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems and an auxiliary feedwater system.
ENS 558753 May 2022 18:44:00VogtleNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopReactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 1541 EDT on May 3, 2022, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 power, the reactor was manually tripped due to the loss of one of the main feed pumps. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. No equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event or adversely impacted plant response to the scram. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater through the steam dumps to the condenser. Unit 2 is not affected. An automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (AFW) also occurred. The AFW auto-start is an expected response from the reactor trip. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported as an eight-hour, nonemergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 558733 May 2022 14:48:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

A non-licensed Dominion Energy supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5587129 April 2022 20:44:00FitzPatrickNRC Region 1GE-4High Pressure Coolant InjectionThe following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1251 EDT on April 29, 2022, while troubleshooting the failure of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Exhaust Drain Pot High Level Alarm to clear, it was discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection exhaust line condensate drain system was not functioning as designed to support removal of condensate from the turbine exhaust. This resulted in some water accumulation in the turbine casing. Subsequently, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System was declared inoperable. As a result, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function at the time of discovery.
ENS 5586829 April 2022 07:49:00HarrisNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopReactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Main Condenser
Main Steam
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0405 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was not complex, with all systems responding normally post-trip. The Auxiliary Feedwater System started automatically as expected. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the Main Steam System to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

No Tech Spec limits were exceeded. Offsite power is available. The suspected cause for the loss of condenser vacuum is when performing the scheduled monthly swap of condenser vacuum pumps, a suction valve failed to shut.
ENS 5586729 April 2022 07:04:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

On 4/28/2022, at 2338 EDT, Sequoyah received an unexpected alarm for seismological recording initiated. At 2341 EDT, unexpected alarm 1/2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra exceeded was received. The National Earthquake Information Center was contacted to confirm there was no seismic activity, and this was also confirmed on the U.S. Geological Survey website. The alarms were determined to be invalid, and they occurred due to a failure in the seismic monitoring system. This failure results in loss of ability to assess the Emergency Action Level for Initiating Condition HU2 `Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels' per procedure EPIP-1, `Emergency Plan Classification Matrix.' If an actual seismic event had occurred, HU2 could not be assessed. However, compensatory measures have been implemented and include assessing OBE criteria based on alternative criteria contained in procedure AOP-N.05, `Earthquake,' which provides conservative guidance when seismic instruments are unavailable. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for an event resulting in a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

The faulty detector was removed from service, so the remaining detector provides conservative detection as the only source to make-up the logic for a seismological alarm.
ENS 5586629 April 2022 00:19:00SequoyahNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone:

On 04/28/22, at 2355 EDT, with both Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 in Mode-1, 100 percent, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared due to receiving two seismic alarms and security feeling ground movement. Additionally, security in a tower heard an explosion. Both units remain in Mode-1, 100 percent and they are investigating the validity of the seismic alarms before proceeding with the Abnormal Operating Procedure required shutdown. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/29/2022 AT 0410 EDT FROM BRIAN KLEIN TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: On 4/29/22, at 0406 EDT, Sequoyah Unit 1 and Unit 2 terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. The Civil Engineers determined that the alarms were due to a failed seismic indicator channel. Through interviews, only one security officer felt ground movement for a couple of seconds and heard a faint rumbling sound. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Gott) via email. Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 05/02/2022 AT 2118 EDT FROM SCOTT SEAL TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: SQN (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant) is retracting the previous NOUE (Notice of Unusual Event) declaration made on 4/28/22 at 2355 (EDT) based on Emergency Action Level HU2 for a seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake levels. Following the declaration of the NOUE, the station reviewed all available indications and determined that a seismic event had not occurred. The instrumentation failure was documented under Event Notification #55867.

