Text

Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, Main Steam Isolation Valves (Msivs), and TS 3.7.3, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (Mfivs).
	ML062430528
Person / Time
Site:	Wolf Creek
Issue date:	08/25/2006
From:	Matthew Sunseri; Wolf Creek
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	WM 06-0033
	Download: ML062430528 (86)
	v • d • e

W*,LF CREEK

' NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION Matthew W. Sunseri Vice President Oversight August 25, 2006 WM 06-0033 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject:

Docket No. 50-482: Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)," and TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)"

Gentlemen, Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) hereby requests an amendment to Facility Operating License No. NPF-42 for the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS). The proposed change will revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)" and TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)," to incorporate the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains into the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and provide associated Conditions and Required Actions.

Additionally, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2 are revised to clearly identify that the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains are required to be tested in accordance with these SRs. These changes are considered to be necessary based on the NRC staff interpretation that SR 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2 requires both actuator trains for a single valve to be surveillance tested. The NRC staff interpretation results in declaring an MSIV or MFIV inoperable with one actuator train inoperable. The Completion Times of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for an inoperable MSIV and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for an inoperable MFIV due to an inoperable actuator train is not commensurate with the safety significance of an inoperable actuator train. Therefore, new Conditions/Required Actions/Completion Times for inoperable actuator train(s) are being proposed.

At WCGS one MSIV is installed in each of the four main steam lines outside the containment and downstream of the safety valves. The MSIVs prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator in the event of a postulated design basis accident. On MFIV is installed in each of the four main feedwater lines outside the containment and downstream of the feedwater control valves. The MFIVs are installed to prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator in the event of a feedwater pipe rupture in the turbine building.

Each MSIV and MFIV is equipped with dual-redundant actuator trains such that either actuator train can effect closure of its associated valve on demand.

RO. Box 411/ Burlington, KS 66839 / Phone: (620) 364-8831 A DD (

An Equal Opportunity Employer M/F/HCNET

WM 06-0033 Page 2 Attachments I through V provide the Evaluation, Markup of Technical Specifications Pages, Retyped Technical Specification Pages, Proposed TS Bases Changes (for information only),

and Summary of Regulatory Commitments, respectively, in support of this amendment request.

Final TS Bases changes will be implemented pursuant to TS 5.5.14, "Technical Specification Bases Control Program," at the time the amendment is implemented.

It has been determined that this amendment application does not involve a significant hazard consideration as determined per 10 CFR 50.92. The amendment application was reviewed by the WCNOC Plant Safety Review Committee. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this amendment application is being provided to the designated Kansas State official.

WCNOC requests review and approval of this proposed license amendment on an expedited basis, i.e., within 90 days of NRC receipt of the proposed license amendment request.

WCNOC is requesting approval in this time frame based on the potential concerns for the failure of an actuator train and the short Completion Times to restore OPERABILITY or close an MFIV. It is anticipated that the license amendment, as approved, will be effective upon issuance, to be implemented within 30 days from the date of issuance.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at (620) 364-4008, or Mr.

Kevin Moles, Manager Regulatory Affairs at (620) 364-4126.

Very truly yours, Matthew W. Sunseri MWS/rlt Attachments: I - Evaluation II - Markup of Technical Specification pages III - Retyped Technical Specification pages IV - Proposed TS Bases Changes (for information only)

V - Summary of Regulatory Commitments cc: T. A. Conley (NRC), w/a J. N. Donohew (NRC), w/a W. B. Jones (NRC), w/a B. S. Mallett (NRC), w/a Senior Resident Inspector (NRC), w/a

STATE OF KANSAS )

) ss COUNTY OF COFFEY )

Matthew W. Sunseri, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Vice President Oversight of Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the contents thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said Corporation with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By & 44 .

Matthew W. Sunseri Vice President Oversight SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me thisa5 day ofAo4, 2006.

E. GIFFORD j NotayPbi

[ [~MARY I~ Notary Public- State of Kansas My Appt. Expires 1 40 0qiCo'p Expiration Date IP,09q42o,'7 -

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 1 of 10 ATTACHMENT I EVALUATION

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 2 of 10 EVALUATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) requests an amendment to Operating License NPF-42 for the Wolf Creek Generating Station (WCGS) to incorporate changes to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)" and TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)." This amendment application proposes to incorporate the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains into the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) and provide associated Conditions and Required Actions. Additionally,. Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2 are revised to clearly identify that the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains are required to be tested in accordance with these SRs.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S TS 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)," and TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)," specifies OPERABILITY and Surveillance requirements for the MSIVs and MFIVs, and includes Conditions and Required Actions to be entered when one or more MSIVs or MFIVs are declared inoperable. Currently, these specifications do not specifically address or provide specific requirements for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains. Inoperability of one of the two actuator trains associated with an MSIV or MFIV does not by itself make the valve incapable of closing since the remaining OPERABLE actuator train can alone effect valve closure on demand. Declaring an MSIV or MFIV inoperable and having to enter the Condition(s) and Required Action(s) for an inoperable valve due only to an inoperable actuator train(s), is unnecessarily restrictive. Therefore, WCNOC proposes to incorporate requirements specifically for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains within TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3 such that these specifications would include Conditions and Required Actions to address inoperable MSIV and MFIV actuator trains.

The following changes are proposed:

LCO 3.7.2 and LCO 3.7.3 are revised to include the actuator trains in the LCO. LCO 3.7.2 is revised to state: "Four MSIVs and their associated actuator trains shall be OPERABLE."

LCO 3.7.3 is revised to state: "Four MFIVs and their associated actuator trains shall be OPERABLE."

" New Conditions A through E are added to TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3 to address inoperable MSIV and MFIV actuator trains, respectively, and the existing Conditions that address inoperable valves are relabeled such that those Conditions would become Conditions F through I for TS 3.7.2 and Conditions F and G for TS 3.7.3. The proposed new Conditions related specifically to the actuator trains would address various degrees or combinations of inoperable actuator trains as follows:

New Condition A would address the condition of having one MSIV or MFIV actuator train inoperable (for a single valve). The proposed Required Action for this Condition would require restoring the inoperable actuator train to OPERABLE status within 7 days.

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 3 of 10 New Condition B would address the condition of having two MSIV or MFIV actuator trains inoperable for different valves (i.e., one actuator inoperable for each of two MSIVs or MFIVs) such that the actuator trains are not in the same separation group. The proposed Required Action for this Condition would require restoring at least one actuator train to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months .

" New Condition C would address the situation when two MSIV or MFIV actuator trains are inoperable (for different valves) and the inoperable actuator trains are both in the same separation group. The proposed Required Action for this Condition would require restoring at least one actuator train to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

" New Condition D would address the situation when both actuator trains for one MSIV or MFIV are inoperable. The Required Action proposed for this Condition would require immediately declaring the affected valve inoperable.

" New Condition E would address the condition of having three or more MSIV or MFIV actuator trains inoperable, or the condition when, after entering Conditions A, B, or C, it is determined that the Required Action and Completion Time of any of those Conditions cannot be met. The Required Action for this Condition would require immediately declaring each affected valve inoperable.

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2 are revised to clearly identify that the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains are required to be tested in accordance with these SRs. SR 3.7.2.2 is revised to state: "Verify each actuator train actuates the MSIV to the isolation position of an actual or simulated actuation signal." SR 3.7.3.2 is revised to state: "Verify each actuator train actuates the MFIV to the isolation position of an actual or simulated actuation signal."

Proposed revisions to the TS Bases are also included in this application. The changes to the affected TS Bases pages will be incorporated in accordance with TS 5.5.14, 'Technical Specifications (TS) Bases Control Program."

3.0 BACKGROUND

On July 13, 2006 at a NRC inspection exit meeting, the NRC identified a potential non-cited green violation for a violation of TS 3.7.2 in that ABHV-0017 was not restored to OPERABLE status within the 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time as required by TS 3.7.2, Required Action A.1 on April 13, 2006. Shortly after the exit meeting, WCNOC requested a meeting with the NRC staff to present information regarding the WCGS analyses and compliance with Technical Specification. WCNOC was notified subsequent to the exit meeting and prior to a meeting with the NRC staff that the potential non-cited green violation was being withdrawn pending further review.

On August 16, 2006, WCNOC and Callaway Plant personnel met with the NRC staff (NRR and Region IV personnel) to provide information on the MSIV/MFIV operation, design bases, safety analyses, and Technical Specifications. The meeting was an informational meeting and the NRC did not provide a specific position at the meeting.

