ULNRC-05566, Amplification for Amendment, Revision of Technical Specification 3.3.2 and 3.7.2 and Addition of New Technical Specification 3.7.19 (License Amendment Request OL-1277 Revised)

Amplification for Amendment, Revision of Technical Specification 3.3.2 and 3.7.2 and Addition of New Technical Specification 3.7.19 (License Amendment Request OL-1277 Revised)

ML091310167
Person / Time
Site:	Callaway
Issue date:	05/04/2009
From:	Sandbothe S AmerenUE, Union Electric Co
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
ULNRC-05566
Download: ML091310167 (193)

Text

AmerenUE PO Box 620 Callawav Plant Fulton, MO 65251 May 4,2009 ULNRC-05566

u. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001

~"¿ 10 CFR 50.90

"' Ameren UE Ladies and Gentlemen:

DOCKET NUMBER 50-483 CALLA WAY PLANT UNIT 1 UNION ELECTRIC CO.

APPLICA TION FOR AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NPF-30 REVISION OF TECHNICAL SPECIFCA TIONS 3.3.2 AND 3.7.2 AND ADDITION OF NEW TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.7.19 (LICENSE AMENDMENT REQUEST OL-1277 REVISED)

Reference:

(1) AmerenUE Letter ULNRC-05466, Transmittal of License Amendment Request OL-1277, dated December 28,2007 (2) AmerenUE Letter ULNRC-05573, Withdrawal of License Amendment Request OL-1277 dated December 10, 2008 AmerenUE herewith transmits an application for amendment to Facility Operating License Number NPF-30 for the Callaway Plant. This transmittal submits a replacement to the application for amendment transmitted via the letter Reference (1) above. Reference (1) was under review by the NRC stafas license amendment request OL-1277 (TAC No. MD7787). By letter Reference (2), AmerenUE withdrew the license amendment request. AmerenUE is now submitting license amendment request OL-1277 Revised. OL-1277 Revised completely replaces Reference (1).

The current submittal proposes revisions to Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)," to add the main steam isolation valve bypass valves (MSIVBVs) and main steam low point drain isolation valves (MSLPDIVs) to the scope ofTS 3.7.2. In minor changes, the title ofTS 3.7.2 and the header on each page ofTS 3.7.2 are revised. The proposed changes also revise a subsidiary of Ameren Corporation

ULNRC05566 May 4, 2009 Page 2 exception footnote (i) in TS Table 3.3.2-1 ofTS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," to remove the MSIVs from the footnote such that the footnote only addresses the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. The MSIVs are addressed in new exception footnote (k) added to TS Table 3.3.2-1.

In addition, a new Technical Specification is proposed to be added. Proposed new TS 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)," provides a Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for the following secondary system isolation valves: steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (SGCIIVs), steam generator blowdown isolation valves (SGBSIVs), and steam generator sample line isolation valves (SGBSSIVs). Correspondingly, new Function 10, "Steam Generator Blowdown System and Sample Line Isolation Valve Actuation," is proposed to be added to TS Table 3.3.2-1 ofTS 3.3.2. The SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs are addressed in new exception footnote (t) added to Table 3.3.2-1 for Function 10.

The appropriate TS Bases changes for the proposed revisions to TS 3.3.2 and TS 3.7.2 are included for information and reflect the proposed changes. Also included for information is a new TS Bases section for new TS 3.7.19.

Attachments 1 through 4 provide the Evaluation, Markup of Technical Specifications, Retyped Technical Specifications, and Proposed Technical Specification Bases changes, respectively, in support of this amendment request. is provided for information only. Final Bases changes will be processed under the program for updates per TS 5.5.14, "Technical Specifications Bases Control Program," at the time this amendment is implemented.

It has been determined that this amendment application does not involve a significant hazard consideration as determined per 10 CFR 50.92. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment. Further, no commitments are contained in this amendment application.

The Callaway Onsite Review Committee and a subcommittee of the Nuclear Safety Review Board have reviewed and approved the proposed changes and have approved the submittal of this amendment application.

AmerenUE requests approval of this license amendment request prior to May 5, 2010. AmerenUE further requests that the license amendment be made effective upon NRC issuance, to be implemented within 90 days from the date of issuance.

ULNRC05566 May 4, 2009 Page 3 In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this amendment application is being provided to the designated Missouri State offciaL. If you have any questions on this amendment application, please contact me at (573) 676-8129, or Mr. Scott Maglio at (573) 676-8719.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Very truly yours, Exected on: - 5/1 /04 Scott Sandbothe Manager, Regulatory Affairs DJW /nls Attachments: 1 - Evaluation 2 - Makup of Technical Specification pages and New TS 3.7.19 3 - Retyed Techncal Specification pages and New TS 3.7.19 4 - Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes and New TS 3.7.19 Bases (for information only

ULNRC05566 May 4, 2009 Page 4 cc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Original and 1 copy)

Attn: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Mr. Elmo E. Collins, Jr.

Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region iv 612 E . Lamar Blvd., Suite 400 Arlington, TX 76011-4125 Senior Resident Inspector Callaway Resident Offce U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 8201 NRC Road Steedman, MO 65077 Mr. Mohan C. Thadani (2 copies)

Licensing Project Manager, Callaway Plant Offce of Nuclear Reactor Regulation U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 0-8G14 Washington, DC 20555-2738

ULNRC05566 May 4, 2009 Page 5 Index and send hardcopy to QA File A160.0761 Hardcopy:

Certrec Corporation 4200 South Hulen, Suite 422 Fort Worth, TX 76109 (Certec receives ALL attachments as long as they are non-safeguards and may be publicly disclosed.)

Electronic distribution for the following can be made via Tech Spec ULNRC Distribution:

A. C. Heflin F. M. Diya T. E. Herrann L. S. Sandbothe S. A. Maglio S. L. Gallagher T. L. Woodward (NSRB)

T. B. Elwood D. J. Walker Ms. Diane M. Hooper (WCNOC)

Mr. Dennis Buschbaum (TXU)

Mr. Scott Bauer (Palo Verde)

Mr. Stan Ketelsen (PG&E)

Mr. Scott Head (STP)

Mr. John O'Neill (Pillsbury Winthop Shaw Pittman LLP)

Missouri Public Service Commission Mr. Floyd Gilzow (DNR)

ULNRC-05566 ATTACHMENT i EV ALUATION to ULNRC-05556 EV ALVA TION

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S 2

3.0 BACKGROUND

5 3.1 MSIV Bypass Valves (MSIVBVs) 6 3.2 Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs) 7 3.3 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves (SGBSIVs) 7 3.4 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Isolation Valves (SGBSSIVs) 7 3.5 Steam Generator Chemical Injection Isolation Valves (SGCIIVs) 8 3.6 Licensing Basis for Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs) 8

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

9 4.1 Technical Evaluation of Proposed Revisions to TS 3.7.2, Main Steam 10 Isolation Valves (MSIVs) 4.2 Technical Evaluation of Proposed New TS 3.7.19, Secondary System 13 Isolation Valves 4.3 Technical Evaluation of Proposed Revisions to TS 3.3.2, ESFAS 15 Instrumentation 4.4 Additional Justification for SSIV Allowed Outage Times 17 5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 18 5.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration 18 5.2 Applicable Regulatory Requirements/Criteria 21 5.3 Conclusions 23

6.0 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATION

23 7.0 PRECEDENT 23

8.0 REFERENCES

24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 EV ALUATION

1.0 DESCRIPTION

The most significant isolation valves within the secondary system at Callaway Plant are addressed in the plant Technical Specifications due to the credited safety functions performed by these valves. The main steam isolation valves (MSIVs), for example, are addressed in TS 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)." The main feedwater isolation valves (MFIVs), along with the main feedwater regulating valves (MFRVs) and MFRV bypass valves (MFRVBVs), are addressed in TS 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)." It is recognized, however, that there are other isolation valves in the secondary system that, although much smaller in size than the MSIV s or MFIV s, nevertheless perform safety functions explicitly or implicitly credited in the accident analyses, but which are not currently addressed in the Technical Specifications. Changes to the Technical Specifications are therefore being proposed to incorporate requirements for secondary system isolation valves not currently addressed by the Technical Specifications, as follows.

The proposed changes will revise Technical Specifications (TS) 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)," to add the main steam isolation valve bypass valves (MSIVBVs) and the main steam low point drain isolation valves (MSLPDIVs) to the scope of the TS. The proposed changes include revising the Limiting Condition for Operation (LeO) and Applicability sections ofTS 3.7.2 and adding or revising Conditions, Required Actions, and Sureilance Requirements as necessary to address the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. In minor changes, the title ofTS 3.7.2 and the header on each page ofTS 3.7.2 are revised. In addition, Footnote (i) for Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation," in Table 3.3.2-1 of Technical Specification 3.3.2, "ESF AS Instrumentation,"

is revised such that it reflects the actuation circuitry requirements necessary to support and/or be consistent with the revised Applicability ofLCO 3.7.2. Footnote (i) is further revised to remove the MSIV s from the scope ofthe note so that it only addresses the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. New exception footnote (k) is added to TS Table 3.3.2-1 for Function 4 to address the MSIVs alone.

The proposed changes also add new TS 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)," to include a Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirements for the secondary system isolation valves (SSIVs). The applicable SSIVs are the steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (SGCIIVs), steam generator blowdown isolation valves (SGBSIVs), and steam generator sample line isolation valves (SGBSSIVs). TS 3.3.2 and Table 3.3.2-1 are revised such that they reflect the actuation circuitry requirements necessary to support the SSIV s consistent with the Applicability of new LCO 3.7.19. New Function 10, "Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Page 1 of 24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 Isolation," is added to TS Table 3.3.2-1. New exception footnote (t) is added to Table 3.3.2-1 for Function 10 to address the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs.

2.0 PROPOSED CHANGE

S This amendment application proposes to revise TS 3.7.2 to incorporate requirements for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. TS 3.7.2 is retitled to "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSIVBVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs)." In a minor change, the header for each page ofTS 3.7.2 is revised to "MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs." TS 3.7.2 LCO, Applicabilty, ACTIONS, and Surveilance Requirements (SRs) are specifically revised to incorporate requirements for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. The LCO and Applicability are further revised to more clearly convey requirements and provisions on a "for each main steam line" basis. The proposed wording for the Applicability would ensure that the exceptions specified therein are properly interpreted when applied to any of the isolation valves (i.e., MSIV, MSIVBV, or MSLPDIV) in a steam line (s).

The proposed changes add new CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIMES for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. Current CONDITION H is revised to CONDITION J, and Required Actions H.l and H.2 are renumbered to Required Actions J.1 and J.2. Current CONDITION I is revised to CONDITION K and Required Actions 1.1 and 1.2 are renumbered as K.l and K.2. CONDITION Know states "Required Action and Associated Completion Time of Condition H, I, or J not met." New CONDITION H is modified by a Note indicating that, when one or more MSIVBV s are inoperable, separate Condition entry is allowed for each main steam line.

New CONDITION H addresses one or more MSIVBVs inoperable, and Required Actions H.1 and H.2 require the inoperable MSIVBV(s) to be closed or isolated in 7 days and verified closed or isolated once per seven days. New CONDITION I is modified by a Note indicating that, when one or more MSLPDIVs are inoperable, separate Condition entry is allowed for each main steam line. New CONDITION I addresses one or more MSLPDIV s inoperable, and Required Actions 1.1 and 1.2 require the inoperable MSLPDIV(s) to be closed or isolated in 7 days and verified closed or isolated once per seven days. Revised SR 3.7.2.2 incorporates "each MSIVBV, and each MSLPDIV" to be verified. New TS SR 3.7.2.3 requires the isolation time for each MSIVBV and each MSLPDiv to be verified that it is within limits when tested in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

A new Technical Specification 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)," is proposed with a Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveillance Requirements appropriate to the SSIVs. The applicable SSIVs are the steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (SGCIIVs), steam generator blowdown isolation valves (SGBSIVs), and steam generator sample line isolation valves (SGBSSIVs) (as identified in the new TS Bases section to be incorporated for TS 3.7.19). The LCO requires the SSIV s to be OPERALE. The LCO is modified by a Note that allows locked closed manual SSIV s to be open under administrative controls.

Page 2 of24 to ULNRC-05566 The proposed Applicability requires the SSIVs to be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators.

The LeO and Applicability convey requirements and provisions on a "for each secondary system flow path" basis. The proposed wording for the Applicability ensures that the exceptions specified therein are properly interpreted when applied to any of the isolation valves (SSIVs) in a secondary system flow path. Exceptions to the Applicability are allowed for cases where there is assurance that the SSIV is assured of performing its specified safety function and the associated secondary system flow path is or can be fully isolated.

The CONDITIONS and ACTIONS are modified by a Note to allow separate Condition entry for each SSIV. CONDITION A applies when one or more SSIVs are inoperable. Required Actions A.1 and A.2 require the SSIV to be closed or isolated in 7 days and verified closed or isolated once per 7 days. The Required Actions A.1 and A.2 have been modified by a Note that allows closed or isolated automatic SSIVs to be open or unisolated under administrative controls. CONDITION B applies when the Required Action and associated Completion Time (of Condition A) are not met. Upon entry into this Condition, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. In this case the plant must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> per Required Actions B.1 and B.2, respectively.

Appropriate SRs are proposed for the SSIV s. Proposed SR 3.7.19.1 verifies that the isolation time of each automatic SSIV is within limits when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program. The Frequency for SR 3.7.19.1 is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program. Proposed SR 3.7.19.2 verifies that each automatic SSIV in a secondary system flow path is capable of closure on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

Revisions to TS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," and Table 3.3.2-1 ofTS 3.3.2 are required in association with the proposed changes to TS 3.7.2 and new TS 3.7.19.

The instrumentation and actuation circuitry that generates and processes the signals to which the automatic valves being added to the TS are designed to respond must be addressed within TS 3.3.2. Because the MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs receive a steam line isolation signal (SLIS) to close, they are addressed in TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation." The proposed change to TS 3.3.2, ESFAS Instrumentation, Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, footnote (i) revises the current statement of footnote (i), "Except when all MSIVs are closed," to eliminate the MSIVs from the footnote and to state the following in order to address only the MSIVBV sand MSLPDIVs:

(i) Except when:

1. All MSIVBVs are closed and de-activated; 1.a Closed and de-activated; or Page 3 of24

Attachment i to ULNRC-05566 l.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 1.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

2. All MSLPDIVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

Because Function 4.c, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)," in TS Table 3.3.2-1 pertains only to the MSIVs, new footnote (k) is added and states, "Except when all MSIV s are closed and de-activated."

Together, proposed footnote (i) and new footnote (k) replace current footnote (i) in MODES 2 and 3 in TS Table 3.3.2-1 for Function 4.a, "Steam Line Isolation - Manual Initiation," Function 4.b, "Steam Line Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)," Function 4.d, "Steam Line Isolation - Containment Pressure-High 2," Function 4.e.l, "Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure - Low," and in MODE 3 only for Function 4.e.2, "Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure -

Negative Rate - High."

Changes to TS 3.3.2 based on new TS 3.7.19, "SSIVs," include the addition of new Required Action P.2 for Condition P (which applies when one or more manual auxiliar feedwater initiation or steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation channels are inoperable). Upon entering Condition P, Required Action P.2 would require declaring the associated steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves immediately inoperable (since these valves are designed to close in response to the manual star of an auxiliar feedwater pump or manual isolation ofthe steam generator blowdown and sample lines). Another change proposed for TS 3.3.2 is the addition of new Function 10, "Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation," to Table 3.3.2-1. Because the automatically operated SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs receive a steam generator blowdown system isolation signal (SGBSIS) to close, they are associated with TS Table 3.3.2-1, new Function 10. New footnote (t) is being added to provide an Applicability exception for the associated instrumentation when the automatic SSIV s are closed and de-activated or isolated. Specifically, the new note reads as follows:

(t) Except when all Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valves are:

1. Closed and de-activated; or

2. Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

3. Isolated by a combination of closed manual valve(s) and closed de-activated automatic valve(s).

Page 4 of24 to ULNRC-05566 Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages with the proposed markups and includes the new proposed TS 3.7.19. Attachment 4 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked-up to show the proposed changes and includes the new TS Bases pages for TS 3.7.19. Attachment 4 is provided for information only.

3.0 BACKGROUND

The Main Steam System functions to (1) contain and transport saturated steam from the steam generator to the main turbine and other loads, (2) serve as the main heat sink for the primary system, preventing fuel overheating during transients and accidents, and (3) supply a source of power to the turbine-driven auxiliar feedwater pump (TDAFP) turbine. The Main Steam System stars at the four steam generators and includes the components on each of the four main steam lines. Leaving the steam generator, each main steam line contains an atmospheric steam dump valve and five main steam safety valves installed in each steam header. Downstream of the main steam safety valves, are steam supplies to the TDAFP via two of the four steam headers.

Main steam then flows through the main steam isolation valves (MSIVs) or MSIV Bypass valves (MSIVBVs) to the turbine building. The MSIVs and MSIVBVs provide steam generator isolation for steam line break protection. Upstream of the MSIVs, the steam generators act independently of each other when the MSIVs are closed. Normally the MSIVs are open and the MSIVBVs are closed. When the MSIVs are open, the individual main steam flows from the steam generators tie together in a parallel configuration which is then distributed to loads in the turbine building. The crosstie header equalizes the pressure in all four steam generators which maintains equal flow on all the generators. On each steam header upstream of the MSIVs is a 12-inch diameter drain standpipe. Attached to the 12-inch line is a I-inch diameter line back to the condenser. One air-operated low point drain isolation valve (MSLPDIV) is installed in each 1-inch drain line. The MSLPDIV is normally open to allow a steam trap to pass moisture to the main condenser. FSAR Section 10.3 describes the Main Steam Supply system.

The major function of the steam generator blowdown system is to maintain the steam generator secondary chemisty within specifications. It is designed to recover a portion ofthe heat from the blowdown process and treat the water prior to returning it to the secondary system or discharging it. The blowdown system also provides the means to sample the secondary side of the steam generators, drain the steam generators during outages, and re-circulate the steam generator water during wet layup conditions. The steam generator b10wdown system consists of a flash tank, a regenerative heat exchanger, an nonregenerative heat exchanger, filters, demineralizers, a surge tank, and discharge and drain pumps. Each of the four steam generators has its own blowdown and sample lines.

The blowdown from each of the steam generators is conveyed to the steam generator blowdown flash tank by 4-inch blowdown lines. One b10wdown isolation valve (SGBSIV) is installed in each of the four blowdown lines outside the containment.

Page 5 of24 to ULNRC-05566 The SGBSIVs are designed to prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator. The valves isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system.

Each of the four steam generators has a blowdown sample line. There are three safety-related sample isolation valves installed in each of the four sample lines. Two of the three valves are located inside containment (one from each sample point), and one valve is installed outside containment. The sample isolation valves are designed to prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator. The blowdown sample valves isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. FSAR Section 1004.8 describes the Steam Generator Blowdown System.

FSAR Figure 1004-8 shows the location of the blowdown and sample isolation valves.

The Main Feedwater System preheats, pressurizes, and transports feedwater from the condensate system and heater drain pumps to the inlet of the steam generators. Main feedwater isolation valves are installed in each of the four feedwater lines outside of containment and downstream of the feedwater regulating valves. One main feedwater isolation valve and main feedwater regulating valve are located on each main feedwater line, outside but close to containment. The main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves are located in six-inch lines that bypass flow around the regulating valves when in service during shutdown and starup evolutions. The Main Feedwater System includes a feedwater chemical injection system that allows the maintenance of proper system pH and scavenges oxygen present in the steam generators to minimize corrosion during plant shutdown conditions. The system adds chemicals such as hydrazine and amine mixture to the desired steam generator downstream of the feedwater isolation valve, directly into the feedwater system. Normally this system is used during cold shutdown, when preparing the steam generators for wet lay-up condition. The chemical injection isolation valves are normally closed, unless used during cold shutdown. FSAR Section 1004.7 describes the Condensate and Feedwater systems.

3.1 MSIV Bvpass Valves (MSIVBVs)

The MSIVBVs are air-operated, two-inch bypass valves around the MSIVs. They are provided for warming of downstream steam lines and equalizing the steam pressure across the MSIVs. The MSIVBVs have two redundant solenoid valves which, when de-energized, result in valve closure. Both of the solenoid valves are de-energized on a steamline isolation signaL. The MSIV sand MSIVBV s are controlled from the main control board paneL. The MSIVBV s also have manual handwheels that are normally locked in the neutral position. The specific MSIVBV valves IDs are ABHVOOI2, ABHVOOI5, ABHV0018, and ABHV0021. FSAR Figure 10.3-1 shows the location of the four MSIVBVs.

3.2 Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs)

Page 6 of 24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 On each of the four main steam lines, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, is a 12-inch diameter low point drain line. Each drain line has a level detection system that consists of a level switch that annunciates on a high leveL. One air-operated low point drain valve (MSLPDIV) is installed in each drain line. The MSLPDIVs are normally open to allow a steam trap to pass moisture to the main condenser. The MSLPDIVs close upon receipt of an SLIS and function to isolate the plant's secondary side. For emergency closure on receipt of an SLIS, either of two safety-related solenoid valves is de-energized to dump air supplied to the valve actuator. The electrical solenoid valves are energized from separate Class 1E sources. The MSLPDIVs fail in the closed position. The specific MSLPDIV valves IDs are ABLV0007, ABLV0008, ABLV0009, and ABLV0010. FSAR Figure 10.3-1 shows the location of the four MSLPDIVs.

3.3 Steam Generator Blowdown Isolation Valves (SGBSIVs)

There are four steam generator blowdown system isolation valves - one in each steam generator blowdown system line. The SGBSIV s are air-operated globe valves which fail closed. For emergency closure, either of two safety-related solenoid valves is de-energized to dump air supplied to the valve actuator. The electrical solenoid valves are energized from separate Class 1 E sources and are de-energized upon receipt of an SGBSIS (AFAS) signal, thus causing the SGBSIVs to automatically close. The specific SGBSIV valve IDs are BMHV001, BMHV002, BMHV003, and BMHV004. FSAR Figure 10.4-8 shows the location of the four SGBSIVs.

3.4 Steam Generator Blowdown Sample Isolation Valves (SGBSSIVs)

Three SGBSSIVs are installed in each of the sample line flow paths for each steam generator. Two valves are located inside the containment (one from each sample point), and one valve is located outside containment. The SGBSSIVs are solenoid-operated globe valves which fail closed. The solenoid valves inside containment are energized from separate Class IE sources than the outside containment solenoid valves.

When open, the SGBSSIVs automatically close upon receipt of an SGBSIS (AFAS) signaL. Four SGBSSIVs are located in the steam generator blowdown sample line inside containment and four SGBSSIV s are located in the sample line outside containment.

Inside containment, the specific SGBSSIV valves IDs are BMHV0019, BMHV0020, BMHV0021, and BMHV0022. Outside containment, the specific SGBSSIV valves IDs are BMHV0065, BMHV0066, BMHV0067, and BMHV0068. Inside containment, one SGBSSIV is located in a line that connects between each steam generator's blowdown line and sample line. For each ofthe four cross-connect lines, the SGBSSIV valves IDs are BMHV0035, BMHV0036, BMHV0037, and BMHV0038. FSAR Figure 10.4-8 shows the location of the twelve SGBSSIV s.

3.5 Steam Generator Chemical Injection Isolation Valves (SGCIIVs)

Page 7 of24 to ULNRC-05566 The steam generator chemical injection system delivers chemicals to the steam generators via chemical addition through lines that tap directly into the feedwater lines, downstream of the main feedwater isolation valve. For each or any of the four feedwater lines, a positive displacement metering pump delivers the chemicals from a supply tank into the associated feedwater line via an injection flow path that includes an automatic air-operated globe isolation valve, a check valve, and a manual gate valve prior to entering into the feedwater system.

The steam generator chemical injection system is used to maintain proper system pH and scavenge oxygen present in the steam generators to minimize corrosion during plant shutdown conditions. The system adds hydrazine and amine mixture to the steam generator and is normally not in use during plant power operation, but it typically is during plant conditions in hot standby or cold layup.

During plant operation at full power, an infrequently performed test (steam generator moisture carryover measurement) utilizes the chemical injection flow path to determine the average moisture caryover content in steam from the steam generators using a radioactive tracer method. The steam generator chemical injection system is infrequently used during the modes of applicability of the new proposed TS 3.7.19.

The manual gate valve located in each chemical injection flow path is maintained locked closed until the system is used. The four locked closed manual valves are secondary system isolation valves (SGCIIVs). The SGCVIIV valves IDs are AEV0128, AEV0129, AEV0130, and AEV013 1. FSAR Figure 10.4-6 (Sheet 2) shows the location of these valves.

When the system is used, the manual gate valve is opened under administrative controls. These controls include the presence of a dedicated operator who has constant communication with the control room while the flow path is open. Therefore, crediting the locked closed manual valve in the chemical injection flow path for isolation is warranted when it is only opened under administrative controls.

When the valves are closed they fuction to isolate the plant's secondary side.

