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The query [[Originated by::Scott Murray]] [[Category:ENS Notification]] was answered by the SMWSQLStore3 in 0.0130 seconds.


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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 539835 April 2019 14:00:00On 4/4/19 at approximately 1250 PDT, it was discovered that the Nuclear Test Reactor (NTR) facility control room console had not been properly secured at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC) in accordance with license technical specifications and internal procedures. The console key remained in the console and no licensed operator was present. The reactor is considered secured when the console key lock switch is off and the console key is in proper custody. The reactor was shut down at the time and the key lock was in the off position. The licensed operator exited and locked the control room at 1250 PDT but left the console key at the console failing to secure it in the designated storage safe as required. No personnel entered the control room until 1345 PDT when an authorized Radiation Monitoring Technician entered, discovered the key and immediately notified a licensed operator. Additional actions are being evaluated as a part of the corrective action program. No unsafe condition existed, however, the event is being reported pursuant to an inadequacy of an administrative or procedural control in NTR Technical Specification 6.2.2(a)(2) because it could have caused the existence or development of an unsafe condition with regard to reactor operations."
ENS 5374419 November 2018 13:59:00On 11/17/2018, at approximately 1445 EST, it was discovered that the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Dry Conversion Line 1 kiln seal began to leak and caused an alarm on the Hydrogen Fluoride (HF) room detection system. This manufacturing process equipment is within an established FMO contamination-controlled area which is designed to contain and control this type of release. The area was not occupied at the time, there were no personnel exposures or releases from the area and the affected process was shut-down. As a precautionary measure consistent with current NRC radiation protection requirements, an appropriate, additional radiological control was imposed by requiring respiratory protection for entry into the room to keep personnel exposures as low as reasonably achievable until the area could be decontaminated in a safe and timely manner. Although the affected equipment remains shutdown, this additional radiological control remained in place for more than 24 hours. NRC Fuel Cycle Safety and Safeguards staff recently clarified its position for this type of reportability determination in a letter sent to the Nuclear Energy Institute dated October 5, 2018. Because of this letter, this event is conservatively being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(1). The NRC region will be notified. Additionally, the North Carolina Radiation Protection Commission and New Hanover County Emergency Management will also be notified.
ENS 536372 October 2018 14:38:00

EN Revision Text: CONCURRENT NOTIFICATION At approximately 1525 (EDT) on October 1st, 2018, Fire Riser 318 which serves both non-contaminated and contaminated areas in (Fuel Manufacturing Operations) (FMO), was taken out of service due to a pin hole leak in the pipe. Water was contained and surveys were completed to ensure no contamination was released into non-contaminated areas. The New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified at 1655 (EDT) on October 1st, 2018, per State code requirements. An hourly fire watch was implemented for surveillance of the affected areas. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Section.

  • * * UPDATE ON 10/4/18 AT 1335 EDT FROM PHILLIP TO OLLIS * * *

The leaking sprinkler pipe fitting was replaced this morning and the system was restored to service at approximately 11 AM, 10/4/18. The NHC (New Hanover County) Deputy Fire Marshal was notified via telephone of the return to service at 11:50 AM, 10/4/18. Notified the R2DO (Lopez), NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5352727 July 2018 13:00:00

On 7/26/18 at approximately 1355 PDT, the Building 103 laboratory facility ventilation exhaust system was disabled during a scheduled evacuation drill at the Vallecitos Nuclear Center (VNC). The system was restored on 7/26/18 at approximately 1407 PDT. There were no active fissile material operations in Building 103, thus no unsafe condition existed, and no release of material occurred. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 70.50 (b)(2). The licensee will notify the NRC Region 4 office.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1031 EDT ON 8/7/2018 * * *

EN53527, made July 27, 2018, reported an event in accordance with 10CFR70.50(b)(2) in which the Vallecitos Nuclear Center Building 103 facility ventilation exhaust system was disabled for approximately 12 minutes. At the time of the report, information regarding the special nuclear material (SNM) in the affected Building 103 areas was not available and a conservative decision was made that the ventilation system was required to prevent releases or exposures to radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits or to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Based on a subsequent review of SNM inventory records and additional survey measurements, it has been determined the event report should be retracted due to the minimal amount of SNM that could have been affected. Notified R4 Fuel Cycle Decommissioning Branch and NMSS Enrichment and Conversion Branch. Notified R4DO (Vasquez) and NMSS Events Notification (email).

