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| Start date | Report date | Site | Reporting criterion | System | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 56804 | 19 October 2023 16:10:00 | Prairie Island | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: Reporting due to loss of emergency preparedness capabilities. Seismic monitoring capability is non-functional due to loss of power. These monitors do not have a credited compensatory measure. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee intends to notify state and local officials. | ||
| ENS 56698 | 25 August 2023 21:00:00 | Byron | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1600 CDT on 8/25/2023, a partial loss of the commercial phone communications system occurred that affects the emergency notification system (ENS) and the functionality of an emergency response facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification of a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Communications via alternate methods were subsequently established. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 56650 | 1 August 2023 13:55:00 | Fermi | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Reactor Pressure Vessel | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 08/01/2023 at 0955 EDT, the Fermi 2 active seismic monitoring system provided indication of a potential seismic activity event. Plant abnormal procedures were entered, and compensatory measure were met and remain in place. Neither the (United States Geological Survey) (USGS) nor the next closest nuclear power plant could confirm or validate the readings obtained at Fermi. The seismic monitoring system was declared nonfunctional to validate the calibration of the system. Femi 2 has two active seismic monitors: one on the reactor pressure vessel pedestal and one in the high-pressure core injection (HPCI) room. Only the HPCI room accelerometer was declared inoperable. The HPCI accelerometer is the sole 'trigger' for the seismic recording system, which outputs peak accelerations experienced during a seismic event. This is used in assessment of the magnitude of an earthquake for EAL HU 2.1. The loss of the active seismic monitoring system is reportable to the NRC within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). No seismic activity has been felt onsite and the USGS recorded no seismic activity in the area. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 56513 | 9 May 2023 18:55:00 | Peach Bottom | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1455 (EST) on Tuesday May 9, 2023, Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) technical support center (TSC) ventilation system lost power. Power loss was caused by a tree down on the 361 transmission line. Power was not able to be restored within an hour. At 1639 (EST), power was restored to TSC ventilation, and capability was restored. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency preparedness capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the onsite TSC. NRC Resident has been notified. | ||
| ENS 56501 | 2 May 2023 19:00:00 | Palisades | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At approximately 1500 (EDT) on 5/2/2023, it was determined that the commercial telecommunications capacity was lost to the Palisades Nuclear Plant (PNP) control room and technical support center due to an issue with the telecommunications provider. After discovery of the condition it was discovered that this loss also included the emergency notification system (ENS). Communications link via the satellite phone was tested satisfactorly. In addition, if needed, the satellite phone would be used to initiate call-out of the emergency response organization. The condition did not affect the ENS or commercial telecommunications capabilities at the offsite Emergency Operations Facility. The telecommunications provider has not provided an estimated repair time. PNP will be notifying the NRC resident inspector.
The following information was provided by the licensee via email: This notification is being made to retract event EN 56501 that was reported on May 02, 2023. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Implementing Procedures provide an acceptable alternative routine communication system, which is satellite phones, for communicating with Federal, State, and local offsite agencies, that are in addition to the primary commercial telephone system. It was determined that no actual or potential loss of offsite communications capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1, 'Event Report Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii),' and NEI 13-01, Revision 0, 'Reportable Action Levels for Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.' The NRC Decommissioning Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Commercial telecommunications to the plant were restored at approximately 0600 EDT on 5/3/2023. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski) | ||
| ENS 56410 | 15 March 2023 00:00:00 | Yankee Rowe | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On March 14, 2023, at 2000 EDT, in accordance with 10 CRFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Yankee Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) determined that the impacts of a severe winter storm have resulted in a major loss in off site response capability. Since approximately 0200, very heavy snow has fallen and greater than two feet has accumulated on site. All security related equipment has remained functional, and there have been no impacts to methods of offsite communications or emergency assessment capability. The concrete cask heat removal systems have remained operable in accordance with the NAC International multi-purpose container system (NAC-MPC) technical specifications. From approximately 0550 until 1840, offsite power was lost, and the site was powered by the security diesel generator. Periodically throughout the day, the Security Shift Supervisor was in contact with State and local police to ensure response capability. At the 2000 hours update, the law enforcement agencies reported that there were recent reports of trees and power lines being downed by the weight of the snowfall causing road closures and significantly impacting routes and response times to the site. The site remains fully staffed.
