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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56342 | 7 February 2023 21:10:00 | The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1738 EST on 02/07/2023, while in mode 5 at 0 percent power, it was determined during local leak rate testing (LLRT) that the primary containment leakage rate exceeded the allowable limit defined in 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, 'Primary Reactor Containment Leakage Testing for Water-Cooled Power Reactors.' Both primary containment isolation valves in a penetration failed LLRT requirements which represents a failure to maintain primary containment integrity. This event is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55420 | 20 August 2021 12:53:00 | A licensed operator failed a pre-access authorization test specified by the FFD testing program test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55188 | 12 April 2021 09:17:00 | At 2320 EST on 02/17/2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the Group 2 containment isolation logic occurred on the inboard valves. The reason for the actuation was most likely due to air entrapment in reactor water level sensing lines following maintenance. Group 2 inboard isolation valves in the drywell floor and equipment drain system and the fission product monitor system automatically isolated as designed. As a corrective action, the variable leg and reference leg of the instrumentation were backfilled with water to ensure all air was removed from the line. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that results in an invalid actuation of the Group 2 containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 55187 | 12 April 2021 09:17:00 | At 2323 EST on 02/12/2021, with Unit 2 in Mode 5 at zero percent power, an actuation of the Group I containment isolation logic occurred during fluid flushing of turbine stop valves. The reason for the actuation was due to a maintenance activity resulting in turbine stop valve movement with no condenser vacuum which is a Group I isolation signal. Two Group I isolation valves, 2B31F019 and 2B31F020, reactor water sample valves, automatically isolated as designed when the system actuation signal was received. The other Group I valves had already been removed from service as part of the refueling outage schedule. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an event that results in an invalid actuation of the Group I containment isolation system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |