05000335/FIN-2017004-01
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Finding | |
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Title | Inadequate Reactor System Trip Process for Inoperable Channel Results in Operation in a Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
Description | A Green, self-revealing NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the licensees failure to have an adequate procedure for reducing the trip setpoint of the B channel of the reactor protection system (RPS) high startup rate (HSUR) bistable. The licensees failure to establish an adequate procedure, as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, to place the "B" channel wide range nuclear instrument in a tripped condition was a performance deficiency (PD). This deficiency resulted in a violation of Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.1.1. Following discovery of the condition, the licensee initiated immediate corrective actions to place the B channel RPS HSUR in trip, meeting the TS requirement. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of procedural quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, there was no procedure to perform the setpoint reduction method as identified in 1-AOP-99.01. The only direction was to Contact I&C in the step. The Instrumentation and Control (I&C) processes used to implement the HSUR reduced setpoint reduction method were inadequate, in that, they did not evaluate all potential failure conditions when setting the HSUR bistable. The finding did not screen as greater than Green because while the degradation affected a single RPS trip signal, it did not affect the function of other redundant trips; and the finding did not involve control manipulations that unintentionally added positive reactivity; and finally the finding did not result in a mismanagement of reactivity by operators. Using IMC 0310, Aspects Within the Cross-Cutting Areas, the inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance. Specifically, the cross- cutting aspect of resources (H.1) was assigned to the finding because the licensee did not ensure an adequate procedure was available to implement the HSUR setpoint reduction. |
Site: | Saint Lucie |
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Report | IR 05000335/2017004 Section 4OA3 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2017 (2017Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
Inspectors (proximate) | T Morrissey S Roberts D Bacon P Capehart D Lanyi J Orr G Ottenberg R Patterson |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion V Technical Specification |
CCA | H.1, Resources |
INPO aspect | LA.1 |
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Finding - Saint Lucie - IR 05000335/2017004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Saint Lucie) @ 2017Q4
Self-Identified List (Saint Lucie)
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