07-14-2017 | On May 15, 2017, at 19:18 hours, station Operations personnel were performing a High Pressure Coolant Injection ( HPCI) Pump Operability Test which ensures the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve opens as pump flow decreases. When the HPCI Turbine was tripped, the Minimum Flow Valve did not open as expected when system flow was reduced to the low flow setpoint. Operators took steps to open the valve manually, but upon release of the control switch, the valve returned to the closed position.
The valve was then left in the closed position.
The HPCI system was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition G was entered.
The cause of the Minimum Flow Valve failing to open was attributed to the HPCI Pump Discharge Flow Indicating Switch, specifically, intermittent failure of the high side micro switch caused by residual material from the manufacturing process.
The Flow Indicating Switch, which had been installed for three months, was replaced and the HPCI Pump Operability Test was successfully re-performed. The failed switch was then sent to Exelon's Power Labs for failure analysis.
The safety significance of this event was minimal. Given the impact on the HPCI system, this report is submitted for Unit 2 in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The HPCI system is a single train system and the loss of HPCI could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident. |
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Category:Letter
MONTHYEARIR 05000254/20230042024-02-0505 February 2024 Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2023004 and 05000265/2023004 ML24004A0052024-01-17017 January 2024 Exemption from Select Requirements of 10 CFR Part 73 (EPID L-2023-LLE-0042 (Security Notifications, Reports, and Recordkeeping and Suspicious Activity Reporting)) RS-24-001, Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request I5R-26, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval2024-01-0303 January 2024 Response to Request for Additional Information Regarding Relief Request I5R-26, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval IR 05000254/20234032023-12-22022 December 2023 Public- Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Security Baseline Inspection Report 05000254/2023403 and 05000265/2023403 IR 05000254/20230102023-12-20020 December 2023 Comprehensive Engineering Team Inspection Report 05000254/2023010 and 05000265/2023010 ML23349A1622023-12-17017 December 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 298 and 294 Increase Completion Time in Technical Specification 3.8.1.B.4 (Emergency Circumstances) RS-23-128, Response to Request for Additional Information for the Emergency License Amendment Request Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days2023-12-15015 December 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information for the Emergency License Amendment Request Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days ML23305A1402023-12-13013 December 2023 Units 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, Unit 2; Peach Bottom, Units 2 & 3; and Quad Cities, Units 1 and 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt Traveler TSTF-580 RS-23-123, Emergency License Amendment Request - Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days2023-12-13013 December 2023 Emergency License Amendment Request - Increase Technical Specifications Completion Time in TS 3.8.1.B.4 from 7 Days to 30 Days ML23339A1762023-12-0505 December 2023 Notification of NRC Baseline Inspection and Request for Information (05000265/2024001) ML23319A3342023-11-20020 November 2023 Regulatory Audit in Support of License Amendment Requests to Adopt TSTF 505, Revision 2 and 10 CFR 50.69 RS-23-104, Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation2023-11-17017 November 2023 Request for Exemption from Enhanced Weapons, Firearms Background Checks, and Security Event Notifications Implementation ML23317A1192023-11-10010 November 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC - 2023 Annual Report - Guarantees of Payment of Deferred Premiums IR 05000254/20230032023-11-0909 November 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2023003 and 05000265/2023003 RS-23-113, Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Revision 17 and Fire Protection Report (Fpr), Revision 262023-10-20020 October 2023 Submittal of Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (Ufsar), Revision 17 and Fire Protection Report (Fpr), Revision 26 RS-23-097, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans2023-10-12012 October 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Advisement of Leadership Changes and Submittal of Updated Standard Practice Procedures Plans ML23206A0382023-09-21021 September 2023 Proposed Alternative to the Requirements of the ASME Code IR 05000254/20230112023-09-20020 September 2023 Safety-Conscious Work Environment Issue of Concern Team Inspection Report 05000254/2023011 and 05000265/2023011 RS-23-089, Sixth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program2023-09-0505 September 2023 