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ENS 5703619 March 2024 18:19:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: While performing a planned high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system surveillance, an isolation signal was received based upon an exhaust rupture disc high pressure signal. This resulted in an unplanned inoperability of the HPCI system. All systems responded as expected, and the event is under investigation. No other systems were affected by this condition. This event is reportable as an 8-hour non-emergency notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as HPCI is a single train safety system. There was no impact to plant personnel or the public as a result of this condition. The NRC resident has been notified of this condition.
ENS 569134 January 2024 16:00:00

The following is a summary of the information provided by Engine Systems, Inc. (ESI) via fax: An edge or lip in the bore of an EMD (Brand name: Electro-Motive Diesel) cylinder liner prevented successful installation of the corresponding power assembly on an emergency diesel generator set. The lip is located axially at the bottom of the inlet ports and is present around the circumference of the bore. The EMD model 645E4 is a 2-stroke engine with air inlet ports in the wall of the cylinder liner. As the piston travels below the inlet ports, air box pressure scavenges and replenishes air to the power assembly. Installation of the power assembly requires lowering the piston through the liner in order to secure the connecting rod to the crankshaft. During this process the piston could not be lowered below the inlet ports due to the piston rings catching on the lip. The power assembly was not installed and therefore there was no safety hazard; however, if the defect had gone undetected there was the potential to damage engine components and possibly reduce load carrying capacity of the engine. The extent of the condition is this single cylinder liner, P/N 9318833, S/N 20M0938 used in the power assembly at Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) - Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, Serial Number: 23H1306. Corrective Actions: For TVA-Sequoyah: No action required; the power assembly has been returned to ESI. For ESI: To prevent reoccurrence, ESI has revised the dedication package to include verification that bore machining is continuous along the entire length and no edges or lips are present. The revision was implemented on December 6, 2023.

  • * * UPDATE ON 1/17/24 AT 1515 EST FROM DAN ROBERTS TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

Engine Systems, Inc. sent a revision to change the date of defect identification to November 27, 2023. Notified R2DO (Miller), Part 21 Group (email)

ENS 5597029 June 2022 15:53:00

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: Representatives of Elmhurst Hospital (RML IL-01612-01) contacted the Agency at approximately 1230 CDT today, 6/29/22, to report a Y-90 Theraspheres administration that took place on 6/29/22 (approximately 1000 CDT) which resulted in 100 percent of the dose prescribed not being delivered. The pre and post surveys of the vial and delivery system were nearly identical, supporting the licensee's assertion that no microspheres were delivered. The patient was surveyed post-administration and was at background. While contamination was identified on the draping, it resulted from the disconnection of the delivery system when the administration was halted. No contamination was identified on the patient. Microspheres were observed clustered at the hub and none beyond. The licensee claims there were no kinks and the manufacturer's checklist was followed to include agitation/flushing. At this time, it is unclear if the patient and referring physician have been notified, but the licensee is aware of the requirement. The licensee is aware of the 15-day written report requirement. The AU ((Authorized User)) will be back in the office on Friday and understands the Agency will need additional information via a reactionary inspection. The Agency is scheduling a reactive inspection and this report will be updated as information becomes available. Illinois Item Number: IL220023

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/01/2022 AT 1616 EDT FROM LLINOIS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY TO KAREN COTTON VIA E-MAIL* * *

The Agency conducted a reactive inspection on 7/1/22. At that time, no indications of root cause could be identified. The licensee's written report was received timely and presented no new information. The delivery kit was returned to the manufacturer for assessment when decayed. Subsequent information was submitted to the Agency for review. The licensee's written report was received timely. Documentation included Gamma camera images of the administration set up kit and catheter which appeared to show activity in the microcatheter. Based on images reviewed, the Agency cannot rule out that some activity may have been delivered to the patient. Due to the contamination, not all of the activity in the waste was able to be accounted for; however, the bulk of activity in the waste indicated that conservatively less than 8.9% of the dosage was delivered. Agency inspectors determined the potential root cause as clumping of microspheres between the D and E lines of the administration kit pending investigation/assessment of the administration kit by the manufacturer. The Agency will continue to monitor additional information provided by the licensee. This matter may be considered closed. Notified R3DO (Hills) and NMSS Event Notification via email. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient

ENS 5596828 June 2022 18:03:00A non-licensed supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5596224 June 2022 16:28:00The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: At 1257 EDT on June 24, 2022, it was discovered the Low Pressure Core Spray System (LPCS) was INOPERABLE. At Perry, the Low Pressure Core Spray System is considered a single train system in Modes 1, 2, and 3; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Inoperability of the Low Pressure Core Spray system was caused by a loss of power to the LPCS Minimum Flow Valve during surveillance activities. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5596124 June 2022 14:51:00

The following was received from Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: The Agency was notified on 6/24/2022, that an employee at Decatur Memorial Hospital handled a vial of F-18 and may have received an extremity dose in excess of 2.5 Gy (250 rad). The exposure reportedly occurred on Monday, June 20, and was not reported timely. Agency staff will perform a reactionary inspection at 0600 CDT, Monday, June 27, when licensee staff are back on site. Agency inspectors were contacted via email by the RSO ((Radiation Safety Officer)) designee for Decatur Memorial Hospital (RML, IL-02444-01) on 6/22/2022, to advise an operator grabbed a reaction vessel vial containing 10 mCi of F-18 FDG ((fluorodeoxyglucose)) for roughly 20 seconds in order to save a production run. NOTE: The reported activity was updated on 6/24/2022, to 10 Ci. Reportedly, the employee was training a new operator and noticed during synthesis, the reaction vessel wasn't placed in the heating apparatus and synthesis would fail. He opened up the mini cells and placed the vessel into the correct spot with his gloved hand. At that time, both Agency and licensee staff estimated the exposure to the hand to be in the range of several hundred millirem to possibly over the 50 rem occupational limit. The licensee was instructed to expedite processing of the employee's extremity and whole-body badges and conduct a time-motion study to determine if occupational limits had been exceeded. During a phone discussion with the licensee on 6/24/2022, the license corrected previously provided information and stated the production vial contained 10 Ci of F-18. Agency staff immediately made a second call to the licensee's on-duty pharmacist to confirm. At 10 Ci, Agency staff estimate the operator's actions may have caused or threatens to cause a shallow dose equivalent to the extremities of 2.5 Gy (250 rad) or more. This is based on a 20 second contact time with a vial containing 10 Ci of F-18 and using a 1cm distance. Clarification will be obtained on 6/27/2022, during a reactionary inspection to perform a time motion study. The Agency is awaiting the dosimetry results. Illinois Item Number: IL220022

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/5/22 AT 1711 FROM GARY FORSEE TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: This is an update to NMED incident EN55961 (Illinois incident number IL220022) where we reported an incident involving the potential for an occupational exposure exceeding 250 rad to the extremities. Agency staff completed a reactionary inspection and received the expedited dosimetry reports from the licensee. A time motion study conducted by Agency staff estimates the occupational exposure at no more than 19 rem to each hand and no more than a few hundred millirem whole body. The dosimetry reports were received and indicated the employee received 100 millirem whole body and an average of 1.2 rem to each hand. We do believe the extremity and whole body badges to be representative of the doses received. Neither our conservative calculations nor the processed dosimetry report indicate this will be an abnormal occurrence. We will update the NMED report and resubmit to INL tomorrow. Notified R3DO (Lafranzo); NMSS Events Notification, Gretchen Rivera-Capella, and Robert Sun via email.

