Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 53779 | 5 December 2018 20:07:00 | At 1539 (CST) December 5, 2018, with Unit 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to degrading condenser vacuum. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally, post-trip. An actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system occurred during the manual trip. The auxiliary feedwater system automatically started as designed when the valid actuation signal was received. Operations stabilized the plant in mode 3 (hot standby). Decay heat is being removed by atmospheric dump valves. Unit 2 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The loss of condenser vacuum resulted because one of two circulating water pumps was running and its discharge valve shut. The cause for the valve shutting is under investigation. There is no primary to secondary leakage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector |
| ENS 51792 | 15 March 2016 15:14:00 | During a scheduled refueling outage, an inspection of containment components revealed a suspected through wall leak on 1CV-200B, Letdown Orifice 'B' Outlet Control. Non-destructive engineering inspection has been completed and determined that an indication exists. 10 CFR 50.2(2)(i) defines the reactor coolant pressure boundary as being connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including the outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment. 1CV-200B is isolable from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) by a single motor operated valve, 1RC-427, Reactor Coolant Loop 'B' Leg to CVCS Letdown Isolation valve. 1CV-200B is located inside of containment between 1RC-427 and the two containment isolation valves for the letdown line, 1CV-371 and 1CV-371A. Based on the definition provided in 10 CFR 50.2, the condition is considered pressure boundary leakage and is considered reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii). Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6. Repairs for the condition are being determined. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51506 | 29 October 2015 10:38:00 | At 0348 CDT, while Point Beach Unit 2 was performing outage activities, it experienced a Main Power Transformer lockout and associated loss of busses (2A-01, 2A-02, 2B-01 and 2B-02). The loss of the two non-vital 4160 V buses resulted in actuation of the Unit 2 undervoltage logic which resulted in actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System. The Auxiliary Feedwater System functioned normally upon actuation. This condition was determined to be reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A)(6), PWR auxiliary or emergency feedwater system actuation. This event did not affect the operating Unit 1. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 49295 | 22 August 2013 01:28:00 | Point Beach was notified via our EP (emergency plan) manager that emergency plan siren K 5 actuated inadvertently at 2100 (CDT) on 8/21/13, during severe weather. Initial notification of this occurrence was made by Kewaunee County Emergency Management to the Kewaunee Nuclear Plant EP manager. The Kewaunee EP manager in turn notified the Point Beach EP manager. The siren stopped sounding at 2125 on 8/21/13, and was removed from service to prevent additional inadvertent actuations before it is repaired. The loss of coverage for siren K-5, which is the only Point Beach siren out of service at this time, is 1.9%, which is below the 50% loss of coverage requiring additional notifications. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46032 | 19 June 2010 11:25:00 | At 0636 hours, control room personnel initiated a manual reactor trip of Unit 2 from MODE 2 at 0% power. Just prior to the initiation of the manual reactor trip, an automatic turbine trip had occurred as a result of the receipt of a generator lockout signal. Prior to the automatic turbine trip, an orderly power reduction to 44% power had been completed and the unit was being maintained in a stable condition in MODE 1. At the time of the turbine trip, two sets of condenser steam dump valves were isolated, in preparation for scheduled condenser waterbox tube cleaning. Following the manual reactor trip, all safety systems and equipment operated as expected. The cause of the turbine trip, including receipt of the generator lockout signal, is under investigation. The unit is stable in MODE 3 at normal RCS temperature and pressure. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) t and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Just prior to the trip, the unit was critical in Mode 2. All rods are fully inserted into the core. |
| ENS 43649 | 18 September 2007 11:37:00 | At 0043 on 9/18/07, during performance of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.4.1, the 2T-13 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was found to be at 105 degrees F. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.4 A was therefore not met due to temperature being above the parametric value limit of 97 degrees F (100F technical specification value). The cause of the elevated temperatures of 2T-13 is currently under investigation. At 0843 an orderly shutdown of Unit 2 was commenced because of the continued elevated temperature of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the problem and take remedial actions continues. Unit 1 RWST temperature is 77 F. Licensee is taking action to lower Unit 2 RWST temperature. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Unit 2 RWST temperature was verified at 97 degrees F at 1421 CDT. The 2T-13 RWST is operable and LCO 3.5.4.is now met. The Unit 2 power reduction was terminated at 20% reactor power. Current plans are to continue to cool down the RWST using station procedures that place the RWST on recirculation through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger with component cooling water (CCW) to cool the heat exchanger. Plans are in progress to return Unit 2 to full power on 09/18/07. A root cause evaluation is in progress to determine the specific cause of the event; however, preliminary investigations have determined that the heaters were on with an improper setpoint. The power supply to the heaters have been turned off and temperatures are being monitored on an hourly basis while the RWST is on recirculation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Peterson) |