Notified R2DO (Miller), and IR MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller) via email.
ENS 5585926 April 2022 13:13:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4Service water
Emergency Diesel Generator
Primary Containment Isolation System
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Shutdown Cooling
Core Spray
Residual Heat Removal
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 0040 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signals. Subsequently, at approximately 0148 EST on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray initiation signals. In addition, all four Emergency Diesel Generators auto started, Group 10 (Instrument Air) Primary Containment Isolation System actuations occurred, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Booster pumps tripped resulting in a brief interruption (approximately 9 minutes) to the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) heatsink. Jumpers, installed per planned refueling outage activities, prevented discharge of Emergency Core Cooling Systems into the reactor. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR Loop `A' were removed from service and under clearance. RHR SDC remained operable via RHR Loop `B' and forced circulation was maintained in the reactor. At the time of these events, Unit 1 was shutdown for refueling and the `A' and `C' reactor water level transmitters had been isolated in preparation for planned replacement. Leak-by of the instrument isolation valves occurred on both transmitters. Leak-by on the `C' instrument occurred at a faster rate with the `A' instrument providing the confirmatory signals resulting in Low Level 2 (LL2) and Low Level 3 (LL3) indication at approximately 0040 EST and 0148 EST, respectively. All actuations occurred as designed for LL2 and LL3 signals. During these events, reactor water level remained stable at the Reactor Vessel Head Flange and the `B' and `D' reactor water level transmitters remained off-scale-high, as expected under these conditions. Therefore, the actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system (i.e., there was no low reactor water level condition). Considering the above, these actuations were invalid.

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
ENS 5585723 April 2022 16:27:00ByronNRC Region 3Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0854 (CDT) on April 23, 2022, while performing volumetric inspections required by ASME Code Case N-729-6, a rejectable indication on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) was identified. The indication is located inboard of the J-groove weld and is OD-initiated (outer diameter - initiated). This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The repair is scheduled during the refueling outage.

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/29/22 AT 1112 EDT FROM BRYAN LYKKEBAK TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: The rejectable indication on Reactor Vessel Head Penetration 75 Core Exit Thermocouple (CETC) initiated on the outside diameter (OD) of the nozzle in an area that was not surface stress mitigated (peened). The indication was found to be acceptable for continued operation under CFR and ASME requirements and will not be repaired during this outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Ziolkowski).
ENS 5585623 April 2022 06:04:00CatawbaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Manual ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

On April 23, 2022, at 0224 (EDT) hours, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, two control rods dropped during control rod testing resulting in misalignment, which required a manual reactor trip in accordance with plant procedure. All safety systems functioned as expected. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed to provide makeup flow to the steam generators. Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the steam generator power operated relief valves. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The cause of the dropped rods is being investigated. Unit 1 is not affected. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

Electrical power is in normal off-site arrangement. All emergency electrical supplies are available.
ENS 5584819 April 2022 18:02:00CallawayNRC Region 4Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5584415 April 2022 11:31:00PilgrimNRC Region 1GE-3The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On April 15, 2022 at 1000 hours (EDT), four off-site notifications were made to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Department of Environmental ÿProtection (MADEP) in accordance with the Massachusetts Contingency Plan (310 CMR 40.0000). ÿThe notifications document non-radiological contaminants found slightly above reportable concentrations in select soil and groundwater samples collected during site characterization efforts, as part of the decommissioning process, from four parcels of land at the property.ÿ ÿReportable concentrations in soil were identified in a composite sample for Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs). ÿReportable concentrations in groundwater were identified in samples for per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) and Semi Volatile Organic Compound (SVOC). Additionally, the reports include sample results where laboratory reporting limits equaled or exceeded reporting thresholds. This notification is being made solely as a four-hour, non-emergency notification for a Notification of Other Government Agency in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi).ÿ There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Lead Decommissioning Inspector and NMSS Project Manager assigned to Pilgrim have been notified.
ENS 5584314 April 2022 11:18:00North AnnaNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopSteam Generator
Reactor Protection System
Auxiliary Feedwater
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