ENS 5333113 April 2018 15:00:00GNF-A's (Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas) Fuel Manufacturing Operation maintains a safe geometry Radwaste accumulation tank to receive certain liquid discharges from operations. During the annual shutdown work activities and routine inspections, an accumulation of material was identified in a safe geometry Radwaste accumulation tank. The accumulation appears to have occurred due to reduced recirculation flow, an engineered feature that mixes the contents of the tank as part of a density control. The accumulation of material is an indication that the tank density control had degraded. Plant operations attempted to remove and quantify the material per normal requirements. On 4/12/18 at approximately 1900 (EDT), GNF-A determined that the material could not be quantified in a timely manner. In the absence of quantification, GNF-A has conservatively determined that this condition is a failure to meet performance requirements and is therefore reporting it within 24 hours of discovery pursuant to Part 70 Appendix A (b)(2). Additional controls on the tank geometry remained intact and at no time was an unsafe condition present. In addition, there are no sources that could result in a rapid addition of uranium to the system. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. The licensee will be notifying their NRC Program Manager (Vukovinsky), the Radiation Protection Section at North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, and Hanover County Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 5314029 December 2017 13:00:00Consistent with paragraphs 111.1 and V.1 of the NRC Confirmatory Order of December 14, 2017 in EA-17-090, GNF-A makes the following report. GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - Americas) is making this report to the NRC Operations Center, pursuant to 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1) to state that the NRC has concluded GNF-A received a package on September 29, 2016, which had removable radioactive surface contamination on its external surfaces that exceeded the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 71.87(i). This report is solely for the purposes of reaching resolution from an October 25, 2017 alternative dispute resolution because GNF-A maintains that the removable radioactive surface contamination on the external surfaces of the package (an open metal dumpster) and the removable surface contamination on scrap pipes contained in the dumpster did not exceed the applicable limits set forth in 10 CFR 71.87(i). Safety Significance of Event: At no time was an unsafe condition. Status of Corrective Action: Issue resolved during Alternative Dispute Resolution. The licensee will inform the NRC Region II Project Manager, State of North Carolina and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 5225119 September 2016 14:30:00EVENT DESCRIPTION: It was determined at approximately 6 AM today (Eastern) that an Item Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with a Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) exhaust system was not operating as required. An FMO scrubber exhaust system blower was determined to be not operating and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. The safety function of the scrubber exhaust system is to limit the release of uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and its byproducts to the environment in the unlikely event of an accidental airborne release in a process area. Other upstream controls remained available and reliable and prevented significant quantities of UF6 and its byproducts from being released into the scrubber exhaust system. There was no release of material and at no time was an unsafe condition present. The Dry Conversion Process has been shutdown. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENT: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: The Dry Conversion Process (DCP) was shutdown. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. There was no offsite release of UF6 as a result of the IROF failure. The licensee will inform the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County and the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5166219 January 2016 15:56:00It was discovered on 1/18/16, that an accumulation of uranium oxide existed that indicated a degradation of an IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) in the dry scrap recycle furnace off-gas system. Approximately 42 kg of uranium oxide powder was removed from the favorable geometry off-gas dropout. The degraded IROFS resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements in the event of a fire. The dry scrap recycle operation had been shut down on 1/14/16 and was not in operation at the time. Additional controls on combustibles, geometry and moderation remained intact and at no time was an unsafe condition present. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being investigated. This event is being communicated to meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A(b)(2). The licensee will inform State and local agencies and NRC Region II.
ENS 5075022 January 2015 14:44:00During a GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at approximately 3:00 PM (EST) yesterday (1/21/15) that a quantitative risk assessment associated with the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) cylinder cold trap operation was improperly analyzed in the current ISA. The item relied on for safety (IROFS) and other controls associated with preventing overfilling the cold trap system remained available and reliable. However, the initiating event frequency for a particular accident sequence was determined to be higher than that documented resulting in a failure to meet performance requirements. At no time was the postulated condition present; therefore no potential unsafe condition occurred. The affected equipment has been shut down and an investigation is underway to provide additional corrective actions and determine extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will be notifying the State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Division and the New Hanover City of Environmental Management. The NRC Region II office and NRC Project Manager will be notified.
ENS 4996928 March 2014 16:45:00

It was determined at 1:30PM today (3/28/14) that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Conversion Process recycle operation was inoperable. Although the second IROFS preventing moderation intrusion to the recycle container continued to operate within its allowable parameters, it alone was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. The affected equipment has been shut down and at no time was an unsafe condition present. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, the event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2) within 24 hours of discovery. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and the cause of the failure are being determined. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.

