07-21-2017 | On May 22, 2017 at 05:10 am (EST), while placing Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water ( RHRSW) in service for biocide treatment of the Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RI IR) Reservoir, the Division 2 RI IRSW Flow Control Valve ( FCV) (El 1 50F068B) failed to fully open.
Troubleshooting discovered the direct cause was failure of the anti-rotation bushing stem key. The apparent cause was system operating conditions (high vibration) resulting in the failed tack welds. Previous troubleshooting on an indication issue on May 5, 2017 for the RHRSW FCV was inadequate, and did not identify the failure of the anti-rotation key. As a result, the RHRSW FCV was returned to service at 2:50 pm on May 7, 2017, and subsequently failed on the next on-demand stroke at 5:10 am on May 22, 2017. Seventeen similar Motor Operated Valves ( MOVs) were inspected and no MOVs exhibiting the symptoms observed on the E1150F068B prior to the failure of the anti-rotation key were found, and all anti-rotation devices were found to be intact. The Past Operability determination for 131150E068B found that the MOV was unable to perform its design basis functions from May 3. 2017 at 5:48 am, when the RI IRSW FCV was last successfully stroked under dynamic conditions, through May 24. 2017 at 4:04 pun, when the RI IRSW FCV was returned to service. The Division I RI-IRSW was available throughout the event except on two occasions. Division 1 of RHRSW was declared inoperable for Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower ( MDCT) Nozzle Cleaning activities on May 9, 2017 from 8:41 am to May 9, 2017 at I I :18 pm. Division I of RI IRSW was again declared inoperable for IVIDCT Nozzle Cleaning activities on May 11, 2017 at 8:35 am through May 11, 2017 at 10:01 pm. The as found condition of the Division 2 RHRSW FCV is a condition prohibited by Technical Specification 3.7.1 and reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(13) "Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications," and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(13) "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat. |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000341/20230042024-02-0505 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023004 ML23341A1852023-12-0808 December 2023 Acknowledgement of Response to NRC Inspection Report 05000341/2023402 and Disputed Non-Cited Violation ML23310A1492023-12-0808 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 227 Regarding Revision of Technical Specification 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating, Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency Surveillance Requirements IR 05000341/20230102023-12-0808 December 2023 Nbsp;Biennial Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection Report 05000341/2023010 IR 05000016/20230012023-12-0101 December 2023 NRC Inspection Report No. 050-00016/2023-001 (Drss) - Enrico Fermi Atomic Power Plant, Unit 1 ML23334A1902023-12-0101 December 2023 Request for Information for an NRC Post-Approval Site Inspection for License Renewal Inspection Report 05000341/2024010 ML23335A0062023-12-0101 December 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information; Inspection Report 05000341/2024002 IR 05000341/20230032023-11-0707 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023003 and 07200071/2023001 ML23297A0512023-10-30030 October 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 226 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications 3.8.1, AC Sources - Operating (Exigent Circumstances) ML23311A3482023-10-20020 October 2023 DTE Electric Company (DTE) - Submittal of the Renewed Fermi 3 Michigan Department of Environmental, Great Lakes, and Energy (EGLE) National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Permit No. MI0058892 ML23272A1552023-10-10010 October 2023 Letter to Licensee and Federal Register Notification of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License and Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination (Exigent Circumstances) (EPID L-2023-LLA-0134) (Letter) ML23283A0222023-10-0909 October 2023 Follow Up to Fermi Unit 2 Inservice Testing (IST) Program for the Fourth 10-Year Inspection Interval ML23276B4542023-10-0505 October 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000341/2023402 ML23243A8852023-09-18018 September 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 225 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water, Emergency Equipment Service Water and System and Ultimate Heat Sink (Exigent Circumstances) ML23248A2242023-09-0707 September 2023 Regulatory Audit in Support of Review of License Amendment Request for a Risk-Informed Approach for Addressing the Effects of Debris on ECCS Strainer Performance ML23223A2242023-08-29029 August 2023 Individual Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Renewed Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for Hearing (Exigent Circumstances) ML23237B4332023-08-25025 August 2023 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and RFI IR 05000341/20230052023-08-24024 August 2023 Updated Inspection Plan for Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2023005) ML23229A0122023-08-17017 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 224 to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-568, Revise Applicability of BWR TS 3.6.2.5 and TS 3.6.3.2 (Emergency Circumstances) IR 05000341/20233012023-08-16016 August 2023 NRC Initial License Examination Report 05000341/2023301 ML23227A2212023-08-15015 August 2023 Emergency Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF 568, Revise Applicability of BWR TS 3.6.2.5 and TS 3.6.3.2 ML23219A1792023-08-0707 August 2023 Information Request to Support Upcoming Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection at Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 IR 05000341/20230022023-08-0404 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023002 ML23216A1872023-08-0404 August 2023 Submittal of Relief Request RR-A25 for Extended License Period ML23206A1272023-07-26026 July 2023 NOED for Fermi Power Plant, Unit Two Technical Specification 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water Emergency Equipment Service Water System and Ultimate Heat Sink ML23200A2552023-06-28028 June 2023 Post-Exam Letter with Comments and Exam Analysis IR 05000341/20230012023-06-28028 June 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2023001 ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III ML23122A2332023-06-26026 June 2023 Issuance of Amendment No. 223 Regarding Revision of Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-582, Reactor Pressure Vessel Water Inventory Control (RPV WIC) Enhancements IR 05000341/20220102023-06-21021 June 2023 Reissue Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2, Design Basis Assurance Inspection (Teams) Inspection Report 05000341/2022010 ML23166A0892023-06-15015 June 2023 Operator Licensing Examination Approval Fermi Power Plant, June 2023 ML23158A1332023-06-0808 June 2023 Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) for Fermi Power Plant, Unit Two (EPID L-2023-LLD-0000) Technical Specification 3.7.2, Emergency Equipment Cooling Water (Eecw)/ Emergency Equipment Service Water (Eesw) System and Ultimate Heat Sink ML23130A1032023-05-17017 May 2023 Regulatory Audit Summary Regarding License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Relating to Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency IR 05000341/20234022023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000341/2023402 ML23118A3612023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request for the Cyber-Security Baseline Inspection, Notification to Perform Inspection 05000341/2023402 ML23114A1172023-05-0101 May 2023 Information Request to Support the NRC Annual Baseline Emergency Action Level and Emergency Plan Changes Inspection ML23115A4152023-04-25025 April 2023 Information Meeting with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 ML23124A2032023-04-10010 April 2023 DTE Electric Company Submittal of Fermi 3 Periodic Reports ML23200A1842023-04-0606 April 2023 Proposed Exam Submittal Letter IR 05000341/20230112023-04-0606 April 2023 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000341/2023011 IR 05000341/20234012023-03-17017 March 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2023401 ML23074A1972023-03-16016 March 2023 Confirmation of Initial License Examination February 2024 IR 05000341/20220062023-03-0101 March 2023 Annual Assessment Letter for Fermi Power Plant, Unit 2 (Report 05000341/2022006) ML22361A1022023-02-24024 February 2023 Reactor Decommissioning Branch Project Management Changes for Some Decommissioning Facilities and Establishment of Backup Project Manager for All Decommissioning Facilities ML22325A2992023-02-24024 February 2023 Audit Plan in Support of Review of License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements Relating to Emergency Diesel Generator Voltage and Frequency ML23039A1552023-02-14014 February 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000341/2022004 IR 05000341/20224032023-02-13013 February 2023 Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000341/2022403 ML23200A2162023-01-20020 January 2023 Outline Submittal Letter 2024-02-05
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEAR05000341/LER-2017-0052017-11-0303 November 2017 Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function, LER 17-005-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function 05000341/LER-2017-0042017-10-0909 October 2017 Inadequate Procedural Cuidance for Residual I feat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss if Safety Function, LER 17-004-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Residual Heat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function 05000341/LER-2017-0032017-07-21021 July 2017 Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve, LER 17-003-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve NRC-17-0040, (LER) SER 17-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Granted for Individual Subsequent to Being Denied Unescorted Access at Another Nuclear Facility2017-05-15015 May 2017 (LER) SER 17-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Granted for Individual Subsequent to Being Denied