Sixth Ten-Year Interval Inservice Testing Program RS-23-080, Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs2023-08-30030 August 2023 Constellation Energy Generation, LLC, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-264-A, Revision 0, 3.3.9 and 3.3.10 - Delete Flux Monitors Specific Overlap Requirement SRs RS-23-086, Relief Request I5R-26, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval2023-08-28028 August 2023 Relief Request I5R-26, Inservice Inspection Program Relief Request Regarding Examination Coverage for the Fifth Inservice Inspection Interval SVP-23-038, Owner'S Activity Report Submittal Fifth 10-Year Interval 2023 Refueling Outage Activities2023-08-14014 August 2023 Owner'S Activity Report Submittal Fifth 10-Year Interval 2023 Refueling Outage Activities IR 05000254/20230022023-08-0808 August 2023 Integrated Inspection Report 05000254/2023002 and 05000265/2023002 ML23178A0742023-08-0707 August 2023 Issuance of Amendment Nos. 296 and 292 Adoption of TSTF-416 Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) Valve Alignment Verification Note Location ML23216A0362023-08-0707 August 2023 Notification of an NRC Biennial Licensed Operator Requalification Program Inspection and RFI ML23216A0562023-08-0404 August 2023 Information Meeting (Open House) with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 SVP-23-031, Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report2023-07-14014 July 2023 Regulatory Commitment Change Summary Report ML23181A1062023-06-30030 June 2023 Postponement- Information Meeting (Open House) with a Question-And-Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-Of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station ML23178A2422023-06-28028 June 2023 Reassignment of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Branch Chief in the Division of Operating Reactor Licensing for Plant Licensing Branch III ML23179A1932023-06-28028 June 2023 07122023 Letter-Significant Public Meeting to Discuss NRC End-of-Cycle Performance Assessment of Quad Cities Nuclear Plant for Performance for 2022 Calendar Year IR 05000254/20234012023-06-26026 June 2023 Cyber Security Inspection Report 05000254/2023401 and 05000265/2023401 IR 05000265/20230402023-06-22022 June 2023 Reissue Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station 95001 Supplemental Inspection Supplemental Report 05000265/2023040 and Follow Up Assessment Letter RS-23-077, Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations2023-06-16016 June 2023 Response to NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2023-01, Preparation and Scheduling of Operator Licensing Examinations ML23167B1722023-06-16016 June 2023 95001 Supplemental Inspection Report 05000265/2023040 and Follow-Up Assessment Letter RS-23-060, Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors2023-06-0808 June 2023 Application to Adopt 10 CFR 50.69, Risk-Informed Categorization and Treatment of Structures, Systems, and Components for Nuclear Power Reactors RS-23-059, License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b2023-06-0808 June 2023 License Amendment Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt Risk Informed Completion Times TSTF-505, Revision 2, Provide Risk-Informed Extended Completion Times - RITSTF Initiative 4b ML23144A3632023-05-26026 May 2023 Information Meeting (Open House) with a Question and Answer Session to Discuss NRC 2022 End-of-Cycle Plant Performance Assessment of Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Units 1 and 2 RS-23-042, Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling2023-05-25025 May 2023 Application to Revise Technical Specifications to Adopt TSTF-580, Provide Exception from Entering Mode 4 with No Operable RHR Shutdown Cooling ML23033A4042023-05-15015 May 2023 Exemption from the Requirements of 10 CFR Part 2, Section 2.109(B) Related to Submission of Subsequent License Renewal Application Letter IR 05000254/20234022023-05-15015 May 2023 Security Baseline and ISFSI Inspection Reports 05000254/2023402, 05000265/2023402, 07200053/2023401 ML23132A2022023-05-12012 May 2023 Annual Radiological Environmental Operating Report ML23125A0612023-05-0808 May 2023 Proposed Alternative to the Requirements of the ASME Code IR 05000254/20230012023-05-0808 May 2023 Integrated Report 05000254/2023001 and 05000265/2023001 RS-22-067, 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report2023-05-0404 May 2023 10 CFR 50.46 Annual Report ML23118A3472023-05-0101 May 2023 County, 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, 2; and Quad Cities, 1 & 2 - Correction of Amendment No. 193 Adoption of TSTF-306, Revision 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration EPID L-2022-LLA-0143 RS-23-068, Response to Request for Additional Information for Quad Cities Relief Request I6R-11, Proposed Alternatives for a Temper Bead Weld Repair of the Mating Surfaces of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Shell2023-04-28028 April 2023 Response to Request for Additional Information for Quad Cities Relief Request I6R-11, Proposed Alternatives for a Temper Bead Weld