On April 14, 2022, at 0928 (EDT) hours, Unit 1 automatically tripped from 100 percent power during the control rod operability periodic test. The reactor trip occurred during the manipulation of the rod control mode selector switch as part of the rod operability testing. The Operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. The reactor trip was uncomplicated, and all control rods fully inserted into the core. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed because of the reactor trip and provide makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv) (A) for a valid actuation of an ESF (Engineered Safety Features) system. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. An investigation into the cause of the reactor trip is underway. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

There was no affect to Unit 2. Unit 2 is operating at 100 percent power.
ENS 558318 April 2022 01:10:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopResidual Heat RemovalThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

At 1900 EDT on 04/07/22, while Unit 4 was in Mode 4 following a refueling outage, it was discovered that both trains of residual heat removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to gas voiding. At 2032 EDT corrective actions were completed and both trains of RHR were declared operable. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/11/22 AT 1022 EST FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN SMITH * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 4/8/2022 at 0110 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the (NRC Operations Center (NRCOC)) pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) that both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) were simultaneously inoperable due to the presence of gas voids that were identified during scheduled system gas accumulation testing. Subsequent evaluation by (Florida Power & Light (FPL)) Engineering has concluded that both trains of RHR remained operable and capable of performing their specified safety function. This NRCOC notification is a retraction of EN# 55831. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Miller)
ENS 558287 April 2022 16:12:00SurryNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone call:

At 0909 EDT on 4/7/2022, it was determined that a security officer tested positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 558215 April 2022 06:08:00Nine Mile PointNRC Region 1GE-5Feedwater
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
High Pressure Core Spray
Reactor Water Cleanup
Control Rod
Automatic ScramThe following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email:

On 4/5/2022, at time 0223, during maintenance on Feedwater Level Control Valve 2FWS-LV10B, a Feedwater transient occurred resulting in an RPS Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 Recirculation Sample System Isolation, Group 3 TIP ((Traversing Incore Probe)) Isolation Valve Isolation, Group 6 and 7 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation and Group 9 Containment Purge Isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS Systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8-hour non-emergency ENS ((Emergency Notification System)) reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance:

There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 558182 April 2022 15:10:00Browns FerryNRC Region 2GE-4FeedwaterThe following information was provided by the licensee via fax:

At 1345 CDT, Browns Ferry declared a Notification of Unusual Event due to a fire at the 3B Reactor Feedwater Pump within the Turbine Building which was not extinguished within 15 minutes. Subsequently, the fire was extinguished at 1402 CDT. Unit 3 remains in Mode 1 at approximately 9.5 percent rated thermal power (RTP). Unit 1 and 2 remain at 100 percent RTP and unaffected. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The fire began at 1332 CDT. It is believed that the fire was in the oil system of the Feedwater Pump. The fire was extinguished by the on-site fire brigade. No off-site assistance was requested. The Unusual Event was declared under Emergency Action Level HU-4. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and required State and local government agencies. Unit 3 is currently stable. Notified DHS-SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and CISA Central Watch Officer, and FEMA NWC, DHS NRCC THD Desk, and DHS NuclearSSA via email.

  • * * UPDATE FROM CHASE HENSLEY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1650 EDT ON 4/2/2022 * * *

The Notification of Unusual Event was exited at 1544 CDT.

Notified R2DO (Miller), IR-MOC (Kennedy), NRR-EO (Felts), DHS-SWO, FEMA Ops Center, and CISA Central Watch Officer.
ENS 5580428 March 2022 14:55:00SeabrookNRC Region 1Westinghouse PWR 4-LoopA non-licensed employee possessed a prohibited substance (alcohol) within the Protected Area. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on hold pending results of an investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5580023 March 2022 16:43:00OconeeNRC Region 2B&W-L-LPSteam Generator
Feedwater
The following information was provided by the licensee via email and phone:

At 1625 (EST) on 2/13/2022, with Unit 2 in Mode 3 at 0 percent power and plant heat up to normal operating temperature in progress, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) occurred. The reason for the EFW auto-start was lowering water level in the 2A and 2B Steam Generators due to failure of the 2A Main Feedwater Pump to respond as required to maintain Steam Generator water level as Steam Generator pressure increased during plant heat up. The 2A and 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'low steam generator level' signal was received for the 2A and 2B Steam Generators. Following further evaluation, it was determined that a valid EFW actuation occurred, therefore this event is being reported as a late 8-hour non-emergency notification of a valid actuation of the EFW system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).