On March 14, 2023, at 2000 EDT, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Yankee Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation determined that the impacts of a severe winter storm resulted in a major loss in offsite response capability. Downed trees and power lines in conjunction with up to thirty-six (36) inches of snow prevented vehicle passage on normal response routes. On March 15, 2023, at approximately 1700 EDT, these roadways were passable, and employees and emergency vehicles regained normal access to the site. However, the Town of Rowe, Massachusetts police chief informed the site that the town remained in an emergency status and the roadways may need to be intermittently closed in order for utility workers to restore power lines and continue to clear tree limbs. On March 16, 2023, 1815 EDT, the Town of Rowe, Massachusetts police chief secured from the emergency. Therefore, this update is to inform the NRC that the Yankee Nuclear Power Station Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation has similarly returned to baseline operations. NRC Region I management has been updated throughout the progression of the storm and recovery. A press release is not anticipated. Notified R1DO (Bickett) | ||
| ENS 56356 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Clinton | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56352 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Braidwood | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56354 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Byron | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56355 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Calvert Cliffs | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56357 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Quad Cities | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56358 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Peach Bottom | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56359 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Nine Mile Point | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56360 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Limerick | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56361 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Dresden | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56362 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | FitzPatrick | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56363 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | Ginna | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 56364 | 6 February 2023 11:30:00 | LaSalle | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by Constellation via email: On 02/06/2023 at 0416 EST, the Constellation Emergency Response Organization (ERO) Notification Database System uploaded data files into the Mass Notification System (Everbridge) which is used to notify ERO personnel when activated. At 0630, the individual reviewing the uploaded files discovered that the data files did not upload properly and that Everbridge may not notify all ERO individuals within the required 10 minutes of system initiation. Constellation resolved the issue by 0752. During the time period of 0416 to 0752, control room operators would have been unaware that the ERO notification was not successful. Therefore, this issue constitutes a loss of offsite communications capability and is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), 'The licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability (e.g., significant portion of control room indication, Emergency Notification System, or offsite notification system).' This loss of offsite communications capability affected all Constellation nuclear stations. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. Each affected station NRC Resident Inspectors have been or will be notified. | ||
| ENS 55981 | 7 July 2022 21:01:00 | Cooper | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and fax: On 7/7/2022, at 0740 CDT, the National Weather Service reported to Cooper Nuclear Station that the NAWAS ((National Warning System)) radio tower near Shubert, Nebraska would neither transmit nor receive. The Shubert Tower transmitter activates the EAS ((Emergency Alert System))/Tone Alert Radios used for public notification. Additional information from the National Weather Service received 7/7/2022 at 1601 (CDT) determined that the Shubert Tower transmitter is non-functional and would not likely be repaired within 24 hours. The backup notification system has been verified to be available throughout this period. This is considered to be a major loss of the Public Prompt Notification System capability. The primary notification system is not expected to be restored to service within 24 hours, and therefore this condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), since the backup alerting methods do not meet the primary system design objective. The backup notification system is available to use for notifications if needed. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The backup notification system has to be manually activated. | ||
| ENS 55867 | 29 April 2022 03:38:00 | Sequoyah | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: On 4/28/2022, at 2338 EDT, Sequoyah received an unexpected alarm for seismological recording initiated. At 2341 EDT, unexpected alarm 1/2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra exceeded was received. The National Earthquake Information Center was contacted to confirm there was no seismic activity, and this was also confirmed on the U.S. Geological Survey website. The alarms were determined to be invalid, and they occurred due to a failure in the seismic monitoring system. This failure results in loss of ability to assess the Emergency Action Level for Initiating Condition HU2 `Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels' per procedure EPIP-1, `Emergency Plan Classification Matrix.' If an actual seismic event had occurred, HU2 could not be assessed. However, compensatory measures have been implemented and include assessing OBE criteria based on alternative criteria contained in procedure AOP-N.05, `Earthquake,' which provides conservative guidance when seismic instruments are unavailable. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for an event resulting in a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified." The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The faulty detector was removed from service, so the remaining detector provides conservative detection as the only source to make-up the logic for a seismological alarm. | ||