Repair of the Mating Surfaces of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head and Shell SVP-23-018, Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 20222023-04-28028 April 2023 Radioactive Effluent Release Report for 2022 ML23114A2522023-04-28028 April 2023 Request to Use a Provision of a Later Edition of the ASME Boiler & Pressure Vessel Code, Section XI ML23110A0622023-04-25025 April 2023 Transmittal of Final Quad Cities Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 Accident Sequence Precursor Report (Licensee Event Report 254-2022-001) ML23081A0382023-04-25025 April 2023 County, 1 & 2; Nine Mile Point, 2; and Quad Cities, 1 & 2 - Issuance of Amendments to Adopt TSTF-306, Rev. 2, Add Action to LCO 3.3.6.1 to Give Option to Isolate the Penetration 2024-02-05
[Table view] Category:Licensee Event Report (LER)
MONTHYEARSVP-22-072, Manual Scram Due to Feedwater Regulator Valve Failure Increasing Reactor Water Level2022-12-30030 December 2022 Manual Scram Due to Feedwater Regulator Valve Failure Increasing Reactor Water Level 05000254/LER-2017-0042018-01-0505 January 2018 Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to Wear Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid, LER 17-004-00 For Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 re: Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to Wear Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid 05000254/LER-2017-0032017-11-17017 November 2017 Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue, LER 17-003-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue 05000265/LER-2017-0012017-07-13013 July 2017 High Pressure Coolant Injection Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open, LER 17-001-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 2, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open 05000254/LER-2017-0022017-05-26026 May 2017 Four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Closure Times Exceeded, LER 17-002-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Closure Times Exceeded 05000254/LER-2017-0012017-03-22022 March 2017 Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously, LER 17-001-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously 05000265/LER-2016-0022016-06-24024 June 2016 High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable Due to Valve Packing Leak, LER 16-002-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 - RE: High Pressure Coolant Injection System Declared Inoperable Due to Valve Packing Leak 05000265/LER-2016-0012016-05-19019 May 2016 Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Tests Exceed Technical Specification Limits, LER 2016-001-00 for Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 Regarding Main Steam Isolation Valve Local Leak Rate Tests Exceed Technical Specification Limits 05000254/LER-2016-0022016-03-14014 March 2016 Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Momentarily Lost Due to Air Line Failure (RWCU Pump Rm), LER 16-002-00 for Quad Cities Units 1 and 2, Regarding Secondary Containment Different Pressure Momentarily Lost due to Air Failure (RWCU pump Rm) 05000254/LER-2016-0012016-03-10010 March 2016 Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Momentarily Lost Due to Air Line Failure (RWCU Hx Rm), LER 16-001-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Secondary Containment Differential Pressure Momentarily Lost Due to Air Line Failure (RWCU Hx Rm) 05000254/LER-2015-0102016-02-0505 February 2016 Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Due to Differential Pressure Switch Failure, LER 15-010-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Loss of Control Room Emergency Ventilation System Due to Differential Pressure Switch Failure SVP-03-036, LER 03-S01-00, Security Event Report for Quad Cities, Unescorted Protected Area Access Granted Based on Falsified Information and Inadequate Screening Caused by a Failure of Administrative Controls.2003-03-0303 March 2003 LER 03-S01-00, Security Event Report for Quad Cities, Unescorted Protected Area Access Granted Based on Falsified Information and Inadequate Screening Caused by a Failure of Administrative Controls. ML17252B4771976-09-15015 September 1976 LER 76-059-00 for Dresden, Units 2 and 3 Re Review of Quad-Cities Unusual Event Letter Led to Discovery That Dresden'S Standby Gas Treatment System Deviated from Single Failure Criteria That Disabled the SBGT System ML18348A2401976-08-0606 August 1976 LER 1976-027-00, Reportable Occurrence of Control Rods for Quad-Cities, Unit 1 ML18348A2391976-08-0404 August 1976 LER 1976-026-00, Reportable Occurrence of Control Rods for Quad-Cities, Unit 1 2022-12-30
[Table view] |
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pnvacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects Resource@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
3. LER NUMBER
2017 - 00 001
PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION
General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor, 2957 Megawatts Thermal Rated Core Power Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [XX].