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 4 of 10 On August 21, 2006, the NRC Project Manager communicated to WCNOC the position that SR 3.7.2.2 is interpreted by the NRC staff that the SR requires both actuation trains be surveillance tested. Since SR 3.0.1 requires SRs to be met and that failure to meet a Surveillance, whether such failure is experienced during the performance of the Surveillance or between performances of the Surveillance, shall be a failure to meet the LCO. Therefore, the failure of an actuation train is a failure to meet the SR which results in LCO 3.7.2 not being met and the MSIV should be declared inoperable absent any specific Conditions associated to actuator trains.

The NRC staff interpretation results in declaring an MSIV or MFIV inoperable with one actuator train inoperable. While WCNOC does not agree with the NRC staff interpretation, the Completion Times of 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months for an inoperable MSIV and 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months for an inoperable MFIV does not provide a reasonable amount of time to effect repairs to an inoperable actuator train.

Declaring an MSIV or MFIV inoperable and having to enter the Condition(s) and Required Action(s) for an inoperable valve due only to an inoperable actuator train(s), is unnecessarily restrictive. Therefore, WCNOC proposes to incorporate requirements specifically for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains within TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3 such that these specifications would include Conditions and Required Actions to address inoperable MSIV and MFIV actuator trains.

Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

One MSIV is installed in each of the four main steam lines outside the containment and downstream of the main steam safety valves. The MSIVs prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator in the event of a postulated design basis accident. The valves are bidirectional, double disc, parallel slide gate valves. The valves are designed to close between 1.5 to 5 seconds against the flows associated with line breaks on either side of the valve, assuming the most limiting normal operating conditions prior to occurrence of the break.

Each MSIV is equipped with two redundant actuator trains such that either actuator train can independently perform the safety function to fast-close the valve on demand. (Reference 1)

Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)

One main feedwater isolation valve (MFIV) is installed in each of the four main feedwater lines outside the containment and downstream of the feedwater control valve. The MFIVs are installed to prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator in the event of a feedwater pipe rupture in the turbine building. The main feedwater check valve provides backup isolation. The MFIVs isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. In the event of a secondary cycle pipe rupture inside the containment, the MFIV limits the quantity of high energy fluid that enters the containment through the broken loop and provides a pressure boundary for the controlled addition of auxiliary feedwater to the three intact loops. (Reference 2)

MSIV/MFIV Actuator Train An actuation train consists of a hydraulic accumulator controlled by solenoid valves on the associated MSIV or MFIV. For each MSIV or MFIV, one actuator train is associated with separation group 4 (yellow), and one actuator train is associated with separation group 1 (red).

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 5 of 10 The main steam and feedwater isolation valves are operated by hydraulic actuators. These actuators are controlled by a combination of hydraulic fluid and/or compressed nitrogen gas accumulators, which are controlled by solenoid valves. Each main steam and feedwater isolation valve has one actuator with two separate nitrogen accumulators. Each accumulator is controlled from a separate Class IE electrical system, and each is capable of closing the valve independently of the other. (Reference 3)

Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation System (MSFIS)

The MSFIS controls the hydraulic actuators for eight actuation valves, four valves (MSIVs) control the main steam lines and four valves (MFIVs) for the feedwater lines. The MSFIS controls four solenoids in each hydraulic actuator, through four contacts of separate actuation relays, installed in the MSFIS cabinets. Overall, each separation group in its dedicated cabinet contains 32 (4x8) actuation relays.

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Consistent with other Technical Specifications, the proposed Completion Times for inoperable MSIV or MFIV actuator trains are to be based on a hierarchy of Conditions such that shorter Completion Times would be specified for increasingly degraded conditions. Conditions addressing inoperable actuator trains would be specified first in TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3, i.e.,

before the Conditions that are currently in place for addressing inoperability of the MSIVs and MFIVs themselves. The intent is that when only an actuator train(s) is declared inoperable, the applicable Condition for the inoperable actuator train(s) would be entered first. Then, depending on the number of actuator trains that are concurrently inoperable and what the associated Required Action requires for the applicable Condition, or if the applicable Required Action and Completion Time cannot be met, the MSIV(s) or MFIV(s) associated with the inoperable actuator train(s) would be declared inoperable so that the Condition(s) addressing inoperability of the MSIV(s) or MFIV(s) would thus be entered.

Justification for the Completion Times to be specified for Required Actions A.1, B.1, and C.1 is as follows:

Condition A - With only a single actuator train inoperable on one MSIV or MFIV, a Completion Time of 7 days for Required Action A.1 is reasonable in light of the fact that with one actuator train inoperable, and because of the dual-redundant actuator design, the affected valve would still be capable of closing on demand (assuming no additional failures) via the remaining OPERABLE actuator train. The proposed 7-day Completion Time takes into account the design redundancy, only 3 of 4 MSIVs and MFIVs are assumed to close in the accident analyses, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of a design basis accident occurring during this period. Additionally, this Completion Time is consistent with Required Action A.1 of TS 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System," which provides a 7-day Completion Time to restore one inoperable steam supply to the turbine driven AFW pump (the turbine driven AFW pump has redundant steam supplies).

" Condition B - With an inoperable actuator train on one MSIV or MFIV and one inoperable actuator train on another MSIV or MFIV, such that the actuator trains are not in the same separation group, a Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for Required Action B.1 is reasonable

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 6 of 10 since, again, the dual-redundant actuator train desigrt-ensures that with only one actuator train inoperable on each of the affected MSIVs, each MSIV would still be capable of closing on demand, assuming no additional failures and only 3 of 4 MSIVs and MFIVs are assumed to close in the accident analyses. Compared to Condition A however, it is appropriate to have a shorter Completion Time for Condition B since with an actuator train inoperable on each of two MSIVs or MFIVs, there is an increased likelihood that an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train) would cause an MSIV to fail to close.

Condition C - With an inoperable actuator train on one MSIV or MFIV and one inoperable actuator train on another MSIV or MFIV, but with both inoperable actuator trains in the same separation group, a Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months for Required Action C.1 is appropriate.

Like the above cases, the dual-redundant actuator train design for each MSIV and MFIV ensures that a single inoperable actuator train for any valve would not prevent the affected valve from closing on demand. In this regard, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is reasonable and conservative since only one actuator train per valve is permitted to be inoperable (for two MSIVs or MFIVs), so that the remaining OPERABLE actuator train on each affected MSIV or MFIV remains capable of effecting valve closure on demand (assuming no additional failures). A Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months is also considered conservative with respect to only 3 of 4 MSIVs and MFIVs are assumed to close in the accident analyses and the low probability of an event occurring during such an interval that would demand MSIV or MFIV closure.

Additionally, Completion Time is consistent with Condition G of TS 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation," which provides a 24-hour Completion Time for restoring one train to OPERABLE status. Condition G is applicable to Function 4.b (Steam Line Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays) which provides the actuation logic from the Solid State Protection System through the MSFIS cabinets to the actuator trains. A loss of one actuation logic train would be equivalent to a loss of 4 actuator trains in the same separation group.

However, compared to the Required Action for Condition B above, a shorter Completion Time for Condition C is appropriate since with two actuator trains inoperable in the same separation group, an additional failure such as the failure of an actuation logic train in the other separation group could cause both affected MSIVs or MFIVs to fail to close on demand.

For Conditions D and E, the Completion Time of "immediately" is conservative and appropriate.

For Condition D, for example, when both actuator trains for one MSIV or MFIV are inoperable, it is appropriate to require immediately declaring the valve inoperable since having both actuator trains inoperable would constitute a condition that renders the affected MSIV or MFIV incapable of closing on demand.

With respect to Condition E, for the Condition when the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C is not met, it follows that the affected MSIV(s) or MFIV(s) should immediately be declared inoperable since the assumption is that the Completion Time(s) of Condition A, B, or C has expired or cannot be met. This "default" Condition is in keeping with the intent that when only the actuator trains for affected MSIVs or MFIVs are inoperable (and not the valves themselves), the Conditions and Required Actions for the inoperable valve actuator trains should be entered first, and then if those Required Actions cannot be met, the affected MSIVs or MFIVs should be declared inoperable so that the Conditions and Required Actions for the inoperable valves are then entered. Required Action

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 7 of 10 E.1 ensures the affected MSIV(s) or MFIV(s) are promptly declared inoperable. This format or approach is consistent with other Technical Specifications and the format of the Improved Standard Technical Specifications (NUREG-1431).