| ENS 55796 | 19 March 2022 20:06:00 | Palo Verde | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73. At 1306 (MST) on March 19, 2022, the Technical Support Center (TSC) lost normal and alternate electrical power, resulting in the inability to perform emergency assessments at the TSC. At the time of the event, the normal power source to the TSC (offsite power) was under a clearance for maintenance activities and the alternate power source (backup generator) was running to provide electrical power to the TSC. At 1306, the alternate power source to the TSC was lost when the backup generator tripped. Power was restored to the TSC via the normal power source at 1723. The cause of the TSC backup generator trip is unknown at this time. All three units are stable and in Mode 1. No emergency classification was required per the Emergency Plan. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed. | ||
| ENS 55769 | 6 March 2022 03:15:00 | Byron | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee: At 2115 CST on March 5, 2022 Byron Station Technical Support Center (TSC) emergency ventilation system supply fan belt failed. This failure affected the ability of the TSC ventilation system to maintain adequate radiological habitability in the event of an emergency with an airborne radiological release. All other capabilities of the TSC are unaffected by this condition. If an emergency was declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If the TSC becomes uninhabitable, the Station Emergency Director would relocate the TSC staff to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable procedures. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. | ||
| ENS 55758 | 25 February 2022 16:33:00 | McGuire | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee: On 2/25/22, at 1133 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) high temperature alarm annunciated in the Control Room due to an equipment malfunction that resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55741 | 16 February 2022 16:59:00 | Watts Bar | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1159 EST, on 2/16/2022, the Watts Bar Nuclear, Shift Manager was notified that Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750 EST. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820 EST, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 55742 | 16 February 2022 16:28:00 | Sequoyah | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 1128 EST on 2/16/2022, the SQN (Sequoyah Nuclear) Shift Manager was notified that TVA (Tennessee Valley Authority) attempted to notify Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA) regarding routine siren testing at 0750. TVA was unable to reach TEMA via telephone land line or the Emergency Communication and Notification System (ECNS). TEMA Watch Point staff were located at their back-up facility. TVA subsequently notified TEMA via cell phone that there were communication issues with the primary and backup notification methods. It was determined that the TEMA back-up facility was not able to receive incoming calls. At 0820, TEMA positioned personnel at their primary facility in order to respond to notifications. This restored primary and backup means of notifying the state because the primary facility was not affected by the communication issues. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Offsite Communications Capability because it affected TVA's ability to notify the State of TN. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | ||
| ENS 55715 | 27 January 2022 16:38:00 | Cooper | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The Licensee provided the following information via email: On January 27, 2022 at 1038 CST, with Cooper Nuclear Station in Mode 1, 100 percent power, the meteorological tower primary and backup data acquisition system failed, which resulted in a loss of meteorological data to the plant. Information technology personnel investigated and restored the primary system to service. Meteorological data to the plant was restored at 1105 CST on January 27, 2022. This notification Is being made due to a loss of emergency assessment capability In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been Informed.
The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: This notification is being made to retract event EN 55715 that was reported on January 27, 2022. Based on further investigation, the Emergency Plan and Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures provide acceptable alternative methods for performing emergency assessments that are in addition to the data obtained from the primary and backup meteorological tower information. It was determined that no actual or potential major loss of emergency assessment capability existed per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). This is consistent with NUREG 1022, Revision 3, Supplement 1 and NEI 13-01, Revision 0. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the retraction. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe) | ||
| ENS 55694 | 7 January 2022 07:20:00 | Comanche Peak | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 0120 (CST) on 01/07/2022, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability with regard to meteorological conditions. A backup diesel generator for the primary Meteorological Tower did not start due to a dead battery. After the battery issue was resolved, the diesel generator started but it subsequently tripped due to a loose fuse. The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers at 0305 (CST) on 01/07/2022 and proper operation was verified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. | ||
| ENS 55674 | 22 December 2021 17:45:00 | Harris | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On December 27, 2021, at 1014 EST, a system error in the site's Alert and Notification Siren System was identified, indicating a loss of the siren system affecting a greater than 25% of the emergency planning zone population. Review of the system's data logger indicates the system error has been present within the system since December 22, 2021, at 1245 EST. The fleet's telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This condition is reportable as a Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident, state and local agencies have been notified.