EVENT IDENTIFICATION
The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) [BJ] Minimum Flow Valve failed to open during HPCI Pump operability testing.
A. CONDITION PRIOR TO EVENT
Unit: 2 Reactor Mode: 1 Event Date: May 15, 2017 Event Time: 19:18 hours Mode Name: Power Operation Power Level: 100%
B. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT
On May 15, 2017 at 19:18 Central, station Operations personnel were performing Procedure QCOS 2300-05, "HPCI Pump Operability Test," which ensures the Motor Operated (MO) 2-2301-14, "HPCI Minimum Flow Valve," opens as pump flow decreases. During the test, the valve unexpectedly failed to open. Operators took steps to open the valve manually, but upon release of the control switch, the valve immediately returned to the closed position. Operators left the valve in the closed position. The Unit 2 HPCI system remained available but was declared inoperable.
Troubleshooting determined that the failure was due to a failure of the commercially dedicated HPCI Flow Indicating Switch (FIS) 2-2354. FIS 2-2354 had been recently replaced on February 2, 2017, under a corrective work order utilizing a commercially dedicated switch. The FIS was bench tested and post maintenance tested satisfactorily on February 2, 2017. The switch was again calibrated under a preventative maintenance work order during the next quarterly system work window on May 15, 2017, in accordance with a 92-day preventative maintenance frequency.
All results were satisfactory. The switch then failed during the subsequent quarterly system run on the same day. In the follow-up failure analysis Power Labs reported that the switch had an intermittent failure of the high side micro switch due to residual material remaining from the manufacturing process.
On May 15, 2017, at 23:27 Central, ENS #52758 was made to the NRC under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), to report this event as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
Given the impact on the HPCI system, this report is submitted for Unit 2 in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), which requires the reporting of any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Pnvacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U S Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects Resource@nrc gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection
3. LER NUMBER
2017 00 001
C. CAUSE OF EVENT
The cause was determined to be failure of the HPCI Pump Discharge Flow Indicating Switch, specifically intermittent failure of the high side micro switch caused by residual material from the manufacturing process.
D. SAFETY ANALYSIS
System Design According to the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS), Units 1 and 2 Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 6.3.2.3, the HPCI subsystem is designed to pump water into the reactor vessel under Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) conditions which do not result in rapid depressurization of the pressure vessel. The loss of coolant might be due to a loss of reactor feedwater or to a small line break which does not cause immediate depressurization of the reactor vessel. The sizing of the HPCI subsystem is based upon providing adequate core cooling during the time that the pressure in the reactor vessel decreases to a value that the Core Spray [BM] subsystem and/or the Low Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) [BO] subsystem become effective. The HPCI subsystem is designed to pump 5600 gallons per minute into the reactor vessel within a reactor pressure range of about 1120 pounds per square inch gage (psig) to 150 psig. Initiation of the HPCI subsystem occurs automatically on signals indicating reactor low-low water level or high drywell pressure. HPCI injection into the reactor vessel may be accomplished manually by the operator or without operator action by the HPCI automatic initiation circuitry. HPCI can also operate in a pressure control mode of consuming steam from the reactor vessel without providing full injection into the vessel (down to and including zero injection).
Safety Impact The safety impact of this condition was minimal. Valve MO 2-2301-14 is a normally closed valve that is used to maintain minimum flow through the HPCI pump to the Suppression Pool when the injection isolation valves are shut.