ENS 5597129 June 2022 20:56:00The following was received from the California Department of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch (CDPH/RHB ) via email: On 06-29-2022, Mistras Group determined that their shipment containing radioactive materials was officially declared lost. This is not a NSTS ((National Source Tracking System)) level source. The RSO ((Radiation Safety Officer)) for Mistras Group Inc. notified CDPH/RHB that a QSA source changer, QSA model 650L, No. 201 containing a QSA Global, Inc. iridium-192 source, model A424-9 No. 683G (radioactivity content on 06-29-2022 was 4.5 curies) shipped on 06-16-2022 had not arrived at QSA Global, Burlington, MA in a timely manner. The (Common Carrier) tracking number indicates the package arrived at the (Common Carrier) hub in Memphis, TN on 06-17-2022, but was delayed with an expected delivery on 06-22-2022. On 06-20-2022, QSA Global notified Mistras Group that only two of their three shipments had been received. On 06-22-2022, the (Common Carrier) reported the package remained delayed. On 06-25-2022, a missing Dangerous Goods (DG) investigation was opened to trace the package. DG was provided a picture of the missing package. On 06-27-2022, the (Common Carrier) administrator notified Mistras Group that the package was not located in the hub of the (Common Carrier), Memphis, TN. On 6-28-2022, the (Common Carrier) DG personnel notified Mistras Group that the package was not found at LAX ((Los Angeles International Airport)). California 5010 Number: 062922 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 559243 June 2022 13:20:00

The following was received from the Florida Department of Health (the department) via email: (The Radiation Safety Officer) from Mosaic Fertilizer called at 1130 EDT this morning to report a failed fixed density gauge on a pipeline. They reported that an employee found a (5 mCi Cs-137) sealed source on the ground, picked it up, held it in their hand for anywhere between 30 to 60 seconds before realizing what it was, then dropped it and reported it to management. The source was transported in an empty bucket and placed on a shelf in the onsite RAM ((Radioactive Material)) storage cabinet. The department's Materials Licensing was notified and will be sending out an inspector as soon as possible to conduct an immediate onsite inspection. The NRC was also notified. Source Assay Date June 2009. The following additional information was obtained from the department in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Based on the information provided, the department calculated 1.42 R dose. They shared the information with the Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), which calculated 2.24 R dose, with no decay correction. It was determined that no medical attention is required. Florida Incident Number: FL22-062

  • * * UPDATE FROM MARK SEIDENSTICKER TO LLOYD DESOTELL AT 1024 EDT ON 06/08/22 * * *

The following was received from the Florida Department of Health (the Department) via email: Decay corrected calculations done by Bureau of Radiation Control, and verified by REAC/TS (Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site), for a 30 second dose to the hand was 1.42 R. (Contact dose rate constant to the hand of 770 R/min/Ci x 1 min/60 sec x 0.0037 Ci x 30 sec = 1.42 R) REAC/TS calculation = 2.24 R w/no decay correction. REAC/TS comments: there was very little to no medical concern, just observe the employee's hand. The Radiation Safety Officer (was) notified the morning of 6/8/22 of the inspectors' findings, dose calculation results and REAC/TS comments. Notified R1DO (Greives) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 559273 June 2022 21:06:00

The following was received from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) via email: The NJDEP staff was notified of the loss of a 5 mCi syringe of Cu-64 from the Hackensack University Medical Center (NJ License no. 450695). The licensee contacted the NJDEP hotline at approximately 1933 EDT on 6/3/2022. The NJDEP staff was contacted at 1958 EDT. The NJDEP staff contacted the licensee RSO ((Radiation Safety Officer)) at 2002 EDT and asked for an update of the situation. The licensee RSO stated that the search for the syringe was continuing and that they contacted the isotope supplier to confirm its delivery. The supplier confirmed they had delivered the dose in the early morning of 6/3/2022. The NJDEP staff is monitoring the situation and more details will be provided as they become available.

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/7/22 AT 0853 EDT FROM JACK TWAY TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update was received from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) via email: A unit dose of Cu-64 calibrated for 4.4 mCi at 1500 EDT on 6/3/2022 (current activity estimated as 0.023 mCi) was discovered missing at Hackensack University Medical Center (NJ License no. 450695). The licensee reported the missing material to NJDEP who then reported the incident to NRC Operations Center. The NJ licensee followed up with their isotope suppliers to determine what might have happened to the dose. Video surveillance footage confirmed that the dose, in its Type A package was delivered by Nuclear Diagnostic Products to the Hackensack Nuclear Medicine PETCT Department at 0500 EDT on 6/3/2022. The driver was recorded on video leaving the Nuclear Medicine Department with a security guard and one black Type A package as expected. At 1020 EDT a driver from Medical Delivery Services, employed by Sofie Pharmaceuticals, was recorded delivering 1 Type A package and then leaving at 1022 EDT with 3 Type A packages, one of which bore the Yellow II label indicating it was not 'empty'. Sofie interviewed the driver who stated that he only picked up 2 packages, counter to what the video footage portrays. The driver has been suspended while Sofie continues to attempt to locate the package. Notified R1DO (Greives), NMSS Event Notifications and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 559253 June 2022 17:58:00The following was received from the New York State Department of Health Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection (the Department, BERP) via email: A New York State licensee informed the Department on June 3 that a patient received a HDR ((High Dose Rate)) therapy to the wrong site. The male patient was diagnosed with Basal Carcinoma of the skin on the left scalp. The patient received a total of 36 Gy over 6 weeks (6 Gy per week). Doses were delivered using a Varian Model Vari-Source XI. The Physician/Authorized User discovered the event and made the initial report to the Department. He indicated he misidentified the treatment site. It seems the error was discovered June 3, 2022. Treatment dates, notification of patient/family and other details regarding this event are not available to BERP yet. The Radiation Safety Officer is conducting an investigation. The Department will follow-up and provide an update. New York Report ID No. NY-22-04 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 559231 June 2022 17:28:00The following licensee provided information was forwarded from the Mississippi State Department of Health via email: A replacement Ir-192 source ((100 Ci)) was ordered from QSA Global on 3-24-22. QSA sent an `Advanced Shipping Notice' email after hours at 1800 CDT on 5-26-22. The source arrived the following day, Friday, 5-27-22. The source was delivered to the Shipping/Receiving dock (building 9145), operated by S3 ((Syncom Space Services)). (Note: the standard practice is for the source to be delivered directly to the building where S3 licensed sources are secured.) The Receiving worker signed for the shipment at 1000 CDT on 5-27-22. The Receiving worker is not a radiation safety qualified employee. The RSO ((Radiation Safety Officer)), nor any other radiation safety qualified personnel were contacted upon delivery of source. The RSO was not at work on Friday, and unaware the source was being delivered that day. The source was in the Shipping/Receiving building (locked when personnel are not on site) until Tuesday morning, 5-31-22. Upon arrival to work at 0600 CDT Tuesday morning, the RSO read the email from QSA Global and checked the tracking information. At that time, he realized the source had been delivered. The RSO identified which Receiving worker signed for the source. Their shift starts at 0700 CDT. Upon their arrival, the RSO verified that the source was at the Shipping/Receiving building. The RSO immediately picked up the source and brought it to the secure vault. Management was then notified, and the investigation began. The S3 Heath Physics Coordinator and RSO (with concurrence from NASA HP ((Health Physicist))) concluded that no employee was exposed to an unallowable amount of radiation based on where the source was placed and its proximity to employees in the area. The investigation is ongoing to identify the process failures that lead to this incident. NASA has been notified and the incident has been entered into a formal tracking system.