For the other portion of Condition E, i.e., for the condition when three or more actuator trains are inoperable, it is conservative and appropriate as well to immediately declare the affected MSIVs or MFIVs inoperable for this condition. For the situation of having three actuator trains inoperable, for example, such a condition could involve two inoperable actuator trains on one valve and one inoperable actuator train on another valve, or an inoperable actuator train on each of three valves. In each case, the inoperable actuator trains could all be in the same separation group or be staggered among the two separation groups. In the former case, a single assumed failure such as an instrument logic train failure could cause one or two valves to fail to close on demand. In the latter case, such a single failure could cause either none of the valves to fail to close on demand, or all three to fail to close on demand. Thus, immediately declaring the affected MSIVs or MFIVs inoperable is either appropriate or conservative. In any case, the conditions addressed by Condition E would constitute an inoperability that exceeds the scope of any of the conditions addressed by Conditions A, B. or C, and it is conservative in this case to simply require declaring all of the affected MSIVs or MFIVs inoperable.

Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2 are revised to clearly identify that the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains are required to be tested in accordance with these SRs. Since the current SRs do not clearly articulate applicability to the actuator trains and the NRC staff interpretation is that the actuator trains are encompassed within the SRs, a revision to the SRs is appropriate.

A probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) evaluation was performed to bound the risk associated with Completion Times for concurrent inoperable MSIV and MFIV actuator trains. This evaluation was not used to establish the proposed Completion Times (for proposed Conditions A, B, and C), but it was used to gauge the acceptability of the Completion Times being proposed, which were based on engineering judgment and consistency with other Technical Specifications, as described above. The PSA evaluation performed used the Regulatory Guide 1.174 and Regulatory Guide 1.177 metrics to determine a maximum Completion Time. Results of the evaluation showed that the proposed Completion Times are very conservative when compared to the PSA evaluation. For example, the most severe condition of two actuator trains inoperable when the inoperable actuator trains are in the same separation group has a proposed Completion Time of 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months ," the PSA evaluation calculated a Completion Time value of greater 4 days.

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

This section addresses the standards of 10 CFR 50.92 as well as the applicable regulatory requirements and acceptance criteria.

5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration This license amendment request proposes to revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)" and TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)," to incorporate the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains into the Limiting Condition for

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 8 of 10 Operation (LCO) and provide associated Conditions and Required Actions. Additionally, Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.2.3 are revised to clearly identify that the MSIV actuator trains and MFIV actuator trains are required to be tested in accordance with these SRs. Wolf Creek Nuclear Operating Corporation (WCNOC) has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed amendment by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92, "Issuance of amendment," Part 50.92(c), as discussed below:

(1) Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains do not involve any design or physical changes to the facility, including the MSIVs, MFIVs, and actuator trains themselves. The design and functional performance requirements, operational characteristics, and reliability of the MSIVs, MFIVs, and actuator trains are thus unchanged.

There is therefore no impact on the design safety function of the MSIVs and MFIVs to close (as an accident mitigator), nor is there any change with respect to inadvertent closure of an MSIV or MFIV (as a potential transient initiator). Since no failure mode or initiating condition that could cause an accident (including any plant transient) evaluated per the Updated Safety Analysis Report-described safety analyses is created or affected, the change cannot involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

With regard to the consequences of an accident and the equipment required for mitigation of the accident, the proposed changes involve no design or physical changes to the MSIVs, MFIVs, or any other equipment required for accident mitigation. With respect to MSIV and MFIV actuator train Completion Times, the consequences of an accident are independent of equipment Completion Times as long as adequate equipment availability is maintained. The proposed MSIV and MFIV actuator Completion Times take into account the redundancy of the actuator trains, only 3 of 4 MSIVs and MFIVs are assumed to close in the accident analyses, and are limited in extent consistent with other Completion Times specified in the Technical Specifications. Adequate equipment availability would therefore continue to be required by the Technical Specifications. On this basis, the consequences of applicable, analyzed accidents (such as a main steam line break) are not significantly impacted by the proposed changes.

Based on all of the above, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

(2) Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No The proposed changes to incorporate requirements for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains do not involve any design or physical changes to the facility, including the MSIVs, MFIVs, and actuator trains themselves. No physical alteration of the plant is involved, as no new or different type of equipment is to be installed. The proposed changes do not alter any assumptions made in the safety analyses, nor do they involve any changes to plant procedures

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 9 of 10 for ensuring that the plant is operated within analyzed limits. As such, no new failure modes or mechanisms that could cause a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated are being introduced.

Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

(3) Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No The proposed change to incorporate requirements for the MSIV and MFIV actuator trains does not alter the manner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined. No changes to instrument/system actuation setpoints are involved. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted by this change and the proposed change will not permit plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis.

Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Conclusion:

Based on the above evaluation, WCNOC concludes that the proposed amendment presents no significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria The portion of the Main Steam Supply System from the steam generator to the steam generator isolation valves is safety related and is required to function following a design basis accident and to achieve and maintain the plant in a post accident safe shutdown condition. The portion of the Condensate and Feedwater System from the steam generator to the steam generator isolation valves is safety related and is required to function following a design basis accident and to achieve and maintain the plant in a post accident safe shutdown condition.

General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, "Design bases for protection against natural phenomena,"

requires that the safety related portion of the Main Steam Supply System and Condensate and Feedwater System be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, floods, and external missiles.

GDC 4, "Environmental and dynamic effects design bases," requires that the Main Steam Supply System and Condensate and Feedwater System be designed to remain functional after a safe shutdown earthquake or to perform its intended function following postulated hazards such as internal missiles, or pipe break.

GDC 34, "Residual heat removal," requires that component redundancy be provided for the Main Steam Supply System and Condensate Feedwater System so that safety functions can be performed, assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power.

Attachment I to WM 06-0033 Page 10 of 10 The proposed TS change does not affect the MSIVs, MFIVs, and associated actuator train design and compliance with the above regulatory requirements and criteria. Thus, for the proposed amendment, 1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, 2) activities will continue to be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and 3) the issuance of the amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

WCNOC has determined that the proposed amendment would change requirements with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR 20, or would change an inspection or surveillance requirement. WCNOC has evaluated the proposed change and has determined that the change does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed change meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9).

Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), an environmental assessment of the proposed change is not required.

7.0 REFERENCES

7.1 References

1. USAR Section 10.3.2.2.

2. USAR Section 10.4.7.2.2.

3. USAR Section 7.3.7.1.

7.2 Precedent A similar change was approved for the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, in Amendment No. 172 on June 16, 2006. The differences between Callaway Plant Amendment No. 172 and the WCNOC proposed changes are longer Completion Times for new Conditions A, B, and C in TS 3.7.2; proposed changes to TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valve(s)," for actuator trains, and proposed changes to Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.7.2.2 and SR 3.7.3.2.

Attachment IIto WM 06-0033 Page 1 of 8 ATTACHMENT II MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 2 of 8 TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS .................................................................................... 3.7-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ................................................ 3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) ..................... 3.7-5 _

3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) ..................................... . 3.7-X 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) ................................................... 3.7-,W I1 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System .................................................. 3.7-1A 13 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ..................................................... 3.7-X He, 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System ...................................... 3.7-4t,6 11 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW) ........................................... 3.7-le'* 2.

3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ............................. 3.7-A 22..

3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ................. 3.7-2,2 Z4 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) ............................ 3.7-25 2.17 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System - Not Used ................................................. 3.7-2a 30 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) .................................................. 3.7-.9 31 3.7.14 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) -

Not Used ..................................................................................... 3.7-23 35 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ..................................................... 3.7-34 3(

3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration ........................................ 3.7-45 31 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .......................................................... 3.7-37 31 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity ............................................................. 3.7-3@ 41 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ........................................................... 3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .................................................................... 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown .................................................................... 3.8-18 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ........................................ 3.8-21 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating .................................................................... 3.8-24 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ................................................................... 3.8-28 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters .................................................................... 3.8-30 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating ......................................................................... 3.8-34 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown ......................................................................... 3.8-35 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating ...................................................... 3.8-37 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ...................................................... 3.8-39 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 3.9-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration ......................................................................... 3.9-1 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves ....................................... 3.9-2 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.9-3 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations ................................................................ 3.9-5 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level .................................................... 3.9-7 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level ...................................................... 3.9-9 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iii Amendment No. 123,432,34, 163

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 3 of 8 MSIVs 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

LCO 3.7.2 Four MSIVs shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME 31 One MSIV inoperable in Restore MSIV to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months MODE 1. OPERABLE status.

F Required Action and Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months j associated Completion Time of Condition)not met. 0

.1. 4

- --NOTE---.. ... 1 Close MSIV. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.

erify MSIV is closed. Once per One or more MSIV 7 days inoperable in MODE 2 or 3.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. 123

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 4 of 8 INSERT 3.7-5 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MSIV actuator train A.1 Restore MSIV actuator 7 days inoperable, train to OPERABLE status.

B. Two MSIV actuator trains B.1 Restore one MSIV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for different actuator train to MSIVs when the OPERABLE status.

inoperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group.