  • * *UPDATE PROVIDED BY SCOTT MURRAY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1219 EDT ON 03/31/2014 * * *

After further review, it was determined, at approximately 1125 EDT on 3/31/2014, that the second IROFS (mentioned in the initial report) was not reliable to meet performance requirements. As a result, the report is amended as follows: The second IROFS preventing significant moderator intrusion to the recycle container was available, but its reliability could not be confirmed. The control continued to limit significant moderator intrusion and an unsafe condition did not exist. The remaining IROFS was not sufficient to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event report is being conservatively amended pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (a)(4) within 1 hour of discovery. The IROFS that was inoperable in the initial report was a process flow moisture probe. The second IROFS that was believed to be available in the initial report but later determined to not be reliable was a set of process control valves used to prevent moderation intrusion to the recycle container. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management. Notified R2DO (Sykes) and NMSS EO (Rahimi)

ENS 4975923 January 2014 11:30:00On 1/22/14 at 1:15 PM (EST), it was discovered during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Warning System (CWS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound a portion of the local alarm horns in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #1. While another module provides overlapping detector coverage, it does not provide overlapping horn audibility in the affected areas. The cause of the event is believed to be related to a battery component failure. Personnel were immediately removed from the affected areas and repairs initiated to restore normal operation of the system. The module was repaired and the system returned to normal on 1/22/14 at approximately 3:00 PM. The affected outdoor CWS horns were retested to ensure proper system operability. There are no active fissile material operations at the WFSC, thus no unsafe condition existed. Longer term preventive actions are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee will be notifying NRC NMSS Licensing Project Manager, NRC Region II Inspection Coordinator, State of North Carolina Radiation Protection Branch, and the New Hanover Emergency Response Branch.
ENS 4934113 September 2013 10:55:00

At about 1045 EDT on 9/13/13, it was discovered that the feed tube level sensor on a press operation is not fail safe upon loss of signal. The sensor is a sole IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) for a particular sequence. Criticality controls remained in place. Affected equipment has been shut down. No unsafe condition exists. Feed tube level sensor is in place for the sequence to limit mass. At no time was the mass limit exceeded. We are reporting under Part 70, Appendix A, (a)(4) which states that credited IROFS must remain available and reliable. We cannot evaluate reliability in the time required for a 1 hour report. In addition, the affected equipment has been secured. An investigation is underway to determine corrective actions and extent of condition. The license will notify NRC Region 2.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO DANIEL MILLS ON 9/27/2013 AT 1003 EDT * * *

On 9/13/13, GNF-A conservatively made a 1 hour event notification (EN 49341) due to a discovery that a feed tube level sensor is not fail safe upon loss of signal. After further review, it has been determined that the control remained available, reliable and continued to meet performance requirements. As a result, the event notification is retracted. The licensee has notified NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Sykes), NMSS EO (Rubenstone), and IRD (Grant).

ENS 488075 March 2013 09:40:00During a post maintenance test of a sole IROFS (Item Relied On For Safety) in the scrap press area, it was discovered that a sole IROFS of a pressure mat did not function as designed. The pressure mat is designed to ensure operator presence. The clutch that would be disengaged when the pressure switch is not active failed to do so. The press was immediately shut down. Similar presses have also been shut down. Double contingency was maintained (Moderation and Mass). The sole IROFS is designed for prevention of a fire scenario. At no time was an unsafe condition present. There were no radiological or chemical hazards resulting from this event. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine the cause of the failure. The licensee has notified NRC R2 Inspectors and State and Local Agencies.
ENS 4870931 January 2013 14:00:00In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV) (VIO 70-1113/2010-003), Global Nuclear Fuel Americas, LLC (GNF-A) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA action plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the third milestone (balance of plant) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2013. On January 30, 2013, GNF-A completed the ISA reviews for the balance of plant and has identified an additional 110 items relied on for safety (IROFS) for these areas which were existing safety controls. Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS, and application of management measures to the IROFS will be completed by March 31, 2013 per the current ISA action plan schedule. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition. Existing balance of plant area safety controls have been identified as IROFS per ISA action plan controls (continue to) perform their intended safety function. Balance of Plant Area milestone complete per ISA action plan. The licensee will notify the R2 NRC Inspector (Thomas), North Carolina Division of Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County.
ENS 485544 December 2012 13:03:00

During a (Global Nuclear Fuels) GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at 1:30 PM yesterday (12/3/12) that Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle furnace operation were improperly analyzed in the ISA. Although criticality controls associated with preventing moderation intrusion exist and these controls remained in place, they were not sufficiently independent to meet performance requirements. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The affected equipment has been shut down. An investigation is continuing which will provide additional corrective actions and extent of condition. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify state and local governmental agencies and has notified the onsite NRC Inspectors.

* * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO PETE SNYDER AT 1600 EST ON 12/5/12 * * * 

An extent of condition review determined there are three more areas with IROFS that are not sufficiently independent. These areas are vaporization/conversion of the Dry Conversion Process, an area used to pack material for recovery and a hood that is used to transition to a moderation restricted area in the gadolinia shop. The affected equipment in these areas has also been shut down and the investigation continues to identify additional corrective actions. The licensee notified the onsite NRC Inspectors. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS (Rahimi).

ENS 484979 November 2012 14:59:00As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), an accident sequence associated with hydrogen piping in the laboratory area was being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, a configuration that had not been properly analyzed was identified. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was determined at approximately 11 AM (EST) on November 9, 2012 that the system was not fully described in the ISA and resulted in a failure to demonstrate performance requirements were met. Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee determined the as-found condition is of minimal safety significance. The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2, State, and local authorities.
ENS 4820217 August 2012 13:36:00

At 12:39 PM (EDT) it was discovered that only one Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) remained in place to prevent a Criticality Event in the ceramics area of the Fuel Manufacturing Operations facility. The failed IROFS was Fuel Business System (FBS) Control of Mass of Uranium Transportable Container (IROFS 900-01), due to an overweight pellet boat. The IROFS that remained in place at all times was Spill Identification and Cleanup (IROFS 900-11). The initiating event for the accident sequences (spill of a pellet boat) did not occur. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1456 EDT ON 8/17/2012 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

The pellets have been removed from the overweight boat and placed into an approved container; the IROFS for these accident sequences have been restored. The extent of condition is being evaluated and at this time no other overweight boats have been identified. Region II and NMSS HQ and other notifications have been completed. Notified the R2DO (Guthrie) and NMSS (Waters).

ENS 4803820 June 2012 15:30:00

It was discovered at approximately 1700 EDT on 6/19/2012 that the moderation control in the gadolinia pellet press operation had been degraded. An operator error allowed a can containing approximately 14 kg of uranium powder to be processed without the required material move transaction, a process control that ensures the container and material type are allowed at the designated location. This resulted in a temporary degraded item relied on for safety (IROFS) condition involving a criticality control. The press moderation control is one of four IROFS to prevent a criticality accident. The gadolinia press station material control system functioned as designed and prompted the operator of an error. The other criticality controls on geometry were maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation has been shut down and additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause are being evaluated. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to 10 CFR 70, Appendix A (b) (2).

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1359 EDT ON 7/11/12 * * *

On 6/20/12, GNF-A conservatively made a 24 hour event notification (EN 48038) due to a single missed Fuel Business System (FBS) transaction on 6/19/12 at the gadolinia press operation. After further review of the identified condition, it has been determined to be not reportable to NRC and the event notification can be retracted. Notified R2DO (Blamey) and NMSS EO (Silva).

ENS 4785119 April 2012 13:30:00

At approximately 1345 EDT on 4/18/12, during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #22), the local alarm horn in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #3 inspection records area was found to be inaudible. The cause and extent of the condition is under investigation. Personnel were removed from the inspection records area until compensatory measures were established. There are no active fissile material operations impacted by this discovery, thus no unsafe condition existed. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and the New Hanover County Emergency Response Center.

  • * * RETRACTION FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO JOHN SHOEMAKER ON 05/17/2012 AT 1641 EDT * * *

Upon further review, GNF-A has determined that the reported condition (EN 47851) was not required to be reported by the plain letter of the regulation (10 CFR 70.50(b)(2)) and the filing of the report was inconsistent with industry practice. As such, this report is being retracted. GNF-A has entered the condition identified in the course of the monthly tests (i.e., areas where audibility of the CAAS should be enhanced) into its corrective action program and is addressing them accordingly. The licensee will notify NRC Region II (Thomas). Notified R2DO (Shaeffer) and NMSS (Stablein).