ENS 5592131 May 2022 18:51:00The following was received from the California Department of Public Health via email: On May 31, 2022, the RSO of Alta California Geotechnical, Inc. (Alta), contacted the Brea office of the California Department of Public Health to report a stolen moisture density gauge. The gauge was a CPN model MC-3 S/N M3811862 (10 mCi Cs-137, 50 mCi Am-241:Be). On May 27, at approximately 1700 PDT, the gauge was placed in a locked Mobile Mini (temporary storage) container in a fenced (also locked) area of the construction site in Jurupa Valley, California. The theft occurred sometime between Friday, May 27 and Tuesday, May 31. When Alta personnel arrived at the construction site at approximately 0500 PDT Tuesday morning, they discovered that the storage container lock (a hidden shank/"hockey puck" style) was drilled through and the locked transportation case containing the gauge was removed, along with other equipment. Alta personnel searched the surrounding area until approximately 0630 PDT and then contacted the Riverside County Sheriff to report the theft. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health. 5010 Number: 053122 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5590219 May 2022 11:45:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On May 18, 2022, at approximately 1450 (EDT), an electrical switch for the Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) legacy speakers was noted to be out of its normal position. A functional redundant speaker system is installed in the main processing plant and laboratory. As a consequence of the switch being out of position, in the highly unlikely event that the CAAS had actuated, the alarm would not have been annunciated in areas outside of the main processing area and laboratory where there are no redundant speakers. Compliance was restored at approximately 1500 (EDT) when the switch was placed back in its normal position. The system was subsequently tested and confirmed to be operational. The most recent audibility test of the speaker system had been performed on May 13, 2022, at approximately 1100 (EDT). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector on May 18, 2022, at approximately 1625 (EDT). There were no actual nuclear safety consequences. The potential consequence was that, in the event of a nuclear criticality accident, evacuation could have been delayed for those personnel outside of the main processing area where redundant speakers have not been installed.
ENS 558876 May 2022 17:21:00The following was received from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the "Agency") via email: On 05/06/2022, at 1340 EDT, the Agency received a call from RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) at Thermo Scientific Portable Analytical Instrument, Inc. (the `licensee') reporting a leaking sealed source. The 20-year-old source/device (Thermo Scientific Portable Analytical Instruments, Inc.; Model XLi 969; Device s/n 5243; Source s/n EG-8804) is currently containing 0.12 mCi of Fe-55 (original activity was 20 mCi on 04/07/2002). The RSO received the leak test report on 05/06/2022 and he noticed that the source is leaking as 0.0058 microcuries of removal activity which is in excess of regulatory limits (0.005 microcuries). This device was sent to the licensee for decommissioning and was received from the licensee's customer on 04/21/2022. The source was removed from the device as part of decommissioning. There was no external contamination spread outside of the device or surrounding work area surfaces. The source will be secured and properly disposed of in accordance with the regulations.
ENS 558856 May 2022 16:36:00