C. Two MSIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MSIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

are in the same separation group.

D. Two actuator trains for one D.1 Declare the affected MSIV Immediately MSIV inoperable, inoperable.

E. Three or more MSIV E.1 Declare each affected Immediately actuator trains inoperable. MSIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 5 of 8 MSIVs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued's CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME Required Action and Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion

& Time of Conditionnt met.

Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 ------ E NOTE - ....------------.---

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with

< 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.2.2 -------- NOTE -------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each to the isolation position 18 months on an actual or simu ate actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit I 3.7-6 Amendment No. 123

Attachment IIto WM 06-0033 Page 6 of 8 MFIVs 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)

LCO 3.7.3 Four MFIVss APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTE----------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each CONDITION I REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME One or more MFIVs Close MFIV. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable.

Verify MFIV is closed. Once per 7 days 4 4 j Required Action and associated Completion

!AN D:(

Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months TMe6tmt Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Wolf Creek - Unit I 3.7-7 Amendment No. 123

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 7 of 8 INSERT 3.7-7 CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MFIV actuator train A.1 Restore MFIV actuator 7 days inoperable, train to OPERABLE status.

B. Two MFIV actuator trains B.1 Restore one MFIV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for different actuator train to MFIVs when the OPERABLE status.

inoperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group.

C. Two MFIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MFIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

are in the same separation group.

D. Two actuator trains for one D.1 Declare the affected MFIV Immediately MFIV inoperable, inoperable.

E. Three or more MFIV E.1 Declare each affected Immediately actuator trains inoperable. MFIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

Attachment II to WM 06-0033 Page 8 of 8 MFIVs 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 NOTE -----------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the isolation time of each MFIV is < 5 seconds. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.3.2 Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2. u.tuAAor ir~tDi ac+4vAts,

+Iqc MFWt Verify each

c ýthe isolatio~nposition on to 18 months an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-8 Amendment No. 123

Attachment III to WM 06-0033 Page 1 of 44 ATTACHMENT III RETYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS .......................................... 3.7-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ................................................ 3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) .............................................. 3.7-5 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) ........................................ 3.7-8 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs) ................................................... 3.7-11 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System .................................................. 3.7-13 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ...................................................... 3.7-16 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System ...................................... 3.7-18 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW) ........................................... 3.7-20 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ................................................................. 3.7-22 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) ................. 3.7-24 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) ............................ 3.7-27 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System - Not Used ................................................. 3.7-30 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) .................................................. 3.7-31 3.7.14 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS) -

Not Used ..................................................................................... 3.7-35 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ......................................................... 3.7-36 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration ........................................... 3.7-37 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .......................................................... 3.7-39 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity ............................................................... 3.7-41 3.8 ELECTRICAL POW ER SYSTEMS ........................................................... 3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating .................................................................... 3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown .................................................................... 3.8-18 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air ........................................ 3.8-21 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating .................................................................... 3.8-24 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ................................................................... 3.8-28 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters .................................................................... 3.8-30 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating ......................................................................... 3.8-34 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown ......................................................................... 3.8-35 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating ....................... 3.8-37 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - Shutdown ...................................................... 3.8-39 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS ..................................................................... 3.9-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration ......................................................................... 3.9-1 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves ....................................... 3.9-2 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation .................................................................... 3.9-3 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations ................................................................ 3.9-5 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level .................................................... 3.9-7 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level ...................................................... 3.9-9 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 iii Amendment No. 123, 4 32,4 4, 163

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS (continued) 3.9.7 Refueling Pool W ater Level ...................................................................... 3.9-11 4.0 DESIG N FEATURES ........................................................................................ 4.0-1 4.1 Site Location ............................................................................................ 4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core ............................................................................................. 4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage .............................................................................................. 4.0-1 5.0 ADM INISTRATIVE CO NTROLS ...................................................................... 5.0-1 5.1 Responsibility ............................................................................................ 5.0-1 5.2 O rganization .............................................................................................. 5.0-2 5.3 Unit Staff Q ualifications ............................................................................. 5.0-4 5.4 Procedures ................................................................................................ 5.0-5 5.5 Program s and Manuals ............................................................................. 5.0-6 5.6 Reporting Requirem ents ........................................................................... 5.0-22 5.7 High Radiation Area .................................................................................. 5.0-27 Wolf Creek - UnIt 1 iv Amendment No. 123, 4,42, 15,164

MSSVs 3.7.1 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs)

LCO 3.7.1 Five MSSVs per steam generator shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOTE----

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSSV.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more steam A.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months generators with one MSSV POWER to <87% RTP.

inoperable and the Moderator Temperature Coefficient (MTC) zero or negative at all power levels.

B. One or more steam B.1 Reduce THERMAL 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months generators with two or POWER to less than or more MSSVs inoperable, equal to the Maximum OR Allowable % RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 One or more steam for the number of generators with one MSSV OPERABLE MSSVs.

inoperable and the MTC positive at any power level. AND I_ I (continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-1 Amendment No. 123

MSSVs 3.7.1 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 --------- NOTE ------

Only required in MODE 1.

Reduce the Power Range 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Neutron Flux-High reactor trip setpoint to less than or equal to the Maximum Allowable % RTP specified in Table 3.7.1-1 for the number of OPERABLE MSSVs.

C Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND OR C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months One or more steam generators with > 4 MSSVs inoperable.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.1.1 ------------------- NOTE-- --------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each required MSSV lift setpoint per Table In accordance with 3.7.1-2 in accordance with the Inservice Testing the Inservice Program. Following testing, lift setting shall be within Testing Program

+_1%.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-2 Amendment No. 42-3, 132

MSSVs 3.7.1 Table 3.7.1-1 (page 1 of 1)

OPERABLE Main Steam Safety Valves versus Maximum Allowable Power NUMBER OF OPERABLE MSSVs PER MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE POWER STEAM GENERATOR (% RTP) 4 87 3 65 2 44 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-3 Amendment No. 123

MSSVs 3.7.1 Table 3.7.1-2 (page 1 of 1)

Main Steam Safety Valve Lift Settings VALVE NUMBER STEAM GENERATOR LIFT SETTING (psig +/- 3%)

1 #2 #3 #4 AB-V0055 AB-V0065 AB-V0075 AB-V0045 1185 AB-V0056 AB-V0066 AB-V0076 AB-V0046 1197 AB-V0057 AB-V0067 AB-V0077 AB-V0047 1210 AB-V0058 AB-V0068 AB-V0078 AB-V0048 1222 AB-V0059 AB-V0069 AB-V0079 AB-V0049 1234 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-4 Amendment No. 123

MSIVs 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

LCO 3.7.2 Four MSIVs and their associated actuator trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODE 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MSIV actuator train A.1 Restore MSIV actuator 7 days inoperable, train to OPERABLE status.

B. Two MSIV actuator trains B.1 Restore one MSIV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for different actuator train to MSIVs when the OPERABLE status.

inoperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group.

C. Two MSIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MSIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

are in the same separation group.

D. Two actuator trains for one D.1 Declare the affected MSIV Immediately MSIV inoperable, inoperable.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-5 Amendment No. 4223,

MSIVs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME E. Three or more MSIV E.1 Declare each affected Immediately actuator trains inoperable. MSIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

F. One MSIV inoperable in F.1 Restore MSIV to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months I MODE 1. OPERABLE status.

G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

H. -------- NOTE -------------- H.1 Close MSIV. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV. AND H.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per One or more MSIV 7 days inoperable in MODE 2 or 3.

Required Action and 1.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition H not AND I met. I 1.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-6 Amendment No. 42-3,

MSIVs 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 ------------------------------- NOTE ----------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the isolation time of each MSIV is In accordance with

< 5 seconds. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.2.2 -------------------------------- NOTE ---------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each actuator train actuates the MSIV to the 18 months isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-7 Amendment No. 423,

MFIVs 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)

LCO 3.7.3 Four MFIVs and their associated actuator trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

NOT r------------------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each M I CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One MFIV actuator train A.1 Restore MFIV actuator 7 days inoperable, train to OPERABLE status.

B. Two MFIV actuator trains B.1 Restore one MFIV 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months inoperable for different actuator train to MFIVs when the inoperable OPERABLE status.

actuator trains are not in the same separation group.

C. Two MFIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MFIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

are in the same separation group.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-8 Amendment No. 4-2-3,

MFIVs 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Two actuator trains for one D.1 Declare the affected MFIV Immediately MFIV inoperable, inoperable.

E. Three or more MFIV E.1 Declare each affected Immediately actuator trains inoperable. MFIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

F. One or more MFIVs F.1 Close MFIV. 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months inoperable.

AND F.2 Verify MFIV is closed. Once per 7 days G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition F not AND met.