There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5579619 March 2022 23:43:00Palo VerdeNRC Region 4CEThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At 1306 (MST) on March 19, 2022, the Technical Support Center (TSC) lost normal and alternate electrical power, resulting in the inability to perform emergency assessments at the TSC. At the time of the event, the normal power source to the TSC (offsite power) was under a clearance for maintenance activities and the alternate power source (backup generator) was running to provide electrical power to the TSC. At 1306, the alternate power source to the TSC was lost when the backup generator tripped. Power was restored to the TSC via the normal power source at 1723. The cause of the TSC backup generator trip is unknown at this time. All three units are stable and in Mode 1. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5578814 March 2022 18:30:00LaSalleNRC Region 3GE-5The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email:

At 1338 CDT on 3/14/2022, it was determined that a contract supervisor tested positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5578512 March 2022 06:56:00Turkey PointNRC Region 2Westinghouse PWR 3-LoopMain Steam Isolation ValveThe following information was provided by the licensee via email:

At 0050 EST on 3/12/22, while shutting down for entry into a scheduled refueling outage, the station discovered that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (4A MSIV) did not fully close on demand. All other equipment operated as expected. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 04/26/22 AT 1422 EDT FROM DAVID STOIA TO BRIAN PARKS * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 3/12/2022 at 0656 EDT Turkey Point Unit 4 notified the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) that a single Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) did not fully close when manually demanded from the control room during shutdown of Unit 4 for a refueling outage. Following disassembly and inspection of the MSIV, Florida Power & Light Engineering identified the cause of the deficiency and determined that the valve would have fully seated under its design accident conditions. This notification is a retraction of EN# 55785. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction.

Notified R2DO (Miller).
ENS 557809 March 2022 23:20:00BrunswickNRC Region 2GE-4High Pressure Coolant Injection
Reactor Core Isolation Cooling
Automatic Depressurization System
The following information was provided by the licensee:

At 2013 EST on March 9, 2022, the HPCI System was declared inoperable following evaluation of routine HPCI surveillance testing data indicating that the required response time for reaching rated conditions was not met. Therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System and Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) are operable. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Investigation is in-progress to determine the cause. Unit 1 is not affected by this event. Unit 1 is in a refueling outage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 05/04/22 AT 1135 EDT FROM CHARLIE BROOKSHIRE TO DAN LIVERMORE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 20:13 EST on March 9, 2022, the HPCI System was declared inoperable following evaluation of routine HPCI surveillance testing data indicating that the required response time for reaching rated flow and pressure was not met. Subsequent to this, it was determined that the required response time was overly conservative for assuring the safety function of the system could be fulfilled. The required response time was revised. The operability determination for this event has been updated indicating that system operability was never lost for this event. There was not a condition that could have prevented the system from fulfilling the safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R2DO (Miller).
ENS 557759 March 2022 00:47:00Davis BesseNRC Region 3B&W-R-LPThe following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email:

A non-licensed, contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM GERALD WOLF TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1448 EDT ON 3/16/2022 * * *

The following information was received from the licensee via E-mail: This is a retraction of EN55775. The measured Blood Alcohol Level (BAC) of the individual was below the Fitness-For-Duty program limits, so this event did not constitute a violation of the Fitness-For-Duty program. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

Notified R3DO (Hills) and the FFD E-mail group.
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