The following information was provided by the Licensee via email: Further troubleshooting efforts identified that the Chatham County EOC Siren Activation Point remained capable of sending an alert signal to the sirens for the duration of the event described above. This ensures siren activation would be performed in a timely manner in the event of a radiological emergency. This Event Notification is therefore retracted, as no loss of emergency preparedness capabilities has occurred. The NRC Resident and local agencies have been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller) | ||
| ENS 55444 | 1 September 2021 03:50:00 | Palo Verde | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. On 8/31/21 at 2050 (MST), the Seismic Monitoring System was discovered Non-Functional. This constitutes an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability for an operational basis earthquake. There is currently no seismic activity in the area according to the U.S. Geological Survey. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the loss of seismic monitoring capability. | ||
| ENS 55443 | 31 August 2021 18:40:00 | Waterford | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 1340 CDT on August 31, 2021, Waterford 3 Nuclear Generating Station discovered a condition impacting functionality of the ENS and commercial telephone lines. This issue was evaluated and determined to be a major loss of communications capability because the condition affected the ability to directly communicate between the NRC and the Control Room. Satellite phone capability was established at 1410 CDT. Additional communication capability was restored at 1609 CDT. Communication capability via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) was reestablished at 1923 CDT. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55339 | 4 July 2021 13:11:00 | Catawba | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0911 EDT on July 4, 2021, a failure occurred on 2 out of 3 of the required seismic monitoring instruments that feed the Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) annunciator. The failure would prevent an OBE EXCEEDED alarm on the Seismic Monitoring Panel in the Control Room. This results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore the seismic monitoring instruments. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the unplanned failure of the required seismic instruments affects the ability to assess a seismic event greater than the OBE. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55325 | 24 June 2021 14:01:00 | Braidwood | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) supply fan belt had failed, which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Corrective maintenance activities will be performed to restore functionality. The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC supply fan. The work duration is approximately 8 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. (The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.) There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been notified. | ||
| ENS 55305 | 13 June 2021 03:27:00 | Comanche Peak | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Steam Generator Main Steam Line | At time 2227 CDT on 06/12/21, Main Steam Line 2-01 Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2325 was declared to be non-functional. With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in Steam Generator 2-01 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-01. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2325 to functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 55304 | 12 June 2021 22:25:00 | Comanche Peak | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Steam Generator Main Steam Line | At time 1725 CDT on 06/12/21, Main Steam Line 2-03 Radiation Monitor 2-RE-2327 was declared to be non-functional. With this radiation monitor non-functional, all of the emergency action levels for a steam generator tube rupture in Steam Generator 2-03 could neither be evaluated nor monitored. This unplanned condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity. Compensatory measures are in place to assure adequate monitoring capability. Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-03. Corrective actions are being pursued to restore 2-RE-2327 to functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 55213 | 25 April 2021 16:00:00 | Harris | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 1200 EDT on April 25, 2021, planned maintenance activities on the Harris Nuclear Plant Seismic Monitoring System will be performed. The work includes performance of preventive maintenance and system upgrades. The work duration is approximately 10 days and compensatory measures will be in place for seismic monitoring. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 55086 | 29 January 2021 03:30:00 | LaSalle | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | HVAC | This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) Supply Fan belt had failed which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Corrective maintenance activities are being performed on January 29, 2021 to the TSC HVAC (heating, ventilation, and air conditioning system). The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC Supply Fan. The work duration is approximately 12 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee will be notifying the Illinois Emergency Management Agency. | |
| ENS 55055 | 3 January 2021 11:45:00 | Vogtle | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 1414 EST on 12/31/2020, a planned maintenance outage commenced on the Vogtle 1and 2 Seismic Monitoring System. The work was to address abnormal indications on the uninterruptable power supply, and was scheduled for an eight (8) hour duration. During the restoration activities, the system did not respond properly and has remained Non-Functional. Compensatory measures for seismic event classification were implemented in accordance with Vogtle procedures prior to removing the system from service. Based upon the troubleshooting conducted, the system is not expected to be restored within 72 hours from the start of the planned outage. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Seismic Monitoring System is the method for evaluating that an Operational Basis Earthquake (OBE) threshold has been exceeded following a seismic event in accordance with Initiating Condition 'Seismic event greater than OBE levels' and Emergency Action Level HU2. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Compensatory measures implemented include having a phone number to call to verify if an earthquake has occurred. | ||
