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The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: Agilent Technologies manufacturers ECDs (Electron Capture Detectors), containing 15 millicuries each, of Ni-63 for use in Gas Chromatographs (for generation of ionized atmospheres for chemical analysis). We have a number of ECDs in use at our facility as addressed below for customer support and R&D. We are required by our license to perform wipe (swipe) tests every six months. The ECD in question was last wiped in August. We were in the process of performing our most recent wipe test last month (February) when we discovered the ECD and its host GC were no longer in the lab they were being used in. (Source was determined to be missing on February 22, 2022 at 1000 EDT when it could not be found for the scheduled swipe test.) We discovered quickly that the individual chemist with ownership of the ECD retired in November of 2021 (last date the device was accounted for). Investigations to date have not been successful in recovering the ECD. Information pertinent to the incident to follow. I will also be submitting a letter to the appropriate address in one month if we are still unable to recover the ECD. ECD Model # G2397A ECD Serial Number # U25487 Activity: 15 millicurie Ni-63 Facility security: Access to building is limited to those issued electronic badges. Labs are further secured by electronic access only to necessary personnel. (Therefore the source is not suspected to have been stolen.)

• * * UPDATE ON 4/21/2022 AT 1244 EDT FROM DAVID BENNETT TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone: The source is still lost. The licensee is submitting a written report to Region 1. Notified R1DO (Dentel), ILTAB, and NMSS Events Notification by email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

On December 6, 2021, at 1125 hours Eastern Standard Time (EST), during planned maintenance activities, electrical power was lost to the 4160V emergency bus E-3. The power loss to emergency bus E-3 affected both Unit 1 and 2. Emergency Diesel Generator #3 received an automatic start signal but was under clearance for planned maintenance. Emergency bus E-3 was re-energized at 1315 EST hours via offsite power. The loss of power to E3 resulted in Unit 2 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems), and Group 10 (i.e., air isolation to the drywell) isolations. The actuations of PCIVs were completed and the affected equipment responded as designed. Per design, no Unit 1 safety system group isolations or actuations occurred. Other Unit 2 actuations included the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start signal to the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREV). Systems functioned as designed. Safety systems functioned as designed following the de-energization of bus E-3. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of PCIS on Unit 2 and an automatic start signal to Emergency Diesel Generator #3. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Except for the Emergency Diesel Generator, which is out of service for planned maintenance, all equipment has been returned to its normal alignment.

• * * UPDATE FROM JJ STRNAD TO THOMAS KENDZIA AT 2028 EST ON DECEMBER 6, 2021 * * *

The loss of power to E3 resulted in Unit 1 Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems). Other Unit 1 actuations included the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start signal to the Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B and the Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREV). Systems functioned as designed. Safety systems functioned as designed following the de-energization of bus E-3. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of PCIS on Unit 1. All Unit 1 equipment was returned to its normal alignment. The NRC Resident will be notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).

The following report was received from the Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control (the Division) via email: The licensee was at a temporary jobsite and stepped away from their vehicle. An unknown man ran up to the vehicle and stole the truck and its contents. At the time the truck was stolen, a Moisture Density Gauge containing licensed material was secured in the bed of the licensee's truck in its transportation case. The licensee notified the police and has begun actions to recover the gauge. The Division is waiting for additional information from the licensee. Utah Event Report ID Number: UT 210006

• * * UPDATE FROM SPENCER WICKHAM TO THOMAS KENDZIA AT 1259 EDT ON 11/4/21 * * *

The following information was received via e-mail: At the time of this notification (UT 210006) we did not have information pertaining to the gauge. Please see the following gauge information. Model: Instrotek 3500, Serial Number: 3823, Cs-137: 11 mCi, Am-241: 44 mCi. The licensee has recovered the stolen gauge. The gauge was still locked and chained in the transport vehicle in it's transport package and had not been tampered with. The Division will update and send the NMED report once the event is closed. Notified R4DO (KOZAL), NMSS Events Notification group (email), and ILTAB (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

On September 12, 2021, at 1728 EDT, with Unit 1 in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) while performing inspections of the North Anna Power Station Unit 1 reactor vessel head flange area, a weld leak was identified on the reactor vessel flange leak-off line that connects to the flange between the inner and outer head o-rings. Entered TRM 3.4.6 Condition B for ASME Code Class 1,2, and 3 components. With known leakage past the inner head o-ring, this condition is reported since the fault in the tubing is considered pressure boundary (Reactor Coolant System) leakage. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded. The NRC Resident has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 10/21/21 AT 1153 EDT FROM DENNIS BRIED TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The condition identified in EN 55457, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be in a tubing connection downstream of the reactor vessel inner O-ring. Leakage past a seal or gasket is not considered to be pressure boundary leakage, as defined by Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller)

At 0905 EDT, it was discovered both trains of Auxiliary Building Gas Treatment System (ABGTS) were simultaneously INOPERABLE due to the auxiliary building secondary containment enclosure (ABSCE) being inoperable; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. ABSCE and ABGTS were returned to operable.

• * * RETRACTION ON 10/14/2021 AT 0756 EDT FROM TRACY SUDOKO TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

This is a retraction of the 8-hour Immediate notification (EN55421) made to the NRC by Sequoyah Nuclear Plant on August 20, 2021. Sequoyah is retracting this event notification based on the following: Regulatory Guidance in NUREG-1022, Revision 3, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73', Sections 2.8 'Retraction and Cancellation of Event Reporting', and 4.2.3 'ENS Notification Retraction'. On August 20, 2021 personnel found door A-118 open. This door is part of the ABSCE. During the initial investigation, it was found that other personnel had the door open using Precaution A of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 which allows material access through ABSCE doors if the door is closed within three minutes. It was found that A-118 door had been open for greater than three minutes. With this door open the ABSCE was beyond its capability for ABGTS fan to maintain the required pressure during an Aux. Building Isolation. Thus, the site declared the ABSCE and both Trains of ABGTS inoperable per LCO 3.7.12 Conditions A, B and E. With the ABSCE being a single train system, this caused a condition that "could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function" which requires an Immediate Notification to the NRC within eight hours under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D). This Immediate Notification was reported on August 20, 2021 at 1600 EDT. It was later determined that at 'Time of Discovery', although Door A-118 was open, it was not obstructed, the door was open by normal means, was capable of being closed and was now attended. The time requirement per 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 for closure of an open ABSCE door is within three minutes of notification. Although the individual found holding the door was unaware of the requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 to close the door, communications were established and the Main Control Room (MCR), upon discovery of the 'Open Door', could have directed closure starting at the Time of Discovery if required. Since the MCR was aware the door was open, had communications established with personnel at the door, the door was capable of closure and not restricted, the three minute closure requirement of 0-TI-SXX-000-016.0 was met. Subsequently, the door was closed within approximately two minutes of notification to close. The closure of the door with these procedural measures met confirmed the integrity of the ABSCE and therefore Operability of ABGTS. Based on the above critical thinking, entry into LCO 3.7.12 Condition A, B, and E was retracted on August 22, 2021 at 2044 EDT. With the LCO conditions retracted and the above determination that at the Time of Discovery safety function was maintained, the Immediate Notification per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(D) was not required. The issue of Past Operability remains for instances in time that the door did not have appropriate compensatory measures in place. Any further notification required for this event will be submitted as a Licensee Event Report. Notified R2DO (Miller)

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * UPDATE ON 4/5/22 AT 1651 (EDT) FROM D.TOWNSEND TO T. HERRITY * * *

The initial event notification should have characterized the test type as a follow-up fitness-for-duty test, rather than a random test. R4DO (Dixon) and FFD Group via email.