05000219/FIN-2009002-01
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure of the Oyster Creek RAGEMS to Meet the Requirements of the Emergency Plan |
| Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50.54(q), Conditions of Licenses, because Exelon did not properly maintain the conditions of the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan. Specifically, Exelon did not implement timely corrective or compensatory actions when the radioactive gas effluent monitoring system (RAGEMS) automatic sampling system was taken out of service from November 2006 through March 2009. Exelons corrective actions included replacing solenoid valves in the automatic sampling system and placing the automatic system back in service. The finding was more than minor because it affected the Emergency Response Organization Performance attribute of the Emergency Preparedness (EP) Cornerstone to ensure that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the public health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, Appendix B, Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green). Specifically, the inspectors utilized IMC 0609, Appendix B, Section 4.9 and Sheet 1, Failure to Comply, to determine that the failure to satisfy 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) was a risk-significant planning standard (RSPS) problem; but it was not a RSPS functional failure of the Oyster Creek dose assessment process. Because a time-motion study concluded that a manual iodine and particulate sample could have been obtained under accident conditions without exceeding regulatory dose limits, the inspectors determined that the RSPS function had not been degraded and the failure of the automatic sampling system ultimately would not have affected the outcome of protecting the health and safety of the public. The performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, because Exelon did not take appropriate corrective actions in a timely manner commensurate with its safety significance and complexity. Specifically, the RAGEMS sampling system was not able to satisfy the functions required by the Oyster Creek Emergency Plan for over two years before Exelon took adequate steps to initiate corrective actions P.1(d) |
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
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| Report | IR 05000219/2009002 Section 4OA2 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2009 (2009Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Emergency Prep |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Nimitz D Spindler R Bellamy J Kulp J Schoppy M Ferdas S Barr T Setzer |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Oyster Creek - IR 05000219/2009002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Oyster Creek) @ 2009Q1
Self-Identified List (Oyster Creek)
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