| ENS 55017 | 1 December 2020 16:16:00 | Harris | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54977 | 1 November 2020 09:56:00 | Sequoyah | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0556 EST on 11/01/2020, Sequoyah received unexpected alarms for seismological recording initiated and (Units) 1/2 Safe Shutdown Earthquake response spectra exceeded. No seismic event was felt on site, the National Earthquake Information Center was contacted to confirm there was no seismic activity, and this was also confirmed on the U.S. Geological Survey website. The alarms were determined to be invalid, and they occurred due to a failure in the seismic monitoring system. This failure results in loss of ability to assess the Emergency Action Level for Initiating Condition HU2 'Seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake (OBE) levels' per procedure EPIP-1. If an actual seismic event occurred, HU2 could not be assessed. However, compensatory measures have been implemented and include assessing OBE criteria based on alternative criteria contained in procedure AOP-N.05 'Earthquake' which provides conservative guidance when seismic instruments are unavailable. This is an eight hour, non-emergency notification for an event resulting in a major loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54968 | 27 October 2020 21:08:00 | Wolf Creek | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Response Data System | At 1608 CDT on 10/27/2020, Wolf Creek Unit 1, operating at 100 percent rated thermal power in Mode-1, experienced a loss of the on-site wired corporate network. During actions to restore, it was discovered the ability to access the dose assessment software was compromised due to a security program. Access to the program was established after some time using Wi-Fi connectivity, but was not able to be accessed without network access. Actions are being taken to rectify. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The licensee believes this was not a cyber-event and that the Emergency Response Data System was available, but couldn't verify. Should the Wi-Fi network access be lost, there's no capability to perform a dose assessment. Standalone laptops are being provided but have not been placed onsite yet. That should restore the ability to have dose assessment capability at all times.
The licensee notified the NRC that the network has been restored to the Technical Support Center building and the emergency plan dose assessment group was capable of performing dose assessment. The licensee also noted that the group is able to perform dose assessment without the network, if needed. The network is still unavailable in the control room. The licensee confirmed that ERDS is available. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Pick). | |
| ENS 54943 | 11 October 2020 07:15:00 | Catawba | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0315 (EDT) on October 11, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. At the current leakage (approximately 3.2 gpm), the dose analysis indicates dose to TSC inhabitants would exceed the 30 days REM TEDE (Total Effective Dose Equivalent) limit should leakage continue for the entire duration. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility, There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54929 | 30 September 2020 13:15:00 | Comanche Peak | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Steam Generator Main Steam Line | At time 0815 (CDT) on 09/30/20, Main Steamline Radiation Monitor 2-RUK-2325/2327 (Main Steam Line 2-01/2-03 Radiation Monitor) was removed from service for planned maintenance. Compensatory measures were in place prior to removing the monitor from service to assure adequate monitoring capability available to implement the CPNPP (Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant) emergency plan in the unlikely event of challenges to the steam generator or fuel cladding. The N16 radiation monitor serves as a backup with alarm function and Radiation Protection technicians have been briefed on taking local readings with a Geiger-Mueller tube on MSL 2-01 and MSL 2-03. With this radiation monitor non-functional, compensatory measures in place and the monitor not restored to service within 72 hours, the condition is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant (CPNPP) has assurance of steam generator integrity and fuel cladding integrity and there is negligible safety significance to the current condition with respect to the public health and safety perspective. Corrective actions are being pursued to complete maintenance and restore 2-RUK-2325/2327 to functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | |
| ENS 54917 | 28 September 2020 09:00:00 | Peach Bottom | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | HVAC | EN Revision Imported Date : 10/12/2020 LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE: This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed on 09/28/20 to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work includes replacement of supply fan and roof-top unit. Work is scheduled to complete on 10/11/20. If an emergency is declared requiring PBAPS TSC activation during this period, the PBAPS TSC will be staffed and activated using existing Emergency Preparedness (EP) procedures. If the PBAPS TS becomes uninhabitable due to radiological, or other conditions, the TSC Station Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with EP procedures. The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee.
An eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability was made on 9/28/20 under Event Notification 54917 for planned maintenance activities to the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This event was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the planned maintenance affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. This update to EN 54917 is to notify applicable stakeholders that, following satisfactory completion of the planned supply fan and roof-top unit replacement work, the PBAPS TSC ventilation system has been returned to service with no remaining work or outstanding deficiencies related to this work. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Lally). | |
| ENS 54898 | 12 September 2020 21:48:00 | Catawba | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Emergency Core Cooling System | At 1748 EDT on September 12, 2020, Unit 2 emergency core cooling system (ECCS) leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long-term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repair options to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC are currently being evaluated. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. This same condition was reported under EN #54887. | |
| ENS 54887 | 6 September 2020 07:45:00 | Catawba | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 034S (EDT) on September 6, 2020, Unit 2 ECCS leakage outside containment was determined to exceed the long term habitability dose analysis for the Catawba Nuclear Station Technical Support Center (TSC) under bounding conditions. Repairs are currently in-progress to arrest the leakage and restore functionality of the TSC. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC: becomes uninhabitable. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to the alternate facility. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the discovered condition of the TSC affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. There is no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54829 | 11 August 2020 17:34:00 | Peach Bottom | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 1334 EDT on Tuesday August 11th, the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS) Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System lost power due to a trip of the Station Blackout (SBO) electric power supply breaker. The trip was due to a fault at the Conowingo Dam and Conowingo was not able to realign electric power to the SBO within an hour. Power restoration is complete and TSC Ventilation was restored at 1725 EDT. This report is being submitted pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a Major Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Onsite Technical Support Center (TSC). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54803 | 29 July 2020 00:49:00 | Prairie Island | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation monitor RE-69, 'Guardhouse Area Radiation Detector' was found failed on operator rounds. RE-69 is a category A1 piece of equipment that provides the sole means of indication for a parameter used to directly assess emergency action level (EAL) RA3.1, 'dose rate greater than 15 mR/hr in either of the following areas: Control Room (R-1), Central Alarm Station (R-69).' A compensatory measure was subsequently established and the ability to assess EAL RA3.1 has been restored. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54770 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | Catawba | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Catawba, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the McGuire Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54772 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | Brunswick | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Brunswick, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. | ||
| ENS 54771 | 10 July 2020 13:00:00 | Oconee | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | At 0900 EDT hours on 7/10/2020 Duke Energy will undertake planned maintenance activities on the common Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) for Brunswick, Catawba, Harris, McGuire, Oconee, and Robinson nuclear sites. The work includes performance of upgrades to the emergency AC power system and requires the removal of both normal and emergency power to the facility. The work duration is approximately ten (10) days. If a declared emergency were to occur at Oconee, the Alternate EOF would be set up in the Catawba Alternate Technical Support Center (TSC) location as described in implementing procedures. The Emergency Response Organization has been notified that the primary EOF will be unavailable during the upgrade project and to report to the alternate location, if activated. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of emergency assessment capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |