Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 54233 | 20 August 2019 20:00:00 | While performing a purification on the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (FWST), it was discovered that the single train system was inoperable due to the level being less than the required volume per SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.5.4.2. The condition was discovered on 8/18/19 at 1700 (EDT). The FWST level was restored to greater than the required volume per SR 3.5.4.2 at 1744 on 8/18/19. This condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) for an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53715 | 5 November 2018 11:30:00 | The following information was received from the State of Florida via e-mail: (The Licensee Operations Manager ) called (the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control) to report a Troxler gauge theft from the truck of (an operator). The gauge was noted missing from the back of (the operator's) truck on Sunday, November 4, 2018. The Incident was reported to this office (Florida Bureau of Radiation Control) on November 5, 2018 at 1030 EST. (The Licensee Operations Manager) plans to call local law enforcement to report the theft. At the time of this report, (the Licensee Operations Manager) could not furnish (the operator's) residential address. The gauge contained an 8 mCi Cs-137 source and a 40 mCi Am-241/Be source. Florida Incident Number: FL18-136
The following information was reported via phone: The Florida Bureau of Radiation Control was informed that the Troxler gauge has been found. They have no other information at this time. Notified R1DO (WERKHEISER), ILTAB (via E-mail), and NMSS Events Notifications E-mail group. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 53709 | 1 November 2018 10:26:00 | The following information was obtained from the State of Tennessee via email: On 10/31/18, while performing radiography work in Nashville, TN, a radiographer working for World Testing noticed that his survey meter still had elevated readings and that the source had not successfully returned back to the camera. He attempted again to return the source but was unsuccessful. The (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO was notified. After responding and investigating, the RSO was able to retract the source back into the camera. The device information includes the following: Manufacturer: USA Global Model #: A424-9 Serial #: 9269 Source Serial #: 65744G Isotope: Ir-192 (20.1 Ci) A follow-up report will be submitted within 30 days. Tennessee State Event Report ID No.: TN-18-197 |
| ENS 53670 | 16 October 2018 18:41:00 | The following information was received via email: On October 16th 2018, The ExxonMobil RSO at the Billings Montana Refinery (License # 25-03375-01) notified USNRC of one (1) device (insertion type nuclear gauge) that failed to function as designed (10 CFR 30.50.Section B.2). Device Information: Ohmart device, model MT-93-439-001 with 10 mCi. of Cs-137; S/N: 0692GK; Source capsule model: A-2102 (X38/2); Manufacture date: Nov 7th, 1994 Upon locking out the nuclear gauge at approximately 11:00am, the nuclear gauge user identified that the cable connecting the source capsule housing (torpedo) to the source holder retrieval mechanism had become detached. The source capsule housing appears to be in its normal operating location at the bottom of the equipment guide tube in the boot of the vessel, however, due to the disconnected cable it cannot be retrieved. The following precautionary measures were taken to ensure minimal potential for exposure (1) no vessel entry permits will be issued for the vessel (2) the area around the boot was barricaded to restrict entry. There is no additional risk of radiation exposure to members of the general public or radiation workers due to the failure of the equipment function. The source capsule housing is scheduled to be retrieved, shielded, and shipped for transfer to QSA Global by VEGA Americas, Inc. on 10/18/18. |
| ENS 53641 | 3 October 2018 15:11:00 | The following was received via email from the State of Texas: On October 3, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that one of their radiography crews had reported they could not retract a 22 Curie Iridium-192 source into a SPEC 150 exposure device. The crew was working at a remote job site (in Carrizo Springs, TX). The exposure device was sitting on a pipe rack. During an exposure (not the first one) the device fell off the pipe rack, hitting the guide tube, and crimping the tube to a point where the source could not be retracted back into the device. The crew contacted the RSO and a retrieval team was sent to the location. The source was positioned in the collimator and covered with bags of lead shot. The retrieval team was able to cut the protective coating off of the guide tube and, using a pair of pliers, reshape the guide tube until the source could be retracted to the fully locked position. No member of the general public received an exposure from this event. The highest dose received by an individual responding to this event was 40 millirem. Texas Incident: I-9616 |
| ENS 53614 | 20 September 2018 15:24:00 | The following information was received from the State of California via email: On September 19, 2018, the (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO notified the (California Radiological Health Branch) that a CPN soils gauge, model MC-1DR # MD00605736 containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241/Be had been run over by construction equipment at a temporary job site in Camarillo, CA. The gauge operator had placed the gauge near his test area, but was 15 feet away when the accident occurred. After the accident, he immediately stopped all work in the area and cordoned off an area 30 feet around the damaged gauge before calling his RSO. A radiation survey meter was available from a local radiography company who met the RSO and the gauge operator at accident site. The shaft housing the rod above the cesium source was snapped off from the gauge. The source was in the 'safe mode' during the accident and remained in the shielded area of the gauge. The gauge was able to be loaded into the shipping container for return to the permanent storage location. Radiation surveys were performed with a Bicron GM detector and no contamination was found in the area. The root cause is operator error by the gauge operator. The gauge will be disposed thru the manufacturer (CPN). California Report No.: 5010-091918 |
| ENS 53602 | 13 September 2018 12:11:00 | The following excerpted information was obtained from the State of Washington via email: On 8/31/2018, two (70 microCurie) I-125 seeds were implanted into a patient's breast associated with an RSL (radioactive seed localization) procedure; they were explanted on 9/4/2018. On 9/5/2018, (the State of Washington) was notified by a Nuclear Medicine Technician from Polyclinic-Madison Center (904 Seventh Avenue, Seattle) that I-125 seeds had been returned to them following a pathologic exam at the Polyclinic Histology Laboratory. The leaking seeds and surgical clips were placed in a shielded container that housed multiple seeds undergoing decay-in-storage prior to disposal. The three plastic containers that were used (specimen cup, sentinel node container, and breast tissue container) have sealed lids and are presently located in the shielded Biodex storage locker located in Polyclinic's nuclear cardiology Hot Lab at Madison Center. All three containers have internal I-125 contamination from the leaking seed. In an attempt to establish a mechanism of action for the leaking source, the surgeon was interviewed and nothing in the way of an apparent cause was identified. Additionally, the surgical notes did not identify any anomalies. Although a breach of source containment occurred for an unknown cause, the radiation exposures received by personnel involved with handling of the leaking seed and the patient that had the seed implanted in breast tissue for four days were assessed as not representing a safety issue for any individual. Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 53605 | 14 September 2018 16:00:00 | On Friday, August 3, (2018,) at approximately 1245 PST, Holtec International (a contractor for Southern California Edison (SCE)) was lowering a Multi-Purpose Canister (MPC) loaded with spent fuel into the Cavity Enclosure Container (CEC) of the SONGS Holtec UMAX Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) for purposes of dry storage. The canister was suspended from a Holtec Vertical Cask Transporter (VCT). During the download, the canister encountered an interference with the CEC divider shell and became bound in place. As a result, the downloader slings of the VCT became slack while the MPC was resting partially inside the CEC. Once Holtec became aware of the situation, the VCT towers were raised in order to restore tension in the rigging and to raise the MPC. The VCT was then adjusted, and the MPC was then safely lowered into the CEC and the rigging was disengaged. There was no effect on the integrity of the canister or release of radioactive material as a result of this event. This event meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR72.75(d)(1) in that the VCT, which is an important-to-safety component, was placed in a configuration which defeated its ability to perform its safety function. The VCT and associated rigging are described in Certificate of Compliance 1040, Technical Specification 5.2.c.3, which requires that lifting equipment shall have redundant drop protection features which prevent uncontrolled lowering of the load. By placing the VCT in the configuration of this event, the single-failure proof nature of the lifting devices was defeated. The VCT was no longer capable of mitigating the consequence of an accident, and there was no redundant equipment available and operable to perform the required safety function. SCE made an original determination that the event did not require a report. However, SCE contacted the NRC (Region IV) on Monday August 6th and again on Tuesday August 7th to provide details of the event. It has now been determined that the event is reportable under 10CFR72.75(d)(1) and this late report is being made. Licensee notified RIV (Simpson). |