09-18-2017 | On July 20, 2017, with the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station ( DBNPS) operating at approximately 100 percent power, it was identified that the Emergency Diesel Generator ( EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents were not adequately protected from potential tornado-generated missiles. If a missile crimped the vent it could disable the transfer pump or tank, potentially impacting the seven-day fuel supply for the affected train(s) of EDG. While the storage tanks were protected from tornado missiles when installed, the vents were not provided with any such protection. Compensatory measures were established to ensure a vent path remained following a tornado event, and actions will be taken to ensure the vents for each EDG fuel oil storage tank are adequately protected from tornado missiles.
This issue is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) as an event where a single cause or condition caused two independent trains to become inoperable in a single system, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. |
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EPID:L-2018-LLL-0016, Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles, LER 17-001-00 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles (Open) |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000346/20243012024-02-0202 February 2024 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000346/2024301 IR 05000346/20230042024-01-31031 January 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2023004 ML23313A1352024-01-17017 January 2024 Authorization and Safety Evaluation for Alternative Request RP 5 for the Fifth 10 Year Interval Inservice Testing Program ML23353A1192023-12-19019 December 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, January 2024 L-23-260, Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station2023-12-0707 December 2023 Corrections to the 2022 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-23-243, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-12-0606 December 2023 Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation - Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23338A3172023-12-0606 December 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000346/2024001 IR 05000346/20234032023-11-0202 November 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2023403 ML23293A0612023-11-0101 November 2023 Letter to the Honorable Marcy Kaptur, from Chair Hanson Responds to Letter Regarding Follow Up on Concerns Raised by Union Representatives During the June Visit to the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant L-23-215, Changes to Emergency Plan2023-10-19019 October 2023 Changes to Emergency Plan ML23237B4222023-09-28028 September 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp. - Vistra Operations Company LLC - Letter Regarding Order Approving Transfer of Licenses and Draft Conforming License Amendments ML23269A1242023-09-27027 September 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure IR 05000346/20234012023-09-13013 September 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000346/2023401 (Public) L-23-205, Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-09-12012 September 2023 Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments L-23-172, Quality Assurance Program Manual2023-08-31031 August 2023 Quality Assurance Program Manual IR 05000346/20230112023-08-30030 August 2023 Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000346/2023011 ML23129A1722023-08-25025 August 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 IR 05000346/20230052023-08-24024 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (Report 05000346/2023005) L-23-188, Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-08-0707 August 2023 Energy Harbor Nuclear Corp., Supplement to Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments IR 05000346/20230502023-08-0303 August 2023 Special Inspection Report 05000346/2023050 IR 05000346/20230902023-08-0101 August 2023 EA-23-002 Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - NRC Inspection Report No. 05000346/2023090 (Public) ML23178A2742023-08-0101 August 2023 Letter to the Honorable Marcy Kaptur from Chair Hanson Responds to Letter Regarding the License Transfer Application for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station L-23-175, Submittal of Fifth Ten Year Inservice Testing Program2023-08-0101 August 2023 Submittal of Fifth Ten Year Inservice Testing Program IR 05000346/20230022023-07-27027 July 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2023002 ML23193A7842023-07-13013 July 2023 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000346/2023402 ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III ML23160A2342023-06-13013 June 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination L-23-034, 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models2023-06-13013 June 2023 2022 Annual 10 CFR 50.46 Report of Changes to or Errors in Emergency Core Cooling System Evaluation Models IR 05000346/20235012023-06-13013 June 2023 Emergency Preparedness Biennial Exercise Inspection Report 05000346/2023501 L-23-135, Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-05-31031 May 2023 Response to Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations L-23-065, Annual Financial Report2023-05-22022 May 2023 Annual Financial Report ML23124A1742023-05-17017 May 2023 Energy Harbor Fleet Vistra License Transfer - Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Commance Peak Plant, Units 1 & 2, Beaver Valley Station, Units 1 & 2, Davis Besse Station, Unit 1 and Perry Plant, Unit 1 ML23129A0112023-05-16016 May 2023 Notice of Consideration of Approval of Indirect and Direct License Transfer for Comanche Peak Plant, Units 1 & 2, Beaver Valley Station, Units 1 & 2, Davis Besse Station, Unit 1 and Perry Plant, Unit 1 (EPID L-2023-LLM-0000) (Letter) ML23131A2732023-05-15015 May 2023 Notification of NRC Supplemental Inspection 95001 and Request for Information L-23-101, Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 20222023-05-12012 May 2023 Combined Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report and Radioactive Effluent Release Report for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station - 2022 L-23-131, Readiness for Resumption of NRC Supplemental Inspection2023-05-12012 May 2023 Readiness for Resumption of NRC Supplemental Inspection IR 05000346/20230102023-05-0909 May 2023 Commercial Grade Dedication Inspection Report 05000346/2023010 ML23123A1272023-05-0303 May 2023 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection at Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station IR 05000346/20230012023-05-0101 May 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000346/2023001 and 07200014/2022001 L-23-092, Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 20222023-04-27027 April 2023 Occupational Radiation Exposure Report for Year 2022 ML23111A1972023-04-26026 April 2023 Information Meeting with Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Plant Station ML23114A1062023-04-25025 April 2023 Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection CP-202300181, ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI, Corrected Affidavit for Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-04-20020 April 2023 ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, ISFSI, Corrected Affidavit for Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments CP-202300157, ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, and ISFSI, Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments2023-04-14014 April 2023 ISFSI, Beaver Valley, Units 1 and 2, ISFSI, Davis-Besse, Unit 1, ISFSI, Perry, Unit 1, and ISFSI, Application for Order Consenting to Transfer of Licenses and Conforming License Amendments ML23096A1382023-04-11011 April 2023 Review of the Spring 2022 Steam Generator Tube Inspection Report L-23-061, Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports2023-03-31031 March 2023 Submittal of the Decommissioning Funding Status Reports L-23-037, and Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments2023-03-29029 March 2023 and Perry Nuclear Power Plant - Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation Changes, Tests, and Experiments L-23-066, Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage2023-03-21021 March 2023 Annual Notification of Property Insurance Coverage ML23066A2892023-03-14014 March 2023 Request for Threshold Determination Under 10 CFR 50.80 and 10 CFR 72.50 for an Amendment to the Voting Agreement ML23066A2592023-03-14014 March 2023 Request for Withholding Information from Public Disclosure for Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, Davis Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, and Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 2024-02-02
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000346/LER-2017-0022017-11-27027 November 2017 Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass, LER 17-002-00 For Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Regarding Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass 05000346/LER-2017-0012017-09-18018 September 2017 Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles, LER 17-001-00 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles 05000346/LER-2016-0082017-02-27027 February 2017 Application of Technical Specification for the Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation, LER 16-008-01 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Regarding Application of Technical Specification for the Safety Features Actuation System Instrumentation 05000346/LER-2016-0092016-11-0909 November 2016 Reactor Trip due to Rainwater Intrusion and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation on High Steam Generator Level, LER 16-009-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Reactor Trip due to Rainwater Intrusion and Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation on High Steam Generator Level 05000346/LER-2016-0072016-08-22022 August 2016 Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Setpoint Test Failures, LER 16-007-00 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1 Regarding Pressurizer Code Safety Valve Setpoint Test Failures 05000346/LER-2016-0062016-08-15015 August 2016 Potential to Trip Emergency Diesel Generator on High Crankcase Pressure, LER 16-006-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 RE: Potential to Trip Emergency Diesel Generator on High Crankcase Pressure 05000346/LER-2016-0052016-07-11011 July 2016 - , Plant Startup with Anticipatory Reactor Trip System in Main Turbine Bypass, LER 16-005-00 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1, Regarding Plant Startup with Anticipatory Reactor Trip System in Main Turbine Bypass 05000346/LER-2016-0042016-06-0606 June 2016 Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Resistance Temperature Detector Wire Insulation Degradation, LER 16-004-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Reactor Coolant System Hot Leg Resistance Temperature Detector Wire Insulation Degradation 05000346/LER-2016-0032016-05-31031 May 2016 Leak from Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Piping Flexible Hose due to Undetected Manufacture Weld Defect, LER 16-003-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 Regarding Leak from Reactor Coolant Pump Seal Piping Flexible Hose due to Undetected Manufacture Weld Defect 05000346/LER-2016-0022016-03-29029 March 2016 Unanticipated Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Actuation, LER 16-002-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Regarding Unanticipated Steam and Feedwater Rupture Control System Actuation 05000346/LER-2016-0012016-03-29029 March 2016 1 OF 7, LER 16-001-00 for Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 Regarding Reactor Trip During Nuclear Instrumentation Calibrations and Steam Feedwater Rupture Control System Actuation on High Steam Generator Level ML0409003422004-03-26026 March 2004 LER 97-004-01 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1 Regarding Reactor Coolant Pump Motor Oil Piping Not Protected from Leakage as Required Per 10CFR50, Appendix R ML0404901932004-02-13013 February 2004 LER 99-003-01 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1 Regarding Failure to Perform Engineering Evaluation for Pressurizer Cooldown Rate Exceeding Technical Specification Limit ML0331701982003-11-0707 November 2003 LER 98-002-01 for Davis-Besse Unit 1 Regarding Plant Trip Due to High Pressurizer Level as a Result of Loss of Letdown Capability 2017-09-18
[Table view] |
comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 001 05000 - 346 YEAR 2017 - 00 Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
System Description:
The Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station (DBNPS) Class 1 E AC Electrical Power Distribution System AC sources consist of the offsite power sources (preferred power sources, normal and alternate) and the onsite standby Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). An EDG [EK-DG] starts automatically on a Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) [JE] actuation or on an essential bus degraded voltage or loss of voltage signal.