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the agency) via email: The Agency was contacted on 5/5/22, by GE Healthcare to advise that a radiopharmaceutical package was damaged in transit and reported as lost at the carrier's facility. GE Healthcare reports the 6 inch x 6 inch package (UN2915, Type A Package, Yellow II, TI 0.1) was shipped from Arlington Heights, IL to Richland, MS on 5/3/22. The package contained a lead shielded container with 1.956 mCi of In-111 (activity at the time of shipment on 5/3/22). The package reportedly arrived in one piece at the (common carrier's) Memphis hub on 5/3/22. On 5/5/22, the carrier advised the licensee that they had found the damaged package at their Memphis hub with its inner contents missing. Dangerous Goods is currently working with the shipper and conducting a search of the facility. The package now contains approximately 1.2 mCi (of In-111). There is no indication of intentional theft or diversion, and the contents would not be useful for illicit intent. This matter has a 30-day reporting requirement to the US NRC. Updates will be provided as they become available. Item Number: IL220015

  • * * UPDATE ON 6/6/22 AT 1106 FROM GARY FORSEE TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the agency) via email: On 6/6/22, the licensee provided the required written report. The carrier has not provided any updates and the package is still lost. At this point, the radioactive material has decayed to less than 0.5 uCi. Pending no additional developments, this matter is considered closed. Notified R3DO (Szwarc) and R1DO (Grieves), and NMSS Event Notifications and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 558774 May 2022 20:47:00The following was received from the California Department of Public Health, Radiologic Health Branch via email: On May 4, 2022, the Radiation Safety Officer for Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, Inc. (EZIP) contacted Los Angeles County Radiation Management regarding two missing sources. Pennsylvania licensee Abington Jefferson Health, located in North Wales, PA, shipped a package on October 21, 2021, and (the common carrier) tracking information indicated the package was delivered to EZIP with no receipt signature on October 22, 2021. Abington Jefferson Health contacted EZIP on November 10, 2021, requesting a receipt for confirmation of the returned sources. The sources were two gadolinium-153 line sources, with approximately 13 millicuries (mCi) each (greater than 1000 times the Appendix C value of 10 microCi). EZIP did not have a record of receipt of the package, and a search of the EZIP facility did not find the sources. The notification to Los Angeles County Radiation Management by EZIP was delayed due to confusion by EZIP regarding whether the package had been returned to Abington Jefferson Health by (the common carrier). 5010 Number: 050422 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 558764 May 2022 19:31:00The following was received from the California Department of Public Health Radiologic, Health Branch via email: The Radiation Safety Officer for UCSD ((University of California, San Diego)) contacted the Radiologic Health Branch regarding the loss of I-125 sealed sources. He also reported the loss to the CA State Warning Center (control no. 22-2532). A medical physicist at the Moore's Cancer Center at UCSD received a box that contained 4 packs of I-125 sealed sources instead of his expectation of 3 packs. The medical physicist removed 3 packs and set the packing box outside for recycling, believing it was empty. The cardboard box was taken away by environmental services staff and has possibly been taken to the on-campus recycling center. The pack contains approximately 6-7 I-125 medical brachytherapy seeds with combined activity of 2.3 millicuries. The seeds are sealed in a shielded, sterile pack. The expected exposure level is close to background radiation level outside of the shielded pack. UCSD sent health physicists to the recycling center to search for the missing package. 5010 Number: 050322 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5597230 June 2022 14:21:00The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report the occurrence of an invalid automatic actuation satisfying the reporting criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), specifically for the actuation of one train of the Essential Service Water (ESW) system that occurred on May 1, 2022. On May 1, 2022, with the plant shut down and the core offloaded, control room personnel were performing a fast power transfer from Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) transformer XNB02 to ESF transformer XNB01. In anticipation of this activity, the `B' load shedder and emergency load sequencer (LSELS) had been removed from service. Also, at the time, a portion of the `A' ESW train was isolated to support performance of a local leak rate test (LLRT) of a containment isolation valve in the affected portion of `A' ESW train piping. Service Water was supplying cooling water flow to `A' train loads (in lieu of ESW cooling water). When the power transfer was performed, an unexpected automatic start of the `A' ESW pump, along with some associated, automatic valve repositioning, occurred. The actuation occurred due to inadvertent satisfaction of automatic start logic for the ESW pump. The logic is intended to detect loss of ESW flow when the opposite train LSELS isolates Service Water during an undervoltage condition on a safety bus. The flow transmitter involved in the actuation is situated in a portion of the ESW piping that was isolated for the LLRT. The low-flow signal from the transmitter was consequently not reflective of low cooling water flow to plant loads in light of the fact that cooling water flow was being supplied to plant loads and the transmitter was locally isolated. In regard to the ESW train actuation, therefore, although the undervoltage signal was considered a valid signal due to the voltage drop caused by the fast transfer activity, the low-flow signal from the noted transmitter was considered to be invalid. For this invalid actuation, it was concluded that the actuation was not part of a pre-planned sequence, that the affected system was not properly removed from service during the occurrence, and that the safety function had not already been performed relative to the occurrence. (The) NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and an email of this report has been sent to hoo.hoc@nrc.gov.
ENS 5586629 April 2022 00:19:00