G.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-9 Amendment No. 3,

MFIVs 3.7.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 -------------------- NOTE ----------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the isolation time of each MFIV is < 5 seconds. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.3.2 -------------------- NOTE ----------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each actuator train actuates the MFIV to the 18 months I isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-10 Amendment No. 4-23,

ARVs 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Relief Valves (ARVs)

LCO 3.7.4 Four ARV lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ARV line inoperable A.1 Restore 7 days for reasons other than required ARV line to excessive leakage. OPERABLE status.

B. Two ARV lines inoperable B.1 Restore all but one 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for reasons other than required ARV line to excessive leakage. OPERABLE status.

C. Three or more ARV lines C.1 Restore all but two ARV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable for reasons lines to OPERABLE other than excessive status.

leakage.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-11 Amendment No. 123, 127,4-56, I

ARVs 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. With one or more of the D.1 Initiate action to close the Immediately ARVs inoperable because associated block valve(s).

of excessive seat leakage.

AND D.2 Restore ARV(s) to 30 days OPERABLE staus.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 Verify one complete cycle of each ARV. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.4.2 Verify one complete cycle of each ARV block valve. 18 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-12 Amendment No. 123,.2t7,--.5,

AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

. NOT

.. r------------------------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4b. is not applicable when entering MODE CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One steam supply to A.1 Restore steam supply to 7 days turbine driven AFW pump OPERABLE status.

inoperable. AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. One AFW train inoperable B.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months for reasons other than OPERABLE status.

Condition A. AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO (continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit I 3.7-13 Amendment No. 423,-15, I

AFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time for Condition A or B AND not met.

C.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months OR Two AFW trains inoperable.

D. Three AFW trains D.1A --------- NOTE------

inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to restore Immediately one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 -------------------- NOTE ----------------

Not required to be performed for the AFW flow control valves until the system is placed in standby or THERMAL POWER is > 10% RTP.

Verify each AFW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-14 Amendment No. -23,,

AFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY 4

SR 3.7.5.2 ------------------------------- NOTE ----------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after Ž 900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify the developed head of each AFW pump at the In accordance with flow test point is greater than or equal to the required the Inservice Test developed head. Program SR 3.7.5.3 Verify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, 18 months sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.4 ------------------------------- NOTE ----------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months after >_900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the required AFW flow Prior to entering paths by verifying flow from the condensate storage MODE 2 tank to each steam generator. whenever unit has been in MODE 5 or 6 for > 30 days Wolf Greek - Unit I 3.7-15 Amendment No. 423, I

CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

LCO 3.7.6 The CST contained water volume shall be > 281,000 gal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. CST contained water A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months volume not within limit, means OPERABILITY of backup water supply. AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter AND A.2 Restore CST contained 7 days water volume to within limit.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND 8.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-16 Amendment No. 4-23, 1

CST 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST contained water volume is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months

> 281,000 gal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-17 Amendment No. 4-93, I

CCW System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System LCO 3.7.7 Two CCW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CCW train inoperable. A.1- -------------- NOTE------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"

for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCW.

Restore CCW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-18 Amendment No. 423, I

CCW System 3.7.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 ------------------

NOTE-- --------------

Isolation of CCW flow to individual components does not render the CCW System inoperable.

Verify each CCW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2 Verify each CCW automatic valve in the flow path that 18 months is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.7.3 Verify each CCW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-19 Amendment No. 4,23, I

ESW System 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Essential Service Water (ESW) System LCO 3.7.8 Two ESW trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One ESW train inoperable. A.1 --------- NOTES------

1. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources - Operating,"

for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW System.

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ESW System.

Restore ESW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months OPERABLE status.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-20 Amendment No. 423, I

ESW System 3.7.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. Required Action and associated Completion B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months Time of Condition A not AND met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 -------------------- NOTE ----------------

Isolation of ESW System flow to individual components does not render the ESW System inoperable.

Verify each ESW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each ESW automatic valve in the flow path that 18 months is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each ESW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signal.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-21 Amendment No. 4-32, I

UHS 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Plant inlet water A.1 Verify water level of main 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months temperature of UHS not cooling lake _>1075 ft.

within limit, mean sea level. AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months thereafter AND A.2 Verify plant inlet water Once per hour temperature of UHS is

< 940 F.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time not met. AND OR B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months UHS inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-22 Amendment No. 123, !34, I

UHS 3.7.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level of UHS is >_1070 ft mean sea level. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months SR 3.7.9.2 Verify plant inlet water temperature of UHS is < 900 F. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-23 Amendment No. 123,,,34, I

CREVS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

I1 I I r-----------------------------------------------

The control room boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B. Two CREVS trains B.1 Restore control room 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months inoperable due to boundary to OPERABLE inoperable control room status.

boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-24 Amendment No. 423,434, I

CREVS 3.7.10 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME D. Required Action and D.1.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREVS train in CRVIS Time of Condition A not mode.

met in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of AND irradiated fuel assemblies.

D.1.2 Verify OPERABLE Immediately CREVS train is capable of being powered by an emergency power source.

OR D.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND D.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. Two CREVS trains E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, ALTERATIONS.

or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. AND E.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

F. Two CREVS trains F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-25 Amendment No. 423,131,43--, 34, I

CREVS 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREVS train pressurization filter unit 31 days for a 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating and each CREVS train filtration filter unit for

_15 minutes.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). VFTP SR 3.7.10.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates on an actual or 18 months simulated actuation signal.

SR 3.7.10.4 Verify one CREVS train can maintain a positive 18 months on a pressure of > 0.25 inches water gauge, relative to the STAGGERED outside atmosphere during the CRVIS mode of TEST BASIS operation.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-26 Amendment No. 123, 134, I

CRACS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)

LCO 3.7.11 Two CRACS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One CRACS train A.1 Restore CRACS train to 30 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months (continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-27 Amendment No. 123, !34, I

CRACS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CRACS train in operation.

Time of Condition A not met in MODE 5 or 6, or AND during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. C.1.2 Verify OPERABLE Immediately CRACS train is capable of being powered by an emergency power source.

OR C.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

AND C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

D. Two CRACS trains D.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, ALTERATIONS.

or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. AND D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. Two CRACS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-28 Amendment No. 12 3 , 4 13T , I

CRACS 3.7.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CRACS train has the capability to remove 18 months the assumed heat load.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-29 Amendment No. 123,,34a, I

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Pump Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS)

NOT USED Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-30 Amendment No. 423,434,1I

EES 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES)

LCO 3.7.13 Two EES trains shall be OPERABLE.

.. . . .- /I-I\

I-.........................----------------.---

The auxiliary building or fuel building boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

NOTE ------------------------

The SIS mode of operation is required only in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4. The FBVIS mode of operation is required only during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One EES train inoperable A.1 Restore EES train to 7 days in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. OPERABLE status.

B. Two EES trains inoperable B.1 Restore auxiliary building 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months due to inoperable auxiliary boundary to OPERABLE building boundary in status.

MODE 1,2, 3, or 4.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-31 Amendment No. 42, -,°4 , 32 34, 1I

EES 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months associated Completion Time of Condition A or B AND not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4. C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months OR Two EES trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

D. One EES train inoperable D.1 Place OPERABLE EES Immediately during movement of train in operation in FBVIS irradiated fuel assemblies mode.

in the fuel building.

OR D.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

E. Two EES trains inoperable E.1 Restore fuel building 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months due to inoperable fuel boundary to OPERABLE building boundary during status.

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-32 Amendment No. 423, 132,-31I4, I

EES 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME F. Required Action and F.1 Suspend movement of Immediately associated Completion irradiated fuel assemblies Time of Condition E not in the fuel building.

met.

OR Two EES trains inoperable during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building for reasons other than Condition E.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each EES train for > 10 continuous hours 31 days with the heaters operating.

SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required EES filter testing in accordance with In accordance with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each EES train actuates on an actual or 18 months.

simulated actuation signal.

(continued)

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-33 Amendment No. 123,132, 134, 1

EES 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative 18 months on a pressure > 0.25 inches water gauge with respect to STAGGERED atmospheric pressure in the auxiliary building during TEST BASIS the SIS mode of operation.

SR 3.7.13.5 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative 18 months on a pressure > 0.25 inches water gauge with respect to STAGGERED atmospheric pressure in the fuel building during the TEST BASIS FBVIS mode of operation.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-34 Amendment No. 423, 32, 434, I

3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Penetration Room Exhaust Air Cleanup System (PREACS)

NOT USED Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-35 Amendment No. ,1,23,,34, I

Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.15 The fuel storage pool water level shall be >: 23 ft over the top of irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Fuel storage pool water A.1 ----------- NOTE ------

level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.15.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is _23 ft 7 days above the top of the irradiated fuel assemblies seated in the storage racks.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-36 Amendment No. 4,,. 34, 1

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.16 The fuel storage pool boron concentration shall be > 2165 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: When fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage pool and a fuel storage pool verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Fuel storage pool boron NOTE --------------------

concentration not within LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

lim it. -------------------------------------------------

A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

AND A.2.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately fuel storage pool boron concentration to within limit.

OR A.2.2 Verify by administrative Immediately means that a non-Region 1 fuel storage pool verification has been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-37 Amendment No. 23,,1,34, I

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify the fuel storage pool boron concentration is 7 days within limit.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-38 Amendment No. ,23,-1-34, I

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 or 3 shall be within the Acceptable Domain of Figure 3.7.17-1 or in accordance with Specification 4.3.1.1.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in Region 2 or 3 of the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 ----------- NOTE ------

not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to move the Immediately noncomplying fuel assembly to Region 1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means the initial enrichment Prior to storing the and burnup of the fuel assembly is in accordance with fuel assembly in Figure 3.7.17-1 or Specification 4.3.1.1. Region 2 or 3 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-39 Amendment No. 423,34, I

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17

.. ... .. .. .. .. ., .

3.... T I~ ___________

m .............

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' :::::FORAIREGIO EPA l !2BUI : AN ):UP

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. ......? i ,.. .,.-:.. i ~ .i.i .ii.i.i,. ,.?.. ... , ? i.i.:. . -.. .. i... . .. . . ..i, ,, ,,. .*

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...... FOR EGION ...... .2.

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.......... I

..iiiiiiiiiiii o,~

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.ii iiiiiiii *i!i!ii!.!:* *`:!:**i!!iz a !!:::!i!ii* !ii!ii~**** 5 1i!:!i~~:s I:.O

"........... :: ~ *°.,*,' : "' ..- , , ' ,' ....

~ ..... -,: -'*": ::*; % i:";'

i*:-:; : % . : ' : % : .. * ; : -,. , ,, ::' : ' ,.:'°* ,; ' : .

E*iI* ::::?::-:::!L :INIIL*::tNR FI.. ...... H 'd(!'::U*r') :'

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Figure 3.7.17-1 (page 1 of 1)

Minimum Required Fuel Assembly Burnup as a Function of Initial Enrichment to Permit Storage in Regions 2 and 3 Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-40 Amendment No. 423,!4*.1, I

Secondary Specific Activity 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity LCO 3.7.18 The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be < 0.10gICi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Specific activity not within A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months limit.

AND A.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify the specific activity of the secondary coolant is 31 days

< 0.10 gCi/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 3.7-41 Amendment No. 423,413,4, I

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 1 of 20 ATTACHMENT IV PROPOSED TS BASES CHANGES (for information only)

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 2 of 20 MSIVs B 3.7.2 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND The MSIVs isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). MSIV closure terminates flow from the unaffected (intact) steam generators to the break.

One MSIV is located in each main steam line outside, but close to, containment. The MSIVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine steam supply, to prevent MSSV and AFW isolation from the steam generators by MSIV closure. Closing the MSIVs isolates each steam generator from the others, and isolates the turbine, Turbine Bypass System, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators.

\ýý-'The MSIVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by low steam line pressure, high steam line negative pressure rate or High-2 containment pressure. The MSIVs fail as is on loss of control or actuation power.

Each MSIV has an MSIV bypass valve. Although these bypass valves are normally closed, they receive the same emergency closure signal as do their associated MSIVs. The MSIVs may also be actuated manually.

A description of the MSIVs is found in the USAR, Section 10.3 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE The design basis of the MSIVs is established by the containment analysis SAFETY ANALYSES for the large steam line break (SLB) inside containment, discussed in the USAR, Section" 6.2.1.4 (Ref. 2). It is also affected by the accident analysis of the SLB events presented in the USAR, Section 15.1.5 (Ref. 3). The design precludes the blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single active component failure (e.g., the failure of one MSIV to close on demand).

The limiting case for the containment pressure analysis is the SLB inside containment, with initial reactor power at approximately 50% with loss of offsite power and the failure of one emergency diesel generator. At lower powers, the steam generator inventory and temperature are at their maximum, maximizing the analyzed mass and energy release to the containment. Due to reverse flow and failure of the MSIV to close, Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.2-1 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 3 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.2-1 The MSIV is a 28-inch gate valve with dual-redundant hydraulic actuation trains. Either actuation train can independently perform the safety function to fast-close the MSIV on demand. Each actuator train consists of a hydraulic accumulator controlled by solenoid valves on the associated MSIV. For each MSIV, one actuator train is associated with separation group 4 ("yellow"), and one actuator train is associated with separation group 1 ("red").

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 4 of 20 MSIVs No r =C? r . B 3.7.2 BASES APPLICABLE the additional mass and energy in the steam headers downstream from SAFETY ANALYSES the other MSIV contribute to the total release. With the most reactive rod (continued) cluster control assembly assumed stuck in the fully withdrawn position, there is an increased possibility that the core will become critical and return to power. The core is ultimately shut down by the boric acid injection delivered by the Emergency Core Cooling System.

The accident analysis compares several different SLB events against different acceptance criteria. The large SLB outside containment upstream of the MSIV is limiting for offsite dose, although a break in this short section of main steam header has a very low probability. The large SLB inside containment at hot zero power is the limiting case for a post trip return to power. The analysis includes scenarios with offsite power available, and with a loss of offsite power following turbine trip. With offsite power available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems is delayed. Significant single failures considered include failure of an MSIV to close.

The MSIVs serve only a safety function and remain open during power operation. These valves operate under the following situations:

a. An HELB inside containment. In order to maximize the mass and energy release into containment, the analysis assumes that the MSIV in the affected steam generator remains open. For this accident scenario, steam is discharged into containment from all steam generators until the remaining MSIVs close. After MSIV closure, steam is discharged into containment only from the affected steam generator and from the residual steam in the main steam header downstream of the closed MSIVs in the unaffected loops. Closure of the MSVIs isolates the break from the unaffected steam generators.

b. A break outside of containment and upstream from the MSIVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrolled blowdown of more than one steam generator must be prevented to limit the potential for uncontrolled RCS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of the MSIVs isolates the break and limits the blowdown to a single steam generator.

c. A break downstream of the MSIVs will be isolated by the closure of the MSIVs.

Wolf Creek - Unit I 83.7.2-2 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 5 of 20 MSIVS B 3.7.2 BASES APPLICABLE d. Following a steam generator tube rupture, closure of the SAFETY ANALYSES MSIVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact (continued) steam generators to minimize radiological releases.

e. The MSIVs are also utilized during other events such as a feedwater line break. This event is less limiting as far as MSIV OPERABILITY is concerned.

The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CR5.6c()i).Wt* rW LCO This LCO requires that four MSIVs~uaý f',e-.~**smlrsbe OPERABLE.

The MSIVs are considered OPERABLE when the isolation times are within limits, and they close on an isolation actuation signal.

AnMI tioe le due to oe"actuator trai on a valve being*"

.f ?opre e sinc aast three oe MSIVs wllose assumna single ith both ; and Sinoper uator trains n the same M V inoperable hat MSIV is the aicable C°ndifin should be eered.

A v ye actuator considered 0 ERABLE proIed:

Accu ulator pressu is within limit

b. I strument air s pply and pres re to the valv regulator is 'hin

c. All train-r ated test sw ches (Panel S 075N/B) ass iated with the act tor are in t OPERATE p ition, and no est light94dre lit.

This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs will perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits or the NRC staff approved licensing basis.

APPLICABILITY The MSIVs must be OPERABLE in MODE 1, and in MODES 2 and 3 due to significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the MSIVs are closed, they are already performing the safety function.

In MODE 4, the steam generator energy is low.

-TheKskyDXA~r

ýrmni Muý be 6?'Rtkk IEtýbES 121-Zaod S, S4?poft 0PrA-*M~ 6+ *Ve. MSIN.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.2-3 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 6 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.2-3 An MSIV actuator train is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of fast-closing the associated MSIV on demand and within the required isolation time. This includes having adequate accumulator pressure to support fast-closure of the MSIV within the required isolation time and instrument air supply and pressure to the valve regulator is within limits.

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 7 of 20 MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES APPLICABILITY In MODE 5 or 6, the steam generators do not contain much energy (continued) because their temperature is below the boiling point of water; therefore, the MSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

ACTIONS t'.

With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months . Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is consistent with that allowed for containment isolation valves that isolate a closed system penetrating containment. This time is reasonable due to the relative stability of the closed system which provides an additional passive means for containment isolation.

If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months , the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months and ConditioO ,would be entered. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

Condition is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each MSIV.

Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed.

When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition t

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.2-4 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 8 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.2-4A The LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements for the MSIVs as well as for their associated actuator trains. The Conditions and Required Actions for TS 3.7.2 separately address inoperability of the MSIV actuator trains and inoperability of the MSIVs themselves.

A.1 With a single actuator train inoperable on one MSIV, action must be taken to restore the inoperable actuator train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7-day Completion Time is reasonable in light of the dual-redundant actuator train design such that with one actuator train inoperable, the affected MSIV is still capable of closing on demand via the remaining OPERABLE actuator train. The 7-day Completion Time takes into account the redundant OPERABLE actuator train to the MSIV, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable actuator train to the affected MSIV.

B.1 With an actuator train on one MSIV inoperable and an actuator train on an additional MSIV inoperable, such that the inoperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With two actuator trains inoperable on two MSIVs, there is an increased likelihood that an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train) could cause one MSIV to fail to close. The 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable since the dual-redundant actuator train design ensures that with only one actuator train on each of two affected MSIVs inoperable, each MSIV is still capable of closing on demand.

C.1 With an actuator train on one MSIV inoperable and an actuator train on an additional MSIV inoperable, but with both inoperable actuator trains in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24-hour Completion Time provides a reasonable amount of time for restoring at least one actuator train since the dual-redundant actuator train design for each MSIV ensures that a single inoperable actuator train cannot prevent the affected MSIV(s) from closing on demand. With two actuator trains inoperable in the same separation group, an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train in the other separation group) could cause both affected MSIVs to fail to close on demand. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into the redundant OPERABLE actuator trains to the affected MSIVs and the low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable actuator trains to the affected MSIVs.

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 9 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.2-4A (continued)

D.1 Required Action D.1 provides assurance that the appropriate Action is entered for the affected MSIV if its associated actuator trains become inoperable. Failure of both actuator trains for a single MSIV results in the inability to close the affected MSIV on demand.

E.1 With three or more MSIV actuator trains inoperable or when Required Action A.1, B.1, or C.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the affected MSIVs may be incapable of closing on demand and must be immediately declared inoperable.

Having three actuator trains inoperable could involve two inoperable actuator trains on one MSIV and one inoperable actuator train on another MSIV, or an inoperable actuator train on each of three MSIVs, for which the inoperable actuator trains could all be in the same separation group or be staggered among the two separation groups.

Depending on which of these conditions or combinations is in effect, the condition or combination could mean that all of the affected MSIVs remain capable of closing on demand (due to the dual-redundant actuator train design), or that at least one MSIV is inoperable, or that with an additional single failure up to three MSIVs could be incapable of closing on demand. Therefore, in some cases, immediately declaring the affected MSIVs inoperable is conservative (when some or all of the affected MSIVs may still be capable of closing on demand even with a single additional failure), while in other cases it is appropriate (when at least one of the MSIVs would be inoperable, or up to three could be rendered inoperable by an additional single failure). Required Action E.1 is conservatively based on the worst-case condition and therefore requires immediately declaring all the affected MSIVs inoperable. Declaring two or more MSIVs inoperable while in MODE 1 requires entry into LCO 3.0.3.

INSERT B 3.7.2-4B Condition F is entered when one MSIV is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MSIV are inoperable. When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MSIV, Condition A applies.

Attachment IV to WM 06-0033 Page 10 of 20 MSIVs B 3.7.2 BASES ACTIONS and (continued)

For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid.

The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position.

I& and Ithe MSIVs cannot be restored to OPERABLE status or are not closed within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months . The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from MODE 2 conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

On arm J~*A15

£WI~teAC hxý

.Ltý'ýbc71ti SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 A *,A'-"A REQUIREMENTS Z "

This SR verifies that MSIV isolation time is

5.0 second =.The MSIV isolation time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.

The Frequency is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

This test can be conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at operating temperature and pressure. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.

SR 3.7.2.2 'JsrSI t 6 This SR verifies that each can close on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The manuaVast close hand switch in the control room provides an acceptable actuation signal. This Surveillance is normally Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.2-5 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 11 of 20 MSIVS T,1 ckro- B 3.7.2 1i'%CA t.'AcA -6, VýoeM ir16VIayl BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS performed upon returning the plant to operation following a refueling outage. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.

The frequency of MSIV testing is every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency for testing is based on the refueling cycle. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES 1. USAR, Section 10.3.

2. USAR, Section 6.2.

3. USAR, Section 15.1.5.

4. 10 CFR 100.11.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.2-6 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 12 of 20 MFIVs B 3.7.3 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND The MFIVs isolate main feedwater (MFW) flow to the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). The Main Feedwater Regulation Valves (MFRVs) function to control feedwater flow to the SGs.

The MFIV is a 14-inch gate valve with a dual-redundant hydraulic

t' aev i~te MFIVIf.ImVlbýosir!./

r*,~~~~0,vill~o 7* ./

The MFRVs are air-operated angle valves used to control feedwater flow to the SGs from between 20% and full power. The MFRV bypass valves are air-operated globe valves used to control flow to the SGs up to 25%

power.

Closure of the MFIVs terminates main feedwater flow to the steam generators, terminating the event for feedwater line breaks (FWLBs) occurring upstream of the MFIVs. The consequences of events occurring in the main steam lines or in the MFW lines downstream from the MFIVs will be mitigated by their closure. Closure of the MFIVs effectively terminates the addition of main feedwater to an affected steam generator, limiting the mass and energy release for steam line breaks (SLBs) or FWLBs inside containment, and reducing the cooldown effects for SLBs.

The MFIVs isolate the nonsafety related portions from the safety related portions of the system. In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the valves limit the quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break, and provide a pressure boundary for the controlled addition of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) to the intact loops.

One MFIV is located on each MFW line, outside but close to containment.

The MFIVs are located upstream of the AFW injection point so that AFW may be supplied to the steam generators following MFIV closure. The piping volume from these valves to the steam generators is accounted for in calculating mass and energy releases, and refilled prior to AFW reaching the steam generator following either an SLB or FWLB.

The MFIVs close on receipt of any safety injection signal, a Tavg - Low coincident with reactor trip (P-4), a low-low steam generator level, or steam actuatedgenerator water level - high high signal. They may also be manually. In addition to the MFIVs, a check valve inside Wolf Creek - Unit I B 3.7.3-1 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 13 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.3-1 Either actuation train can independently perform the safety function to fast-close the MFIV on demand. Each actuator train consists of a hydraulic accumulator controlled by solenoid valves on the associated MFIV. For each MFIV, one actuator train is associated with separation group 4 ("yellow"), and one actuator train is associated with separation group 1 ("red").

Attachment IV to WM 06-0033 Page 14 of 20 MFIVs r%0hVA0ed5-VNA4 B 3.7.3

?"&,w~.~L BASES BACKGROUND containment is available. The check valve isolates the feedwater line, (continued) penetrating containment, and ensures the pressure boundary of any intact loop not receiving auxiliary feedwater.

The MFIV actuators consist of two separate pneumatic-hydraulic power trains each receiving an actuation signal from one of the redundant ESFAS channels. A single active failure in one power train would not prevent the other power train from functioning. The MFIVs provide the primary success path for events requiring feedwater isolation and isolation of nonsafety related portions from the safety related portion of the system, such as, for auxiliary feedwater addition.

A description of the MFIVs and MFRVs is found in the USAR, Section 10.4.7 (Ref. 1).

APPLICABLE Credit is taken in accident analysis for the MFIVs to close on demand.

SAFETY ANALYSES The safety function of the MFRVs and associated bypass valves credited in accident analysis is to provide a backup to the MFIVs for the potential failure of an MFIV to close even though the MFRVs are located in the nonsafety related portion of the feedwater system. Further assurance of feedwater flow termination is provided by the SGFP trip function; however, this is not credited in accident analysis. The accident analysis credits the main feedwater check valves as backup to the MFIVs to prevent SG blowdown for pipe ruptures in the non-seismic Category I portions of the feedwater system outside containment.

Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii) indicates that components that are part of the primary success path and that actuate to mitigate an event that presents a challenge to a fission product barrier should be in Technical Specifications. The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of the combination and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criteria) so that the plant response to the event remains within appropriate acceptance criteria. The primary success path does not include backup and diverse equipment. The MFIVs, with their dual-redundant actuators, are the primary success path for feedwater isolation; the MFRVs, bypass valves, and the SGFP trip are backup and diverse equipment. Therefore, only the MFIVs are incorporated into Technical Specifications. The MFIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii).