After an EDG has started, it will automatically tie to its respective bus after offsite power is tripped.
Each EDG is provided with storage tanks [DC-TK] having a fuel oil capacity sufficient to operate that diesel for a period of seven (7) days while the EDG is supplying maximum post loss of coolant accident load demand.
Fuel oil is transferred from the above grade elevation storage tank to the day tank by a submersed transfer pump [DC-P] inside each storage tank. Without relying on the storage tanks for additional fuel, each day tank contains fuel for over twenty hours of full-power operation for its respective EDG.
Technical Specifications:
Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.8.1.b requires two EDGs be Operable in Modes 1 through 4. TS LCO 3.8.2.b requires one EDG be Operable in Modes 5 and 6, during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. TS LCO 3.8.3 requires the stored diesel fuel oil, lube oil, and starting air subsystem be within limits for each required EDG when the associated EDG is required to be Operable. With one or more EDGs with diesel fuel oil, lube oil, or starting air subsystem not within limits otherwise specified, LCO 3.8.3 Condition F requires the associated EDG be declared inoperable immediately.
DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:
In order to address the concerns outlined in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2015-06 "Tornado Missile Protection," evaluations of tornado missile vulnerabilities and their potential impact on Technical Specification (TS) plant equipment were conducted.
On July 20, 2017, with the DBNPS operating in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent power, it was identified that the EDG fuel oil storage tank vents were not adequately protected from potential tornado-generated missiles. In the event a tornado missile were to strike the storage tank vents, the missile could completely crimp the vent and isolate the vent path. While the transfer pumps would remain able to transfer fuel oil to the associated EDG day tank, the removal of liquid from the tank would create a vacuum in the tank, which could affect pump performance and challenge the structural integrity of the tank. Both EDGs were declared inoperable and NRC Enforcement Guidance Memorandum (EGM) 15-002, "Enforcement Discretion for Tornado-Generated Missile Protection Noncompliance," was applied.
CAUSE OF EVENT:
The primary cause of the inadequate missile protection on the EDG fuel oil storage tank vents was that the original system design did not recognize the need to provide missile protection for the tanks vents, which are required to support proper tank performance. The original plant design provided a single Diesel Oil Storage Tank [DE-TK] to provide fuel to the two individual EDG day tanks. This single, non-redundant tank comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
CAUSE OF EVENT: (continued) was not missile protected or seismically qualified. The need for separate, redundant, seismic, and missile- protected fuel oil storage tanks to provide a seven-day fuel supply for each EDG was identified after initial plant construction had begun, but before the operating license had been issued. Design documents from original system design and construction state that,missile protection for the fuel oil storage tanks is provided by a mound of structural backfill covering both tanks. Although design drawings show the fuel oil storage tank vents penetrate the structural backfill, none of the documents reviewed consider the vents as potential missile targets or the effect of damaged vents on the operation of the tanks and EDGs.