Unescorted Access at Another Nuclear Facility 05000341/LER-2017-0022017-03-16016 March 2017 High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable, LER 17-002-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable 05000341/LER-2017-0012017-03-0606 March 2017 Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box, LER 17-001-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During the Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box 05000341/LER-2016-0012017-01-23023 January 2017 Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Reactor Protection System Functions Considered Inoperable Due to Open Turbine Bypass Valves, LER 16-001-01 for Fermi 2 Regarding Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Reactor Protection System Functions Considered Inoperable Due to Open Turbine Bypass Valves ML16138A3352016-05-17017 May 2016 ASP Screening Analysis - Reject Fermi Unit 2 (341-15-002) 05000341/LER-2016-0022016-03-22022 March 2016 Both Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection Divisions Inoperable Due to Inoperable Injection Valve, LER 16-002-00 for Fermi 2, Regarding Both Residual Heat Removal Low Pressure Coolant Injection Divisions Inoperable Due to Inoperable Injection Valve NRC-13-0041, Submittal of Initial License Operator Examination2013-07-25025 July 2013 Submittal of Initial License Operator Examination NRC-09-0004, LER 08-S02-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Fitness for Duty (FFD) Drug Testing Results in Reinstated Access Authorization Being Revoked2009-01-26026 January 2009 LER 08-S02-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Fitness for Duty (FFD) Drug Testing Results in Reinstated Access Authorization Being Revoked NRC-08-0062, LER 08-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information2008-09-29029 September 2008 LER 08-S01-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information ML0509505552004-12-17017 December 2004 Final Precursor Analysis - Fermi Grid Loop NRC-04-0083, LER 04-S02-00, Fermi 2 Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information in Background Check2004-11-0808 November 2004 LER 04-S02-00, Fermi 2 Unescorted Access Revoked Upon Discovery of Adverse Information in Background Check NRC-03-0020, LER 03-S01-00, Fermi 2, Unescorted Access Granted Prior to Verification of Fitness for Duty Drug Testing Results2003-03-0505 March 2003 LER 03-S01-00, Fermi 2, Unescorted Access Granted Prior to Verification of Fitness for Duty Drug Testing Results 2017-07-21
[Table view] |
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INITIAL PLANT CONDITIONS
Mode —1 Reactor Power — 100 Reactor Pressure Vessel Temperature — 518 degrees Fahrenheit There were no structures, systems, or components (SSCs) that were inoperable at the start of this event that contributed to this event.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT
On May 22, 2017, at 5:10 am, while placing Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) [BI] in service to support biocide treatment of the Division 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) [BO] Reservoir, the Division 2 RHR Heat Exchanger Service Water Flow Control Valve [(FCV)] (E1150F068B) did not completely open as expected when the push button was pressed. The Division 2 RHRSW Flow Control Valve (FCV) (El 150F068B) failed to fully open. The RHRSW FCV indicated dual position after 5 seconds of operation in the open direction. When the RHRSW pump was started, indicated flow would not go above 2800 Gallons Per Minute (gpm). After the initial flow spike RHRSW flow settled out at 2,800 gpm and would not continue to rise as expected while holding the open pushbutton for El 1 50F068B valve. The Division 2 RHRSW Pump B was placed in off and valve position remained in dual indication. The Operator pushed the close pushbutton and no change in valve position was observed. The operator then depressed the Thermal Overload reset and verified continuity for all fuses in 72F-4A Position 3A, MCC for El 1 50F068B. The FCV was verified closed locally by stem position and manually checking close with hand-wheel. Troubleshooting discovered the direct cause was failure of the anti-rotation bushing stem key tack welds. The welds were repaired and the key was replaced. Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) was satisfactorily completed. The RHRSW FCV was returned to service at 4:04 pm on May 24, 2017.
Prior to the May 22, 2017, RHRSW FCV failure, troubleshooting did not identify cause of the failure.
On May 5, 2017, during shutdown of the Division 2 RHRSW, with flow lowered to 8500 gpm, the E1150F068B improperly indicated full closed. The RHRSW pumps were shutdown and E1150F068B was then stroked and timed with local position verification. When the open pushbutton was pressed, the open light did not come on until after approximately 55 seconds and the valve indicated full open after 125 seconds. On the close stroke, the open light went out after approximately 56 seconds (indicated full closed in the Main Control Room) and the valve was seen to be full closed locally at 124 seconds. The stroke times were longer than expected but still within acceptance criteria.