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.3-2 Revision 0

Attachment IV to WM 06-0033 Page 15 of 20 MFIVs B 3.7.3 BASES LCO This LCO ensures that the MFIVs will isolate MFW flow to the steam generators, following an FWLB or main steam line break. These valves will also isolate the nonsafety related portions from the safety related portions of the system. (o!, *,e.r o.ta'e u-"t cmns This LCO requires that four MFIVs be OPERABLE. The MFIVs are considered OPERABLE when isolation times are within limits and they close on an isolation actuation signal.

An MFIV notrinopera e duestoho actuato tr on a valveweing Foperetsince at I t three of e MFan wisctlos assudgial si failu ith both ac ator trains odthe same IV inoperab o that MFgV is inoperable* nd the appi able Condi ti n should be ntered.

A valv actuator is nsidered OP RABLE pr ided:

a Accum ator pressur s within limi ind energ ben eesdtot inmntfolwin anIo or gL sinle

b. I~n ument air s ply and pre ure to the va e regulator i within I

Fa ilure to meet the LCO requirements can result in additional mass and energy being released to containment following an SLB or FWLB inside containment. A feedwater isolation signal on high steam generator level is relied on to terminate an excess feedwater flow event, and failure to meet the LCO may result in the introduction of water into the main steam lines.

APPLICABILITY The MFIVs must be OPERABLE whenever there is significant mass and energy in the Reactor Coolant System and steam generators. In MODES 1, 2, and 3, the MFIVs are required to be OPERABLE to perform their isolation function and limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to containment in the case of a secondary system pipe break inside containment. When the valves are closed, they are already performing their safety function.

In MODES 4, 5, and 6, steam generator energy is low. Therefore, the MIscan bee clos~ed since MFW is not required.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.3-3 Revision 0

Attachment IV to WM 06-0033 Page 16 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.3-3 An MFIV actuator train is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of fast-closing the associated MFIV on demand and within the required isolation time. This includes having adequate accumulator pressure to support fast-closure of the MFIV within the required isolation time and instrument air supply and pressure to the valve regulator is within limits.

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 17 of 20 MFIVs B 3.7.3 BASES ACTIONS The ACTIONS table is modified by a Note indic that separate Condition entry is allowed for each With one MFIV in one or more flow paths inoperable, action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERABLE status, or to close or isolate inoperable affected valves within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months . When these valves are closed, they are performing their required safety function.

The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time takes into account the redundancy afforded by the dual-redundant actuators on the MFIVs and the low probability of an event occurring during this time period that would require isolation of the MFW flow paths. The 4 hour4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience.

Inoperable MFIVs that are closed must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are closed.

Ifthe MFIV(s) cannot be restored to OPERABLE status, or closed, within the associated Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in at least MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months , and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months .

The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MFIV is 5 5 seconds on an actual or simulated main feedwater isolation actuation signal from each actuator train. The MFIV closure time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. This is consistent with Regulatory Guide 1.22 (Ref. 4)

Wolf Creek - Unit I B 3.7.3-4 Revision 0

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 18 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.3-4A The LCO specifies OPERABILITY requirements for the MFIVs as well as for their associated actuator trains. The Conditions and Required Actions for TS 3.7.3 separately address inoperability of the MFIV actuator trains and inoperability of the MFIVs themselves.

A.1 With a single actuator train inoperable on one MFIV, action must be taken to restore the inoperable actuator train to OPERABLE status within 7 days. The 7-day Completion Time is reasonable in light of the dual-redundant actuator train design such that with one actuator train inoperable, the affected MFIV is still capable of closing on demand via the remaining OPERABLE actuator train. The 7-day Completion Time takes into account the redundant OPERABLE actuator train to the MFIV, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable actuator train to the affected MFIV.

B.1 With an actuator train on one MFIV inoperable and an actuator train on an additional MFIV inoperable, such that the inoperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months . With two actuator trains inoperable on two MFIVs, there is an increased likelihood that an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train) could cause one MFIV to fail to close. The 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable since the dual-redundant actuator train design ensures that with only one actuator train on each of two affected MFIVs inoperable, each MFIV is still capable of closing on demand.

C.1 With an actuator train on one MFIV inoperable and an actuator train on an additional MFIV inoperable, but with both inoperable actuator trains in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months . The 24-hour Completion Time provides a reasonable amount of time for restoring at least one actuator train since the dual-redundant actuator train design for each MFIV ensures that a single inoperable actuator train cannot prevent the affected MFIV(s) from closing on demand. With two actuator trains inoperable in the same separation group, an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train in the other separation group) could cause both affected MFIVs to fail to close on demand. The 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months Completion Time takes into the redundant OPERABLE actuator trains to the affected MFIVs and the low probability of an event occurring that requires the inoperable actuator trains to the affected MFIVs.

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 19 of 20 INSERT B 3.7.3-4A (continued)

D.1 Required Action D.1 provides assurance that the appropriate Action is entered for the affected MFIV if its associated actuator trains become inoperable. Failure of both actuator trains for a single MFIV results in the inability to close the affected MFIV on demand.

E.1 With three or more MFIV actuator trains inoperable or when Required Action A.1, B.1, or C.1 cannot be completed within the required Completion Time, the affected MFIVs may be incapable of closing on demand and must be immediately declared inoperable.

Having three actuator trains inoperable could involve two inoperable actuator trains on one MFIV and one inoperable actuator train on another MFIV, or an inoperable actuator train on each of three MFIVs, for which the inoperable actuator trains could all be in the same separation group or be staggered among the two separation groups.

Depending on which of these conditions or combinations is in effect, the condition or combination could mean that all of the affected MFIVs remain capable of closing on demand (due to the dual-redundant actuator train design), or that at least one MFIV is inoperable, or that with an additional single failure up to three MFIVs could be incapable of closing on demand. Therefore, in some cases, immediately declaring the affected MFIVs inoperable is conservative (when some or all of the affected MFIVs may still be capable of closing on demand even with a single additional failure), while in other cases it is appropriate (when at least one of the MFIVs would be inoperable, or up to three could be rendered inoperable by an additional single failure). Required Action E.1 is conservatively based on the worst-case condition and therefore requires immediately declaring all the affected MFIVs inoperable.

INSERT B 3.7.3-4B Condition F is entered when one or more MFIV is inoperable in MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for one MFIV are inoperable. When only one actuator train is inoperable on one MFIV, Condition A applies.

Attachment IVto WM 06-0033 Page 20 of 20 MFIVs B 3.7.3 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.3.1 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the Inservice Testing Program Frequency. This test is conducted in MODE 3 with the unit at nominal operating temperature and pressure, as discussed in Reference

2. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated.

SR 3.7.3. 2j%

This SR verifies that each can clos on an actual or simulated actuation signal. The manual close hand switch in the control room provides an acceptable actuation signal. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the plant to operation following a refueling outage. This SR is modified by a Note that allows entry into and operation in MODE 3 prior to performing the SR. This allows a delay of testing until MODE 3, to establish conditions consistent with those under which the acceptance criterion was generated The frequency of MFIV testing is every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency for testing is based on the refueling cycle. Operating experience has shown that these components usually pass the Surveillance when performed at the 18 month Frequency. Therefore, this Frequency is acceptable from a reliability standpoint.

REFERENCES, 1. USAR, Section 10.4.7.

2. ASME, Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section Xl.

3. USAR, Table 7.3-14.

4. Regulatory Guide 1.22, Rev. 0.

Wolf Creek - Unit 1 B 3.7.3-5 Revision 0

Attachment V to WM 06-0033 Page 1 of 1

SUMMARY

OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS The following table identifies those actions committed to by WCNOC in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to Mr. Kevin Moles at (620) 364-4126.

COMMITMENT Due Date/Event The license amendment will be implemented within 30 days of Within 30 days of issuance. Final TS Bases changes will be implemented NRC issuance pursuant to TS 5.5.14 at the time the amendment is implemented.

v t e Letter Sequence Request
TAC:MD2895, (Approved, Closed)
Initiation Request Acceptance... Administration Questions Answers 25 October 2006 Results Approval Other: ML063120261
MONTHYEAR2006-11-07 [Table View]

WM 06-0033, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, Main Steam Isolation Valves (Msivs), and TS 3.7.3, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (Mfivs).

Text

Subject:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

Conclusion:

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

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WM 06-0033, Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, Main Steam Isolation Valves (Msivs), and TS 3.7.3, Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (Mfivs).

Text

Subject:

1.0 DESCRIPTION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

3.0 BACKGROUND

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

5.0 REGULATORY ANALYSIS

Conclusion:

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

7.0 REFERENCES

SUMMARY

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