ENS 4782912 April 2012 18:30:00At approximately 8:00 am on April 12, 2012, a criticality safety engineer was notified that waste in the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) area was improperly placed into a designated storage location. Upon investigation, it was determined that waste in the designated location contained materials with a total of less than 5 kg of uranium. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. An operator placed a bag of waste adjacent to a partially filled receptacle instead of placing the bag into the receptacle. This resulted in a portion of one of the documented administrative controls for criticality safety, requiring 24 inches separation between waste storage locations, to be degraded. This event is being conservatively reported per internal procedural requirements. As an immediate corrective action, the material was removed and transferred to the waste processing area. In addition, a shop wide communication to Fuel Manufacturing Operations is underway to inform operators of the issue. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Notifications were sent to state and local agencies and NRC Region II.
ENS 477248 March 2012 11:02:00At approximately 1315 EST on 3/7/12, it was discovered during routine testing on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the local alarm horn in the Wilmington Field Services Center (WFSC) building #1 in-vessel tooling refurbishment area was inaudible. The cause of the condition is under investigation. Personnel were removed from the in-vessel tooling refurbishment area until compensatory measures were established. There are not active fissile material operations impacted by this discovery, thus no unsafe condition existed. The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and New Hanover County.
ENS 4770528 February 2012 14:19:00During a GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), facility walk-downs of the process gas piping were performed that identified a configuration that was different than previously analyzed. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was discovered at 1430 EST February 27, 2012 that the system was different than analyzed in the ISA. Production operations in the affected area have been suspended pending an administrative update of the ISA to reflect current conditions. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. At no time did an unsafe condition exist. While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. The licensee notified the NC Division of Radiation Protection and New Hanover County.
ENS 4805729 June 2012 14:00:00It was discovered on 2/13/12 that the mass control limit in the gadolinia pellet press operation was exceeded. An improperly installed valve allowed a total of 43 kg of uranium powder into the favorable geometry press feed tube, exceeding the 36 kg limit. This resulted in a failed item relied on for safety (IROFS) < 1 hour condition where a criticality control was not maintained. The press feed mass control is a sole IROFS for a fire accident sequence. Control indications functioned as designed and provided notification of the malfunction to the operator and the operation was secured. The other controls on geometry and moderation were maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation was shut down and the powder was removed by 1000 on 2/13/2012. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: Equipment was shut down and powder removed STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. This event is being communicated in order to administratively meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A. The licensee has spoken with Region 2 (Thomas) regarding this issue, and discussed the issue in a Reply to Notice of Violation dated 6/29/2012 letter book number SPM12-030.
ENS 4738027 October 2011 14:33:00On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained. There are no uranium cans of this particular material type currently in these storage locations and no unsafe condition is present. All movement of this material type to these designated storage locations has been suspended. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements due to a loss of double contingency. The licensee will notify Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.
ENS 4722531 August 2011 13:01:00In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the second milestone (fabrication) was scheduled for completion by July 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 30 days. On 8/30/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the fabrication area and has identified 125 existing safety controls that are now being designated as Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. The NOV inspection report (70-1113/2010-013) was dated June 9, 2010 with an NOV response on July 23, 2010. Milestone #1 was reported in EN #46710 on March 30, 2011. This report concerns milestone #2 of 3. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 Project Manager, the State of North Carolina, and Hanover County.
ENS 4722030 August 2011 12:30:00On 8/29/11, it was discovered during troubleshooting on an outdoor Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Data Acquisition Module (DAM #21), that the module had inadequate voltage to properly sound its local alarm horn. The module has been repaired and the system was returned to normal on 8/29/2011. An investigation into the cause of the failure has been initiated. There are indications that the apparent cause of the failure is an AC to DC converter that had a component short circuit. There were no active fissile material operations impacted by this failure. Consequently, no unsafe condition existed. This event is being reported pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70.50 (b)(2). The licensee stated that the system had been tested satisfactorily within the last month. The licensee will notify state and local authorities. The licensee also plans to notify NRC Region 2 (Sykes).
ENS 4716117 August 2011 11:16:00As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), facility walk downs of the UO2 sinter furnace area were performed that identified a configuration that had not been properly analyzed. Based on a review of this as-found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 16, 2011 that a floor trench in the furnace area was improperly analyzed in a criticality safety evaluation. This resulted in a condition in which criticality controls that were documented as being necessary to meet double contingency were not maintained or available because the geometry of the trench was not properly modeled. There was not an actual loss of double contingency. The floor trench does not normally contain uranium, and has removable covers in place to prevent material accumulation and per procedure, is routinely inspected. It was inspected during the spring maintenance shut down and was inspected again today. These inspections confirmed that no visible uranium accumulation was present. At no time was an unsafe condition present. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being conservatively reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify North Carolina State Radiation Protection agency and the New Hanover County Emergency Coordinator.
ENS 4715213 August 2011 11:00:00

As part of the ongoing GNF-A review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis, accident sequences associated with hydrogen piping are being evaluated. As part of this evaluation, facility walk downs of the piping were performed that identified a configuration that had not previously been analyzed. Based on a review of this as found condition, it was determined at approximately 12 p.m. on August 12, 2011 that the system was improperly analyzed in the ISA and resulted in a failure to meet performance requirements. Hydrogen supply to the affected piping system inside the building has been isolated. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2 and appropriate state and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO ERIC SIMPSON AT 1228 EDT ON 8/24/11 * * *

Unnecessary piping branches have been removed and caps welded in place. The new piping configuration has been analyzed for ISA accident sequences. Based upon this, hydrogen supplies to affected equipment will resume and normal operations will commence. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2. Notified R2DO (Widmann) and NMSS EO (Campbell).