Troubleshooting activities were performed. The troubleshooting focused on the indication aspects of the Motor
3. LER NUMBER
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Operated Valve (MOV), which involved inspecting the Torque Switch, Limit Switch, and the associated wiring.
Hand wheel operation of the MOV was performed, and it was noted that the Limit Switches were not actuating when expected. The 4 train-limit switch assembly was replaced, and limits were reset.
On May 7, 2017 PMT was performed which included Equivalent Thrust diagnostic testing and Inservice Testing (IST) Stroke Time Testing Partial Surveillance 24.205.06. This PMT was performed at static conditions and in accordance with MMAll "Post Maintenance Testing Guidelines." Due to the static versus dynamic nature of the testing, the actual failure mechanism was missed and the results were accepted as satisfactory with the valve being returned to service.
The RHRSW FCV E1150F068B and Division 2 RHRSW Subsystem were considered inoperable from May 3, when the RHRSW FCV was last successfully stroked under dynamic conditions, to May 24, 2017. This is a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.1 and reportable under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) "Operation or Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications." Also, during this time, Division 1 RHRSW subsystem was inoperable on two occasions. This is additionally reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: Remove Residual Heat.
SIGNIFICANT SAFETY CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS
"[here were no safety consequences or radiological releases associated with this event. At no time during this event was there a potential for endangering the public health and safety.
UFSAR 3.8.4.1.2 The RHR complex is a reinforced-concrete structure designed to serve as the ultimate heat sink for the reactor during normal shutdowns and postulated accident conditions. The structure is approximately 280 by 127 ft in plan and is located west of the reactor/auxiliary building. The complex consists of two divisions: Division I and Division II. Each division is comprised of a water reservoir, a pump house, a two-cell mechanical draft cooling tower, and two emergency diesel generators. Division I is in the south side, and Division IT is in the north side of the complex. Each division has the capacity to safely and orderly shut down the reactor during normal and/or accident conditions completely independent of the other.
The cooling tower system is designed such that it can function even if one tower division is damaged and rendered out of operation (UFSAR 3.5.1.3.2.2).
The RHRSW system transfers heat from the RHR system to the Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS). The UHS includes two 3,465,000-gal reservoirs. Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower (MDCT) fans cool the UHS. The ultimate heat sink design conforms to the requirements of USNRC Regulatory Guide 1.27.
Fermi 2
3. LER NUMBER
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The Past Operability determination for El 150F068B found that the MOV was unable to perform its design basis functions from May 3, 2017 at 5:48 am, when the RHRSW FCV was last successfully stroked under dynamic conditions, through May 24, 2017 at 4:04 pm, when the RHRSW FCV was returned to service.
The Division 1 RHRSW was available throughout the event except on two occasions. Division 1 of RHRSW was declared inoperable for MDCT Nozzle Cleaning activities on May 9, 2017 from 8:41 am to May 9, 2017 at 11:18 pm. Division 1 of RHRSW was again declared inoperable for MDCT Nozzle Cleaning activities on May 11, 2017 at 8:35 am through May 11, 2017 at 10:01 pm.
The UHS and RHRSW capabilities were analyzed and available equipment would have prevented exceeding design basis limits in the event of a design basis accident.
Each UHS/RHRSW division has the capacity to safely and orderly shut down the reactor during normal and accident conditions completely independent of the other division. The degraded Division 2 RHRSW flow, required an analysis when UHS/RHRSW Division 1 was out of service. Division 1 RHRSW was out of service on May 9, 2017 and May 11, 2017 for maintenance on MDCT Cell sparger nozzles. During maintenance, only a single Division 1 MDCT cell was made unavailable with the other Division 1 MDCT cell left intact and available. The analysis showed that sufficient cooling capability was available for the suppression pool with degraded Division 2 RHRSW flow. The availability of remaining Division 1 equipment coupled with the flow from the Division 2 RHRSW FCV (E1150F068B) would have been sufficient to remove the heat from the Division 2 RHR system.
CAUSE OF THE EVENT
The Direct Cause was Abnormal Stress- Failure of the Anti-Rotation Key (Dropped out of keyway).
