05000413/FIN-2017004-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Administrative Procedures |
| Description | The NRC identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1, Procedures. Specifically, the licensee failed to follow procedure AD-HU-ALL-004, Preparation and Work Instruction Use and Adherence. As a result, the licensee: (1) replaced a pressurizer heater breaker with an incorrect breaker, (2) performed a temporary modification incorrectly, and (3) did not perform an operational test procedure step as written. As corrective actions, the licensee: (1) replaced and tested satisfactorily breaker 1PHP1C-F01B with the correct model and entered this issue into their CAP as CR 2157978, (2) replaced 1NW-61B with the original design piping installed and entered this issue into CAP as CR 2161153, and (3) concluded there were no adverse effects to the diesel generator (DG) caused by this unloaded operation and entered this issue into the CAP as CR 21666032. The failure to follow procedure AD-HU-ALL-0004 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure adherence attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, failing to follow AD-HU-ALL-0004 could result in undetected degradation of plant equipment to perform its intended safety functions. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency confirmed to result in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not result in a loss of safety system function for a single train for greater than TS allowed outage time and did not result in a loss of safety function of one or more non-TS trains of equipment designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of procedure adherence in the area of human performance, because the licensee failed to follow procedure AD-HU-ALL-0004 during implementation of plant maintenance, engineering changes and testing. (H.8) |
| Site: | Catawba  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000413/2017004 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Austin C Scott M Meeks F Ehrhardt |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Catawba - IR 05000413/2017004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Catawba) @ 2017Q4
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