3.6 Licensine

Basis for Secondary System Isolation Valves Per the Callaway licensing basis, the automatic isolation valves associated with the main steam, feedwater, blowdown and sample lines are not containment isolation valves. The specified safety function for these valves is to isolate the plant secondar side in response to certain postulated accidents in order to limit the associated blowdown and/or isolate the non-safety portions of the secondary side from the safety-related portion. The SSIVs are being added to Technical Specifications under the same licensing basis as the current secondary system isolation valves covered in the Technical Specifications (i.e., the MSIVs, MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs). These valves are not required to meet containment isolation criteria since they are not part of the containment barrer. As described in the Callaway FSAR, the main steam lines and feed lines Page 8 of 24 to ULNRC-05566 (including the steam generator blowdown and sample lines) are considered extensions of containment. As noted in FSAR Sections 6.2.4.3, 6.2.6.3, and on Figure 6.2.4-1 and Figure 6.2.4-2, the containment penetrations associated with steam generators are not subject to the 10 CFR 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria that address containment isolation provisions, since the containment barrer integrity is not breached. At Callaway, the boundary or barrer against fission product leakage to the environment is the inside of the steam generator tubes and the outside of the lines emanating from the steam generator shells. The piping itself is an extension of containment and thus treated as the containment barer.

FSAR Section 3.1.3 provides a discussion of Callaway's commitment to GDC-57, "Closed System Isolation Valves." The FSAR states "All containment penetrations are considered to be covered by either GDC-55 or GDC-56. There are no penetrations to which GDC-57 is considered applicable."

The purpose of the main steam line and feed line isolation valves is to isolate the plant secondary side, to control steam generator blow down, and to ensure the delivery of required auxiliary feedwater flow during a design basis accident. In this regard and as further explained below, these valves stil perform a safety function(s).

4.0 TECHNICAL ANALYSIS

Closure of secondar system isolation valves ensures that the assumptions used in the plant accident and containment analyses remain valid. In accident conditions, these valves close to terminate the blowdown from the faulted steam generator, isolate the intact steam generators, isolate the plant secondar side, and prevent possible diversion of auxiliary feedwater flow.

For the applicable design basis accident (main steam line break, feed line break, or steam generator tube rupture), the accident analysis assumes that the steam generators are isolated after secondary system isolation valves receive an isolation signaL.

Following receipt of the steam line isolation signal (SLIS) and auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AFAS), the intact steam generators are assumed to be isolated, except for the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (governed by Technical Specification 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater System"). There are also analysis cases that evaluate the single failure of a main steam or main feedwater isolation valve.

In addition to the valves governed by Technical Specification 3.7.2 (MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs) and Technical Specification 3.7.3 (Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs), Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs), and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)), the analysis assumptions require that the steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves are closed and the steam generator chemical injection flow path is isolated.

When plant accident conditions require delivery of auxiliar feedwater, the normally closed steam supply isolation valves to the turbine-driven auxiliar feedwater pump (TDAFP) open on an AFAS. This ensures availability of the TDAFP. The AFAS Page 9 of24

Attachment i to ULNRC-05566 signal also closes the steam generator blowdown and sample isolation valves to isolate the plant's secondary side (i.e., the non-safety portion of the secondary system from the safety-related portion), thereby preventing any potential diversion of require auxiliary feedwater flow.

When plant accident conditions require feedline isolation, a feedwater isolation signal (FWIS) closes the main feedwater isolation valves, the main feedwater regulating valves, and the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves. Closing these isolation valves also serves to isolate the plant's secondary side.

The steam generator blowdown system also includes the safety-related sample isolation valves. The sample isolation valves prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator and isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. When open, the sample isolation valves are also closed upon receipt of an SGBSIS (AF AS) signaL.

In the event of a secondary side pipe rupture inside containment, the secondary system isolation valves help to limit the quantity of high energy fluid that enters containment through the break. By isolating the plant secondary side, a pressure boundary for the controlled addition of auxiliar feedwater (AFW) to the intact loops is maintained. The secondary system isolation valves function to ensure the primary success path for steamline and feedline isolation and for delivery of required auxiliar feedwater flow required to mitigate the accident.

Because the MSIVs, MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, MFIVs, MFRVs, and MFRVBVs are addressed in TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.3, the other secondary system isolation valves (defined and discussed as SSIVs) are added to TS 3.7.19. Proposed new TS 3.7.19, addresses those secondary system isolation valves (SSIVs) that include SGBSIVs, SGBSSIVs, and SGCIIVs.

4.1 Technical Evaluation of Proposed Revisions to TS 3.7.2. "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)"

As described previously, the MSIVBVs are normally closed during plant operation, while the MSIVs are open. However, the MSIVBVs are open for waring of the steam lines and equalizing steam pressure across the MSIVs. They may also be opened to support maintenance and testing at power. As such, open MSIVBVs could allow a potential release flow path to exist following a postulated accident scenaro such that isolation of the safety-related portions of the secondary system from non-safety-related portions could not be fully effected. Therefore, the MSIVBV s should be subject to requirements for isolation as are the MSIV s. The accident analyses include cases involving the failure of an MSIV to isolate its associated 28-inch main steam line.

Because the MSIVBVs isolate only 2-inch lines, however, failure to isolate would result in a less significant impact upon the consequences of such an accident.

Page 10 of24 to ULNRC-05566 The MSLPDIVs are normally open during plant operation, while the MSIVs are also open. The MSLPDIVs allow a steam trap to pass moisture from the main steam line to the main condenser. As such, the open MSLPDIVs allow a potential release path, following a postulated accident scenario, and hinder the isolation of the safety-related portions of the secondary system from non-safety-related portions. Therefore, in the event ofan accident, MSLPDIVs are required to isolate when open. However, because the MSLPDIVs isolate 1-inch lines, failure to isolate them alone should result in a less significant impact upon the consequences of the postulated accident.

The proposed LCO requires the MSIV and its associated actuator trains, the MSIVBV, and the MSLPDIV in each of the four main steam lines to be OPERALE, thus to ensure that the flowpath(s) associated with each main steam line are capable of being isolated when required. The proposed changes to the LCO and Applicability enhance the current wording by more clearly conveying the requirements and provisions on a "for each main steam line" basis. This is especially effective for providing clear exceptions to the Applicability (as further explained below) which are permitted on the basis that isolation or isolation capability is still ensured when the exception is involved.

Under the proposed TS change, the MSIV s and their associated actuator trains are required OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3. However, consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications, exceptions to the Applicability are allowed for the MSIVs and their associated actuator trains in MODES 2 and 3. In MODES 2 and 3, with the MSIVs closed and de-activated, the MSIVs are assured of performing their specified safety functions. Requiring the MSIV s to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that the specified safety function is being met, thus making it acceptable to exempt the affected MSIV(s) from the Applicability ofTS 3.7.2 under such conditions.

Under the proposed changes, the MSIVBVs are required OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3. The MSIVBVs are considered OPERALE when their isolation times are within limits and they are capable of closing on an isolation actuation signaL. All MSIVBVs can be and are normally closed at power. In MODES 1,2, and 3, exceptions to the Applicability for TS 3.7.2 are allowed for the MSIVBVs when they are assured of performing their specified safety function.

Similar to the proposed TS for MSIV s, the LCO requirements for the MSIVBV s are applicable in MODES 1,2, and 3, but exceptions to the Applicability are permitted for an MSIVBV intended to be excepted from the Applicability. This exception is allowed when the MSIVBV s are assured of performing their specified safety function as follows: for each main steam line (1) the MSIVBV is closed and de-activated, or (2) the MSIVBV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or (3) the MSIVBV is isolated by two closed manual valves. Requiring the valve to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that it is performing its specified safety function. When the valve is de-activated, power and air are removed from both actuation solenoid valves, and the valve is spring closed. Alternatively, requiring the MSIVBV to be closed and isolated by a closed manual valve provides assurance that the specified safety fuction is being Page 11 of24

Attachment I to ULNRC-05566 performed. Finally, the specified safety function may also be ensured by requiring the MSIVBV to be isolated by two closed manual valves.

Under the proposed changes, the MSLPDIVs are required OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3 per LCO 3.7.2. The MSLPDIVs are considered OPERABLE when their isolation times are within limits and they are capable of closing on an isolation actuation signaL. In MODES 1,2, and 3, exceptions to the Applicability for TS 3.7.2 are allowed for the MSLPDIVs when they are assured of performing their specified safety function. This assurance is provided when, for each main steam line, (1) the MSLPDIV is closed and de-activated, or (2) the MSLPDIV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or (3) the MSLPDIV is isolated by two closed manual valves.

When the MSLPDIV is closed and de-activated there is assurance that it is performing its specified safety function. When the valve is de-activated, power and air are removed from both actuation solenoid valves, and the valve is spring closed. Alternatively, requiring the MSLPDIV to be closed and isolated by a closed manual valve provides assurance that the specified safety function is being performed. Finally, the specified safety function may also be ensured by requiring the MSLPDIV to be isolated by two closed manual valves.

With respect to the manual valves used to isolate an MSLPDIV per the last of the above-described options, one manual valve meets ASME Class 2 requirements and the other manual valve meets Class D requirements. The method of isolation is acceptable because of the relatively small diameter of the line isolated (i.e., a 1-inch drain line) and the fact that the isolation valve in the Class D piping serves in addition to the closed manual valve located in the ASME Class 2 piping.

CONDITIONS, REQUIRED ACTIONS, and COMPLETION TIMES are proposed for one or more inoperable MSIVBVs and/or MSLPDIVs. Notes allowing separate Condition entry for these valves are to be included for the proposed Conditions.

With one or more MSIVBVs or one or more MSLPDIVs inoperable, the valve(s) must be closed or isolated within 7 days and verified closed or isolated once per 7 days. The 7-day Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurrng during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVBV or MSLPDIV, operating experience, and less significant consequences from a postulated accident following failure of the MSIVBV or MSLPDIV to isolate. For inoperable MSIVBV s or MSLPDIV s that cannot be restored to OPERALE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7-day Completion Time is consistent with the Completion Time for an inoperable, but closed MSIV, and is reasonably based on engineering judgment and other administrative controls to ensure that the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs are in the closed position.

The new TS surveilance requirements for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs require demonstration of the valves' ability to initiate closure on the same actuation signals as the MSIVs. Proposed TS SR 3.7.2.2 includes verification that each required MSIVBV and Page 12 of24 to ULNRC-05566 MSLPDIV is capable of closure on an actual or simulated actuation signaL. The frequency ofMSIVBV and MSLPDIV testing is every 18 months, the same as currently required for MSIVs. The 18-month Frequency for testing is acceptable from a reliability standpoint and is based on the refueling cycle.

New proposed TS SR 3.7.2.3 verifies that the closure time of each MSIVBV and MSLPDIV is:S 15 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program. This is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident and containment analyses. For the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs, this SR is performed routinely during plant operation (or as required for post-maintenance testing), but it may be required to be performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

4.2 Technical Evaluation of Proposed New TS 3.7.19. Secondary System Isolation Valves Proposed new Technical Specification TS 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)," provides limiting conditions of operation and sureillance requirements for specified secondary system isolation valves. Except for the locked closed manual SSIVs (chemical injection isolation valves), the automatic SSIV valves receive ESFAS signals for automatic isolation. The wording ofthe new Specification is in terms ofthe "SSIVs" which are the locked closed manual steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (SGCINs), steam generator blowdown isolation valves (SGBSIVs), and steam generator sample line isolation valves (SGBSSIV s). These valves, which are more specifically identified in the Bases for new TS 3.7.19, include the automatic SSIVs, i.e.,

steam generator blowdown isolation valves BMHV0001, BMHV0002, BMHV0003, and BMHV0004 and steam generatorblowdown sample line isolation valves BMHVOOI9, BMHV0020, BMHV0021, BMHV0022, BMHV0065, BMHV0066, BMHV0067, BMHV0068, BMHV0035, BMHV0036, BMHV0037, and BMHV0038, as well as the locked closed manual steam generator chemical injection isolation valves AEV0128, AEV0129, AEV0130, and AEV0131. The LCO proposed for TS 3.7.19 simply states, "SSIVs shall be OPERABLE."

The LCO is modified py a Note that allows the locked closed manual SSIV s to be open under administrative controls. The administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the valve can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated.

As noted previously, the LCO requires SSIVs to be OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3 when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators, in order to limit the amount of available fluid that could be added to containment in the event of a secondary system pipe break inside containment. This Applicability (i.e.,

MODES 1, 2, and 3) also supports the auxiliary feedwater function by ensuring that the non-safety portion of the secondary system piping can be isolated from the safety-related Page 13 of24 to ULNRC-05566 portion (thus to prevent the diversion of auxiliar feedwater flow in the event of a demand).

Exceptions to the Applicability are allowed for cases where the SSIV is assured of performing its specified safety function. Specifically, the SSIVs in a secondary system line may be exempted from the Applicability of LCO 3.7.19 (i.e., exempted from the LCO requirement to be OPERALE during an applicable MODE) ifthere is assurance that the associated secondary system flow path is or can be fully isolated. This assurance can be provided by requiring one SSIV to be closed in a maner such that its closure canot be adversely affected by a single active failure, or by having the other SSIV in that secondary system flow path closed in such a maner. When one of the SSIVs is closed and de-activated, or is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or when the secondary system flow path is isolated by the required combination of closed manual valve(s) and closed and de-activated automatic valve(s), the safety function is fulfilled.

When isolating a secondary system flow path(s) associated with the steam generator blowdown connection line between the blowdown and sample lines, the SSIV s and the varous options for isolation of the flow path must assure that the flow path associated with a connection between the SG blowdown and sample line paths are isolated.

Conditions, Required Actions, and Completion Times are proposed for the SSIV s under new TS 3.7.19. The CONDITIONS and REQUIRED ACTIONS are modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each secondary system flow path. With one (or more) SSIV s inoperable, Required Action A.1 must be taken to restore the affected valve (s) to OPERALE status, or to close or isolate inoperable valve (s), within 7 days. When the SSIV is closed or isolated, it is performing its specified safety function. The 7-day Completion Time takes into account the low probability of an event occurng during this period that would require isolation of the plant's secondary side, and is reasonable based on operating experience. See Section 4.4 for additional justification with regard to the reasonableness of such a Completion Time.

Required Action A.2 requires inoperable SSIV s that are closed or isolated to be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessar to ensure that the assumptions in the accident analyses remain valid. The 7-day Completion Time is reasonable based on engineering judgment and in view of valve status indications in the control room and other administrative controls for ensurng that these valves are in the closed position or isolated. (Note that if the SSIV s are closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or the SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed valves, the provisions of an Applicability exception may be met such that the LCO does not apply to the affected secondary system flow path.)

If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A is not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, Required Action B.1 and B.2 require placing the unit in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />, respectively. The allowed Completion Times are Page 14 of24 to ULNRC-05566 reasonable based on operating experience and the time required for reaching the required unit conditions in an orderly manner without challenging unit systems.

With regard to the proposed Surveillance Requirements for new TS 3.7.19, new SR 3.7.19.1 verifies that the isolation time of each automatic SSIV is within limits when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program. The specific limits are documented in the Inservice Testing Program. The SSIV isolation times are less than or equal to those assumed in the accident and containment analyses. The SR is performed only for automatic SSIVs. This surveillance does not include verifying a closure time for the steam generator chemical addition injection isolation valves. These are locked closed manual valves that are only opened under administrative controls. The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

New SR 3.7.19.2 verifies that each automatic SSIV in the flow path is capable of closure on an actual or simulated actuation signaL. The Frequency for this SR is 18 months and is consistent with that of the MSIVs.

4.3 Technical Evaluation of Proposed Revisions to TS 3.3.2. "ESF AS Instrumentation" The addition of the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs to the scope ofTS 3.7.2 (along with the clarifications being made to the Applicability of that TS), as well as the incorporation of new TS 3.7.19 for the SSIVs, requires appropriate supporting changes to be made to TS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instruentation." The TS 3.7.2 changes and the new TS 3.7.19 both require the revision (or addition) of footnotes associated with Table 3.3.2-1 of TS 3.3.2. New TS 3.7.19 requires the incorporation ofa new section (Function) into Table 3.3.2-1.

The changes proposed for TS 3.7.2 include clarifications to when an MSIV, MSIVBV, or MSLPDIV may be "execpted" from the Applicability ofTS 3.7.2. A similar clarfication is being made for specifying when the instrumentation associated with these valves can be execpted from the Applicability ofTS 3.3.2 per Footnote (i).

Specifically, Footnote (i) in Table 3.3.2-1 is being revised to provide an exception to the TS instruentation requirements for the Steam Line Isolation Function when the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs are closed and de-activated, or when they are closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or when they are isolated by two closed manual valves. With the end-device safety function being met (i.e., with the noted valves closed and de-activated or isolated), the associated isolation actuation instrumentation is not required.

Footnote (k) is being added to Table 3.3.2-1. For TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, "Steam Line Isolation," new footnote (k) addresses the MSIVs alone. Upon further review of Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.c, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)," it was determined that a new footnote (k) should be added to address only the MSIVs. A review of the logic schematic drawings confirmed that the MSFIS ESFAS Page 15 of24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 closing signal is only applicable to the MSIVs and does not include the MSIVBVs or MSLPDIVs. The signal from SSPS for steam line isolation goes through reactor protection auxiliary relay racks RP209 and RP21 O. These are not the same as Function 4.c in TS Table 3.3.2-1. The relay racks are considered to be par of the supporting equipment for the end device. In this case, when a relay rack is inoperable, the Condition causes entry into TS 3.7.2 LCO, not TS 3.3.2 LCO. None of the RP auxiliary relay racks are included in TS 3.3. Therefore based on the requirements for Function 4.c, a new footnote (k) is added to address only the MSIVs.

In a corresponding revision to TS Table 3.3.2-1, for MODES 2 and 3, footnote (k) and footnote (i) together replace footnote (i) for TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.a, "Steam Line Isolation - Manual Initiation," Function 4.b, "Steam Line Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)," Function 4.d, "Steam Line Isolation -

Containment Pressure - High 2," Function 4.e.(1), "Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure (1) Low," and in MODE 3 only, Function 4.e.(2), "Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure (2) Negative Rate - High."

For the automatic SSIVs, the instrumentation that actuates the SSIVs must meet the same 10 CFR 50.36 criterion that the valves meet in requiring them in the TS.

Auxiliar relays downstream of the BOP-ESF AS are considered end devices and are covered under LCO 3.7.19. TS 3.7.19 LCO Bases requires SSIVs to be OPERALE when their associated auxiliar relays downstream of the BOP- ESF AS instrumentation circuitry are OPERALE.

Additional changes to TS 3.3.2 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 are required to reflect the actuation circuitry requirements necessary to support the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs addressed by new LCO 3.7.19. Because the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs are designed to automatically close on a steam generator blowdown system isolation signal (SGBSIS) when open, new Function 10, "Steam Generator Blowdown System and Sample Line Isolation," has been added to TS Table 3.3.2-1. Adding new Function 10 to the TS Table 3.3.2-1 makes the instrumentation requirements for the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs visible to the operator and further assures successful TS compliance.

Proposed new Function 10 specifies the Applicable Modes, Required Channels, Conditions, and Surveilance Requirements for SGBSIV and SGBSSIV actuation.

Function 10 includes i O.a, "Manual Initiation"; lO.b, "Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation relays (BOP ESFAS); 10.c, "Safety Injection"; and 10.d, "Loss of Off site Power." New exception footnote (t) has been added to the Table and applied for APPLICABLE MODES where TS 3.7.19 Applicability allows exceptions for the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIVs. The COMPLETION TIMES for TS 3.3.2 Required Actions for CONDITIONS P, Q, and R remain reasonable and appropriate for the SGBSIVs and SGBSSIV s as they are for the secondary system isolation valves currently addressed in TS 3.3.2.

In association with new Function 10.a, "Manual Initiation," new Required Action P.2 has been added to TS 3.3.2 for Condition P (one or more channel (s) inoperable).

Page 16 of24 to ULNRC-05566 Upon entering Condition P, Required Action P.2 requires the operator to immediately declare the associated steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valve (s) inoperable.

4.4 Additional Justification for SSIV Allowed Outa2e Times A probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) was performed to evaluate the risk associated with allowed outage times (AOTs) for inoperable secondary system isolation valves.

This analysis was not used to establish the Completion Times proposed for restoring inoperable secondary system isolation valves under TS 3.7.2 or new TS 3.7.19, but was used to gauge the acceptability ofthe proposed Completion Times which are based on engineering judgment and consistency with operating experience.

In paricular, a PRA analysis using Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174/1.177 metrics was performed to determine the maximum allowed outage times, using conservative assumptions. For example, check valves in the lines containing the SGCIIVs are designed to prevent back flow through these lines and would effectively make the isolation risk (for failure of an SGCIIV to close) insignificant. Nevertheless, check valves were not credited in the risk analysis for the SGCIIV s.

Another example of the conservative approach taken in the PRA analysis concerns the risk associated with the failure of an SGBSSIV to close. Flow through the SGBSSIVs would be through 3/8-inch tubing. Because the flow area for the 3/8-inch tubing is less than 1 % of the flow area of the auxiliary feedwater piping (4 inch diameter), significant auxiliary feedwater flow diversion is unlikely, and this would effectively make the isolation valves risk insignificant.

Finally, it was assumed per the risk analysis that the failure to isolate necessarily results in core damage, and no credit is taken for operator actions to provide backup isolation capability.

Results of the analysis are as follows for valve inoperabi1ity conditions:

CONDITION* ALLOWED OUTAGE TIME (AOT)

MSIVBVs inoperable 7 days MSLPDIVs inoperable 7 days SGCIIVs inoperable 10 days SGBSIV s inoperable 10 days SGBSSIV s inoperable 10 days

• The evaluation assumes no more than one valve is inoperable at a time. This is a reasonable assumption based on the small likelihood that two (or more) secondary system isolation valves would be out of service simultaneously.

Page 17 of24 to ULNRC-05566 The results of the PRA analysis may be compared to the Completion Times specified for the secondary system isolation valves within the proposed Required Actions under TS 3.7.2 and new TS 3.7.19, as summarzed below:

• New TS 3.7.2 Condition H applies to "One or more MSIVBVs inoperable" and Required Action H.1 is to "Close or isolate MSIVBV." New TS 3.7.2 Condition I applies to "One or more MSLPDIV s inoperable" and Required Action 1.1 is to "Close or isolate MSLPDIV." The proposed Completion Time (CT) is specified as 7 days which is the same as the evaluated AOT as given on the Table above for MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs. Therefore, from a risk analysis perspective, the CT for an inoperable MSIVBV or MSLPDIV is acceptable.

• New TS 3.7.19 Condition A applies to "One or more SSIV s inoperable" and Required Action A.1 is to "Close or isolate SSIV." The Completion Time for Required Action A.l is proposed as 7 days which is less than the 10-day AOT evaluated for the SGCIIVs, SGBSIVs, and SGBSSIVs as given in the table above.

Therefore, from a risk analysis perspective, the CT for an inoperable SSIV is acceptable.

It should be noted that the TS changes proposed in this amendment application are not considered to be risk-informed to the extent that this application is a Regulatory Guide 1.17411.177 submittaL. Although a PRA analysis was performed (using the Regulatory Guide 1.1.74/1.177 metrics), that analysis was not used to determine the proposed CTs. The results of the PRA analysis are presented herein simply to show that the proposed CTs are less than what a PRA analysis would justify, thus providing a gauge of their acceptability and conservativeness from a risk point of view.

5.0 REGULATORY SAFETY ANALYSIS 5.1 No Si2nificant Hazards Consideration The proposed changes add the main steam isolation valve bypass valves (MSIVBVs) and the main steam low point drain isolation valves (MSLPDIVs) to the scope ofTS 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)" and revises the name and statements for LCO and Applicability ofTS 3.7.2. New Technical Specification, TS 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)," is proposed to establish requirements for the following secondary system isolation valves: steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (SGCIIVs), steam generator blowdown isolation valves (SGBSIVs), and steam generator sample line isolation valves (SGBSSIVs).

Because the Applicability for TS 3.7.2 is revised and the Applicability for new TS 3.7.19 is proposed, TS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," and Table 3.3.2-1 ofTS 3.3.2 must be revised to maintain consistency with TS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.19. Changes to TS 3.3.2 include adding a new Required Action P.2 for Condition P; adding a new Function 10 to TS Table 3.3.2-1; revising existing TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4, footnote (i); and adding Page 18 of24 to ULNRC-05566 new footnote (k) to TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4; and adding new footnote (t) to TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 10.

AmerenUE has evaluated whether or not a significant hazards consideration is involved with the proposed changes by focusing on the three standards set forth in 10 CFR 50.92(c) as discussed below:

1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed change adds requirements to the TS to ensure that systems and components are maintained consistent with the safety analysis and licensing basis.

Requirements are incorporated into the TS for secondary system isolation valves. These changes do not involve any design or physical changes to the facility, including the SSIVs themselves. The design and functional performance requirements, operational characteristics, and reliability of the SSIVs are unchanged. There is no impact on the design safety function of MSIVs, MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, MFIVs, MFRVs or MFRVBVs to close (either as an accident mitigator or as a potential transient initiator). Since no failure mode or initiating condition that could cause an accident (including any plant transient) evaluated per the FSAR-described safety analyses is created or affected, the change canot involve a significant increase in the probability of an accident previously evaluated.

With regard to the consequences of an accident and the equipment required for mitigation of the accident, the proposed changes involve no design or physical changes to components in the main steam supply system or feedwater system. There is no impact on the design safety function of MSIVs, MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, MFIVs, MFRVs, or MFRVBVs or any other equipment required for accident mitigation. Adequate equipment availability would continue to be required by the TS. The consequences of applicable, analyzed accidents (such as a main steam line break of feedline break) are not impacted by the proposed changes.

The changes to TS 3.3.2, TS Table 3.3.2-1, and exception footnotes associated with Table Function 4 and New Function 10 maintain consistency with the Applicability of revised TS 3.7.2 and new TS 3.7.19. Maintaining TS 3.3.2 and TS Table 3.3.2-1 consistent with the Applicability ofTS 3.7.2 and TS 3.7.19 is consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications.

These changes involve no physical changes to the facility and do not adversely affect the availability of the safety functions assumed for the Page 19 of24 to ULNRC-05566 MSIVs, MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, and SSIVs. Therefore, they do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Based on the above considerations, the proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?

Response: No.

The proposed changes add requirements to the TS that support or ensure the availability of the safety functions assumed or required for the MSIVs, MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, and SSIVs. The changes do not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or changes in controllng parameters. Additional requirements are being imposed, but they are consistent with the assumptions made in the safety analysis and licensing basis. The addition of Conditions, Required Actions and Completion Times to TS for the MSIVBVs, MSLPDIVs, and SSIVs does not involve a change in the design, configuration, or operational characteristics of the plant. Further, the proposed changes do not involve any changes in plant procedures for ensuring that the plant is operated within analyzed limits. As such, no new failure modes or mechanisms that could cause a new or different kind of accident from any previously evaluated are introduced.

Therefore, the proposed changes do not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated.

3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety?

Response: No.

The proposed addition of Conditions, Required Actions and Completion Times for SSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs, as well as the proposed change to the LCO and Applicability for TS 3.7.2 and the proposed new TS 3.7.19 (and the corresponding changes to TS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation") does not alter the maner in which safety limits or limiting safety system settings are determined. No changes to instrument/system actuation setpoints are involved. The safety analysis acceptance criteria are not impacted and the proposed change will not permit plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis. The changes are consistent with the safety analysis and licensing basis for the facility.

Page 20 of 24 to ULNRC-05566 Therefore, the proposed changes do not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

Based on the above, AmerenUE concludes that the proposed amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration under the standards set forth in 10 CFR

50. 92( c), and, accordingly, a finding of "no significant hazards consideration" is justified.

5.2 Applicable Re2ulatorv ReQuirements/Criteria The proposed changes affect the content of the TS, as new components are being added to the scope of the TS. 10 CFR 50.36 is the regulation that provides the requirements regarding the content of Technical Specifications. Specifically, 10 CFR 50.36( c )(2)(ii) states that: "A technical specification limiting condition for operation of a nuclear reactor must be established for each item meeting one or more of the following criteria:...." Criterion 3 of 1 0 CFR 50.36 (c )(2)(ii) requires that a structure, system, or component that is par of the primary success path and which functions or actuates to mitigate a design basis accident or transient that either assumes the failure or presents a challenge to the integrty of a fission product barrer is included in the TS. Conformance to this criterion is the basis for the TS changes that are incorporating requirements for the SSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs.

Additional guidance is provided in SECY-93-067, "Final Policy Statement on Technical Specifications Improvements," dated March 17, 1993. The following discussion summarized from SECY 067 pertains specifically to Criterion 3:

An important concept in assurng the adequate protection of the public health and safety is that in the event that a postulated Design Basis Accident or Transient should occur, structures, systems, and components are available to function or to actuate in order to mitigate the consequences of the Design Basis Accident or Transient. Safety sequence analyses or their equivalent have been performed in recent years and provide a method of presenting the plant response to an accident.

These can be used to define the primary success paths.

A safety sequence analysis is a systematic examination of the actions required to mitigate the consequences of events considered in the plant's Design Basis Accident and Transient analyses, as presented in Chapters 6 and 15 of the plant's FSAR. Such a safety sequence analysis considers the applicable events, whether explicitly or implicitly presented.

The primary success path of a safety sequence analysis consists of the combination and sequences of equipment needed to operate (including consideration of the single failure criteria), so that the plant response to Design Basis Accidents and Transients limits the consequences of these events to within the appropriate acceptance criteria. It is the intent of Criterion 3 to capture into Technical Specifications only those structures, systems, and components that are Page 21 of24 to ULNRC-05566 part of the primary success path of a safety sequence analysis. Also captured by this criterion are those support and actuation systems that are necessary for items in the primary success path to successfully function.

All of the subject SSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs addressed in this amendment application have been determined to meet Criterion 3 contained in 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii), and therefore, a Limiting Condition for Operation and Surveilance Requirements are being established for these valves.

Closure of the SSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs ensures that assumptions used in the plant accident and containment analyses remain valid. In the event of a main steam line or feed line break, the SSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs close to terminate the blowdown from the faulted steam generator and isolate the intact steam generators, and to isolate the plant secondary side (i.e., the non-safety portion from the safety-related portion) thereby preventing possible diversion of auxiliary feedwater flow. The assumed isolation response involves the valves governed by TS 3.7.2 (main steam isolation valves, main steam isolation valve bypass valves, and main steam low point drain isolation valves) and TS 3.7.3 (main feedwater isolation valves, main feedwater regulating valves, and main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves), but the analyses assumptions also require that the steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves, as well as the steam generator chemical injection isolation valves are closed.

The following list provides the regulatory requirements and plant-specific design bases related to the proposed changes.

• GDC-2, "Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires that the safety-related portion of the main steam supply system and the feedwater system be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, such as earthquakes, tornadoes, hurrcanes, floods, and external missiles.

• GDC-3, "Fire Protection," and GDC-4, "Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases," require that the safety-related portion of the main steam supply system and the feedwater system be designed to remain functional after a safe shutdown earhquake (SSE), and to perform its intended function following postulated hazards of fire, internal missiles, or pipe break.

• GDC-13, "Instrumentation and Control," requires that instrumentation shall be provided to monitor variables and systems over their anticipated ranges for normal operation, for anticipated operational occurrences, and for accident conditions as appropriate to assure adequate safety, including those variables and systems that can affect the fission process, the integrty of the reactor core, the reactor coolant pressure boundary, and the containment and its associated systems.

• GDC-34, "Residual Heat Removal," requires ensuring that safety functions of the main steam supply system and the feedwater system can be performed Page 22 of 24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 assuming a single active component failure coincident with the loss of offsite power. The Callaway licensing basis provided in the FSAR, requires that compliance with GDC-34 includes that for a main feedwater line break upstream of the main feedwater isolation valves (outside containment), the feedwater system is designed to prevent the blowdown of anyone steam generator and to provide a path for the addition of auxiliary feedwater for reactor cooldown under emergency shutdown conditions.

The proposed TS changes are consistent with the existing design for the main steam supply and feedwater systems. In fact, the changes support compliance with the above regulatory requirements and criteria. In addition, there are no changes to ESF AS instrumentation requirements such that compliance with any ofthe regulatory requirements would be challenged. The above evaluations confirm that the plant wil continue to comply with all applicable regulatory requirements.

5.3 Conclusions In conclusion, based on the considerations discussed above, (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed maner, (2) such activities wil be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendment wil not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

6.0 ENVIRONMENT AL CONSIDERATION AmerenUE has evaluated the proposed amendment and has determined that the proposed amendment does not involve (i) a significant hazards consideration, (ii) a significant change in the types of or significant increase in the amounts of any effuents that may be released offsite, or (iii) a significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Accordingly, the proposed amendment meets the eligibility criterion for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22( c )(9). Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the proposed amendment.

7.0 PRECEDENT The proposed TS changes are similar to those proposed in the WolfCreek license amendment request, submittal letter ET08.0039, titled "Docket No. 50-482: Revision to Technical Specification (TS) 3.3.2, "Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation," TS 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)," and Addition of New TS 3.7.19, "Secondary System Isolation Valves," dated August 14,2008, currently under review by the NRC staff (T AC NO. MD9469).

The addition of TS requirements for the secondary system isolation valves in new proposed TS 3.7.19, and the addition of the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs to TS 3.7.2 are Page 23 of 24

Attachment 1 to ULNRC-05566 consistent with the Callaway licensing basis and existing TS requirements for the main steam isolation valves, the main feedwater isolation valves, the main feedwater regulating valves, and the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves.

The proposed changes to TS 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation", TS Table 3.3.2-1, Table Function 4, footnote (i), the addition of new footnote (k) to the Table Function 4, the addition of new TS Table 3.3.2-1, Function 10, and the addition of new footnote (t) to Table Function 10 is consistent with the Westinghouse Standard Technical Specifications for TS 3.3.2.

8.0 REFERENCES

8.1 Callaway Plant Technical Specification, 3.3.2, "ESF AS Instrumentation."

8.2 Callaway Plant Technical Specification, 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)."

8.3 Callaway Plant Technical Specification, 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)."

8.4 FSAR Section 10.4.7, Condensate and Feedwater System.

8.5 FSAR Section 10.4.8, Steam Generator Blowdown System 8.6 FSAR Section 10.3, Main Steam Supply System.

8.7 FSAR Section 6.2, Containment Systems.

8.8 FSAR Section 15, Accident Analysis.

8.9 FSAR Section 3.1, Conformance with NRC General Design Criteria.

8.10 FSAR Section 6.2.4, Containment Isolation System.

8.11 FSAR Section 6.2.6, Containment Leakage Testing.

8.12 FSAR Figure 6.2.4-1, Containment Penetrations.

8.13 FSAR Figure 6.2.4-2, "Steam Generator and Associated Systems as a Barrer to the Release of Radioactivity Post LOCA."

8.14 FSAR Figure 10.4-8, "Steam Generator Blowdown System."

8.15 FSARFigure 10.4-6, "Feedwater System." (Sheet 2) 8.16 FSAR Figure 10.3-1, "Main Steam System." (Sheet 2)

Page 24 of24

ULNRC-05566 ATTACHMENT 2 OL-1277 REVISED MARKUP OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES AND NEW TS 3.7.19

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION ........................................................................1.1-1 1.1 Definitions .... ..... ..... ......... ........... ........ ...... ........... ..... ........ .......... ........1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors ............................................................................1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times.......... .............. ......................................................1.3-1 1.4 Frequency....... ....... ........... .................................. ........ ............. ..........1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) ..........................................................................2.0-1 2.1 SLs ........................ .............................. ........... ..... ....... ...................... 2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations .............................................................. ......................2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY .....3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ....................3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .....................................................3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) ........................................................3.1-1 3.1.2 Core Reactivity................ ................................. .............................. 3.1-2 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coeffcient (MTC) ......................................3.1-4 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits ............................................................3.1-7 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits .....................................................3.1-11 3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Limits ...........................................................3.1-13 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication ....................................................................3.1-16 3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2 ........................................3.1-19 3.1.9 RCS Boron Limitations.. 500°F .......................................................3.1-21 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .........................................................3.2-1 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fa(Z))

(Fa Methodology) ......................... ................... ........ .......... ........3.2-1 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor ...................................3.2-6 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) (Relaxed Axial Offset Control (RAOC) Methodology) ..................................................3.2-9 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) ...................................3.2-10 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION . ............. ........ ................. .......... ........................... 3.3-1 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation .................................. .-

3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation ... ........... .............. ........ ............... .... ... .... ....... 3.3-25 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ....... ....................3.3-0/8" CALLAWAY PLANT Amendment 189 OL-I ~ '1'7 Re\li~J

tJl-11'1'l f?e,iI ~

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System ........ ....................................................3.3-¥'.:

3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel G erator (DG) Start Instrumentation ....... ...... ............ ...............................................3.3-57 t 3.3.6 Containment Purge Is tion Instrumentation .................................3.3-17 l 3.3.7 Control Room Emer ency Ventilation System (CREVS)

Actuation Instr mentation .........................................................3.3-o/g 3.3.8 Emergency Exha st System (EES) Actuation Instrumentati n .... ....... .......... ............................... ..................... 3.3-91 I?

3.3.9 Boron Dilution Mi igation System (BDMS) ......................................3.3-~3 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT YSTEM (RCS) ................................................3.4-1 3.4.1 RCSPressure, Temp ature, and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (D Limits ...................................................3.4-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperatur f r Criticality ......................................3.4-3 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperat re (PIT) Limits ..................................3.4-4 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and .........................................................3.4-6 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 ........ ............................................................3.4-7 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 ......... ..........................................................3.4-10 3.4.7 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops ................................................3.4-12 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Fi ed .........................................3.4-15 3.4.9 Pressurizer ............. ....................... ..................................................3.4-17 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves ................................................................3.4-3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Ives (PORVs) ................ .4-21 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System ( ...............................3.4-25 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ............................................................3.4-30 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ................................3.4-32 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ........................................3.4-36 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity ......... ..... ..................................................... .... 3.4-40 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity ..............................................3.4-42 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ...........................3.5-1 3.5.1 Accumulators .......... ........... ........... ........... .................. ..... .................3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating ...........................................................................3.5-3 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown ............................................................................3.5-6 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) .........................................3.5-8 3.5.5 Seal I njection Flow ......... ..................................................... .............3.5-10 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ..................................................................3.6-1 3.6.1 Containment ......................................................... ...................... ....3.6-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .....................................................................3.6-3 CALLAWAY PLANT 2 Amendment 189

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves .................. ....................................3.6-7 3.6.4 Containment Pressure .. .................................................................3.6-16 3.6.5 Containment Air Tem rature .........................................................3.6-17 3.6.6 Containment Spra nd Cooling Systems ......................................3.6-18 3.6.7 Recirculati id pH Control (RFPC) System ...............................3.6-21 3.6.8 Hydro RecombinersHH;~~/j~7ilj~J:lf/1ft'"

3.7 N~ SYSTEMS ................................r.........411...~r-!)+..p~~~-:. ~(~2~~.r) 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ..............................................3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) ............................................3.7-5 3.7.3 MFIVs and MFRVs and MFRV Bypass Valves ...............................3.7)(61 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) ......................................3.7)e II

3. . Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System .................................................3.7)3 Ii-

.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ....................................................3.7-? I f 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System .....................................3.7-):iO 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW) ..........................................3.7~;t 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ...............................................................3.7¥2S 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) .................3.7%;i1 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) ...........................3.7~O 3.7.12 Not Used. . ................ ........................................................................3. 7%31 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) .................................................3.7~4-3.7.14 Not Used. ......................... ... ..... ... ..................................... ....... ......... 3.7~

3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ........................................................3.7'-1 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration ..........................................3.7;)31 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .........................................................3.7;%+1 3.7.18

3.7./1 1~

:'ary;PS~~~v%-~1;.::i,~...~.lv¿;. .(sEi;J......... ~~1!ltl 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ........................................................3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating ...................................................................3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ..................................................................3.8-16 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air .......................................3.8-19 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating ..................................................................3.8-22 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ..................................................................3.8-25 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters ...................... ........ .............. ........ ............... 3.8-27 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating .................... ....................................................3.8-31

3. . Inverters - Shutdown ............... .................... ..................................... 3.8-33 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating .....................................................3.8-35 3.8.10 Distribution Systems - ShutdownuHuo ;C~11~~3R:~..

CALLAWAY PLANT 3 Amendment 186

REQUIRED ACTION

p. P.1 Declare associated auxilary feedwater pump(s) inoperable.

---

NOTE ----------------

One train may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Q.1 Be in MODE 3.

AND Q.2 Be in MODE 4.

R. R.1 Restore train( s) to OPERABLE status.

54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> AND R.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-32 Amendment No. 165

OL-1277 REVISED INSERT AS REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME AND P.2 Declare associated steam generator Immediately blowdown and sample line isolation valve(s) inoperable.

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation ALLOWABLE CONDITIONS VALUE(a) 4.

a. 2 F SR 3.3.2.8 NA Automatic 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays (SSPS)

c. Automatic 2 trains(o) S SR 3.3.2.3 Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

Containment 1, o SR 3.3.2.1 Pressure - High 2 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

e. Steam Line Ptessure (1) Low 1.2 o SR 3.3.2.1 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3 per steam o SR 3.3.2.1 Rate - High line SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock and below P-11 unless the Function is blocked.

(c) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are '1 ~ 50 seconds and '2 $; 5 seconds.

(g) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock; however, may be blocked below P-11 when safety injection on 10 steam line pressure is not blocked.

(h) Time constant utilized in the rate/lag controller is )0 50 seconds.

(0) Each train requires a minimum of two programmable logic controllers to be OPERABLE.

(s) 1. Ifthe as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its .found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required bore returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect 0 the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint tolerance band either side of the Nominal Trip Setpolnt, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoin ,otheiwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to termine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified i e Bases.

OL-I'l17 ~e,\ISed 3.3-40

OL-1277 Revised INSERT A (i) Except when:

1. All MSIVBVs are:

l.a Closed and de-activated; or 1.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 1.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

2. All MSLPDIV s are:

2.a Closed and de-activated; or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(k) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 5 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(1) Steam 4 per SG D  ;? 20.6%(5) of Generator Narrow Range Water el Instrument Low- w erse Span Containment Environment)

(2) Steam 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 Generator SR 3.3.2.5 Water Level SR 3.3.2.9 Low-Low SR 3.3.2.10 (Normal Containment Environment)

The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions).

Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

u) Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated; AND t e-\lt.

2. All MFRVs are:

CJ L- , 2 ri '7 2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or

~=

3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

~ 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(q) Feedwater isolation only.

(r) Except when the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in the same protection set tripped.

(s) 1. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as require efore returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with re ect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint toleran and on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Tri etpoint; otheiwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodoio used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be s: dfied in the Bases.

LANT Amendment No. 189

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(3) Not used.

(4) Containment 1, 2ul. 3() 4 N SR 3.3.2.1 s 2.0 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 Environmental SR 3.3.2.9 Allowance SR 3.3.2.10 Modifier (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

u) Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and AND 2.AI OL--i2 '1'1 Rev sed CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-43 Amendment No. 189

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 8 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

6. Auxiliary Feedwater

d. SG Water Level Low-Low (3) Not used.

(4) Containment 1,2,3 4 N SR 3.3.2.1 " 2.0 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 Environmental SR 3.3.2.9 Allowance SR 3.3.2.10 Modifier

e. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

f. SR 3.3.2.7 NA SR 3.3.2.10 1,2(n) 2 per pump SR 3.3.2.8 NA

h. Auxiliary 1,2,3 3 o  ?; 20.64 psia Feedwater Pump Suction Transfer on Suction Pressure - Low (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1 e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setti g for these Functions). See the

~ Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

Ui ~:~

(n) Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main feedwat r pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put into service following performance of its startup tri test.

f.e,\/ seA OL..I'l17 CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-45 Amendment No. 189

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 9 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

7. Automatic Switchover to Containment Sump

a. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains c SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.13 Relays (SSPS)

b. Refueling Water 1,2.3,4 4 K SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 35.2%

Storage Tank SR 3.3.2.5 (RWST) Level - SR 3.3.2.9 Low Low SR 3.3.2.10 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functons and requirements.

Safety Injection

8. ESFAS Interlocs

a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1.2,3 2 per train, F SR 3.3.2.11 NA 2 trins

b. Pressurizer 1,2.3 3 L SR 3.3.2.5 s 1981 psig Pressure, P-11 SR 3.3.2.9

9. Automatic Pressurizer PORV tion 1,2,3 2 trains H

b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 $2350 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

D\: \'1 ~'1 ~e'i\se CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-46 Amendment No. 189

OL-1277 REVISED INSERT AA Table 3.3.2-1 (page 9 of 9)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUEia)

10. Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation

a. Manual Initiation 1lt),2(t),3(1) 2 trains P SR 3.3.2.8 NA (1 per MDAFW pump)

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation 1(1),2(1),3(1) 2 trains Q SR 3.3.2.3 NA Relays (BOP ESFAS)

c. Safety Injection 1(1),2(1),3(1) Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for initiation functions and requirements.

d. Loss of Offsite 1(1),2(1),3(1) 2 trains R SR 3.3.2.7 NA Power (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2), 6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(t) Except when all Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valves are:

1. Closed and de-activated, or

2. Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

3. Isolated by a combination of closed manual valve(s) and closed de-activated automatic valve(s).

3.7 PLANT SYS ~

3.7.2 Main eam Isolation Valves (MSIVS~

~t-s~~~c --~ :n ACTI REQUIRED ACTION A. One V actuator train A.1 Restore MS IV actuator inoperable. train to OPERABLE status.

B. Two MSIV actuator trains 8.1 Restore one MSIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inoperable for different actuator train to MSIVs when the inoperable OPERABLE status.

actuator trains are not in the same separation group.

C. Two MSIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MSIV 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

are in the same separation group.

D. Two actuator trains for one D.1 Declare the affected Immediately MSIV inoperable. MSJV inoperable.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-5 Amendment No. 172

OL-1277 Revised INSERT B MSNs, MSNBVs, and MSLPDNs INSERT C

, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSNBVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDNs)

INSERT D The MSIV and its associated actuator trains, the MSNBV, and the MSLPDIV in each of the four main steam lines shall be OPERALE.

INSERT Dl For the MSN and its associated actuator trains in each main steam line:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 except when the MSN is closed and de-activated.

For the MSNBV in each mai steam line:

MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. MSNBV is closed and de-activated, or

b. MSNBV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

c. MSIVBV is isolated by two closed manual valves.

For the MSLPDN in each main steam line:

MODES 1,2, and 3 except when:

a. MSLPDN is closed and de-activated, or

b. MSLPDIV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

c. MSLPDN is isolated by two closed manual valves.

~T~

ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME E. Three or more ctuator E.1 Declare each affected Immediately trains inoperable. MSIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion ot-I'J'1'1 Re~5e Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

F. One MSIV inoperable in F.1 Restore MSIV to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> MODE 1. OPERABLE status.

G. Required Action and G.1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.

~ -------------- NOTE -------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each One or more MSIVs ~if~ is closed.

AND 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Once per 7 days

~

inoperable in MODE 2 or 3. - ~

Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition not met.

~~

AND

~ ~MODE4.

6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> 12 hours CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-6 Amendment No. 172

OL-1277 Revised INSERT E H. -------- NOTE----------- H.1 Close or isolate 7 days Separate Condition MSIVBV.

entr is allowed for each main steam line.

---

AN One or more H.2 Verify MSIVBV is Once per 7 days MSIVBVs inoperable. closed or isolated.

1. --------NOTE----------- I. Close or isolate 7 days Separate Condition MSLPDIV.

entr is allowed for each main steam line.

___h______________________ AN One or more 1.2 Verify MSLPDIV is Once per 7 days MSLPDIVs closed or isolated.

inoperable.

3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify isolation time of each MSIV is within limits. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.2.2 Verify each MSI actuates to the isolation position on 18 months an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

~ ~

OL - r:i '7 7 Revsed

~

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-7 Amendment No. 189

OL-1277 Revised INSERT F

, each MSIVBV, and each MSLPDN INSERT G SR 3.7.2.3 Verify Iso1ation tie of each In accordance with the MSNBV and MSLPDN is with Inservice Testing Program limits.

OL-1277 REVISED SSIVs 3.7.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.19 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)

LCO 3.7.19 The SSIVs shall be OPERABLE.

---

NOTE ------------------------- ----------------

Locked closed manual SSIVs may be opened under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1,2, and 3 except for each secondary system flow path when:

a. At least one of the two associated SSIVs is closed and de-activated; or

b. At least one of the two associated SSIVs is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

c. The SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed manual valves, or two closed de-activated automatic valves, or a combination of a closed manual valve and a closed de-activated automatic valve.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ----------------------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each secondary system flow path.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME

---

NO TE --------------------

A. One or more SSIVs Closed or isolated automatic SSIVs inoperable. may be opened or unisolated under administrative controls.

A.1 Close or isolate SSIV. 7 days AND A.2 Verify SSIV is closed or Once per 7 days isolated.

(continued)

OL-1277 REVISED SSIV s 3.7.19 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. Required Action and Associated Completion B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Time not met.

AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.19.1 Verify the isolation time of each automatic SSIV is In accordance with within limits. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.19.2 Verify each automatic SSIV in the flow path actuates 18 months to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

ULNRC-05566 ATTACHMENT 3 OL-1277 REVISED RETYPED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION PAGES AND NEW TS 3.7.19

TABLE OF CONTENTS 1.0 USE AND APPLICATION ........................................................................1.1-1 1.1 Definitions ...................................... ..................... ...... ......... ........ ........ 1.1-1 1.2 Logical Connectors .................................................... .......................1.2-1 1.3 Completion Times.............................................................................1.3-1 1.4 Frequency ................................................... ....................... ................1.4-1 2.0 SAFETY LIMITS (SLs) ........................................................................2.0-1 2.1 SLs ..... ....................................................................... .......................2.0-1 2.2 SL Violations ....................................................................................2.0-1 3.0 LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION (LCO) APPLICABILITY .....3.0-1 3.0 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENT (SR) APPLICABILITY ....................3.0-4 3.1 REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS .....................................................3.1-1 3.1.1 SHUTDOWN MARGIN (SDM) .......................................................3.1-1 3.1.2 Core Reactivity .............................................................................. 3.1-2 3.1.3 Moderator Temperature Coeffcient (MTC) ......................................3.1-4 3.1.4 Rod Group Alignment Limits ............................................................3.1-7 3.1.5 Shutdown Bank Insertion Limits .....................................................3.1-11 3.1.6 Control Bank Insertion Limits ...........................................................3.1-13 3.1.7 Rod Position Indication ....................................................................3.1-16 3.1.8 PHYSICS TESTS Exceptions - MODE 2 ........................................3.1-19 3.1.9 RCS Boron Limitations -: 500°F .......................................................3.1-21 3.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .........................................................3.2-1 3.2.1 Heat Flux Hot Channel Factor (Fa(Z))

(Fa Methodology) ................. .......... ......................... ........... ....... 3.2-1 3.2.2 Nuclear Enthalpy Rise Hot Channel Factor ...................................3.2-6 3.2.3 AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE (AFD) (Relaxed Axial Offset Control (RAOC) Methodology) .................................................3.2-9 3.2.4 QUADRANT POWER TILT RATIO (QPTR) ...................................3.2-10 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION ............................................................................3.3-1 3.3.1 Reactor Trip System (RTS) Instrumentation ...................................3.3-1 3.3.2 Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS)

Instrumentation .......... .......................... ........... ......... ........... .......3.3-25 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation ............................3.3-49 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System .............................................................3.3-54 CALLAWAY PLANT Amendment ##

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION (continued) 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation ........... ................ ............... ....... .......... ...............3.3-57 3.3.6 Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation .................................3.3-59 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

Actuation Instrumentation ............... .......... .... ...... ..... ....... ...... .... 3.3-64 3.3.8 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) Actuation Instrumentation .. ............. ... ........... ... ...... .... .... ....... ........... .........3.3-69 3.3.9 Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS) ......................................3.3-74 3.4 REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM (RCS) ................................................3.4-1 3.4.1 RCSPressure, Temperature. and Flow Departure from Nucleate Boiling (DNB) Limits ...................................................3.4-1 3.4.2 RCS Minimum Temperature for Criticality .......................................3.4-3 3.4.3 RCS Pressure and Temperature (PIT) Limits ..................................3.4-4 3.4.4 RCS Loops - MODES 1 and 2 .........................................................3.4-6 3.4.5 RCS Loops - MODE 3 .....................................................................3.4-7 3.4.6 RCS Loops - MODE 4 .....................................................................3.4-10 3.4.7 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Filed ...............................................3.4-12 3.4.8 RCS Loops - MODE 5, Loops Not Filled .........................................3.4-15 3.4.9 Pressurizer ...................... ................... ........ ................................ ...... 3.4-17 3.4.10 Pressurizer Safety Valves ...............................................................3.4-19 3.4.11 Pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs) ......................3.4-21 3.4.12 Cold Overpressure Mitigation System (COMS) ...............................3.4-25 3.4.13 RCS Operational LEAKAGE ...........................................................3.4-30 3.4.14 RCS Pressure Isolation Valve (PIV) Leakage ................................3.4-32 3.4.15 RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation ........................................3.4-36 3.4.16 RCS Specific Activity .......................................................................3.4-40 3.4.17 Steam Generator (SG) Tube Integrity ..............................................3.4-42 3.5 EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS (ECCS) ...........................3.5-1 3.5.1 Accumulators ......... ............ ............. ......................... ............ ....... ..... 3.5-1 3.5.2 ECCS - Operating ...........................................................................3.5-3 3.5.3 ECCS - Shutdown ............................................................................3.5-6 3.5.4 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) .........................................3.5-8 3.5.5 Seal Injection Flow ...........................................................................3.5-10 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS ..................................................................3.6-1 3.6.1 Containment ... ..... ............................ .............. ........ ................. ....... 3.6-1 3.6.2 Containment Air Locks .....................................................................3.6-3 3.6.3 Containment Isolation Valves .........................................................3.6-7 CALLAWAY PLANT 2 Amendment ##

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3.6 CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS (continued) 3.6.4 Containment Pressure .................. ................. ............. .................... 3.6-16 3.6.5 Containment Air Temperature ............. ........... ..... .............. ..... .........3.6-17 3.6.6 Containment Spray and Cooling Systems ......................................3.6-18 3.6.7 Recirculation Fluid pH Control (RFPC) System ...............................3.6-21 3.6.8 Hydrogen Recombiners ...................................................................3.6-22 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS ............. ................................... .......... ............ ...........3.7-1 3.7.1 Main Steam Safety Valves (MSSVs) ...............................................3.7-1 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSIVBVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs) .................................3.7-5 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs) .............................................3.7-9 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) ......................................3.7-11 3.7.5 Auxilary Feedwater (AFW) System .................................................3.7-14 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST) ....................................................3.7-18 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System .....................................3.7-20 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW) ..........................................3.7-22 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS) ................................................................3.7-25 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) .................3.7-27 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS) ...........................3.7-30 3.7.12 Not Used. ........... ............. ............ ...................... .... ...... ...... ........ ....... 3.7 -33 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) .................................................3.7-34 3.7.14 Not Used. .............................................. ...................... .....................3.7-37 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level ........................................................3.7-38 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration ..........................................3.7-39 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage .........................................................3.7-41 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity ... ......... ................... ........... ............ ........3.7-43 3.7.19 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs) ...................................3.7-44 3.8 ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS ........................................................3.8-1 3.8.1 AC Sources - Operating ...................................................................3.8-1 3.8.2 AC Sources - Shutdown ..................................................................3.8-16 3.8.3 Diesel Fuel Oil, Lube Oil, and Starting Air .......................................3.8-19 3.8.4 DC Sources - Operating ..................................................................3.8-22 3.8.5 DC Sources - Shutdown ..................................................................3.8-25 3.8.6 Battery Cell Parameters ........... ............ ..... ........ .............. ................. 3.8-27 3.8.7 Inverters - Operating ........................................................................3.8-31 3.8.8 Inverters - Shutdown ........................................................................3.8-33 3.8.9 Distribution Systems - Operating ....................................................3.8-35 CALLAWAY PLANT 3 Amendment ##

TABLE OF CONTENTS 3r 8' ~ ELECTRICAL POWER SYSTEMS (continued)

Distribution Systems - Shutdown .....................................................3.8-37 3.9 REFUELING OPERATIONS .................................................................3.9-1 3.9.1 Boron Concentration .......... ........................ ..... ............ ..... ............ ....3.9-1 3.9.2 Unborated Water Source Isolation Valves .......................................3.9-3 3.9.3 Nuclear Instrumentation .. ................................................................. 3.9-5 3.9.4 Containment Penetrations ............. ........ ................ ..................... ..... 3.9-7 3.9.5 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level ...................................................3.9-9 3.9.6 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level ....................................................3.9-11 3.9.7 Refueling Pool Water Level .............................................................3.9-13 4.0 DESIGN FEATURES ............. .................. ........ ..... .......... ................. ...... ..4.0-1 4.1 Site Location .... ............... ............ ..... ........ ..... .......... ..... .... ............. ...4.0-1 4.2 Reactor Core ........... ....................................................................... .4.0-1 4.3 Fuel Storage .... ........... .................................. ............... .... ................4.0-1 5.0 ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS ...........................................................50-1 5.1 Responsibility ................................................................................... 5.0-1 5.2 Organization .................................................................................... 5.0-2 5.3 Unit Staff Qualifications ... ............... ........ ............... ......... .................5.0-4 5.4 Procedures ...................................................................................... 5.0-5 5.5 Programs and Manuals .....................................................................5.0-6 5.6 Reporting Requirements ............. ........... ......... ...... ......... .................. 5.0-20 5.7 High Radiation Area .........................................................................5.0-25 CALLAWAY PLANT 4 Amendment ## I

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME P. One or more channel(s) P.1 Declare associated Immediately inoperable. auxiliary feedwater pump(s) inoperable.

AND P.2 Declare associated Immediately steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valve(s) inoperable.

Q. One train inoperable. ----------------- NOTE ------------------

One train may be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE.

Q.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> AND Q.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> R. One or both train(s) R.1 Restore train(s) to 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> inoperable. OPERABLE status.

OR R.2.1 Be in MODE 3. 54 hours6.25e-4 days <br />0.015 hours <br />8.928571e-5 weeks <br />2.0547e-5 months <br /> AND R.2.2 Be in MODE 4. 60 hours6.944444e-4 days <br />0.0167 hours <br />9.920635e-5 weeks <br />2.283e-5 months <br /> (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-32 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 1 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

1. Safety Injection a Manual 1,2.3,4 2 B SR 3.32.8 NA Initiation

b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation SR 3.3.2.13 Relays (SSPS)

c. Containment 1,2,3 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 ,; 4.5 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 High 1 SR 33.2.9 SR3.3.2.10

d. Pressurizer 1,2,3(b) 4 D SR 33.2.1 ~ 1834 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 Low SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

e. Steam Line 1,2,3(b) 3 per steam D SR3.3.2.1 ~ 610 psig(C)(S)

Pressure - line SR 3.3.2.5 Low SR 3.32.9 SR 3.3.2.10

2. Containment Spray

a. Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train, B SR 3.3.2.8 NA Initiation 2 trains

b. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.22 NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.32.6 Actuation Relays (SSPS)

(a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system selting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) interlock and below P-11 unless the Function is blocked.

(c) Time constants used in the leadllag controller are t ~ 50 seconds and t2 ,; 5 seconds.

(s) 1. Iflhe as-found instrument channei setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpointtolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that Is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpolnt; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-38 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 2 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actualion System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

2. Containment Spray

c. Containment Pressute 1,2,3 4 E SR 3.3.2.1 :s 28.3 psig SR 3.3.2.5 High - 3 SR 33.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10

3. Containment Isolation

a. Phase A Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 B SR 33.2.8 NA Initiation (2) Automatic 1,2.3,4 2 trains C SR 332.2 NA Actuation SR 3.3.2.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation SR 3.3.213 Relays (SSPS)

(3) Safety Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

Injection

b. Phase S Isolation (1) Manual 1,2,3,4 2 per train, S SR 3.3.2.8 NA Initiation 2 trains (2) Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation SR 3.32.4 Logic and SR 3.3.2.6 Actuation Relays (SSPS)

(3) Contain- 1,2,3 4 E SR 332.1 :s 28.3 psig ment SR 332.5 Pressure SR 3.3.2.9 High - 3 SR 3.3.2.10 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1). 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpolnt defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-39 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 3 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a) 4 Steam Line Isolation

a. Manual Initiation 1,2(i)(K),3(I)(K) 2 F SR 3.3.2.8 NA

b. Automatic 1,2(1K), 3(1)(k) 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays (SSPS)

c. Automatic 1, 2(k),3(K) 2 trains(O) S SR 3.3.2.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

d. Containment 1 ,20)(K), 3(I)(k) 3 D SR 3.3.2.1 '" 18.3 psig Pressure - High 2 SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3329 SR 3.3.2.10 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limning safety system selling except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpeint defines the limiting safety system selling for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominai Trip Setpoints.

(i) Except when:

1. All MSIVBVs are:

1.a Closed and de-activated, or 1.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 1.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

2. All MSLPDIVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(k) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.

(0) Each train requires a minimum of two programmable logic controllers to be OPERABLE.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-40 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 33.2-1 (page 4 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

4. Steam Line Isolation

e. Steam Line Pressure (1) Low 1,2 (I)(k), 3(b)(i)(k) 3 per steam D SR 3.3.2.1 ,,610 psig(c)(S) line SR 33.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.10 (2) Negative 3(9)(I)(k) 3 per steam D SR 33.21 '" 124 pSi(h)

Rate - High line SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 SR 33.2.10 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system setlin except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(b) Above the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock and below P-11 unless the Function is blocked.

(c) Time constants used in the lead/lag controller are ~1 ,,50 seconds and ~2 '" 5 seconds.

(g) Below the P-11 (Pressurizer Pressure) Interlock; however. may be blocked below P-11 when safety injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked.

(h) Time constant utilized in the ratellag controller is " 50 seconds.

(i) Except when:

1. All MSIVBVs are:

1.a Closed and de-activated, or 1.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 1.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

2. All MSLPDIVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(k) Except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.

(s) 1. Ifthe as-found instrument channel selpoin! is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpolnl tolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Seipoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoln! tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-41 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 332-1 (page 5 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a) 5 Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

a. Automatic 10),2m,3(j) 2 trains G SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 33.2.6 Relays (SSPS) SR332.14

b. Automatic 1(1),2(1,3(1) 2 trains(o) S SR 33.2.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

c. SG Water Level - 10),2m 4 per SG SR 3.3.2.1 $ 91.4%(5) of High High (P-14) SR 332.5 Narrow Range SR 3.3.2.9 Instrument SR 33.2.10 Span

d. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

(a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system sellng except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system selting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

U) Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated:

AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(I) Except when all MFIVs are closed and de-activated.

(0) Each train requires a minimum of two programmable logic controllers to be OPERABLE.

(s) 1. fthe as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoint shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint tolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be speCified in the Bases CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-42 Amendment No. ###

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 6 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a) 5 Turbine Trip and Feedwater Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(1) Steam 1, 2(J, 3(j) 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 20.6%(5 of Genetator SR 3.3.2.5 Narrow Range Water Level SR 3.3.2.9 Low-Low Instrument SR 3.3.2.10 Span (Adverse Containment Environment)

(2) Steam 1(r), 2Ü)(, 3(Jr) 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 16.6%(5 of Generatot SR 3.3.2.5 Narrow Range Water Level SR 3.3.2.9 Low-Low Instrument SR 33.2.10 Span (Normal Containment Environment)

(a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system selting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d .(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpolnt defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(j Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated; AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

(q) Feedwater isolation only.

(r) Except when the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in the same protection sets are tripped.

(s) 1. 1fthe as-found instrument channel setpolnt is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, but outside its as-found test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-fourid instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared irioperable.

2. The instrument channel setpoirit shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpoint tolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inopetable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-43 Amendment No. #1

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 7 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

5. Turbine Trip and Feedwaler Isolation

e. Steam Generator Water Level Low-Low(q)

(3) Not used.

(4) Containment 1, 20), 3(;) 4 N SR 3.3.2.1 $; 2.0 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 Environmental SR 3.329 Allowance Modifier SR 332.10 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system settnQ except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system selting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

0) Except when:

1. All MFIVs are closed and de-activated; AND

2. All MFRVs are:

2.a Closed and de-activated, or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; AND

3. All MFRVBVs ate:

3.a Closed and de-activated, or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves (q) Feedwater isolation only.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-44 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 332-1 (page 8 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a) 6 Auxiliary Feedwater

a. Manual Initiation 1.2,3 1/pump P SR 3328 NA

b. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains G SR 33.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.6 Relays (SSPS)

c. Automatic 1.2,3 2 trains Q SR 3323 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)

d. SG Water Level Low-Low (1) Steam 1,2,3 4 per SG D SR 3.3.21 ~ 20.6%(S) of Generator SR 3325 Narrow Range Water Level SR 3.3.2.9 Low-Low Instrument SR 3.3.2.10 Span (Adverse Containment Environment)

(2) Steam 1 (r), 2(r), 3(r) 4 per SG D SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 16.6%(s) of Generator SR 3.3.2.5 Narrow Range Water Level SR 3.3.2.9 Low-Low Instrument SR 3.3.2.10 Span (Normal Containment Environment)

(a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system selling except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2).

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpolnt defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(r) Except when the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier channels in the same protection sets are tripped.

(s) the as-found instrument channel setpoint is conservative with respect to the Allowable Value. but outside its as-found

1. If test acceptance criteria band, then the channel shall be evaluated to verify that it is functioning as required before returning the channel to service. If the as-found instrument channel setpoint is not conservative with respect to the Allowable Value, the channel shall be declared inoperable.

2. The instrument channel setpolnt shall be reset to a value that is within the as-left setpointtolerance band on either side of the Nominal Trip Setpoint, or to a value that is more conservative than the Nominal Trip Setpoint; otherwise, the channel shall be declared inoperable. The Nominal Trip Setpoints and the methodology used to determine the as-found test acceptance criteria band and the as-left setpoint tolerance band shall be specified in the Bases.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-45 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 9 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

6. Auxiliary Feedwater

d. SG Water Level Low-Low (3) Not used.

(4) Containment 1,2,3 4 N SR 3.3.2.1 ,; 2.0 psig Pressure - SR 3.3.2.5 Environmentai SR 3.3.2.9 Allowance SR3.3.2.10 Modifier

e. Safety Injection Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for ail initiation functions and requirements.

f. Loss of Offite 1,2,3 2 trains R SR 3.3.2.7 NA Power SR3.3210

g. Trip of all Main 1.2(n) 2 per pump J SR 33.2.8 NA Feedwater Pumps

h. Auxiliary 1,2,3 3 0 SR 3.3.21 ~ 20.64 psia Feedwater Pump SR 3.3.2.9 Suction Transfer SR 3.3.2.10 on Suction SR 3.3.2.12 Pressure - Low (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system settng except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoinl defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Selpoints.

(n) Trip function may be blocked just before shutdown of the last operating main feedwater pump and restored just after the first main feedwater pump is put into service following performance of its startup trip lest.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-46 Amendment No. ##

ESFAS Instrumentation 3.3.2 Table 3.3.2-1 (page 10 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

7. Automatic Switch over to Containment Sump

a. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains C SR 33.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.2.4 and Actuation SR3.3.2.13 Relays (SSPS)

b. Refueling Water 1,2,3,4 4 K SR 3.3.2.1 ~ 35.2%

Storage Tank SR 3.3.2.5 (RWST) Level - SR 3.3.2.9 Low Low SR 3.3.2.10 Coincident with Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for all initiation functions and requirements.

Safety Injection B. ESFAS Interlocks

a. Reactor Trip, P-4 1,2,3 2 per train, F SR 3.3.2.11 NA 2 trains

b. Pressurizer 1,2,3 3 L SR 3.3.2.5 ,,1981 psig Pressure, P-11 SR 3.3.2.9

9. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation

a. Automatic 1,2,3 2 trains H SR 3.3.2.2 NA Actuation Logic SR 3.3.24 and Actuation SR 3.3.2.14 Relays (SSPS)

b. Pressurizer 1.2,3 4 D SR 3.3.2.1 ,,350 psig Pressure - High SR 3.3.2.5 SR 3.3.2.9 (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system selting except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Selpoinl defines the limiting safety system selting for these Functions). See the Bases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3A7 Amendment No. ##

Table 3.3.2-1 (page 11 of 11)

Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE ALLOWABLE FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS CONDITIONS REQUIREMENTS VALUE(a)

10. Steam Generator Slowdown and Sample Line Isolation

a. Manual Initiation 1(1),2(1),3(1) 2 trains P SR 3.3.2.8 NA (1 perMDAFW pump)

b. Automatic 1(1,2(1),3(t) 2 tra ins Q SR 3.3.2.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)

c. Safety Injection 1(1),2(1).3(1) Refer to Function 1 (Safety Injection) for initiation functions and requirements.

d. Loss of Offsite 1(1),2(1).3(1) 2 trains R SR 3.3.2.7 NA Power (a) The Allowable Value defines the limiting safety system seltng except for Functions 1.e, 4.e.(1), 5.c, 5.e.(1), 5.e.(2),

6.d.(1), and 6.d.(2) (the Nominal Trip Setpoint defines the limiting safety system setting for these Functions). See the Sases for the Nominal Trip Setpoints.

(t) Except when all Steam Generator Slowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valves are:

1.Closed and de-activated, or 2.Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or 3.lsolatecl by a combination of closed manual valve(s) ancl closed de-activated automatic valve(s).

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-48 Amendment No. ##

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.3 Post Accident Monitoring (PAM) Instrumentation LCO 3.3.3 The PAM instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.3-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2 and 3.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Restore required 30 days one required channel channel to OPERABLE inoperable. status.

B. Required Action and 8.1 Initiate action in Immediately associated Completion accordance with Time of Condition A not Specification 5.6.8.

met.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-49 Amendment No. ## I

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. ----------- NOTE ----------- C.1 Restore all but one 7 days Not applicable to hydrogen channel to OPERABLE analyzer channels. status.

---

____.._00___-

One or more Functions with two or more required channels inoperable.

D. Two hydrogen analyzer D.1 Restore one hydrogen 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> channels inoperable. analyzer channel to OPERABLE status.

E. Required Action and E.1 Enter the Condition Immediately associated Completion referenced in Time of Condition C or D Table 3.3.3-1 for the not met. channeL.

F. As required by Required F.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Action E.1 and referenced in Table 3.3.3-1. AND F.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> G. As required by Required G.1 Initiate action in Immediately Action E.1 and referenced accordance with in Table 3.3.3-1. Specification 5.6.8.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-50 Amendment No. ## I

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

NOTE -----------------------------------------------

SR 3.3.3.1 and SR 3.3.3.2 apply to each PAM instrumentation Function in Table 3.3.3-1.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.3.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.

SR 3.3.3.2 ______n__________________ NOTE _____________________

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-51 Amendment No. #: I

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 Table 3.3.3-1 (page 1 of 2)

Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation CONDITION REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED REQUIRED FUNCTION CHANNELS ACTION E.1 2 F

1. Neutron Flux

2. Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Hot Leg 2 F Temperature (Wde Range)

3. RCS Cold Leg Temperature (Wde Range) 2 F

4. RCS Pressure (Wide Range) 2 F

5. Reactor Vessel Level Indicating System 2 G (RVLlS)

6. Containment Normal Sump Water Level 2 F

7. Containment Pressure (Normal Range) 2 F

8. Steam Line Pressure 2 per steam F generator

9. Containment Radiation Level (High Range) 2 G

10. Containment Hydrogen Analyzers 2 F

11. Pressurizer Water Level 2 F

12. Steam Generator Water Level (Wide Range) 4 F

13. Steam Generator Water Level (Narrow Range) 2 per steam F generator (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-52 Amendment No. ## I

PAM Instrumentation 3.3.3 Table 3.3.3-1 (page 2 of 2)

Post Accident Monitoring Instrumentation CONDITION REFERENCED FROM REQUIRED REQUIRED FUNCTION CHANNELS ACTION E.1

14. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 1 2(a) F

15. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 2 2(a) F

16. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 3 2(a) F

17. Core Exit Temperature - Quadrant 4 2(a) F

18. Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Rate 4 F

19. Refueling Water Storage Tank Level 2 F (a) A channel consists of two core exit thermocouples (CETs).

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-53 Amendment No. ## I

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.4 Remote Shutdown System LCO 3.3.4 The Remote Shutdown System Functions in Table 3.3.4-1 and the required auxiliary shutdown panel (ASP) controls shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE -------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function and required ASP control.

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A One or more required A.1 Restore required 30 days Functions inoperable. Function and required ASP controls to OR OPERABLE status.

One or more required ASP controls inoperable.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-54 Amendment No. ## I

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.4.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK for each required 31 days instrumentation channel that is normally energized.

SR 3.3.4.2 --------------------- NOTE -----------------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2 for the turbine-driven APN pump.

Verify each required auxiliary shutdown panel control 18 months circuit and transfer switch is capable of performing the intended function.

---

NU II: ---------------------

SR 3.3.4.3 1. Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

2. Reactor trip breaker and RCP breaker position indications are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION for each required 18 months instrumentation channeL.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-55 Amendment No. ## I

Remote Shutdown System 3.3.4 Table 3.3.4-1 (page 1 of 1)

Remote Shutdown System Functions FUNCTION REQUIRED CHANNELS

1. Source Range Neutron Flux(a)

2. Reactor Trip Breaker Position 1 per trip breaker

3. Pressurizer Pressure

4. RCS Wide Range Pressure

5. RCS Hot Leg Temperature

6. RCS Cold Leg Temperature

7. SG Pressure 1 per SG

8. SG Level 1 per SG

9. AFW Flow Rate

10. RCP Breaker Position 1 per pump

11. AFW Suction Pressure

12. Pressurizer Level (a) Not required OPERABLE in MODE 1 or in MODE 2 above the P-6 setpoint.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-56 Amendment No. ## I

LOP DG Start Instrumentation 3.3.5 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.5 Loss of Power (LOP) Diesel Generator (DG) Start Instrumentation LCO 3.3.5 Four channels per 4.16-kV NB bus of the loss of voltage Function and four channels per 4.16-kV NB bus of the degraded voltage Function shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, When associated DG is required to be OPERABLE by LCO 3.8.2, "AC Sources - Shutdown."

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A- One or more Functions with A.1 ----------- NOTE -------

one channel per bus The inoperable channel inoperable. may be bypassed for up to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveilance testing of other channels.

Place channel in trip. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> B. One or more Functions with B.1 Declare associated load Immediately two or more channels per shedder and emergency bus inoperable. load sequencer (LSELS) inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-57 Amendment No. ## I

LOP DG Start Instrumentation 3.3.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.5.1 Tie breakers between 480 Vac buses NG01 and 7 days NG03 and between 480 Vac buses NG02 and NG04 shall be verified open.

SR 3.3.5.2 -------------------------- NOTE -----------------

Verification of time delays is not required.

Perform TADOT. 31 days SR 3.3.5.3 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION with nominal Trip 18 months Setpoint and Allowable Value as follows:

a. Loss of voltage Allowable Value 83 +0, -8.3V (120V Bus) with a time delay of 1.0 + 0.2,

-0.5 sec.

Loss of voltage nominal Trip Setpoint 83V (120V Bus) with a time delay of 1.0 sec.

b. Degraded voltage Allowable Value 107.47 i: 0.38V (120V Bus) with a time delay of 119 i: 11.6 sec.

Degraded voltage nominal Trip Setpoint 107.47V (120V Bus) with a time delay of 119 sec.

SR 3.3.5.4 Verify LOP DG Start ESF RESPONSE TIMES are 18 months on a within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-58 Amendment No. ## I

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.6 Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.6 The Containment Purge Isolation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.6-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.6-1.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One radiation monitoring A.1 Restore the affected 4 hou rs channel inoperable. channel to OPERABLE status.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-59 Amendment No. ## I

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. --------- NOTE --------- B.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable in MODE 1, containment purge 2,3,or4. supply and exhaust valves in closed position.

One or more Functions with one or more manual channels or automatic actuation trains inoperable.

OR Both radiation monitoring channels inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A not met.

icontinueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-60 Amendment No. ## I

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. -------- NOTE -------- C.1 Place and maintain Immediately Only applicable during containment purge CORE ALTERATIONS or supply and exhaust movement of irradiated fuel valves in closed position.

assemblies within containment. OR C.2 Enter applicable Immediately One or more manual Conditions and Required channels inoperable. Actions of LCO 3.9.4, "Containment Penetrations," for containment purge supply and exhaust valves made inoperable by isolation instrumentation.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-61 Amendment No. ## I

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.6-1 to determine which SRs apply for each Containment Purge Isolation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.6.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.6.2 ------------------------ NOTE ____________n__________

The continuit check may be excluded.

Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.6.3 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.6.4 --------------------- NOTE ------------------

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 18 months SR 3.3.6.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.6.6 Verify Containment Purge Isolation ESF RESPONSE 18 months on a TIMES are within limits. STAGGERED TEST BASIS CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-62 Amendment No. ## I

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation 3.3.6 TABLE 3.3.6-1 (PAGE 1 OF 1)

Containment Purge Isolation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE NOMINAL FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS TRIP SETPOINT

1. Manual 1,2,3,4, 2 SR 3.3.6.4 NA Initiation (a), (b)

2. Automatic 1,2,3,4 2 trains SR 3.3.6.2 NA Actuation SR 3.3.6.6 Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)

3. Containment 1,2,3,4 2 SR 3.3.6.1 (c)

Purge SR 3.3.6.3 Exhaust SR 3.3.6.5 Radiation -

Gaseous

4. Containment Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 3.a, for all initiation functions and Isolation - requirements.

Phase A (a) During CORE ALTERATIONS.

(b) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

(c) Set to ensure ODCM limits are not exceeded.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-63 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.7 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.7 The CREVS actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.7-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.7-1.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ---------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One or more Functions with A.1 Place one CREVS train 7 days one channel or train in Control Room inoperable. Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRV1S) mode.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-64 Amendment No. #I I

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. ----------- NOTE ---------- 8.1.1 Place one CREVS train Immediately Not applicable to in CRVIS mode.

Function 3.

AND One or more Functions with 8.1.2 Enter applicable Immediately two channels or two trains Conditions and Required inoperable. Actions of LCO 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventiation System (CREVS)", for one CREVS train made inoperable by inoperable CREVS actuation instrumentation.

OR 8.2 Place both trains in Immediately CRVIS mode.

(cominueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-65 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. Both radiation monitoring C.1.1 Enter applicable Immediately channels inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)," for one CREVS train made inoperable by inoperable CREVS actuation instrumentation.

AND C.1.2 Place one CREVS train 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> in CRVIS mode.

QB C.2 Place both trains in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> CRVIS mode.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time for Conditions Ai S, or C not met in MODE 1, 2, A!

3,or4. 0.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> E. Required Action and E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately associated Completion ALTERATIONS.

Time for Conditions Ai S, or C not met in MODE 5 or 6, AND or during CORE ALTERATIONS, or during E.2 Suspend movement of Immediately movement of irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies. assemblies.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-66 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

NOTE ----------------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.7-1 to determine which SRs apply for each CREVS Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.7.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.7.2 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.7.3 ------------------------ NOTE -------------------

The continuity check may be excluded.

Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.7.4 ------------------------ NOTE -------------------

Verification of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 18 months SR 3.3.7.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months SR 3.3.7.6 --------------------------- NOTE --------------------------

Radiation monitor detectors are excluded from response time testing.

Verify Control Room Ventilation Isolation ESF 18 months on a RESPONSE TIMES are within limits STAGGERED TEST BASIS CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-67 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.7 Table 3.3.7-1 (page 1 of 1)

CREVS Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR OTHER NOMINAL SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILLANCE TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOINT

1. Manual 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2 SR 3.3.7.4 NA Initiation (a), and (c)

2. Automatic 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2 trains SR 3.3.7.3 NA Actuation (a), and (c)

Logic and Actuation (a) 2 trains SR 3.3.7.6 NA Relays (SOP ESFAS)

3. Control Room 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 2 SR 3.3.7.1 (b)

Radiation - and (a) SR 3.3.7.2 Control Room SR 3.3.7.5 Air Intakes (a) 2 SR 3.3.7.6 (b)

4. Containment Refer to LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instrumentation," Function 3.a, for all initiation functions and Isolation . requirements.

Phase A

5. Fuel Building Refer to LCO 3.3.8, "EES Actuation Instrumentation," for all initiation functions and Exhaust requirements.

Radiation-Gaseous (a) During CORE ALTERATIONS or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within containment.

(b) Nominal Trip Setpoint concentration value (l'Ci/cm3) shall be established such that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 2 mR/hr in the control room.

(c) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-68 Amendment No. #1 I

EES Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.8 Emergency Exhaust System (EES) Actuation Instrumentation LCO 3.3.8 The EES actuation instrumentation for each Function in Table 3.3.8-1 shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: According to Table 3.3.8-1.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each Function.

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more Functions A.1 Place one EES train in 7 days with one channel or train the Fuel Building inoperable. Ventilation Isolation Signal (FBVIS) mode.

AND A.2 Place one CREVS train 7 days in Control Room Ventilation Isolation Signal (CRVIS) mode.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-69 Amendment No. ## I

EES Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. ---------- NOTE ------------ B.1.1 Place one EES train in Immediately Not applicable to the FBVIS mode and Function 3. one CREVS train in the CRVIS mode.

One or more Functions AND with two channels or two trains inoperable. B.1.2 Enter applicable Immediately Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventiation System (CREVS)," for one CREVS train made inoperable and enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.13, "Emergency Exhaust System (EES),"

for one EES train made inoperable by inoperable EES actuation instrumentation.

OR B.2 Place both EES trains in Immediately the FBVIS mode and both CREVS trains in the CRVIS mode.

(cominueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-70 Amendment No. #I i

EES Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. Both radiation monitoring C.1.1 Enter applicable Immediately channels inoperable. Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.10, "Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)," for one CREVS train made inoperable and enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.7.13, "Emergency Exhaust System (EES),"

for one EES train made inoperable by inoperable EES actuation instrumentation.

AND C.1.2 Place one EES train in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the FBVIS mode and one CREVS train in the CRVIS mode.

OR C.2 Place both EES trains in 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> the FBVIS mode and both CREVS trains in the CRVIS mode.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Suspend movement of Immediately associated Completion irradiated fuel Time for Conditions A, B, assemblies in the fuel or C not met during building.

movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3~71 Amendment No. ## I

EES Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

---

NOTE ----------------------------------------

Refer to Table 3.3.8-1 to determine which SRs apply for each EES Actuation Function.

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.8.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.8.2 Perform COT. 92 days SR 3.3.8.3 ------------------------ NOTE --------------------

The continuity check may be excluded.

Perform ACTUATION LOGIC TEST. 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS SR 3.3.8.4 ---------------------- NOTE ---------------------

Venfication of setpoint is not required.

Perform TADOT. 18 months SR 3.3.8.5 Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATION. 18 months CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-72 Amendment No. ## I

EES Actuation Instrumentation 3.3.8 Table 3.3.8-1 (page 1 of 1)

EES Actuation Instrumentation APPLICABLE MODES OR SPECIFIED REQUIRED SURVEILlNCE NOMINAL TRIP FUNCTION CONDITIONS CHANNELS REQUIREMENTS SETPOiNT

1. Manual (a) 2 SR 3.3.8.4 NA Initiation

2. Automatic (a) 2 trains SR 3.3.8.3 NA Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)

3. Fuel (a) 2 SR 3.3.8.1 (b)

Building SR 3.3.8.2 Exhaust SR 3.3.8.5 Radiation

- Gaseous (a) During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

(b) Nominal Trip Setpoint concentration value (l.Ci/cmS) shall be established such that the actual submersion dose rate would not exceed 4 mRlhr in the fuel building.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-73 Amendment No. ## I

BDMS 3.3.9 3.3 INSTRUMENTATION 3.3.9 Boron Dilution Mitigation System (BDMS)

LCO 3.3.9 Two trains of the BDMS shall be OPERABLE and one RCS loop shall be in operation.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 2 (below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock), 3,4, and 5.

---

NOTE ------------------------------

The boron dilution flux multiplication signal may be blocked in MODES 2 (below P-6 (Intermediate Range Neutron Flux) interlock) and 3 during reactor startup.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One train inoperable. A.1 Restore train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

B. Two trains inoperable. B.1 --------- NOTE ---------

Plant temperature OR changes are allowed provided the temperature Required Action and change is accounted for associated Completion Time in the calculated 8DM.

of Condition A not met. _.._-----------------_.._----

Suspend operations Immediately involving positive reactivity additions.

AND (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-74 Amendment No. ## I

BDMS 3.3.9 ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME B. (continued) B.2 Perform SR 3.1.1 .1. 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter AND B.3.1 Close and secure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> unborated water source isolation valves.

AND 8.3.2 Verify unborated water Once per 31 days source isolation valves are closed and secured.

C. No RCS loop in operation. C.1 Close and secure 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> unborated water source isolation valves.

AND C.2 Verify unborated water Once per 31 days source isolation valves are closed and secured.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-75 Amendment ## I

BDMS 3.3.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.3.9.1 Perform CHANNEL CHECK. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SR 3.3.9.2 ----------------------- NOTE ----------------------

Only required to be performed in MODE 5.

Verify BGV0178 is secured in the closed position. 31 days SR 3.3.9.3 --------------------- NOTE --------------------

Not required to be performed until 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> after reducing power below P-6 interlock.

Perform COT and verify nominal flux multiplication 184 days set point of 1.7.

SR 3.3.9.4 -------------------------- NOTE --------------------

Neutron detectors are excluded from CHANNEL CALIBRATION.

Perform CHANNEL CALIBRATJON. 18 months SR 3.3.9.5 Verify the centrifugal charging pump suction valves 18 months from the RWST open and the CVCS volume control tank discharge valves close in less than or equal to 30 seconds on a simulated or actual actuation signaL.

SR 3.3.9.6 Verify one RCS loop is in operation. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.3-76 Amendment No. ## I

MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs 3.7.2 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.2 Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSIVBVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs)

LCO 3.7.2 The MSIV and its associated actuator trains, the MSIVBV, and the MSLPDIV in each of the four main steam lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: For the MSIV and its associated actuator trains in each main steam line:

MODE 1, MODES 2 and 3 except when the MSIV is closed and de-activated.

For the MSIVBV in each main steam line:

MODES 1,2, and 3 except when:

a. MSIVBV is closed and de-activated, or

b. MSIVBV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

c. MSIVBV is isolated by two closed manual valves.

For the MSLPDIV in each main steam line:

MODES 1,2, and 3 except when:

a. MSLPDIV is closed and de-activated, or

b. MSLPDIV is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or

c. MSLPDIV is isolated by two closed manual valves.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One MSIV actuator train A.1 Restore MSIV actuator 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable. train to OPERABLE status.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-5 Amendment No. ##

MSIVs. MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. Two MSIV actuator trains B.1 Restore one MSIV 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inoperable for different actuator train to MSIVs when the inoperable OPERABLE status.

actuator trains are !1 in the same separation group.

C. Two MSIV actuator trains C.1 Restore one MSIV 4 hou rs inoperable when the actuator train to inoperable actuator trains OPERABLE status.

m in the same separation group.

D. Two actuator trains for one 0.1 Declare the affected Immediately MSIV inoperable. MSIV inoperable.

E. Three or more MSIV E.1 Declare each affected Immediately actuator trains inoperable. MSIV inoperable.

OR Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met.

F. One MSIV inoperable in F.1 Restore MSIV to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> MODE 1. OPERABLE status.

G Required Action and G1 Be in MODE 2. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition F not met.

(continUed)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-6 Amendment No. ## I

MSIVs, MSIVBVs. and MSLPDIVs 3.7.2 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME H. ---------- NOTE -------- H.1 Close or isolate MSIVBV. 7 days Separate Condition entry is allowed for each main AND steam line.

H.2 Verify MS VBV is closed Once per 7 days One or more MSIVBVs or isolated.

inoperable.

i. ----------- NOTE ---------- 1.1 Close or isolate 7 days Separate Condition entry is MSLPDIV.

allowed for each main steam line. AND One or more MSLPDIVs 1.2 Verify MSLPDIV is Once per 7 days inoperable. closed or isolated.

J. ----------- NOTE ----------- J.1 Close MSIV. 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Separate Condition entry is allowed for each main AND steam line.

J.2 Verify MSIV is closed. Once per 7 days One or more MSIVs inoperable in MODE 2 or 3.

K. Required Action and K.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition H. i, or J AN not met.

K.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-7 Amendment No. ##

MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs 3.7.2 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.2.1 Verify isolation time of each MSIV is within limits. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.2.2 Verify each MSIV, each MSIVBV, and each MSLPDIV 18 months actuates to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.2.3 Verify isolation time of each MSIVBV and MSLPDIV is In accordance with within limits. the Inservice Testing Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-8 Amendment No. ##

MFIVs and MFRVs and MFRV Bypass Valves 3.7.3 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.3 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves (MFIVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valves (MFRVs) and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves (MFRVBVs)

LCO 3.7.3 Four MFIVs, four MFRVs, and four MFRVBVs shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 except when:

a. MFIV is closed and de-activated; or

b. MFRV is closed and de-activated or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

c. MFRVBV is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each valve.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more MFIVs A.1 Close MFIV. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable.

AND A.2 Verify MFIV is closed. Once per 7 days B. One or more MFRVs B.1 Close or isolate MFRV. 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable.

AND B.2 Verify MFRV is closed or Once per 7 days isolated.

C. One or more MFRVBVs C.1 Close or isolate bypass 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable. valve.

AND C.2 Verify bypass valve is Once per 7 days closed or isolated.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-9 Amendment No. ## I

MFIVs and MFRVs and MFRV Bypass Valves 3.7.3 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. Two valves in the same 0.1 Isolate affected flow 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> flow path inoperable. path.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.3.1 ----------------------- NOTE ---------------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify the closure time of each MFRV and MFRV8V is In accordance with within limits. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.3.2 ------------------------ NOTE -------------------

For the MFRVs and MFRVBVs, only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify each MFIV, MFRVand MFRVBV actuates to 18 months the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.3.3 Verify the closure time of each MFIV is within limits. In accordance with the Inservice Testing Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-10 Amendment No. ## I

ASDs 3.7.4 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.4 Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs)

LCO 3.7.4 Four ASD lines shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. One required ASD line A.1 Restore required ASD 7 days inoperable for reasons line to OPERABLE other than excessive ASD status.

seat leakage.

B. Two required ASD lines B.1 Restore all but one 72 hou rs inoperable for reasons required ASD line to other than excessive ASD OPERABLE status.

seat leakage.

C. Three or more required C.1 Restore all but two 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> ASD lines inoperable for required ASD lines to reasons other than OPERABLE status.

excessive ASD seat leakage.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-11 Amendment No. ## I

A$Ds 3.7.4 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. With one or more of the D.1 Initiate action to close Immediately required ASD(s) inoperable the Associated manual because of excessive seat isolation valve(s).

leakage.

AND D.2 Restore ASD(s) to 30 days OPERABLE status.

E. Required Action and E.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND E.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-12 Amendment No. ## I

ASDs 3.7.4 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.4.1 ------------------------ NOTE ----------------

Only required to be performed in MODES 1 and 2.

Verify one complete cycle of each ASD. I n accordance with the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.4.2 Venfy one complete cycle of each ASD manual In accordance with isolation valve. the I nservice Testing Program CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-13 Amendment No. #I I

AFW System 3.7.5 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.5 Auxilary Feedwater (AFW) System LCO 3.7.5 Three AFWtrains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE ------------------------------------------

LCO 3.0.4.b is not applicable when entering MODE 1.

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One steam supply to A,1 Restore steam supply to 7 days turbine driven AFW pump OPERABLE status.

inoperable. AND 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO B. One ESW supply to turbine B.1 Restore ESW supply to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> driven AFW pump OPERABLE status.

inoperable. 8t 10 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO

~continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-14 Amendment No. ## I

AFW System 3.7.5 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. One AFW train inoperable C.1 Restore AFW train to 72 hour8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />s*

for reasons other than OPERABLE status.

Condition A or B. AN 1 0 days from discovery of failure to meet the LCO D. Required Action and D.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time for Condition Ai B or C not met.

Ar QB D.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> Two AFW trains inoperable.

E. Three AFW trains E.1 -------- NOTE --------

inoperable. LCO 3.0.3 and all other LCO Required Actions requiring MODE changes are suspended until one AFW train is restored to OPERABLE status.

Initiate action to restore Immediately one AFW train to OPERABLE status.

• With the exception that the Completion Time associated with the Condition C entry on 2/3/04 for the turbine driven auxiliary feed water pump has been extended on a one-time only basis to 144 hours0.00167 days <br />0.04 hours <br />2.380952e-4 weeks <br />5.4792e-5 months <br />. At the time a formal cause of the inoperability is determined, Condition D wil be entered immediately.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-15 Amendment No. ## i

AFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.1 ---------------------- NOTE ---------------------

Only required to be performed for the AFW flow control valves when the system is placed in automatic control or when THERMAL POWER is ::10% RTP.

Verify each AFW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in each water flow path, and in both steam supply flow paths to the steam turbine driven pump, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.5.2 ----------------------- NOTE -------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after ~ 900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify the developed head of each AFW pump at the In accordance with flow test point is greater than or equal to the required the Inservice Test developed head. Program SR 3.7.5.3 Verify each AFW automatic valve that is not locked, 18 months sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

(continUed)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-16 Amendment No. ## I

AFW System 3.7.5 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS (continued)

SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.5.4 ----------------------- NOTE --------------------

Not required to be performed for the turbine driven AFW pump until 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> after ~ 900 psig in the steam generator.

Verify each AFW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.5.5 Verify proper alignment of the required AFW flow Prior to entering paths by verifying flow from the condensate storage MODE 2 tank to each steam generator. whenever unit has been in MODE 5 or 6 for ~ 30 days CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-17 Amendment No. ## I

CST 3.7.6 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.6 Condensate Storage Tank (CST)

LCO 3.7.6 The CST contained water volume shall be ~ 281,000 gal.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. CST contained water A.1 Verify by administrative 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> volume not within limit. means OPERABILITY of backup water supply. Ar AND Once per 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> thereafter A.2 Restore CST contained 7 days water volume to within limit.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time not met. AND 8.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-18 Amendment No. ## I

CST 3.7.6 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.6.1 Verify the CST contained water volume is 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />

~ 281,000 gal.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-19 Amendment No. ## I

CCW System 3.7.7 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.7 Component Cooling Water (CCW) System LCO 3.7.7 Two CCWtrains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One CCW train inoperable. A.1 ------ NOTE ----------

Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4,"

for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by CCw.

Restore CCW train to 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-20 Amendment No. ## I

CCW System 3.7.7 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.7.1 ----------------------- NOT E -------------------

Isolation of CCW flow to individual components does not render the CCW System inoperable.

Verify each CCW manual, power operated. and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position. is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.7.2 Verify each CCW automatic valve in the flow path that 18 months is not locked. sealed. or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.7.3 Verify each CCW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signaL.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-21 Amendment No. ## I

ESW 3.7.8 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.8 Essential Service Water System (ESW)

LCO 3.7.8 Two ESWtrains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One ESW train inoperable. A.1 ---------- NOTE ------

1 . Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.8.1, "AC Sources-Operating, "

for emergency diesel generator made inoperable by ESW.

2. Enter applicable Conditions and Required Actions of LCO 3.4.6, "RCS Loops - MODE 4," for residual heat removal loops made inoperable by ESW.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-22 Amendment No. ## I

ESW 3.7.8 ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One ESW train inoperable. A.1 (continued) ------NOTE--------

(continued) A one-time Restore ESW train to Completion Time of OPERABLE status. 14 days is allowed to support planned replacement of ESW 'B' train piping prior to April 30, 2009.

72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-23 Amendment ## I

ESW 3.7.8 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.8.1 ---------------------- NOTE --------------------

Isolation of ESW flow to individual components does not render the ESW inoperable.

Verify each ESW manual, power operated, and 31 days automatic valve in the flow path servicing safety related equipment, that is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, is in the correct position.

SR 3.7.8.2 Verify each ESW automatic valve in the flow path that 18 months is not locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position, actuates to the correct position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.8.3 Verify each ESW pump starts automatically on an 18 months actual or simulated actuation signaL.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-24 Amendment No. ## I

UHS 3.7.9 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.9 Ultimate Heat Sink (UHS)

LCO 3.7.9 The UHS shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY; MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One cooling tower train A.1 Restore cooling tower 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> inoperable. train to OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not AND met.

QB B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> UHS inoperable for reasons other than Condition A.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-25 Amendment No. #: I

UHS 3.7.9 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.9.1 Verify water level of UHS is ~ 831.25 fl mean sea 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> leveL.

SR 3.7.9.2 Verify average water temperature of UHS is :: 90°F. 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> SR 3.7.9.3 Operate each cooling tower fan for ~ 15 minutes in 31 days both the fast and slow speed.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-26 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS 3.7.10 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.10 Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS)

LCO 3.7.10 Two CREVS trains shall be OPERABLE.

---

NOTE --------------------------------

The control room boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A One CREVS train A.1 Restore CREVS train to 7 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

8. Two CREVS trains B.1 Restore control room 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> inoperable due to boundary to OPERABLE inoperable control room status.

boundary in MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4. AND C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-27 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS 3.7.10 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDlTON REQUIRED ACTION TIME D. Required Action and 0.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CREVS train in CRVIS Time of Condition A not met mode.

in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies. QB 0.2.1 Suspend CORE Immediately ALTERATIONS.

At 0.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. Two CREVS trains E.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, ALTERATIONS.

or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

A.

E.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

F. Two CREVS trains F.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-28 Amendment No. ## I

CREVS 3.7.10 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.10.1 Operate each CREVS train pressurization filter unit 31 days for;; 10 continuous hours with the heaters operating and each CREVS train filtration filter unit for

~ 15 minutes.

SR 3.7.10.2 Perform required CREVS filter testing in accordance In accordance with with the Ventilation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). VFTP SR 3.7.10.3 Verify each CREVS train actuates on an actual or 18 months simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.10.4 Verify one CREVS train can maintain a positive 18 months on a pressure of ~ 0.125 inches water gauge, relative to STAGGERED the outside atmosphere during the CRVIS mode of TEST BASIS operation.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-29 Amendment No. ## I

CRACS 3.7.11 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.11 Control Room Air Conditioning System (CRACS)

LCO 3.7.11 Two CRACS trains shall be OPERABLE.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One CRACS train A.1 Restore CRACS train to 30 days inoperable. OPERABLE status.

B. Required Action and 8.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A not met AND in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.

B.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> icontinueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-30 Amendment No. ## I

CRACS 3.7.11 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Place OPERABLE Immediately associated Completion CRACS train in Time of Condition A not met operation.

in MODE 5 or 6, or during movement of irradiated fuel QB assemblies.

C.2.1 Suspend CORE ALTERATIONS. Immediately AND C.2.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

D. Two CRACS trains 0.1 Suspend CORE Immediately inoperable in MODE 5 or 6, ALTERATIONS.

or during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies.

AND 0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies.

E. Two CRACS trains E.1 Enter LCO 3.0.3. Immediately inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or4.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-31 Amendment No. ## I

CRACS 3.7.11 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.11.1 Verify each CRACS train has the capability to remove 18 months the assumed heat load.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-32 Amendment No. ## I

3.7.12 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.12 Not Used.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-33 Amendment No. ## I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.13 Emergency Exhaust System (EES)

LCO 3.7.13 Two EES trains shall be OPERABLE.

---

NOTE -----------------------------------

The auxiliary or fuel building boundary may be opened intermittently under administrative control.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3. and 4, During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

---

NOTE ----------------------------

The SIS mode of operation is required only in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. The FBVIS mode of operation is required only during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

ACTIONS CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One EES train inoperable. A.1 Restore EES train to 7 days OPERABLE status.

8. Two EES trains inoperable 8.1 Restore auxilary building 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> due to inoperable auxiliary boundary to OPERABLE building boundary in status.

MODE 1,2,3 or4.

(comlnuea)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-34 Amendment No. ## I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 ACTIONS (continued)

COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME C. Required Action and C.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> associated Completion Time of Condition A or B not AND met in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4.

C.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> Q

Two EES trains inoperable in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 for reasons other than Condition B.

D. Required Action and 0.1 Place OPERABLE EES Immediately associated Completion Time train in the FBVIS mode.

of Condition A not met during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

OR 0.2 Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel building.

E. Two EES trains inoperable E.1 Suspend movement of Immediately during movement of irradiated fuel irradiated fuel assemblies in assemblies in the fuel the fuel building. building.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-35 Amendment No. ## I

Emergency Exhaust System 3.7.13 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.13.1 Operate each EES train for;; 10 continuous hours 31 days with the heaters operating.

SR 3.7.13.2 Perform required EES filter testing in accordance with In accordance with the Ventiation Filter Testing Program (VFTP). the VFTP SR 3.7.13.3 Verify each EES train actuates on an actual or 18 months simulated actuation signaL.

SR 3.7.13.4 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative pressure 18 months on a

0.25 inches water gauge with respect to STAGGERED atmospheric pressure in the auxiliary building during TEST BASIS the SIS mode of operation.

SR 3.7.13.5 Verify one EES train can maintain a negative pressure 18 months on a

0.25 inches water gauge with respect to STAGGERED atmospheric pressure in the fuel building during the TEST BASIS FBVIS mode of operation.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-36 Amendment No. ## I

3.7.14 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.14 Not Used.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-37 Amendment No. ## I

Fuel Storage Pool Water Level 3.7.15 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.15 Fuel Storage Pool Water Level LCO 3.7.15 The fuel storage pool water level shall be ~ 23 ft over the top of the storage racks.

APPLICABILITY: During movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS COMPLETION CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. Fuel storage pool water A.1 --------- NOTE ---------

level not within limit. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Suspend movement of Immediately irradiated fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.15.1 Verify the fuel storage pool water level is ~ 23 ft 7 days above the storage racks.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-38 Amendment No. ## I

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.16 Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration LCO 3.7.16 The fuel storage pool boron concentration shall be ~ 2165 ppm.

APPLICABILITY: When fuel assemblies are stored in the fuel storage pool and a fuel storage pool verification has not been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Fuel storage pool boron ----------------- NOTE ----------------

concentration not within LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

limit.

A.1 Suspend movement of Immediately fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

AND A.2.1 Initiate action to restore Immediately fuel storage pool boron concentration to within limit.

OR A.2.2 Verify by administrative Immediately means that a non-Region 1 fuel storage pool verification has been performed since the last movement of fuel assemblies in the fuel storage pool.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-39 Amendment No. ## I

Fuel Storage Pool Boron Concentration 3.7.16 SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.16.1 Verify the fuel storage pool boron concentration is 7 days within limit.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-40 Amendment No. ## I

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.17 Spent Fuel Assembly Storage LCO 3.7.17 The combination of initial enrichment and burnup of each spent fuel assembly stored in Region 2 or 3 shall be within the Acceptable Domain of Figure 3.7.17-1 or in accordance with Specification 4.3.1.1.

APPLICABILITY: Whenever any fuel assembly is stored in the fuel storage pool.

ACTIONS CONDITION REQUIRED ACTION COMPLETION TIME A. Requirements of the LCO A.1 --------- NOTE -------

not met. LCO 3.0.3 is not applicable.

Initiate action to move Immediately the noncomplying fuel assembly to Region 1.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.17.1 Verify by administrative means the initial enrichment Prior to storing the and burnup ofthe fuel assembly is in accordance with fuel assembly in Figure 3.7.17-1 or Specification 4.3.1.1. Region 2 or 3 CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-41 Amendment No. ## I

Spent Fuel Assembly Storage 3.7.17 55000

,.:: 50000 AC EPTAB E au NUP D MAIN i- F'OR REGIO 2 AND 3 S ORAGE

~ ,_ 45000 C'.

l

-- 40000 i.

0:

(/

o 35000 ci X

i.

L. 30000

3 25000

()

20000

)-

-i ai

i. 15000

(/

(/

4(

-i

i. 1 0000

i. UNAC EPTA LE au NUP OMAIN fOR EGlON 2 OR 3 STO AGE 5000 o

1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 FUEL ASSEMBLY INITIAL ENRICHMENT (w/o U-235)

Figure 3.7.17-1 (page 1 of 1)

MINIMUM REQUIRED FUEL ASSEMBLY BURNUP AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL ENRICHMENT TO PERMIT STORAGE IN REGIONS 2 AND 3 CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-42 Amendment No. ## I

Secondary Specific Activity 3.7.18 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.18 Secondary Specific Activity LCO 3.7.18 The specific activity of the secondary coolant shall be s 0.10 IlCilgm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4.

ACTIONS CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. Specific activit not within A.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> limit.

AND A.2 Be in MODE 5. 36 hours4.166667e-4 days <br />0.01 hours <br />5.952381e-5 weeks <br />1.3698e-5 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.18.1 Verify the specific activity of the secondary coolant is 31 days s 0.10 Ci/gm DOSE EQUIVALENT 1-131.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-43 Amendment No. ## I

SSIVs 3.7.19 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS 3.7.19 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)

LCO 3.7.19 The SSIVs shall be OPERABLE.

---

NOTE -------------------------------

Locked closed manual SSIVs may be opened under administrative controls.

APPLICABILITY: MODES 1, 2, and 3 except for each secondary system flow path when:

a. At least one of the two associated SSIVs is closed and de-activated; or

b. At least one f the two associated SSIVs is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or

c. The SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed manual valves, or two closed de-activated automatic valves, or a combination of a closed manual valve and a closed de-activated automatic valve.

ACTIONS

---

NOTE -----------------------------------------------

Separate Condition entry is allowed for each secondary system flow path.

COMPLETION CONDITON REQUIRED ACTION TIME A. One or more SSIVs ---------------- NOTE -----------------

inoperable. Closed or isolated automatic SSIVs may be opened or unisolated under administrative controls.

A.1 Close or isolate SSIV. 7 days AND A.2 Verify SSIV is closed or Once per 7 days isolated.

(continueo)

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-44 Amendment No. ##

SSIVs 3.7.19 ACTIONS (continued)

CONDITION COMPLETION REQUIRED ACTION TIME B. Required Action and B.1 Be in MODE 3. 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> Associated Completion Time not met. AND B.2 Be in MODE 4. 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS SURVEILLANCE FREQUENCY SR 3.7.19.1 Verify the isolation time of each automatic SSIV is i n accordance with within limits. the Inservice Testing Program SR 3.7.19.1 Verify each automatic SSIV in the flow path actuates 18 months to the isolation position on an actual or simulated actuation signaL.

CALLAWAY PLANT 3.7-45 Amendment No. ##

ULNRC-05566 ATTACHMENT 4 OL-1277 REVISED PROPOSED TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION BASES PAGES (FOR INFORMATION ONLY)

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE initiation function. The two-out-of-three and the two-out-of-four SAFETY configurations allow one channel to be tripped during maintenance or ANALYSES, testing without causing an ESFAS initiation. In cases where an LCO, AND inoperable channel is placed in the tripped condition indefinitely to satisfy APPLICABILITY the Required Action of an LCO, the logic configurations are reduced to (continued) one-out-of-two and one-out-of-three where tripping of an additional channeL, for any reason, would result in an ESFAS initiation. To allow for.

surveillance testing or setpoínt adjustment of other channels while in this condition, several Required Actions allow the inoperable channel to be bypassed. Bypassing the inoperable channel creates a two-out-of-two or two-out-of-three logic configuration allowing a channel to be tripped for testing without causing an ESFAS initiation. Two logic or manual initiation channels are required to ensure no single random failure disables the ESFAS.

The required channels of ESFAS instrumentation provide unit protection in the event of any of the analyzed accidents. ESFAS protection functions are as follows:

Safety Iniection 1S(.t- O~-DIB 1.

l(ev'S-e J Safety Injection (SI) provides two primary functions:

1. Primary side water addition to ensure maintenance or recovery of reactor vessel water level (coverage of the active fuel for heat removal, clad integrity, and for limiting peak clad temperature to .. 2200°F); and to'- !j\:"'JlO1 6~ 2. Boration to ensure recovery and maintenance of SOM (kef! .. 1.0).

These functions are necessary to mitigate the effects of high energy line breaks (HELBs) both inside and outside of containment. The Si signal is also used to initiate other Functions such as:

Phase A Isolation; Reactor Trip; Turbine Trip; Feedwater Isoiation; Start of motor driven auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps; (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-8 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 1. Safety Iniection (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND C . Isolation of SG blowdown and sample lines; J APPLICABILITY Enabling automatic switchover of Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) suction to containment recirculation sumps, coincident with RWST low-low 1 level; Emergency DG start; Initiation of LSELS LOCA sequencer; T6C.N 0 (p--Ol Containment Cooling;

?e. \f \ s-ed Emergency Exhaust System in the LOCA (SI8) mode; Strt of E8W and CCW pumps; and Hydrogen mixing fans start in slow speed.

These other functions ensure:

~ r vSot,wh tr t'O't Isolation of nonessential systems through containment O~ \' ~c-\~ penetrations; Trip of the turbine and reactor to limit power generation;

('o~o.v\t~o. ~\ ~ Isolation of main feedwater (MFW) to limit secondary side e 'l~ mass losses; Start of AFW to ensure secondary side cooling capability; Isolation of SG blowdown and sample lines to limit uncontrolled SG blowdown; Enabling ECCS suction from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) switchover on low-low 1 RW8T level to ensure continued cooling via use of the containment recirculation sumps; Emergency loads for LOCA are properly sequenced and powered; Containment cooling to preserve containment integrity; (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-9 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE b. Containment Isolation - Phase B Isolation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSIS, channels that actuate Containment Spray, Function 2).

LCO, AND The Containment Pressure trip of Phase B Containment APPLICABILITY Isolation is energized to trip in order to minimize the potential of spurious trips that may damage the RCPs.

(1 ) Phase B Isolation - Manual Initiation (2) Phase B Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS)

Manual and automatic initiation of Phase B containment isolation must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3, when there is a potential for an

íSc.N Ob-OIS accident to occur. Manual initiation is also required in MODE 4 even though automatic actuation is not f?e\l ~-ed required. In this MODE, adequate time is available to manually actuate required components in the event of a DBA. However, because of the large number of components actuated on a Phase B containment isolation, actuation is simplified by the o.Jd use of the manual actuation switches. Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays must be

ítl t-i W\lVh-H\ OPERABLE in MODE 4 to support system level

Ç'Ot manual initiation. In MODES 5 and 6, there is insuffcient energy in the primary or secondary systems to pressurize the containment to require Phase B containment isolation. There also is adequate time for the operator to evaluate unit conditions and manually actuate individual isolation valves in response to abnormal or accident conditions.

(3) Phase B Isolation - Containment Pressure The basis for containment pressure MODE applicabilty and the Trip Setpoint are as discussed for ESFAS Function 2.c above.

4. Steam Line Isolation Isolation of the main steam lines provides protection in the event of an SLB inside or outside containment. Rapid isolation of the steam lines will limit the steam break accident to the blowdown (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-20 Revision 7h

BASES APPLICABLE 4.

SAFETY ANALYSES, from one SG, at most. F an SLB upstream of the main ste LCO, AND isolation valves (MSIVs), inside or outside of containment, c sure APPLICABILITY of the MSIVs limits the accident to the blowdown from only t e affected SG. For an SLB downstream of the MSIVs, closure f the MSIVs terminates the accident as'soon as the steam lines depressurize. Steam Line Isolation also mitigates the effects 0 a feed line break and ensures a source of steam for the turbine _

driven AFW pump during a feed line break.

a. Steam Une Isolation - Manual Initiation Manual initiation of Steam Line Isolation can be accomplished from the control room. There are two push buttons in the control room and either pushbutton can initiate action to immediately close all MSIVs. The LCO Ob'O\Q, requires two channels to be OPERABLE.

1'5 ~L~ e. b. Steam Line Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and a-e... \~ Actuation Relavs (SSPS)

Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays in the SSPS consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for ESFAS Function 1.b.

c. Steam Une Isolation - Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS)

As discussed in Reference 13, the Main Steam and Feedwater Isolation System (MSFIS) includes three redundant programmable logic controllers (PLCs) per logic train, arranged in a two-out-of-three voting configuration for each train. The three PLCs in each train operate in parallel, each receiving all of the input signals. Each of the outputs from each PLC drives a relay. The relay contacts are arranged in a two-out-of-three voting scheme, requiring that at least two PLCs agree upon the output before that train can initiate an isolation function. Each train requires minimum of two PLCs to be OPERABLE. tNSEr?

Manual and ~t~dD,~~~n~f:team line isolation must be OPERABLE ~when there is sufficient energy in the RCS and SGs to have an SLB or other accident. This could result in the release of significant uantities of ener y and cause a cooldown of the primary system. .

CALLAWAY PLANT B Revision 7h

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT A main steam isolation valve bypass valves (MSIVBVs), and the main steam low point drain isolation valves (MSLPDIVs)

INSERT B (page 1 of 3)

Steam Line Isolation Functions 4.a, Manual Initiation, 4.b, Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (SSPS), 4.d, Containment Pressure - High 2, and 4.e.(1), Steam Line Pressure - Low must be OPERALE in MODE 1 with no exceptions. Functions 4.a, 4.b, 4.d, and 4.e.1 must also be OPERALE in MODE 2 and MODE 3 (except that Function 4.e.(1) is required in MODE 3 above P-11 and below P-11 unless safety injection on low steam line pressure is blocked) except when:

1. All MSIVs are closed and de-activated; AN

2. All MSIVBV s are:

2.a Closed and de-activated; or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

3. All MSLPDIVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated; or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT B continued (page 2 of 3)

Steam Line Isolation Function 4.c, Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (MSFIS), must be OPERALE in MODE 1 with no exceptions. Function 4.c must also be OPERALE in MODE 2 and MODE 3 except when all MSIVs are closed and de-activated.

Steam Line Isolation Function 4.e.(2), Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High, must be OPERALE in MODE 3 below P-11 (except while blocked below P-11 when safety injection on low steam line pressure is not blocked) except when:

1. All MSIVs are closed and de-activated; AND

2. All MSIVBV s are:

2.a Closed and de-activated; or 2.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 2.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

AND

3. All MSLPDIVs are:

3.a Closed and de-activated; or 3.b Closed and isolated by a closed manual valve; or 3.c Isolated by two closed manual valves.

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT B continued (page 3 of 3)

When these valves are in the above (flow path isolated) confguration, there is no requirement to have an OPERALE actuation signal though Functions 4.a, 4.b, 4.c, 4.d, and 4.e since all the valves are already performing their specified safety function.

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 4.

(continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, LCO, AND M n n SI a cl ed. In MODES 4, 5, and 6, there is insuffcient energy in the APPLICABILITY RCS and SGs to experience an SLB or other accident releasing significant quantiies of energy.

d. Steam Line Isolation - Containment Pressure - High 2 This Function actuates closure ofthe MSIVs in the event of a LOCA or an SLB inside containment to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. The transmitters (dIp cells) are located outside containment with the sensing line (high pressure side of the transmitter) located inside containment. Containment Pressure-High 2 provides no input to any control functions. Thus,

\ ~ three OPERABLE channels are suffcient to satisfy cJC protective requirements with two-out-of-three logic. The

~(,N \ transmitters and electronics are located outside of 1'? ~ . ~eo containment. Thus, they wif not experience any adverse ie environmental conditions, and the Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. The Trip Setpoint is:: 17.0 psig.

Containment Pressure - High 2 must be OPERABLE ~

~~$ T: 2, aR~ ¿)when there is suffcient energy in the primary and secondary side to pressurize the containment following a pipe break. This would cause a significant increase in the containment pressure, thus allowin detection and closure 0 t MSI Ste C o a' n ncti n is quir to e 0 R L .

D 2 d 3 les all I In MODE 4, the increase in containment pressure following a pipe break would occur over a relatively long time period such that manual action could reasonably be expected to provide protection and ESFAS Function 4.d need not be OPERABLE. In MODES 5 and 6, there is not enough energy in the primary and secondary sides to pressuriz the containment to the Containment Pressure - Hig setpoint.

( continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-22 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 4. Steam Line Isolation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, e. Steam Line Isolation - Steam Line Pressure LeO, AND APPLICABILITY (1) Steam Line Pressure ~ Low Steam Line Pressure - Low provides closure of the MSIVs in the event of an SLB to maintain at least one unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment. This Function provides closure of the MSIVs in the eve e' break to ensure a sup for the turbine driv AFW pump.

eam Line Pressure - Low was discus previously under SI Function 1.e and the Trip Setpoint is the same.

~"'O\8

'f~ CN ~

~e\l\~e.

(2) Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - Hi provides closure of the MSIVs for an SLB w en continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE (2) Steam Une Pressure - Negative Rate - High SAFETY (continued)

ANALYSES, LeO, AND less than the P-11 setpoint, to maintain at least one APPLICABILITY unfaulted SG as a heat sink for the reactor, and to limit the mass and energy release to containment.

When the operator manually blocks the Steam Une Pressure - Low main steam isolation signal when less than the P-11 setpoint, the Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High signal is automatically enabled ine ssure _

Negative R provides no input to co of f ctions. Thus, three OPERABLE channels on each steam line are suffcient to satisfy requirements wth a two-out-of-three logic.

TSC.N O~,,()I

\(e\J \sed While the transmitters may experience elevated ambient temperatures due to an SLB, the trip function is based on rate of change, not the absolute accuracy of the indicated steam pressur Therefore, the Trip Setpoint reflects only stead state instrument uncertainties. The Trip Se int is s; 100 psi with a rate/lag controller time c nstant

¿ 50 seconds.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-24 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 6. Auxilary Feedwater (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, c. Auxilai- Feedwater - Automatic Actuation Logic and LCO, AND Actuation Relays (BOP ESFAS)

APPLICABILITY Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of similar features and operate in a similar manner as described for SSPS in ESFAS Function 1.b.

d. Auxilary Feedwater - Steam Generator Water Level -

Low Low SG Water Level - Low Low provides protection against a loss of heat sink. A feed line break, inside or outside of

.\ O(ø"-Ol B containment, or a loss of MFW, would result in a loss of SG 1S~~

t\ q" t (2 \)\~e-.

~'q1 ot '"

water leveL. SG Water Level - Low Low provides input to the SG Water Level Control System. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require a protection function actuation, and a single failure in the

~~ ~ ~~,i

(". :i v' ÇnoA.ltv \. ci c.'\ ~ other channels providing the protection function actuation.

Thus, four OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the requirements with two-out-of-four logic (the Environmental Allowance Modifier (EAM) function also uses a two-out-to(~~~ ') of-four logic). Two-out-of-four low level signals in any SG starts the motor-driven AFW pumps; in two SGs starts the turbine-driven AFW pump. As discussed in Reference 11, the SG Water Level - Low Low trip Function has been modified to allow a lower Trip Setpoint under normal containment environmental conditions.

The EAM circuitry reduces the potential for inadvertent trips via the EAM. enabled on containment pressure exceeding its setpoint as fisted in Table B 3.3.2-1.

Because the SG Water Level transmitters (dIp cells) are located inside containment, they may experience adverse environmental conditions due to a feedline break. The EAM function is used to monitor the presence of adverse containment conditions (elevated pressure) and enables the Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low (Adverse) trip setpoint to reflect the increased transmitter uncertainties due to this harsh environment. The EAM enables a lower Steam Generator Water Level - Low Low (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-31 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE d. Auxilary Feedwater - Steam Generator Water Level -

SAFETY Low Low (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, AND (Normal) trip setpoint when these conditions are not APPLICABILITY present, thus allowing more margin to trip for normal operating conditions. If the EAM trip function has inoperable required channels, it is acceptable to place the inoperable channels in the tripped condition and continue operation. Placing the inoperable channels in the trip mode enables the Steam Generator Water Level -

Low Low (Adverse) Function, for the EAM. If the Steam Generator Water Level -low Low (Normal) trip Function act- 0 b-Ol ~ has an inoperable required channel, the inoperable 1~'l ~(¿~\5 channel must be tripped, subject to the LCO Applicability footnote.

~el\l\Ci.Q \00( tø The Trip Setpoint reflects the inclusion of both steady state and adverse environment instrument uncertinties. The L 'o(~(~~) Trip Setpoints for the SG Water Level - Low Low (Adverse Containment Environment) and (Normal Containment

~ ~.. O~ Environment) bistables are ~ 21.0% and ~ 17.0% of narrow range span, respectively. The Trip Setpoint for the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier i(\~( bistables is :: 1.5 psig.

fci(

e. Auxiliary Feedwater - Safetv Iniection An SI signal starts the motor driven AFW pumps. The AFW initiation functions are the same as the requirements for their Si function. Therefore, the requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all initiating functions and requirements.

f. Auxiliary Feedwater - Loss of Offsite Power The loss of offsite power (LOP) is detected by a voltage drop on each ESF bus. The LOP is sensed and processed by the circuitry for LOP DG Start (Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer) and fed to BOP ESFAS by relay actuation. Loss of power to either ESF bus will start

( continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-32 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE f. Auxiliary Feedwater - Loss of Offsite Power (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, the turbine - driven AFW pump, to ensure that at least one LCO, AND SG contains enough water to serve as the heat sink for APPLICABILITY reactor decay heat and sensible heat removal following the reactor trip, and automatically isolate the SG blowdown and sample lines. In addition, once the diesel generators are started and up to speed, the motor - driven AFW pumps wil be sequentially loaded onto the diesel generator buses.

Functions 6.a through 6.f must be OPERABLE in MODES 1,2, and 3 to ensure that the SGs remain the heat sink for the reactor. SG Water Level - Low Low in any Ofo",OI Pi operating SG wil cause the motor - driven AFW pumps to start. The system is aligned so that upon a start of the 1"StN pump, water immediately begins to flow to the SGs. SG

~~\)\,t. m.O.j Water Level - Low Low in any two operating SGs will

)\ o- \J cause the turbine - driven pump to start. The SG Water Level - Low Low (Normal Containment Environment)

ÇO~ ~ ~~

1. -l Ç- ( fl ~IL C,\ ~

~\ç,

channels do not provide protection when the Containment Pressure - Environmental Allowance Modifier (EAM) channels in the same protection sets are tripped since that enables the SG Water Level - Low Low (Adverse lo'~~ ') Containment Environment) channels with a higher water level trip setpoint. As such, the SG Water Level - Low Low (Normal Containment Environment) channels need not be OPERABLE when the Containment Pressure - EAM channels in the same protection sets are tripped, as discussed in a footnote to Table 3.3.2-1. These Functions do not have to be OPERABLE in MODES 5 and 6 because there is not enough heat being generated in the reactor to require the SGs as a heat sink. In MODE 4, AFW actuation does not need to be OPERABLE because either AFW or residual heat removal (RHR) wil be available to remove decay heat or suffcient time is available to manually place either system in operation.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-33 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 8. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System Interlocks SAFETY (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, AND b. Engineered Safety Feature Actuation Svstem Interlocks -

APPLICABILITY Pressurizer Pressure. P-11 The P-11 interlock permits a normal unit cooldown and depressurization without actuation of SI or main steam line isolation. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels (discussed previously) less than the P-11 setpoint, the operator can manually block the Pressurizer Pressure - Low and Steam Line Pressure - Low Si signals o~..o \ ~ and the Steam Line Pressure - Low steam line isolation t(e\)\~ \

15(30-1 signal (previously discussed). When the Steam Line Pressure - Low steam line isolation signal is manually blocked, a main steam isolation signal on Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High is automatically enabled.

r- _ .AQ.~ CT On d "f v\ t' t fY . This provides protection for an SLB by closure of the tV( .i MSIVs. With two-out-of-three pressurizer pressure channels above the P-11 setpoint, the Pressurizer Pressure - Low and Steam Line Pressure - Low Si signals and the Steam Line Pressure - Low steam line isolation signal are automatically enabled. The operator can also enable these trips by use of the respective manual unblock (reset) buttons. When the Steam Line Pressure - Low steam line isolation signal is enabled, the main steam isolation on Steam Line Pressure - Negative Rate - High is disabled. The Trip Setpoint reflects only steady state instrument uncertainties. The Trip Setpoint is:: 1970 psig.

This Function must be OPERABLE in MODES 1, 2, and 3 to allow an orderly cooldown and depressurization of the unit without the actuation of SI or main steam isolation.

This Function does not have to be OPERABLE in MODE 4, 5, or 6 because system pressure must already be below the P-11 setpoint for the requirements of the heatup and cooldown curves to be met.

9. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation For the inadvertent ECCS actuation at power event (a Condition" event), the safety analysis (Ref. 15) credits operator actions from the main control room to terminate flow from the normal charging pump (NCP) and to open both PORV block valves (assumed to initially be closed) and assure the availability of at least one PORV (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT 8 3.3.2-39 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE 9. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation (continued)

SAFETY ANALYSES, for automatic pressure relief. Analysis results indicate that water LCO, AND relief through the pressurizer safety valves, which could APPLICABILITY result in the Condition II event degrading into a Condition III event if the safety valves did not reseat, is precluded if operator actions are taken within the times assumed in the Reference 15 analysis to terminate NCP flow and to assure at least one PORV is available for automatic pressure relief. The assumed operator action times conservatively bound the times measured during simulator exercises. Therefore, automatic PORV operation is an assumed safety function in MODES 1, 2, and 3. The PORVs are equipped with automatic actuation circuitry and manual control capability. The PORVs are considered OPERABLE in either the automatic or manual mode, as long as the automatic actuation circuitry is OPERABLE and the PORVs can be made available for automatic pressure relief by timely operator actions (Ref. 15) to open the associated block valves (if closed) and to assure the o~..O\B PORV handswitches are in the automatic operation position. The 1"'5ec.N automatic mode is the preferred configuration, as this provides the

~e.\l\ ~e ~\~ required pressure relieving capability without reliance on operator actions.

\- cr a. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation - Automatic

'J (\ ~ t~ o. Actuation Loaic and Actuation Relays (SSPSl t:o't Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same manner as described for Function 1.b, except that the LCO is not applicable in MODE 4 as discussed below for Function 9.b.

b. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation - Pressurizer Pressure - High This signal provides protection against an inadvertent ECCS actuation at power event. Pressurizer pressure provides both control and protection functions: input to the Pressurizer Pressure Control System, reactor trip, SI, and automatic PORV actuation. Therefore, the actuation logic must be able to withstand both an input failure to the control system, which may then require the protection function actuation, and a single failure in the other channels providing the protection function actuation. Thus, four OPERABLE channels are required to satisfy the requirements with a two-out-of-four opening logic. The Trip Setpoint is s2335 psig.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-40 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES APPLICABLE b. Automatic Pressurizer PORV Actuation - Pressurizer SAFETY Pressure - High (continued)

ANALYSES, LCO, AND The automatic PORV opening logic is satisfied when two-APPLICABILITY out-of-four (2/4) pressurizer pressure channels exceed their setpoint. Continued operation is allowed with one inoperable channel in the tripped condition. In this case, the automatic opening logic would revert to one-out-of-single failure (e.g., failed bistable card) in one of the remai . nels could result in both PORVs opening and remaining 0 since the automatic closure logic requires three-out-of-fou 4 channels to reset, which could not be satisfied with two in arable O~..D\ channels. However, this event can be terminate y PORV block valve closure and the consequences 0 this 1'5 ~(. ~ event are bounded by the analysis of a stuck open pressurizer safety valve in Reference 16. Therefore,

~el'I\~.ee\ automatic PORV closure is not a required safety function and the OPERABILITY requirements are satisfied by four OPERABLE pressurizer pressure channels.

Consistent with the Applicability of LCO 3.4.11, "Pressurizer PORVs," the LCO for Function 9 is not applicable in MODE 4 when both pressure and core energy are decreased and transients that could cause an overpressure condition wil be slow to occur. This is also consistent with the Applicabilty of Functions 1.c, 1.d, and 1.e. LCO 3.4.12 addresses automatic PORV actuation instrumentation requirements in MODES 4 (with any RCS cold leg temperature ~ 275°F), 5, and 6 with the reactor vessel head in place.

The ESFAS instrumentation satisfies Criterion 3 of 10CFR50.36(c)(2)(ii).

A Note has been added in the ACTIONS to clarify the application of Completion Time rules. The Conditions of this Specification may be entered independently for each Function listed on Table 3.3.2-1.

In the event a channel's Trip Setpoint is found nonco rvative with respect to the Allowaple Value, or the transmit ,instrument loop, signal rocessing el ni, stable is f Inoperable, then all affected provided by that channel must be declared inoperable and the LCO Condition(s) entered for the protection Function(s) affected. When the Required Channels in Table 3.3.2-1 are specified on a per steam line, (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-41 Revision 7h

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT DD (page 1 of 3)

10. Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation The accident analyses assume that the steam generators are isolated after the steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves receive an isolation signaL. The postulated accidents include the main steam line break (MSLB), the feedwater line break (FWLB), and steam generator tube rupture (SGTR). These analyses consider the transient effects on the primary and secondary systems as well as the potential containment pressure and temperature impact on the containment design bases. Further discussions of these design basis accidents can be found in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15.

The steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves close to terminate the blowdown from the faulted steam generator and isolate the intact steam generators.

Following receipt of the steam line isolation signal (SLIS) and auxiliar feedwater actuation signal (AF AS), the intact steam generators are assumed to be isolated except for the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven auxiliar feedwater pump. In addition to the valves governed by LCO 3.7.2, "Main Steam Isolation Valves, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves, and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves," and LCO 3.7.3, "Main Feedwater Isolation Valves, Main Feedwater Regulating Valves, and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves," the analysis assumptions require that the valves governed by LCO 3.7.19, "Secondary Side Isolation Valves," are closed and the steam generator chemical injection flow path is isolated. Function lOin LCO 3.3.2 covers the actuation instrumentation associated with the steam generator blowdown system isolation valves (SGBSIVs) and the steam generator blowdown system sample isolation valves (SGBSSIVs).

The SGBSIV s prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator and isolate nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. These valves are air-operated globe valves which fail closed. For emergency closure, either of two safety-related solenoid valves is de-energized to dump air supplied to the valve actuator. The electrical solenoid valves are energized from separate Class IE sources and are tripped upon receipt of a steam generator blowdown safety injection signal (SGBSIS) signaL.

The SGBSSIV s prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator and isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT DD continued (page 2 of 3) portions of the system. The SGBSSIVs are solenoid-operated globe valves which fail closed. The inside containment solenoid valves are energized from separate Class 1 E sources from the outside containment solenoid valves. These valves are also closed upon receipt of an SGBSIS signaL.

a. Manual Initiation Manual initiation of the motor-driven auxiliar feedwater (MDAFW) pumps can be accomplished from the control room. This also sends a signal in that separation group to the SGBSIS (isolation signal). Both of the motor-driven AFW pumps have a pushbutton for manual AF AS initiation. The LCO requires two trains (one per MDAFW pump) to be OPERALE.

b. Automatic Actuation Logic and Actuation Relays (BOP-ESFAS)

Automatic actuation logic and actuation relays consist of the same features and operate in the same maner as described for Function 6.c, except that the LCO has an Applicability exception when the isolation function is otherwise satisfied, as discussed below.

c. Safety Iniection The SGBSIS (isolation signal) to these valves is initiated by all the Functions that initiate safety injection (SI). The input requirements for Function 10.c are the same as the requirements for the SI function, except that the LCO has additional Applicability exceptions when the isolation function is otherwise satisfied, as discussed below. Therefore, the other requirements are not repeated in Table 3.3.2-1. Instead, Function 1, SI, is referenced for all other initiating functions and requirements.

d. Loss of Offsite Power The loss of offsite power (LOP) is detected by a voltage drop on each ESF bus. The LOP is sensed and processed by the circuitry for LOP DG Start (Load Shedder and Emergency Load Sequencer) and fed to BOP ESF AS by relay actuation. Loss of power to either ESF bus will initiate the SGBSIS (isolation signal) to these valves.

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT DD continued (page 3 of 3)

Functions 10.a through 10.d must be OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the SGBSIVs and the SGBSSIVs are closed or isolated, they are performing the specified safety function of isolating the plant's secondary side.

Exceptions to the Applicability are allowed for the SGBSIV s and the SGBSSIV s when isolation ofthe potential flow path is assured, such as when these valves are closed and de-activated, or when they are closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or when the flow path is isolated by a combination of closed manual valve(s) and closed and de-activated automatic valve(s). An air-operated SGBSIV is de-activated when power and air are removed from its actuation solenoid valves, and a solenoid-operated SGBSSIV is de-activated when power is removed from its associated solenoid valve.

In MODE 4, 5, or 6, the steam generator energy is low. Therefore, these valves are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

The actuation logic for these valves is shown on FSAR Figure 7.3-1, sheet 2.

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES ACTIONS N.1, N.2.1. and N.2.2 (continued)

Condition N applies to the Environmental Allowance Modifier (EAM) circuitry for the SG Water Level - Low Low trip Functions in MODES 1, 2, and 3. With one or more EAM channel(s) inoperable, they must be placed in the tripped condition within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Placing an EAM channel in trip automatically enables the SG Water Level - Low Low (Adverse Containment Environment) bistable for that protection channel, with its higher SG level Trip Setpoint (a higher trip setpoint means a feedwater isolation or an AFW actuation would occur sooner). The Completion Time of 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> is based on Reference 18. If the inoperable channel cannot be placed in the tripped condition within the specified Completion Time, the unit must be placed in a MODE where this Function is not required to be OPERABLE. The unit must be placed in MODE 3 within an additional six hou 'n MODE 4 within the following six hours.

0.1 and 0.2 Condition 0 applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Suction

~,.()\B Suction Pressure - Low trip Function. The Condensate Storage the highly reliable and preferred suction source for the AFW pumps. is 1'~ ~C~ ~ function has a two-out-of-three trip logic. Therefore, continued operatio

~0\l-\ce is allowed with one inoperable channel until the performance of the next monthly COT on one of the other channels, as long as the inoperable

~~

channel is placed in trip within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />.

Q.1 and Q.2 Condition Q applies to t 0- automatic actuation log' and actuation relays. With one train inoperable, the unit must be brou t to MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 within

.. \1 ~~hours he Required Actions are modified by a Note that allows one train to be bypassed for up to 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> for surveillance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE, B 3.3.2-52 Revision 7h

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT EE and the Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valve Actuation Function 10.a. The associated auxiliar feedwater pump(s) and the associated steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valve(s) must be declared inoperable immediately when one or more chanel(s) or train(s) is inoperable. Refer to LCO 3.7.5, "Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) System," and to LCO 3.7. 19, "Secondary Side Isolation Valves."

INSERT FF (Example 1.3-1 explains the independence of these Completion Times).

INSERT GG and Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valve Actuation Function 10.b

R.1 R.2. and R.2.2 Condition R applies to the Auxiliary Feedwater Loss of Offsite power~ri Function ith the inoperability of one or both train(s), 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> are :rNs kK allowed to return the train(s) to OPERABLE status. The specified Completion Time is reasonable considering this Function is~

associated with the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump (TDAFP)ithe available redundancy provided by the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump and the low probability of an event occurring during this intervaL.

If the Function cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the unit must be

~ced in MODE 3 within lie:lt6 hours and in MODE 4 withinG ili ~houl' The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operatin e ience, to reach the required unit conditions from full power In an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems. In MODE 4, the unit does not have any analyzed transients or conditions that require for mitigation.

S.1. S.2.1. and S2.2 Condition S applies to the MSFIS automatic logic and actuation relays.

The action addresses the train orientation of the actuation logic for these o~.. 0' 2, functions. If one train is inoperable, 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> are allowed to restore the 1 ~~c. train to OPERABLE status. The Completion TIme for restoring a train 0 OPERABLE status is reasonable considering that there is another tr. in

~e.\l"\ ~~ OPERABLE, and the low probability of an event occurring during th intervaL. If the train cannot be returned to OPERABLE status, the u it must be brought to MODE 3 within the next 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and MODE 4 ithin the following 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reas able, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit ditions from full power conditions in an orderly manner and without allenging unit systems. Placing the unit in MODE 4 removes at quirements for OPERABILITY of the protective function. In thi ODE, the unit does not have analyzed transients or conditions that r uire the explicit use of the protection function noted above.

Required Actio are mo i ied by a Note that allows one train to be bypas 04 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> for surveilance testing provided the other train is OPERABLE. This allowance is based on the reliability analysis (Reference 13) assumption that 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> is the average time required to perform channel suiveilance.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-53 Revision 7h

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT HH and the Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valve Actuation Function lO.d.

INSERT II and other isolation valves, INSERT JJ (Example 1.3-1 explains the independence of these Completion Times).

INSERT KK and the ESF AS Function 10 valves,

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.2 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS condition, thus preventing inadvertent actuation. Through the semiautomatic tester, all possible logic combinations, with and without applicable permissives, are tested for each protection function. In addition, the master relay coil is pulse tested for continuity. This verifies o~'o\

'1~ that the logic modules are OPERABLE and that there is an intact voltage signal path to the master relay coils. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 19.

~e.~\se6 SR 3.3.2.3 Of\\~

r _ ~~aA SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST using the BOP ESFAS automatic tester. The continuity check does not have to be tot iY\\'~

to' Atk ') performed, as explained in the Note. This SR is applied to the balance of plant actuation logic and relays that do not have circuits installed to

('o(.~\swJ (fIT 0 perform the continuity check. This test is required every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The Frequency is adequate based on

~ if~~ industry operating experience, considering instrument reliability and operating history data. In addition, SR 3.3.2.3 is the performance of an ACTUATION LOGIC TEST of the MSFIS PLC actuation logic, initiated from the SSPS slave relays. The Frequency of every 31 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is adequate. It is based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliabilty and operating history data.

SR 3.3.2.4 SR 3.3.2.4 is the performance of a MASTER RELAY TEST. The MASTER RELAY TEST is the energizing of the master relay, verifying contact operation and a low voltage continuity check of the slave relay coiL. Upon master relay contact operation, a low voltage is injected to the slave relay coiL. This voltage is insufficient to pick up the slave relay, but large enough to demonstrate signal path continuity. This test is performed every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS. The time allowed for the testing (4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />) is justified in Reference 8. The Frequency of every 92 days on a STAGGERED TEST BASIS is justified in Reference 19.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-55 Revision 7h

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.5 REQUIREMENTS (continued) SR 3.3.2.5 is the performance of a COT.

A COT is performed on each required channel to ensure the channel will perform the intended Function. Setpoints must be found within the Allowable Values specified in Table 3.3.2-1. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable CHANNEL OPERATIONAL TEST of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical Specifications tests at least once per refueling inteNal with applicable extensions.

The setpoint shall be left set consistent with the assumptions of the current unit specific setpoint methodology.

The Frequency of 184 days is justified in Reference 19.

SR 3.3.2.6 SR 3.3.2.6 is the performance of a SLAVE RELAY TEST.. The SLAVE RELAY TE . e e 'zing of the slave relays. Contact operation is v n one of two ways. a ion e . ment that may be operated in the design mitigation mode is either allowed or is placed in a condition where the relay contact operation can be verifie ithout operation of the equipment. Actuation equipment that may no operated in the design mitigation mode is prevented from operation b SLAVE RELAY TEST circuit. For this latter case, contact operation is TS~C.~ ()~..()\ g verified by a continuity check of the circuit containing the slave relay. This test is performed every 92 days. The SR is modified by a Note that f(e",~eA excludes slave relays K602, K620, K622 , K624, K630, K740, K741 , and K750 which are included in testing required by SR 3.3.2.13 and SR 3.3.2.14. The Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience, considering instrument reliabilty and operating history data.

SR 3.3.2.7 SR 3.3.2.7 is the performance of a TADOT every 18 months. This tes is a check of the AFW pump start on Loss of Offsite Power trip Function A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of (continued)

B 3.3.2-56

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT LL and the Steam Generator Blowdown and Sample Line Isolation Valve Actuation Function IO.d.

ESFAS Instrumentation B 3.3.2 BASES SURVEILLANCE SR 3.3.2.7 (continued)

REQUIREMENTS the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the ra ired c tact of the relay are verified by other Te ical Specifications and non- e nical Specific . s at least once per refueling interval' plicable exte ons. The trip actuating devices tested within the scope S .3.2.7 are the LSELS output relays and BOP ESFAS separati n oups 1 and 4 logic associated with the automatic start of the turbin driven auxiliary feedwater pump n an ESF bus undervoltage conditio The Frequency is adequate. It is ased on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical fueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of s tpoints for relays.. The trip actuating devices tested have no associated s point.

i. NSERi' SR 3.3.2.8 SR 3.3.2.8 is the performance of a TADOT. This test is a check of the Manual Actuation Function~AFW pump start on trip of all MFW pump The Manual Safety Injection TADOT shall independently verify OPERABILITY of the undervoltage and shunt trip handswitch contacts for both the Reactor Trip Breakers and Reactor Trip Bypass Breakers as well as the contacts for safety injection actuation. It is performed every 18 months. A successful test of the required contact(s) of a channel relay may be performed by the verification of the change of state of a single contact of the relay. This clarifies what is an acceptable TADOT of a relay. This is acceptable because all of the other required contacts of the o~..o\ relay are verified by other Technical Specifications and non-Technical 1~., Specifications tests at least once per refueling interval with applicable extensions. The Frequency is adequate, based on industry operating experience and is consistent with the typical refueling cycle. The SR is modified by a Note that excludes verification of setpoints during the TADOT for manual initiation Functions. The manual initiation Functions have no associated setponts.

SR 3.3.2.9 SR 3.3.2.9 is the performance of a CHANNEL CALIBRATION A CHANNEL CALIBRATION is performed every 18 mo s, or approximately at every refueling. CHANNEL CALI JION is a complete check of the instrument loop, includi he sensor. The test (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.3.2-57 Revision 7h

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT MM and closure of the steam generator blowdown isolation valves and sample line isolation valves INSERT NN

, and manual generation of an SGBSIS (Function 10.a).

B3.7 PLANT S §sE~ -§)

in Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs)

The MSIVs isolate steam flow from the secondary side of the steam generators following a high energy line break (HELB). MSIV closure terminates flow from the unaffected (intact) steam generators.

0"..0\8 One MSIV is located in each main steam line outside, but close to,

íSCM containment. The MSIVs are downstream from the main steam safety valves (MSSVs) and auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump turbine steam

~e.'\\ç.ed supply, to prevent MSSV and AFW isolation from the steam generators by MSIV closure. Closing the MSIVs isolates each steam generator from the others, and isolates the turbine, Condenser Steam Dump System, and other auxiliary steam supplies from the steam generators.

The MSIV is a 28-inch gate valve with a system-medium actuator. Since the MSIV actuators are system-medium actuators, the MSIV isolation time is a function of steam generator steam pressure. The assumed single active failure of one of the redundant MSIV actuation trains will not prevent the MSIV from closing.

The MSIV actuators onsist of two separate system-medium actuation trains. For each MSIV, one actuator train is associated with separation group 4 ("yellow"), and one actuator train is associated with separation group 1 ("red"). A single active failure in one power train would not prevent the other power train from functioning. The MSIVs provide the primary success path for events requiring steam isolation and isolation of non-safety-related portions from the safety-related portion of the system.

The MSIVs close on a main steam isolation signal generated by low steam line pressure, high steam line negative pressure rate or High-2 containment pressure. The MSIVs fail as is on loss of control signaL. The MSIVs fail closed on loss of actuation power.

A description of the MSIV is found in the FSAR, Section 10.3 (Ref. 1).

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-1 Revision 7i I'

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT C MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs INSERT D

, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves (MSIVVs), and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves (MSLPDIVs)

INSERT E Each MSIV ha an MSIV bypass valve (MSIVBV). Although the bypass valves are normally closed, they receive the same emergency closure signals as the associated MSIV s. The MSIVBV s are open when the MSIV s are closed, to permt warng of the main steam lines prior to starup. MSIVVs are air-operated globe valves. For emergency closure of each MSIVBV, either of two separate solenoid valves, when de-energized, wil result in valve closure. The two electrcal solenoid valves are energized from separate Class IE sources. The MSIVBVs fail in the closed position.

On each of the four main steam lines, upstream of the main steam isolation valves, is a 12-inch diameter low point drain line. Each drain line has a level detection system that consists of a level switch that anunciates on a high leveL. Attached to the 12-inch line is a I-inch diameter line back to the condenser. One air-operated low point drain isolation valve (MSLPDIV) is installed in each I-inch drain line. The MSLPDIVs are normally open to allow a steam trap to pass moistue to the main condenser. The MSLPDIVs close upon receipt of an SLIS and fuction to isolate the plant's secondar side. For emergency closure on receipt of an SLIS, either of two safety-related solenoid valves is de-energized to dump air supplied to the valve actuator. The electrcal solenoid valves are energized from separate Class IE sources. The MSLPDIVs fail in the closed position.

, )I~t\fv',) ci H5LPDrvs The design basis of the MSIV is established by the containment analysis for the large steam line break (SLB) inside containment, discussed in the FSAR, Section 6.2.1.4 (Ref. 2). It is also affected by the accident analysis of the SLB events presented in the FSAR, Section 15.1.5 (Ref. 3). The design precludes the blowdown of more than one steam generator, assuming a single active component failure (e. ., the failure of one MSIV) o close on demand). INSERT F l.

The limiting case for the containment pressure analysis is the double-ended hot leg LOCA, with initial reactor power at 102%, with loss of offsite power and the failure of one train of containment cooling (one containment spray pump and two containment fan coolers).

At lower powers, the steam generator inventory and temperature are at their maximum, generally maximizing the analyzed mass and energy

í5t.W 0 ~..o\B release to the containment. With the most reactive rod cluster control assembly assumed stuck in the fully withdrawn position, there is an

~e,\)t~eC increased possibilty that the core wil become critical and return to power.

The core is ultimately shut down by the boric acid injection delivered by the Emergency Core Cooling System (Ref. 3).

The accident analysis compares several different SLB events against different acceptance criteria. The large SLB outside containment upstream of the MSIV is limiting for offsite dose, although a break in this short section of main steam header has a very low probability. The large SLB inside containment at hot zero power is the limiting case for a post trip return to power. The analysis includes scenarios with offsite power available, and with a loss of offsite power following turbine trip. With offsite power available, the reactor coolant pumps continue to circulate coolant through the steam generators, maximizing the Reactor Coolant System cooldown. With a loss of offsite power, the response of mitigating systems is delayed. Significant single failures considered include failure of an MSIV to close.

The MSIVs serve only a safety function and remain open during power operation. These valves operate under the following situations:

a. An HELB inside containment. In order to maximize the mass and energy release into containment, the analysis assumes that the MSIV in the affected steam generator remains open. For this accident scenario, steam is discharged into containment from all steam generators until the remaining MSIVs lose. After MSIV losure, steam is discharged into containm t only from the affected steam generator and from the resi ual steam in the main steam header downstream of the closed IV in the unaffected (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-2 Revision 7i

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT Fl The postulated accidents (including the main steam line break, the feed water line break, and the steam generator tube rupture) assume the MSIVs, MSIVBVs, and MSLPDIVs function to isolate the secondar system to ensure the priary success path for steamline and feedline isolation and for delivery of required auxiliar feedwater flow.

INSERT F The MSIVVs are typically used for turbine waring and pressure equalization durig starp, and are normally closed during power operation, but may be opened, for example, for testing or maintenance.

The MSLPDIVs are normally open durng power operation to allow a steam trap to pass moistue to the mai condenser. The MSLPDIV s close upon receipt of an SLIS and fuction to isolate the plant's secondar side.

loops. Closure of the MSIVs isolates the bre unaffected steam generators.

A break outside of containment and upstream from the SIVs is not a containment pressurization concern. The uncontrol d blowdown of more than one steam generator must be preve ted to limit the potential for uncontrolled ReS cooldown and positive reactivity addition. Closure of theMSIV isolates the break an limits the blowdown to a single steam g erator.

c.

d. Following a steam generator tube rupture. closure of the MSIVs isolates the ruptured steam generator from the intact steam generators to minimize radiological releases. ~ ~

e. The MSIVs are also utilized during othe vents such as a feedwater line break.~~ess ~'rnlas'trG:~~

Q~~ILI~~~~

Figure B 3.7.2-1 is a curve of the MSIV isolation time as function of steam generator pressure. Meeting the MSIV isolation times in Figure B 3.7.2-1 ensures that the evaluation performed in Reference 8 remains valid.

The MSIVs satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36 (c)(2)(ii).

r aced a tra he MSIVs are considered OPERABLE w en the isolation times are within the limits of Figure B 3.7.2-1 and they are capable of closing on an isolation actuation signaL. An MSIV actuator train is considered OPERABLE when it is capable of closing its .&~O~

MSIV on an isolation actuation signaL. -A ~!lSfe-r H This LCO provides assurance that the MSIVs il perform their design safety function to mitigate the consequences of accidents that could result in offsite exposures comparable to the 10 CFR 100 (Ref. 4) limits or the NRC staff approved licensing basis.

., t)(Ø-oIB 1SCN Re\J\ÇØ CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-3 Revision 7i

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT G This LCO requires that the MSIV and its associated actuator trains, the MSIVBV, and the MSLPDIV for each of the four main steam lines be OPERALE.

INSERT H The MSIVVs and MSLPDIVs are considered OPERALE when their isolation times are withn limits and they are capable of closing on an isolation actuation signaL.

INSERT C

-l)

A.1 With only a single actuator train inoperable on one MSIV, action must b taken to restore the inoperable actuator train to OPERABLE status w' in hours. Th 72-hour Completion Time is reasonable in light of th tJual-redun actuator' . uch that with 'in inoperable, the affected MSIV is still be capable of closing on demand via the remaining operable actuator train. The 72-hour Completion Time (continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-4 Revision 7i

TSBCN 06-018 Revised INSERT I (page i of 2)

Steam is supplied to the turbine and other loads from the four steam generators by four main steam lines. One MSIV and MSIVBV is installed in each of the four main steam lines. One MSLPDIV is installed in the drain line off each of the four main steam lines.

When the main steam line that feeds a given steam generator and its low point drain are isolated, the specified safety function is being met.

Exceptions to the Applicability in MODES 2 and 3 for the MSIVs and their associated actuator trains in each main steam line, as well as in MODES i, 2, and 3 for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs in each main steam line, are allowed for the following cases where the valve(s) is assured of performing its specified safety function:

a. When the MSIV in a given main steam line is closed and de-activated in MODES 2 and 3, it is performing the specified safety function for that main steam line. Requiring the MSIV to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that the MSIV for that main steam line is performing the specified safety function. Closing and de-activating provides a means of isolation that canot be adversely affected by a single active failure, thus assuring the MSIV is performing the specified safety function. The MSIV is a system-medium actuated valve, opened by system pressure acting on the lower piston chamber, closed by the weight ofthe valve intemals and system pressure acting on the upper piston chamber. To de-activate the MSIV, all electrical power sources must be removed from the actuation solenoids and a drain or vent path must be available from the lower piston chamber.

b. When the MSIVBV in a given main steam line is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves, it is performing the specified safety function. Requiring the valve to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that it is performing its specified safety function. Closing and de-activating provides a means of isolation that cannot be adversely affected by a single failure, thus assuring the MSIVBV is performing the specified safety function. When the valve is de-activated, power and air are removed from both actuation solenoid valves and the valve is spring closed. Requiring the MSIVBV to be closed and isolated by a closed manual valve provides additional assurance that the specified safety function is being performed. Requiring the MSIVBV to be isolated by two closed manual valves also provides additional assurance that the specified safety function is being performed.

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT I (page 1 of 2)

Steam is supplied to the four steam generators by four main steam lines. One MSIV and MSIVBV is installed in each of the four main steam lines. One MSLPDIV is installed in the drain line off each ofthe four main steam lines. When the main steam line that feeds the steam generator is isolated and the main steam line drain line is isolated, the specified safety function is being met.

Exceptions to the APPLICABILITY in MODES 2 and 3 for the MSIVs and their associated actuator trans in each main steam line, as well as in MODES i, 2, and 3 for the MSIVBVs and MSLPDIVs in each main steam line, are allowed for the following cases where the valve(s) is assured of performing its specified safety fuction:

a. When the MSIV in a given mai stea line is closed and de-activated in MODES 2 and 3, it is performing the specified safety fuction for that main steam line. Requiring the MSIV to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that the MSIV for that mai steam line is performng the specified safety fuction. Closing and de-activating provides a means of isolation that canot be adversely affected by a single active failure, thus assurig the MSIV is performing the specified safety fuction. The MSIV is a system-medium actuated valve, opened by system pressure acting on the lower piston chamber, closed by the weight of the valve internals and system pressure acting on the upper piston chamber. To de-activate the MSIV, the electrcal power sources must be removed from the actuation solenoids and a drain or vent path must be available from the lower piston chamber.

b. When the MSIVBV in a given main steam line is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves, it is performing the specified safety fuction. Requiring the valve to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that it is performing its specified safety fuction. Closing and de-activating provides a means of isolation that canot be adversely affected by a single failure, thus assurng the MSIVV is performing the specified safety fuction. When the valve is de-activated, power and air are removed from both actuation solenoid valves and the valve is spring closed. Requiring the MSIVBV to be closed and isolated by a closed manual valve provides additional assurance that the specified safety fuction is being performed. Requiring the MSIVBV to be isolated by two closed manual valves also provides additional assurance that the specified safety function is being performed.

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT I continued (page 2 of 2)

c. When the MSLPDIV in a given main steam line is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves, it is performing the specified safety function. Requiring the valve to be closed and de-activated provides assurance that it is performing its specified safety fuction. Closing and de-activating provides a means of isolation that canot be adversely affected by a single failure, thus assurng the MSLPDIV is pedormg the specified safety fuction. When the valve is de-activated, power and ai are removed from both actuation solenoid valves and the valve is spring closed. Requiring the MSLPDIV to be closed and isolated by a closed manual valve provides additional assurance that the specified safety fuction is being performed. Requirng the MSLPDIV to be isolated by two closed manual valves also provides additional assurance that the specified safety fuction is being pedonned.

INSERT J Conditions F and J address inoperability of the MSIV s themselves. Durng Mode i with one MSIV itself inoperable, Condition F (i.e., Required Action F.I) applies. Condition G subsequently applies if the Required Action and Completion Time of Condition F canot be met. With more than one MSIV inoperable during Mode i, LCO 3.0.3 applies.

Durg Mode 2 or 3, with one MSIV itself or two or more MSIV s themselves inoperable, Condition J applies so that Required Actions J.I and J.2 are required to be entered.

Condition K subsequently applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition J canot be met.

Condition H addresses inoperability of the MSIVBV s. With one or more MSIVV s inoperable, Condition H (i.e., Required Actions H.I and H.2) applies. Condition K subsequently applies if the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition H canot be met.

Condition I addresses inoperability of the MSLPDIVs. With one or more MSLPDIVs inoperable, Condition I (i.e., Required Actions 1.1 and 1.2) applies. Condition K subsequently applies ifthe Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition I canot be met.

BASES

~

1'~CN 0"- oie e\Jised 83.7.2 ACTIONS 8J (continued) takes into account the design redundancy, reasonable time for repairs, and the low probabilty of a design basis accident occurring during this period.

fU With an actuator train on one MSIV inoperable and an actuator train on another MSIV inoperable, such that the inçiperable actuator trains are not in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. With two actuator trains inoperable on two MSIVs, there is an increased likelihood that an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train) could cause one MSIV to fail to close. The 24-hour Completion Time is reasonable, however, since the dual-redundant actuator train design ensures that with only one actuator train on each of two affected MSIVs inoperable, each MSIV is still capable of closing on demand.

C.1 With an actuator train on one MSIV inoperable and an actuator train on another MSIV inoperable, but with both inoperable actuator trains in the same separation group, action must be taken to restore one of the inoperable actuator trains to OPERABLE status within 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. A reasonable amount of time for restoring at least one actuator train is permitted since the dual-redundant actuator train design for each MSIV ensures that a single inoperable actuator train cannot prevent the affected MSIV(s) from closing on demand. Wtih two actuator trains inoperable in the same separation group, however, an additional failure (such as the failure of an actuation logic train in the other separation group) could cause both affected MSIVs to fail to close on demand. The 4-hour Completion Time takes into account the low probabilty of occurrence of an event that would require MSIV closure during such an intervaL.

0.1 With both (two) actuator trains for a single MSiV inoperable, the affected MSIV must immediately be declared inoperable. This is appropriate since such a condition renders the affected MSIV incapable of closing on demand.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-5 Revision 7i

BASES ACTIONS

( continued)

With three or more MSIV actuator trains inoperable, or with the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A, B, or C not met, the affected MSIVs must immediately be declared inoperable. Having three actuator trains inoperable could involve two inoperable actuator trains on one MSIV and one inoperable actuator train on another MSIV, or an inoperable actuator train on each of three MSIVs, for which the inoperable actuator trains could all be in the same separation group or be staggered among the two separation groups.

Depending on which of these conditions or combinations is in effect, the condition or combination could mean that all of the affected MS IVs remain capable of closing on demand (due to the dual-redundant actuator train design), or that at least one MSIV is inoperable, or that with an additional single failure uR to all three MSIVs could be incapable of closing on herefore, in some immediately declaring the affected MSIVs inoperable is conservative hen some or all of the affected MSIVs may stil be capable of closing on demand even with a single additional failure), while in other cases it is appropriate hen at least one of the d be inoperable, or up to all th could be rendered inoperable by an ad iiona sing e ai ure). Since Condition E addresses all of these conditions or combinations, Required Action E.1 is conservatively based on the worst-case condition and therefore requires O~ ~ 01 1~~Cl4 immediately declaring all of the affected MSIVs inoperable. It may be noted that declaring two or more MSIVs inoperable during Mode 1 requires

\\e.~\~~. entry into Specification 3.0.3.

F.1 With one MSIV inoperable in MODE 1, action must be taken to restore OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />. Some repairs to the MSIV can be made with the unit hot. The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurring during this time period that would require a closure of the MSIVs.

Required Action F.1 is entered when one MSIV is inoperable during MODE 1, including when both actuator trains for a single, affected MSIV CALLAWAY PLANT

BASES

~ B 3.7.2 ACTIONS G.1 If the MSIV cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed in MODE 2 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and Condition H would be entered. The Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach MODE 2 and to close the MSIVs

~in~n orderl manner and wilhoul Challe~ng unil syslems.

~ ~ Q.~rrT_ . i:~If MOnS eAt" ) ~ ~

a ote indicating that, when ¿or more

~ n- ) t::~a~ is modified by each m~ S~

~ :: MSIVs are ino erable in 2 or 3, separate Condition entry is allowed for Since the MSIVs are required to be OPERABLE in MODES 2 and 3, the isc. t. 0 b -D l 2i inoperable MSIVs may either be restored to OPERABLE status or closed.

Re\li ~ea When closed, the MSIVs are already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis.

The 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Completion Time is consistent with that allowed in Condition F.

For inoperable MSIVs that cannot be restored to OPERABLE status within the specified Completion Time, but are closed, the inoperable MSIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineeri judgment, in view of MSIV status indications available in the control om, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves ar the closed position.

(continued)

CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-7 Revision 7i

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT K (page 1 of 2)

H.I and H.2 Condition H is modified by a Note indicating that, when one or more MSIVVs are inoperable, separate Condition entry is allowed for each main steam line.

With one or more MSIVBVs inoperable, action must be taken to restore each MSIVBV to OPERALE status withn 7 days or the inoperable MSIVBV must be closed or isolated. When closed or isolated, the MSIVBV is aleady in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, considerig the low probabilty of an accident occurg durng ths time period that would require a closure of the MSIVBV s.

For inoperable MSIVBVs that canot be restored to OPERALE status within 7 days, but are closed or isolated, the inoperable MSIVBVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engieering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that these valves are in the closed position or isolated.

If the MSIVBV in a given main steam line is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves, ths LCO does not apply as discussed in the Applicability section of these Bases.

I.I and 1.2 Condition I is modified by a Note indicating that, when one or more MSLPDIVs are inoperable, separate Condition entr is allowed for each main stear line.

With one or more MSLPDIVs inoperable, action must be taen to restore each MSLPDIV to OPERALE status within 7 days or the inoperable MSLPDIV must be closed or isolated. When closed or isolated, the MSLPDIV is already in the position required by the assumptions in the safety analysis. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, considering the low probability of an accident occurng during this time period that would require a closure of the MSLPDIVs.

When the MSLPDIV is isolated by two closed manual valves, one manual valve meets ASME Class 2 requirements and the other manual valve meets Class D requirements.

The method of isolation is acceptable because (1) the MSLPDIV is an isolation valve in the secondar system, (2) the line isolated is a I-inch drain line, and (3) the isolation valve in the Class D piping serves in addition to the other closed manual valve located in the ASME Class 2 piping.

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT K continued (page 2 of 2)

For inoperable MSLPDIVs that canot be restored to OPERALE status withi 7 days, but are closed or isolated, the inoperable MSLPDIVs must be verified on a periodic basis to be closed. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the safety analysis remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications available in the control room, and other administrative controls to ensure that these valves are in the closed position or isolated.

If the MSLPDIV in a given steam line is closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or isolated by two closed manual valves, ths LeO does not apply as discussed in the Applicability section of these Bases.

~

SURVEILLANCE SR 3.7.2.1 REQUIREMENTS This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIV is within the limits of Figure 8 3.7.2-1 from each actuator train when tested pursuant to the lnservice Test Program. The MSIV isolation time is assumed in the accident and containment analyses. Figure B 3.7.2-1 is a curve of the MSIV isolation time as a function of steam generator pressure, since there is no pressure indication available at the MSIVs. The acceptance curve for the MSIV stroke time is conservative enough to account for potential

\0 ..0\ ~ pressure differential between the steam generator pressure indication and

"$~ 0 pressure at the MSIVs. Meeting the MSIV isolation times in Figure

~e~\~ 83.7.2-1 ensures that the evaluation performed in Reference 8 remains valid. This Surveilance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage. The MSlVs should not be tested at power, since even a part stroke exercise increases the risk of a valve closure when the unit is generating power.

The Frequency is in accordance with the lnservice Testing Program.

SR 3.7.2.2 ,~,. ~

This SR verifies that each MSIV is capable of closure 0 simulated actuation signaL. The manual fast close hand Control Room provides an acceptable actuation signaL. actuation train must be tested separately. This Surveillance is normally performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage in conjunction with SR 3.7.2.1. However, it is acceptable to perform this surveilance individually. The frequency of MSiv. testing is every 18 months. The 18 month Frequency for testing is based on the refueling cycle. This Frequency is acceptable from a reJia ility standpoint.

CALLAWAY PLANT 83.7.2-8

TSBCN 06-0 i 8 Revised INSERT L If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Conditions H, I or J are not

met, INSERT M

, each MSIVBV, and each MSLPDIV INSERT N SR 3.7.2.3 This SR verifies that the closure time of each MSIVV and MSLPDIV is :S 15 seconds when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testig Program. This is consistent with the assumptions used in the accident and containment analyses.

For the MSIVV s and MSLPDIV s, this Sureilance is performed routinely durng plant operation (or as required for post-maintenance testing), but it may also be required to be performed upon returng the unit to operation followig a refueling outage.

The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

1. FSAR, Section 10.3, Main Steam Supply System.

2. FSAR, Section 6.2, Containment Systems.

3. FSAR, Section 15.1.5, Steam System Piping Failure.

10 CFR 100.11.

~e~ Sl~C£ t5.

6.

FSAR 6.2.1.4.3.3, Containment Pressure - Temperature Results.

Amendment 172 to Facility Operating license No. NPF-30, (NRC Safety Evaluation included), Callaway Unit 1, dated June 1 ,

2006.

7. Westinghouse Letter, SCP-07-26, dated March 6,2007.

o~"'O'B

'"StN

~e:~,~eA CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-9 Revision 7i

eo

~ ~

iSCN O,,-Orai Re\liSed 83.7.2

~

!l 46

.ø I~

l 3)

L. .

I

~

i:i 20 1S 10

i o

a;

§ l l i I l ~ I l §.. g

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.. Ge "AÜ l)ø Figure B 3.7.2-1 (page 1 of 1)

MSIV Stroke Time Limit vs Steam Generator Pressure CALLAWAY PLANT B 3.7.2-10 Revision 7i

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 B 3.7 PLANT SYSTEMS B 3.7.19 Secondary System Isolation Valves (SSIVs)

BASES BACKGROUND Closure of secondary system isolation valves (SSIV s) ensures that the assumptions used in the plant accident and containment analyses remain valid. In accident conditions, SSIV s close to terminate the blowdown from the faulted steam generator and isolate the intact steam generators, and to isolate the plant secondary side in order to prevent possible diversion of auxiliary feedwater flow.

The accident analyses assume that the steam generators are isolated after secondary system isolation valves receive an isolation signaL. Following receipt of the steam line isolation signal (SLIS) and auxiliary feedwater actuation signal (AF AS), the intact steam generators are assumed to be isolated, except for the steam supply valves to the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (governed by Technical Specification 3.7.5, Auxiliary Feedwater System). There are also analysis cases that evaluate the single failure of a main steam or main feedwater isolation valve.

In addition to the valves governed by Technical Specification 3.7.2 (Main Steam Isolation Valves, Main Steam Isolation Valve Bypass Valves, and Main Steam Low Point Drain Isolation Valves) and Technical Specification 3.7.3 (Main Feedwater Isolation Valves, Main Feedwater Regulating Valves, and Main Feedwater Regulating Valve Bypass Valves), the analysis assumptions require that the steam generator blowdown and sample line isolation valves are closed and the steam generator chemical injection flow path is isolated.

When plant accident conditions require delivery of auxiliary feedwater, the normally closed steam supply isolation valves to the turbine-driven auxiliar feedwater pump (TDAFP) open on the turbine-driven AFAS. This ensures availability of the TDAFP. The motor-driven AFAS signal closes the steam generator blowdown and sample isolation valves in order to isolate the plant's secondary side.

The steam generator blowdown system (SGBS) helps to maintain the steam generator secondary side water within chemical specifications. Heat is recovered from the blowdown and returned to the feedwater system. Portions of the SGBS are safety-related and are required to function following a design basis accident. One blowdown isolation valve (SGBSIV) is installed in each of the four blowdown lines outside the containment.

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 BASES BACKGROUND (continued)

These valves prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator and isolate nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. These valves are air-operated globe valves which fail closed. For emergency closure, either of two safety-related solenoid valves is de-energized to dump air supplied to the valve actuator. The electrical solenoid valves are energized from separate Class i E sources and are tripped upon receipt of an SGBSIS (AF AS) signaL.

The SGBS also includes safety-related sample isolation valves (SGBSSIVs). Three SGBSSIVs are installed in each of the sample line flow paths for each steam generator. Two valves are located inside the containment (one from each sample point), and one valve is located outside containment. The SGBSSIV s prevent uncontrolled blowdown from more than one steam generator and isolate the nonsafety-related portions from the safety-related portions of the system. The SGBSSIVs are solenoid-operated globe valves which fail closed. The inside containment solenoid valves are energized from separate Class IE sources from the outside containment solenoid valves. These valves are also closed upon receipt of an SGBSIS (AF AS) signaL.

When plant accident conditions require feedline isolation, a feedwater isolation signal (FWIS) trips the main feedwater pumps and closes the main feedwater isolation valves, the main feedwater regulating valves, and the main feedwater regulating valve bypass valves. The FWIS also provides a signal to close the air-operated chemical injection isolation valve located in the chemical injection flow path associated with each main feedwater line. The valves automatically fail closed when an FWIS is received.

The steam generator chemical injection system delivers chemicals to the steam generators via chemical addition through lines that tap directly into the feedwater lines, downstream ofthe main feedwater isolation valve. For each or any of the four feedwater lines, a positive displacement metering pump delivers the chemicals from a supply tank into the associated feedwater line via an injection flow path that includes an automatic air-operated globe isolation valve, a check valve, and a manual valve prior to entering into the feedwater system.

The steam generator chemical injection system is used to maintain proper system pH and scavenge oxygen present in the steam generators to minimize corrosion during plant shutdown conditions. The system adds hydrazine and amine mixture to the steam generator and is normally not in use during plant power operation, except during plant conditions in hot standby or cold layup. However, during plant operation at full power, an infrequently performed test (Steam Generator Moisture Carryover Measurement) utilizes the chemical injection flow path to determine the average moisture carryover content in steam from the steam generators using a radioactive tracer method. The steam generator chemical injection system is infrequently used during the Applicability of this Specification.

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 BASES BACKGROUND

( continued)

The manual valve located in each chemical injection flow path is maintained locked closed until the system is used. When the system is used, the manual valve is opened under administrative controls. These controls include the presence of a dedicated operator who has constant communication with the control room while the flow path is open. Therefore crediting the locked closed manual valve in the chemical injection flow path for isolation is warranted when it is only opened under administrative controls.

The main stear and related secondary side lines are automatically isolated upon receipt of an SLIS or FWIS. The diverse parameters sensed to initiate an SLIS are low stear line pressure, high negative stear pressure rate, and high containment pressure (Hi-2).

An FWIS is generated by an SIS, reactor trip with low Tave (not credited in any safety analysis-see Function 8.a Bases in LCO 3.3.2, "ESFAS Instruentation"), stear generator water level high-high, or stearn generator water level low-low. The diverse parameters sensed to initiate an SIS are low stear line pressure, low pressurizer pressure, and high containment pressure (Hi-1).

The SGBSIS (AF AS) isolates the stearn generator blowdown and sample lines. An SGBSIS (AF AS) is generated by an SIS, motor-driven AF AS, or under voltage on Switchgear 4.16 KV buses NB01 or NB02 (Ref. 4).

Descriptions ofSSIVs are found in the FSAR, Section 10.4.7 (Ref.) and Section 10.4.8 (Ref. 2).

APPLICABLE SAFETY ANALYSES The accident analyses assume that the stearn generators are isolated after secondary system isolation valves receive an isolation signaL. The postulated accidents include the main stearn line break, the feed water line break, and stear generator tube rupture. Further discussions ofthese design basis accidents can be found in the FSAR, Chapters 6 and 15.

The secondary system isolation valves function to ensure the primary success path for steamline and feedline isolation and for delivery of required auxiliary feedwater flow. These valves therefore satisfy Criterion 3 of 10 CFR 50.36( c )(2)(ii).

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 BASES LCO This LCO ensures the secondary system isolation valves will isolate the plant's secondary side and ensures the required flow of auxiliary feedwater to the intact steam generators. The automatic secondary system isolation valves are considered OPERALE when their isolation times are within limits and they are capable of closing on an isolation actuation signaL.

OPERAILITY of the automatic SSIVs also requires the OPERAILITY of the auxiliar relays downstream of the Balance of Plant (BOP) Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESF AS) cabinets (the auxiliary relays in the RP system cabinets are considered to be part of the end devices covered by this LCO).

The locked closed manual valves in the chemical injection flow path are considered OPERALE when they are locked closed. Locked closed manual secondary system isolation valves include:

steam generator chemical injection isolation valves (AEVOI28, AEV0129, AEV0130, and AEV013 i).

Automatic secondary system isolation valves include: (1) steam generator blowdown isolation valves (BMHVOOOl, BMHV0002, BMHV0003, and BMHV0004) and (2) steam generator blowdown sample line isolation valves (BMHV0019, BMHV0020, BMHV0021, BMHV0022, BMHV0065, BMHV0066, BMHV0067, BMHV0068, BMHV0035, BMHV0036, BMHV0037, and BMHV0038).

The LCO is modified by a NOTE to allow the locked closed chemical injection valves to be opened under administrative controls. The administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the valve can be rapidly isolated when a need for isolation is indicated.

APPLICABILITY The SSIVs in each secondary system flow path must be OPERALE in MODES 1,2, and 3, when there is significant mass and energy in the RCS and steam generators. When the SSW s are closed or isolated, they are performing the specified safety function of isolating the plant's secondary side.

Exceptions to the Applicability are allowed for the automatic SSIVs when isolation of the potential flow path is assured, such as when at least one SSW in a flow path is closed and de-activated, or is closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or the SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed manual valves, or two closed de-activated automatic valves, or a combination of a closed manual valve and a closed de-activated automatic valve. An air-operated SSW is de-activated when power and air are removed from its actuation solenoid valves, and a solenoid-operated SSIV is de-activated when power is removed from its associated solenoid valve.

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIV s B3.7.19 BASES APPLICABILITY

( continued)

In MODE 4,5, or 6, the steam generator energy is low. Therefore, the SSIVs are not required for isolation of potential high energy secondary system pipe breaks in these MODES.

ACTIONS The ACTIONS Table is modified by a Note indicating that separate Condition entry is allowed for each secondary system flow path.

A.I and A.2 With one or more SSIVs inoperable, action must be taken to restore the affected valves to OPERALE status, or to close or isolate inoperable valves within 7 days. When these valves are closed or isolated, they are performing their specified safety function.

The 7 day Completion Time takes into account the low probability of an event occurrng during this time period that would require isolation of the plant's secondary side. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable, based on operating experience.

Inoperable SSIVs that are closed or isolated must be verified on a periodic basis that they are closed or isolated. This is necessary to ensure that the assumptions in the accident analyses remain valid. The 7 day Completion Time is reasonable based on engineering judgment, in view of valve status indications in the control room, and other administrative controls, to ensure that these valves are in the closed position or isolated.

If the SSIVs are closed and de-activated, or closed and isolated by a closed manual valve, or the SSIV flow path is isolated by two closed valves, this LCO does not apply as discussed in the Applicability section of these Bases.

The Required Actions have been modified by a Note that allows the closed or isolated automatic SSIV to be opened or unisolated under administrative controls. The administrative controls consist of stationing a dedicated operator at the valve controls, who is in continuous communication with the control room. In this way, the valve may be closed or the flow path may be isolated rapidly when a need for isolation is indicated.

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 BASES ACTIONS

( continued)

B.l and B.2 If the Required Action and associated Completion Time of Condition A are not met, the unit must be placed in a MODE in which the LCO does not apply. To achieve this status, the unit must be placed at least in MODE 3 within 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and in MODE 4 within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The allowed Completion Times are reasonable, based on operating experience, to reach the required unit conditions in an orderly manner and without challenging unit systems.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIRMENTS SR 3.7.19.1 This SR verifies that the isolation time of each automatic ssrv is within limits when tested pursuant to the Inservice Testing Program (1ST). The specific limits are documented in the Inservice Testing Program. The ssrv isolation times are less than or equal to those assumed in the accident and containment analyses. This surveilance does not include verifying a closure time for the steam generator chemical addition injection isolation valves. An exception is made for these normally locked closed valves, which are not included in the 1ST program, because the valves are passive (typically not required to actuate into their safety position) and they contain a locking device and a check valve in their flow path.

For the SSIVs, performance of this surveillance may be done during plant operation (or as required for post-maintenance testing), but it may also be required to be performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.

The Frequency for this SR is in accordance with the Inservice Testing Program.

SR 3.7.19.2 This SR verifies that each automatic ssrv in the flow path is capable of closure on an actual or simulated actuation signaL. This surveilance is routinely performed during plant operation, but may also be performed upon returning the unit to operation following a refueling outage.

The Frequency for this SR is 18 months.

TSBCN 06-018 REVISED SSIVs B 3.7.19 BASES REFERENCES

1. FSAR, Section IOA.7, Condensate and Feedwater System

2. FSAR, Section 10A.8, Steam Generator Blowdown System

3. FSAR Figure 10.4-8, Sheet 1, Note 9

4. FSAR Figure 7.2-1, Sheet 2