A contributing cause to this event was that earlier compensatory measures proceduralized in procedure RA-EP-02810, Tornados or High Winds, were not properly vetted to ensure the EDGs would remain capable of performing their design function following a tornado. The potential for a fuel oil storage tank vent to be damaged during a tornado and challenge the EDG function was first identified in 2009. Compensatory actions were established to be performed after a tornado to ensure both fuel oil storage tanks had an adequate .vent path even if the normal vents were damaged. Those compensatory actions were later incorporated in procedure RA-EP-02810 to direct operators to inspect vulnerable missile targets following a tornado strike and establish an alternate vent path if the normal vent is damaged. However, to prevent physical damage to the tanks and transfer pumps that could result from operation without adequate venting, one of the procedure steps used to establish an alternate vent requires locking out the associated transfer pump and declaring the affected EDG train inoperable. This action is not aligned with the Technical Specifications, which requires the fuel transfer system to operate as designed. Moreover, the procedure does not include steps to restore the system to service for operability. While these procedure steps would prevent additional damage to the fuel oil storage tank, they do not ensure the fuel oil storage and transfer system remains fully functional during and after a tornado.
ANALYSIS OF EVENT:
The fuel oil and transfer system has level switches in the EDG Day Tanks that initiate automatic transfer of fuel oil from the fuel oil storage tanks to the Day Tanks. If the storage tank vent path were compromised with a complete crimp by a tornado-generated missile and automatic fuel transfer was initiated, the transfer pump would start to draw a vacuum in the tank. Reduced pressure in the tank could degrade or disable the ability of the transfer pump to deliver fuel to the Day Tank and the integrity of the storage tank could be challenged, which would impact the seven-day fuel supply for the affected train(s) of EDG. When full, each EDG Day Tank contains enough fuel to supply a fully-loaded EDG for about one and one-half hours before the transfer pumps would auto start to refill the Day Tank.
While tornadoes are rather common in Ohio, the probability of a tornado striking the station is very low. As discussed in EGM 15-002, the probability of a tornado missile striking a non-conforming component is very small. For a tornado missile to disable a fuel oil storage tank, the tornado would have to generate missiles that would strike the unprotected vent piping and crimp it in a way to completely isolate the vent path. If the vent piping were sheared off completely, the tank would remain vented. If the tank vent were completely crimped, time is available for the operators to restore the vent path before the transfer pump would automatically start. Therefore, as concluded in EGM 15-002, this issue is of low risk significance.
comments regarding burden estimate to the Information Services Branch (T-2 F43), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 001 05000 - 346 YEAR 2017 - 00 Reportability Discussion:
This issue resulted in both EDGs being declared inoperable in accordance with TS LCO 3.8.1. Therefore, this issue represented an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), and an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). This issue was reported to the NRC Operations Center on July 20, 2017, at 1330 hours0.0154 days <br />0.369 hours <br />0.0022 weeks <br />5.06065e-4 months <br /> (Event Number 52865).
This issue is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to: (A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition; (B) remove residual heat; (C) control the release of radioactive material; and (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident. This issue is also being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii) as an event where a single cause or condition caused two independent trains to become inoperable in a single system, and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS:
Completed Actions:
A standing order was issued as an immediate compensatory measure to satisfy the requirements of EGM 15-002. This compensatory measure directs the operators to existing plant procedures to secure the site if a tornado watch or warning is predicted or issued and to mitigate and recover from the effects of a tornado by establishing an alternate vent path for the fuel oil storage tanks.
Scheduled Actions:
A modification will be developed and implemented to ensure vents for each EDG fuel oil storage tank are adequately protected from tornado missiles.
Procedure RA-EP-02810, Tornados or High Winds, will be revised to ensure the EDGs can perform their design function following a tornado missile strike.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS:
There have been no Licensee Event Reports (LERs) at the DBNPS in the past three years related to actual or postulated tornado missiles. A previous issue with postulated tornado missiles was reported via LER 2002-006, but did not include any issues with the EDG fuel oil storage tanks or vents. The tornado that struck the DBNPS on June 24, 1998, was classified by the National Weather Service as an F2 (Fujita Scale) with winds ranging from 113 to 157 miles per hour. While the 1998 tornado resulted in a complete loss of offsite power, the EDGs were started prior to the loss of offsite power and supplied their respective essential loads until offsite power was restored (refer to DBNPS LER 98-006 for further information).
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05000346/LER-2017-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles LER 17-001-00 for Davis-Besse, Unit 1, Regarding Emergency Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vents Not Adequately Protected from Tornado-Generated Missiles | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000346/LER-2017-002 | Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass LER 17-002-00 For Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Regarding Auxiliary Feed Water Pump Turbine Bearing Damaged due to Improperly Marked Lubricating Oil Sight Glass | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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