ENS 4671030 March 2011 09:07:00In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the first milestone (conversion) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 60 days. On 3/29/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the conversion area and has identified 87 existing safety controls that are now being designated as items relied on for safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan. Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. Safety Significance of Events: There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition. Safety Equipment Status: Existing conversion area safety controls have now been designated as IROFS per ISA Action Plan. Controls are available to perform their safety function. Status of Corrective Actions: Conversion Area milestone complete. ISA Action Plan continues. The licensee intends to discuss this issue further with the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County, and the NRC Region 2 office.
ENS 466638 March 2011 10:18:00At approximately 7:00 a.m. on Monday, March 7th, it was reported that a can of powder was present on a conveyor in the UO2 press feed area without the required material control transaction. At approximately 10:10 a.m. it was discovered that the can contained three vacuum bags of powder. The transaction is one criticality control for the conveyor to ensure only authorized dry materials are stored. The second controlled parameter (mass of uranium in each can) was maintained at all times. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. The total amount of UO2 powder in the improperly stored can was approximately 13.6 kg. The material control transactions have been properly performed and the can has been transferred to an approved storage location. As a result, SNM movements have been ceased pending investigation and implementation of additional corrective actions. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident (Thomas), New Hanover County Emergency Management, and North Carolina of Environment and Natural Resources.
ENS 4624410 September 2010 17:00:00At approximately 1000 (EDT) on September 10, 2010 during normal operation of a Gad slugger feed hood in the Fuel Manufacturing Building, a connection between the powder hopper and the vibrating feeder was observed as being not properly secured. After starting the vibrating feeder a small amount of powder leaked from the vibrating feeder into the hood. The base of the hood is equipped with a photo-sensor that detected the powder accumulation and automatically shut down the vibrating feeder to stop the leak. A total of 2.2 kg of powder was removed from the hood. An investigation determined that a clamp on the feed tube had not been properly reinstalled following an equipment cleanout. The two controlled parameters for criticality safety of this equipment are moderation and geometry and Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) are established for both. With the clamp improperly installed, the geometry-related IROFS was in a degraded state. Additional IROFS on moderation remained available to perform their intended safety functions and were not challenged. Geometry control was maintained by the photo-sensor interlock; however this IROFS is not credited for this accident sequence in the ISA. Although, this event did not result in an unsafe condition and double contingency was maintained, the performance requirements could not be met when taking no credit for the degraded IROFS. As a result, this report is conservatively being made per 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(2). The Gad slugger and similar equipment have been shutdown pending implementation of additional corrective actions. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2 Office, the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section and the New Hanover County Emergency Preparedness Organization.
ENS 4624310 September 2010 14:00:00During a GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas) review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at (1430 EDT) on September 9, 2010 that the accident evaluation associated with hydrogen containment in the Dry Conversion Process was improperly analyzed in the ISA. A loss of hydrogen containment was analyzed in the ISA, however appropriate Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) to prevent or mitigate a hydrogen explosion, resulting in a loss of UF6 or HF containment, were not identified in the ISA. The affected equipment was promptly shut down on September 9, 2010. Existing hydrogen detection systems were augmented to assure controls are available and reliable to perform their intended safety functions as interim compensatory measures. These controls were functionally verified prior to restart of the affected operations at 2230 (EDT) on September 9, 2010. The interim controls will be designated as IROFS upon completion of the ISA documentation update currently underway. This event is being reported pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee considers this discovery to be of low safety significance because the discovery did not result in an unsafe condition. The required IROFS have been identified and are in place. The licensee notified the NRC Region 2 Office, the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section and the New Hanover County Emergency Preparedness Organization.
ENS 459764 June 2010 13:30:00During a GNF-A (Global Nuclear Fuels - America) review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at 9:30 AM today (6/4/10) that the list of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) associated with the Dry Scrap Recycle Furnace operation was incomplete in the ISA Summary. Although criticality controls exist and these controls associated with moderation intrusion and geometry remained in place, functional, and maintained with appropriate management measures, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS. The existing criticality safety analyses of the operation bound the situation, were effective, and were not challenged. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The affected equipment has been shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported for administrative reporting pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee will be changing the list of IROFS to include these criticality controls. The licensee will notify Region II (Gibson).
ENS 4578523 March 2010 09:20:00At approximately 0930 (EDT) on Monday, March 22nd, an operator noticed that a waste collection bag in the dry conversion area had torn away from its receptacle as it is designed to do when the mass of waste exceeds the specified threshold. The operator lifted the bag up and found it to be heavier than normal. The operator then transferred the bag to the decontamination area to sort through the contents and determine what had been placed in the bag per procedure. During the sorting process, the operator found two vacuum cleaner bags that contained uranium. Upon discovery of the vacuum bags, the operator promptly notified Nuclear Safety staff, who further notified Operations Management and the EHS Manager. Upon investigation it was determined that 8.7 kg of UO2 was present in the two vacuum bags, which is less than the criticality safety limit of 25kg UO2 specified in the Criticality Safety Analysis. As a result, no unsafe condition existed. Since uranium was placed directly into the waste collection receptacle, one of the administrative requirements for double contingency was violated. The second control functioned as designed and the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was controlled to less than the safe mass limit. Therefore, this event resulted in a failure of an administrative requirement necessary to meet double contingency and is being reported per internal procedural requirements. As an immediate corrective action, the material was transferred into a favorable geometry 3-gallon can per procedure. In addition, a stand down of DCP operations was promptly performed to inform operators of the issue and retrain on the waste collection control requirements. All subsequent shifts have been briefed of the issue and retrained on the control requirements prior to returning to work. The double contingency controls required include (1) only contaminated items may be placed in a waste container. No uranium or containers with unknown uranium contents are allowed in the waste collection containers and (2) waste bags are designed to physically tear from their holders prior to accumulating greater than a safe mass in the bag. Material may not be placed in the bag after it has torn from the holder. Uranium was removed from the waste collection bag and placed into a 3-gallon can, which is a favorable geometry. Immediate corrective actions are complete. Investigation of the event and implementation of long term corrective actions are pending. At no time did an unsafe condition exist as the mass of uranium within the waste collection receptacle was less than the safe mass limit. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2, and the North Carolina State Department of Radiation.
ENS 4571723 February 2010 14:05:00

During a (Global Nuclear Fuel, Americas) GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was discovered at 3pm yesterday (2/22/2010) that the list of safety controls associated with the handling of hydrofluoric material may be incomplete in the ISA Summary. After further review, it was determined this morning that the list of Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) was incomplete, and as a result, the UF6 conversion area has been shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for these processes. UF6 conversion will remain shutdown until IROFS have been identified and implemented. While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported on 2/23/2010 pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A (b)(1) within 24 hours. The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (Rich) and will notify the state and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PHILLIP OLLIS TO DONG PARK AT 0905 EST ON 3/11/10 * * *

During the GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was determined at 10:30am yesterday (3/10/2010) that the list of IROFS associated with the storage of uranium hexafluoride cylinders may be incomplete in the ISA Summary. As a result, conservative compensatory management measures for UF6 cylinder storage have been implemented pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for these areas. While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported as an addendum to event report 45717 pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. Notified R2DO (Nease) and NMSS EO (Benner).

ENS 4616811 August 2010 14:45:00On January 25, 2010 during normal operation of a slugger press in the Fuel Manufacturing Building, a tube connecting the feed hood to the press became disconnected. After starting the vibrating feeder, an operator discovered the feed tube was slightly misaligned and some (uranium) powder had spilled into the hood. The operator immediately used the emergency stop button and the equipment was shutdown. A total of 6.9 kg was removed from the hood. An investigation determined that a clamp on the feed tube came loose, allowing the tube to separate from the fit up device. The two controlled parameters for criticality safety for this equipment are moderation and geometry and Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS) are established for both. When the tube became misaligned, one geometry related IROFS became unavailable to perform its intended safety function. Additional lROFS on geometry and moderation remained available to perform their intended safety functions and were not challenged. Therefore, this did not result in an unsafe condition. GNF-A's (Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas) initial review determined this event was not reportable. However, during an inspection February 22 to 26, 2010, NRC evaluated the event and determined that during the period when the tube was misaligned, one IROFS was not available to perform its intended safety function. Therefore, facility performance requirements were not met and a report to the NRC was required. The NRC issued a notice of violation to GNF-A on March 26, 2010 (70-1113/2010-002-01) for failure to report the event pursuant to 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(2). The event is now being reported retroactively to satisfy this reporting requirement. The licensee notified the NRC Region 2 Office, the North Carolina Radiation Protection Section and the New Hanover County Emergency Response Organization.
ENS 4549112 November 2009 11:47:00During a GNF-A ongoing review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA), it was discovered at 3pm yesterday (11/11/09) that there may be an incomplete list of criticality safety controls associated with the Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas in the ISA Summary. At 7pm, it was determined that the list of Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS) was incomplete and the affected equipment was shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for these processes. Notwithstanding the documentation deficiency, the controls associated with moderator intrusion and geometry remained in place, functional, and maintained with appropriate management controls. While this discovery did not result in an unsafe condition, it is being reported on 11/12/09 pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours. Safety Significance of Events: Low safety significance - All process criticality safety controls remained intact and functioning for this processes. Safety Equipment Status: Pellet and Fuel Load fabrication areas are shutdown and will remain shutdown until the ISA review is completed. Status of Corrective Actions: Pellet and Rod Load Fabrication areas will remain shutdown pending final investigation results and identification of additional IROFS. The licensee notified NRC Region 2 Inspector (Crespo) and will notify state and local authorities.
ENS 4472416 December 2008 16:23:00At approximately 0600 on 12/16/2008, the horns of the inside Criticality Warning System (CWS) covering the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) were discovered to be in manual mode. On 12/12/08 at approximately 0700, the horns had been taken out of automatic mode and placed in manual mode as part of system maintenance activities at 0700 and inadvertently remained in this condition until this morning at 0600. According to a preliminary investigation, it appears that following maintenance on 12/12/08, incomplete system restoration left the automatic horn function disabled but the detection system remained operational. Once identified, the system was immediately restored to the automatic mode and the inside FMO CWS system was returned to normal operation. Follow-up tests have confirmed that the warning system horns are fully operational. The event is being reported within 24-hours pursuant to 10CFR70.50(b)(2) as an event in which safety equipment was disabled. During the time that the warning system was disabled, there were no conditions that would have resulted in warning system activation. Corrective actions have been taken to prevent re-occurrence. The licensee will be notifying NRC Region 2 as well as State and local governments.
ENS 4394630 January 2008 19:00:00

