Semantic search

Jump to: navigation, search
Search

Edit query Show embed code

The query [[System::Feedwater]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 1.6925 seconds.


Results 11 – 20    (Previous 10 | Next 10)   (20 | 50 | 100 | 250 | 500)   (JSON | CSV | RSS | RDF)
 SiteStart dateTitleDescription
ML19085A03631 March 2019NUREG/IA-0505, International Agreement Report - Assessment of Trace 5.0 Against ROSA-2 Test 5, Main Stream Line Break with Steam Generator Tube Rupture
ML19064B30831 March 2019NUREG/IA-504, International Agreement Report Assessment of Trace 5.0 Against ROSA-2 Test 3 Counterpart Test to Pkl
ML19063B34531 March 2019NUREG/IA-511 - International Agreement Report - Simulation of ROSA-2 Test-2 Experiment: Application to Nuclear Power Plant.
ENS 53966Brunswick30 March 2019 21:47:00Manual Reactor Scram and Specified System ActuationAt 17:47 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) on March 30, 2019, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at approximately 23 percent reactor power and main turbine startup in progress coming out of a refuel outage, a high temperature was sensed at main turbine bearing #9. As a result of and to arrest the high temperature condition, the main control room inserted a manual reactor scram. All control rods inserted as expected during the scram. When the scram was inserted, reactor water level dropped below the Low Level 1 actuation setpoint. Per design, the Low Level 1 signal resulted in Group 2 (i.e., floor and equipment drain isolation valves), Group 6 (i.e., monitoring and sampling isolation valves) and Group 8 (i.e., shutdown cooling isolation valves) isolations. The main control room manually closed all Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), in anticipation of a low vacuum prior to the Group 1 automatic closure signal being received. High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) was aligned for pressure control and Reactor Coolant Isolation System (RCIC) was aligned for level control. The Reactor Coolant Sample Line Isolation valves closed as expected on low main condenser vacuum. All systems responded as designed. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in valid actuations of the Primary Containment Isolation System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. At the time of notification, decay heat was being removed by the condenser through one open MSIV and a feedwater pump running.
L-2019-076, Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.4Saint Lucie28 March 2019Technical Specification Bases Control Program Periodic Report of Bases Changes TS 6.8.4.j.4
ML19087A08128 March 2019Sunport Comment on BTP 7-19
ML19088A211Summer28 March 2019Submittal of 2018 Annual Operating Report
ML19086A32228 March 2019March 28, 2019 Public Stakeholder Meeting on Possible Regulatory Process Improvements for Non-light Water Reactors (Siting and Mechanistic Source Term)
NRC-19-0015, 2 Power Plant - Submittal of Pump Relief Requests for the Inservice Testing Program Fourth 10-Year IntervalFermi27 March 20192 Power Plant - Submittal of Pump Relief Requests for the Inservice Testing Program Fourth 10-Year Interval
ML19087A148Byron27 March 2019E-Mailed Request for Information for Byron Station, Unit 2, on 03/27/19 (DRS-M.Holmberg)