The bypass valve is automatically opened on low pump flow and closed on high flow whenever the steam supply valve to the HPCI turbine is open. According to UFSAR Section 6.3.2.3.3, the HPCI minimum flow system is provided for pump protection. The minimum flow valve is automatically opened on low pump flow and closed on high flow whenever the steam supply valve to the turbine is open. Even though the minimum flow valve failed to open, the HPCI System remained capable of performing its intended design/safety function and would not have hindered the system from fulfilling any required safety function or injection over the required 10 minute mission time.
According to UFSAR Table 6.2-7, MO 2-2301-14 is considered a primary containment isolation valve [ISV] with a normal position of closed. MO 2-2301-14 is the only primary containment isolation valve present in line 2-2340-4"-DX.
The failure of the FIS caused MO 2-2301-14 to fail in and remain in the closed position. Since the line could effectively be isolated utilizing the primary containment isolation valve, the primary containment integrity could be assured, therefore, the primary containment system remained capable of performing its intended design/safety function.
With MO 2-2301-14 failing to open, HPCI was declared inoperable and TS 3.5.1 Condition G was entered. Required Action G.2 is to restore HPCI System to OPERABLE status, with a completion time of 14 days. The FIS was replaced, post maintenance tested and the HPCI system declared operable within the 14 day completion time. There were no other issues or problems identified with valve MO 2-2301-14 after replacement of the FIS. No other repairs were required or performed.
Since HPCI is a single train safety system, this notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) (Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function).
comments regarding burden estimate to the FOIA, Privacy and Information Collections Branch (T-5 F53), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by e-mail to Infocollects.Resource@nrc gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection
3. LER NUMBER
2017 - 00 001 The engineering analysis that was performed demonstrated this event did not constitute a Safety System Functional Failure (SSFF). (Reference NEI 99-02, Revision 7, Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline, Section 2.2, "Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, Safety System Functional Failures, Clarifying Notes, Engineering Analyses.") As such, this event will not be reported in the NRC Performance Indicator (PI) for SSFF since an engineering analysis was performed which determined that the system was capable of performing its safety function during this event.
Risk Insights The plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model gives no credit for failure of the HPCI Minimum Flow Valve failure to open and does not include it in the model; hence, the failure of the valve to open did not contribute to an increase in risk.
In conclusion, due to the fact that the HPCI system was available to perform its safety function, the overall safety significance and impact on risk of this event were minimal.
E. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Immediate:
1. The failed FIS was replaced with a new commercially dedicated and bench tested FIS and post maintenance tested satisfactorily.
Follow-up:
1. Site Procurement will purchase the FIS from an approved Appendix B program vendor rather than purchasing a commercially dedicated part.
2. The Calibration Data Sheet for the FIS will be revised to include cycling new switches ten (10) times during bench testing.
F. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES
The station events database, LERs, and INPO Consolidated Event System (ICES) were reviewed for similar events at QCNPS. This event was caused by an intermittent failure of the high side micro switch of the HPCI FIS which contained residual material from the manufacturing process.
No previous occurrences were identified as applicable to the circumstances of this event.
G. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA
Failed Equipment: Flow Indicating Switch Component Manufacturer: Barton Component Model Number: 289A Component Part Number: N/A This event has been reported to ICES as Report No. 415432
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05000265/LER-2017-001 | High Pressure Coolant Injection Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open LER 17-001-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 2, Regarding High Pressure Coolant Injection Minimum Flow Valve Failed to Open | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000254/LER-2017-001 | Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously LER 17-001-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Secondary Containment Interlock Doors Opened Simultaneously | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material | 05000254/LER-2017-002 | Four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Closure Times Exceeded LER 17-002-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Four Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) Closure Times Exceeded | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000254/LER-2017-003 | Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue LER 17-003-00 for Quad Cities, Unit 1, Regarding Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning Piping Refrigerant Leak Due to High Cycle Fatigue | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000254/LER-2017-004 | Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to Wear Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid LER 17-004-00 For Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1 re: Unit 1 HPCI Did Not Trip Due to Wear Debris in the Turbine Stop Valve Oil Resetting Solenoid | |
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