An uranium dioxide powder mixture was contained in a hopper of unfavorable geometry with moisture prevention criticality protection measures. After starting a process stream, moisture was unintentionally introduced into the hopper containing the uranium dioxide powder. At 1840 Global Nuclear Fuels declared an Alert condition onsite as a result of this introduction of moisture to the uranium dioxide powder. The process stream was secured which stopped the introduction of moisture. No criticality occurred.

* * * UPDATE FROM S. MURRAY TO P. SNYDER AT 2110  ON 1/30/08 * * * 

The uranium dioxide powder in the hopper was successfully discharged into a hybrid container of favorable geometry. At 2107 the licensee exited the Alert condition. Notified R2DO (Bonser), NMSS (Weber, Mamish), IRD (Cruz), DHS (Haselton), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Smith), USDA (Timmons), HHS (Turner) and EPA (National Response Center) (Snowden).

ENS 4389712 January 2008 11:10:00During a project review for the recovery of uranium generated by the chemical laboratory in the Fuel Manufacturing/Operations (FMO) complex, it was discovered that ten (10) laboratory generated cans of material had been improperly stored on a conveyor system. The cans of material came from the FMO chemical laboratory that generated them from its process. The material consisted of both dry uranium powder/pellets and wet ammonium diurinate (ADU). Each can contained approximately 16kg of uranium. After the material was placed in the cans, it was given an incorrect material type indicating it contained only dry material. When the material was moved from the chemical lab to a storage area in preparation for processing, it was improperly stored on a conveyor which was only authorized for dry material. The second controlled parameter (mass of uranium in each can) was maintained at all times. Upon discovery of this condition, the ten (10) cans were immediately placed on skids on the conveyor to provide the necessary spacing between each can. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 within 24 hours of discovery. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERAIING CONDITIONS: The basis of criticality safety relies on spacing of cans (geometry) and mass as independent criticality safety controls. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS: 1 - Mass control remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed. NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION: 1 - Control on can spacing was lost since skids were not used to separate moderated cans on the conveyor. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: Low Safety Significance - independent control on mass remained intact - additional failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. SAFETY EOUIPMENT STATUS: All ten (10) cans were placed on skids on the conveyor system and will await further processing. STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Corrective and preventative actions will be identified as part of the incident investigation. The cans were improperly stored for several weeks. The licensee will be making notifications to NRC Region 2, the State of North Carolina and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency.
ENS 4363713 September 2007 09:41:00During an investigation of an unusual sinter test measurement result, it was determined that one of the Items Relied On For Safety (IROFS), as documented in the (Integrated Safety Analysis) (ISA) summary, had degraded. This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10 CFR 70.50 Appendix A (b)(2). The IROFS described for the moderation control of the powder additive at the Dry Conversion Process (DCP) blender operation did not function as required because of an error that occurred at the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) container transfer station. At no time did an Unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective and was not challenged. The container transfer station operation is shut down pending completion of an investigation and implementation of corrective actions.
ENS 435421 August 2007 11:30:00

During a review of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) it was discovered that controls associated with the container transfer station in the Dry Scrap Recycle (DSR) area had not been included in the updated ISA Summary. Although process controls exist, they were not declared or documented in the ISA as IROFS (Items Relied on For Safety). This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR70.50 Appendix A(b)(1). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective, and was not challenged. All affected equipment is shut down pending revision of the ISA to document IROFS for this process. While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant with the reporting requirements of 10CFR70.50 Appendix A within 24 hours of discovery. The licensee has notified Region 2 (Gibson) ,State, and local authorities.

  • * * UPDATE AT 1433 EDT ON 09/14/07 FROM SCOTT MURRAY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided the following information as a supplemental report: A detailed review of authorized process equipment and controls was performed to ensure each has been evaluated in an ISA and the required IROFS have been identified. This review identified ten other processes with a valid criticality safety analysis that were not specifically documented as a part of an ISA evaluation and the required IROFS had not been identified. The ISA reviews for these have been completed and the required IROFS documented. A total of twelve new IROFS have been identified. The licensee will inform the NRC Region 2 Office and the Headquarters Project Manager. Notified R2DO (Musser) and FSME (Wastler).