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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 49595 | 2 December 2013 13:52:00 | This is a 10 CFR 50.55(e) initial notification for a significant breakdown in the Quality Assurance (QA) Program of Chicago Bridge & Iron (CB&I) Lake Charles facility, a sub-supplier of CB&I. CB&I Lake Charles supplies safety-related structural sub-modules for the Vogtle 3 & 4 construction project. In September 2013, CB&I Lake Charles issued a root cause analysis report for deviations associated with sub-modules being supplied to domestic AP1000 construction projects. An evaluation of the root cause analysis results concluded that a significant QA program breakdown had occurred that could have produced a defect. No defect has been identified. This initial notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(4)(iii) and 10 CFR 50.55(e)(5)(i). The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Reference similar Summer Event (EN#49582). |
| ENS 48906 | 10 April 2013 09:47:00 | 50.55(e) initial notification for failure to comply with requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion VII for procurement of safety-related components associated with AP1000 Nuclear Power Plant construction by CB&I (formerly Shaw Nuclear). This 50.55(e) initial notification addresses a failure to comply by CB&I, an agent of Southern Company for Vogtle 3&4, to meet the requirements of Appendix B, Criterion VII. It is concluded that the QA programmatic issues, as identified by the root cause analysis associated with NRC violation 05200025/2012-004-02, could have produced a defect and this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The root cause of the programmatic procurement problems was that the existing Shaw Nuclear procurement and quality oversight and inspection program did not include a sufficiently strategic, integrated, and graded approach to assure the required quality of material, equipment, and services. This notification closes the interim report submitted on February 4, 2013 by Southern Company. This 50.55(e) initial notification is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.55(e)(3)(iii)(C). The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48136 | 26 July 2012 14:27:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness for duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47765 | 23 March 2012 14:33:00 | On March 9, 2012, Shaw's Vogtle 3&4 Construction Contractor FFD program manager notified SNC (Southern Nuclear Operating Company) FFD program manager of his discovery of anomalies in their random pool while preparing to perform the weekly random pool generation. At that time, approximately 20 people were identified as not being in the pool that had active badges. Corrective actions were implemented to update the pool and provide additional verification of any changes made to the pool. Subsequently discussions with licensing resulted in the conclusion that there was not an indication that there was a programmatic issue and thus was reportable under a 30 day report to the NRC. The NRC was informed of this decision and has been at Vogtle collecting data regarding this event. Since that time, Shaw has been checking past months to determine the extent of condition. On March 22, at 21:01, Shaw notified SNC that the October - December results of personnel who had active badges but was not in the pool was significantly higher than the January through March results, developed earlier. On the basis of this information, SNC has determined that this now rises to the level of a programmatic vulnerability and is subject to a 24-hour report to the NRC. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(4) and 26.417(b)(1) as a discovered vulnerability of the FFD program. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspectors.
The licensee noted that this event is also being reported under 10 CFR 26.417(b)(1). R2DO (Haag) has been notified. |
| ENS 47723 | 7 March 2012 16:00:00 | On March 01, 2012, it was discovered that a (Contractor) program manager intentionally failed to implement a procedure change as instructed by management. An initial investigation has determined that interim compensatory actions were in place prior to this pending procedural change. The involved manager's access authorization has been revoked. Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. (SNC) was notified by (the Contractor) of this discovery on March 06, 2012 at 19:00 EST. SNC is providing this notification under the provisions of 10 CFR 26.719(b)(3) as an intentional act that casts doubt on the integrity of the FFD program. At the time of this report, no regulatory barriers for individuals assigned to perform duties that require them to be subject to the FFD program have been breached regarding this event. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |