ENS 54687: Difference between revisions

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| unit = 2
| unit = 2
| utype = W-4-LP, W-4-LP
| utype = W-4-LP, W-4-LP
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)
| cfr = 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i)
| emergency class = Non Emergency  
| emergency class = Non Emergency
| notification date = 05/01/2020 11:53
| notification date = 05/01/2020 11:53
| notification by = Rodney Pickard
| notification by = Rodney Pickard
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| event date = 05/01/2020 03:54 EDT
| event date = 05/01/2020 03:54 EDT
| last update date = 05/15/2020
| last update date = 05/15/2020
| title = En Revision Imported Date  5/18/2020
| title = Technical Specification Required Shutdown Due to Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage
| event text = EN Revision Text: TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PRESSURE BOUNDARY LEAKAGE
| event text = At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage.
At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage.
At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit.
At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit.
At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met.
At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met.
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This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 5/15/2020 AT 1442 EDT FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *
* * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 5/15/2020 AT 1442 EDT FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *
The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.'  
The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.'
The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage.
The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage.
There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.
There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction.
Notified R3DO (Stone).
Notified R3DO (Stone).
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200518en.html#en54687
| URL = https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/event-status/event/2020/20200518en.html#en54687
}}{{unit info
| Unit =  2
| type =
| Scram code =  N
| Reactor critical =  Y
| Initial power =  100
| Initial reactor mode =  Power Operation
| Current power =  0
| Current reactor mode =  Hot Standby
}}
}}


{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]]
{{ENS-Nav}}[[Category:Power Reactor]]

Latest revision as of 12:38, 15 January 2021

ENS 54687 +/-
Where
Cook American Electric Power icon.png
Michigan (NRC Region 3)
Reporting
10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), Tech Spec Required Shutdown
Time - Person (Reporting Time:+3.98 h0.166 days <br />0.0237 weeks <br />0.00545 months <br />)
Opened: Rodney Pickard
11:53 May 1, 2020
NRC Officer: Donald Norwood
Last Updated: May 15, 2020
54687 - NRC Website