The Apparent Cause is System/Equipment Operation — High Vibration. E1150F068B experiences high vibrations during throttling activities to support RHRSW initiation and shutdown. The anti-rotation key tack welds failed and the key dropped out of the keyway allowing the stem to rotate under dynamic conditions.
The first Contributing Cause is inadequate performance monitoring. The MOV Preventive Maintenance procedures do not inspect all anti-rotation devices.
The second Contributing Cause is troubleshooting. The MMA26 "Troubleshooting" pursued Routine Troubleshooting on May 5 through May 7, 2017. The Routine Troubleshooting did not identify a true fault failure mechanism. The limit switches were replaced. The FCV PMT produced satisfactory results which were accepted as completion of troubleshooting and repair activities. The valve was stroked in a static, no RHRSW flow environment without the anti-rotation key. The anti-rotation key failure was not considered as a failure mechanism on May 5, 2017. The troubleshooting performed was inadequate. The potential failure mechanisms were not all considered.
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3. LER NUMBER 1. FACILITY NAME Fermi 2 05000-341 2017 -003 -00
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
The anti-rotation key was replaced and the RHRSW FCV passed PMT. Division 2 RHRSW was returned to service.
The anti-rotation key design is used on 17 other Generic Letter (GL96-05 "Periodic Verification of Design-Basis Capability of Safety-Related Motor-Operated Valves") program MOVs at Fermi 2. Walkdowns including keyway weld inspections have been completed. The inspections verified the integrity of the anti-rotation device.
There are no MOVs exhibiting the symptoms observed on the RHRSW FCV (El 150F068B) prior to the failure of the anti-rotation key.
Internal and external Operating Experience (OE) was searched. There was no other similar internal or external OE identified that identified anti rotation key welds as a failure mechanism.
The RHRSW FCVs, Division 2 E1150F068B and Division 1 E1150F068A, experience high vibrations during throttling activities to support RHRSW system startup and shutdown. Using System Operating Procedure (SOP) 23.208, "RHR Complex Service Water Systems," which directs the operation of RHRSW FCV E1150F068B during startup of Division 2 RHRSW (Procedure Section 5.4), the E1150F068B is throttled open for 5 seconds for one of the Division 2 RHRSW Pumps. One pump was then started. The RHRSW FCV is then throttled open to obtain 5400 gpm to 6300 gpm as indicated on El 1-R602B, "Division 2 RHR HX SW Flow Indicator." After flow is verified, the second pump is started, if available, before throttling E1150F068A (B) fully open.
Procedure SOP 23.208 is being evaluated for revision to prevent vibration damage on RHRSW FCV valves E115017068A and E1150F068B.
Procedures 35.306.003 "Motor Operator Periodic Inspection" and 35.306.020 "Motor Operated Valve Mini Periodic Inspection," will be revised to include inspection steps for anti-rotation devices on Globe Valves.
The functional testing and PMT were ineffective in discovering the failure and its associated pre-cursors on May 7, 2017. The troubleshooting performed was inadequate. The potential failure mechanisms were not all considered. An evaluation will be performed to assess additional training on the expectations for troubleshooting performance.
PREVIOUS OCCURENCES
None.
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Failed Component: Powell, William Company Globe Valve due to high system vibration transferred to the RHRSW FCV.
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05000341/LER-2017-001 | Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box LER 17-001-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Loss of Reactor Protection System Scram Function During the Main Steam Isolation Valve and Turbine Stop Valve Channel Functional Tests due to Use of a Test Box | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000341/LER-2017-002 | High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable LER 17-002-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding High Water Level Indications at Low Reactor Pressures Causes Some Functions of High Pressure Coolant Injection System and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System to be Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) | 05000341/LER-2017-003 | Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve LER 17-003-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Division 2 Residual Heat Removal Service Water System (RHRSW) Inoperable Due to an Inoperable RHRSW Flow Control Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000341/LER-2017-004 | Inadequate Procedural Cuidance for Residual I feat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss if Safety Function LER 17-004-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Inadequate Procedural Guidance for Residual Heat Removal Complex Ventilation Systems Leads to Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications and Loss of Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000341/LER-2017-005 | Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function LER 17-005-00 for Fermi 2 Regarding Non-Functional Mechanical Draft Cooling Tower Fan Brakes Leads to HPCI Being Declared Inoperable and Loss of Safety Function | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident |
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