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: On 04/28/22, at 2355 EDT, with both Sequoyah Unit 1 and 2 in Mode-1, 100 percent, a Notice of Unusual Event was declared due to receiving two seismic alarms and security feeling ground movement. Additionally, security in a tower heard an explosion. Both units remain in Mode-1, 100 percent and they are investigating the validity of the seismic alarms before proceeding with the Abnormal Operating Procedure required shutdown. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 04/29/2022 AT 0410 EDT FROM BRIAN KLEIN TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via telephone: On 4/29/22, at 0406 EDT, Sequoyah Unit 1 and Unit 2 terminated the Notice of Unusual Event. The Civil Engineers determined that the alarms were due to a failed seismic indicator channel. Through interviews, only one security officer felt ground movement for a couple of seconds and heard a faint rumbling sound. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. The state of Tennessee and the Tennessee Valley Authority were notified. Notified R2DO (Miller), NRR EO (Miller), and IR MOC (Gott) via email. Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, FEMA NWC (email), DHS NRCC THD Desk(email), and DHS Nuclear SSA (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 05/02/2022 AT 2118 EDT FROM SCOTT SEAL TO LLOYD DESOTELL * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: SQN (Sequoyah Nuclear Plant) is retracting the previous NOUE (Notice of Unusual Event) declaration made on 4/28/22 at 2355 (EDT) based on Emergency Action Level HU2 for a seismic event greater than Operating Basis Earthquake levels. Following the declaration of the NOUE, the station reviewed all available indications and determined that a seismic event had not occurred. The instrumentation failure was documented under Event Notification #55867. Notified R2DO (Miller), and IR MOC (Gott), NRR EO (Miller) via email.

ENS 559263 June 2022 20:32:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The following event description is based on information currently available. If, through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe invalid actuations of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 1 B Train Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system and Essential Spray Pond (ESP) system that occurred while in a refueling outage. On April 11, 2022, at approximately 2045 Mountain Standard Time, an automatic start of the Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP systems occurred during restoration from a surveillance test. The station was conducting a surveillance test during a Unit 1 refueling outage to verify the proper responses of the Engineered Safety Features Actuation Systems to simulated design basis events. The test portion was completed satisfactorily; however, during the restoration portion, the load sequencer inadvertently cycled between Mode 0 and Mode 1 three times in immediate succession. At the time of the system actuations, one of the actuation signals associated with this portion of the test had been reset per procedure. Another actuation signal was still in while restoration steps were ongoing, but the sequencer was not expected to cycle between Modes. The system actuations did not occur as a result of actual plant conditions or parameters and are therefore invalid. The Unit 1 B Train AF and ESP system actuations were complete and the systems started and functioned successfully. For the systems that did not actuate, the reasons are clearly understood as those systems were in an overridden condition due to test configuration. The spurious actuation was not able to be replicated and a direct cause was not identified. There were no adverse impacts to public health and safety nor to plant employees. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed.
ENS 558909 May 2022 12:36:00The following is a summary received from the New Mexico Environmental Protection Division (the agency) via phone: On 05/09/22, at 0934 MDT, the agency was notified of an industrial radiography event that occurred on 04/11/22. The licensee reported a mechanical equipment failure and that no exposure occurred. The agency is en route to follow-up and gather additional details on the event. The agency also notified R4 (Erickson).
ENS 558215 April 2022 06:08:00The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone and email: On 4/5/2022, at time 0223, during maintenance on Feedwater Level Control Valve 2FWS-LV10B, a Feedwater transient occurred resulting in an RPS Automatic Reactor Scram on Low Level (Level 3, 159.3 inches). Following the scram, reactor water level dropped below Level 2 (108.8 inches) resulting in a Group 2 Recirculation Sample System Isolation, Group 3 TIP ((Traversing Incore Probe)) Isolation Valve Isolation, Group 6 and 7 Reactor Water Cleanup Isolation and Group 9 Containment Purge Isolations. All control rods inserted as expected. High Pressure Core Spray and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling initiated and injected as expected. ECCS Systems have been secured and normal reactor pressure and level control has been established for hot shutdown. Nine Mile Point Unit 2 is stable in Mode 3. These 4 hour and 8-hour non-emergency ENS ((Emergency Notification System)) reports are being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident was informed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: There was no impact on Unit 1.
ENS 558194 April 2022 10:57:00

The following information was received from the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via email: Report of a leaking General License Ni-63 source (Model: G2397A, S/N: U3951) on an Electron Capture Detector. The source was returned to the manufacturer. Leak test result: 20 microcuries (740 kBq) NMED Item Number: OH220004

  • * * UPDATE ON 4/5/22 AT 1413 EDT FROM S. JAMES TO T. HERRITY * * *

UPDATES/CORRECTIONS ON LICENSEE NAME, ACTIVITY AND LEAK TEST RESULTS: Leak test was taken on Electron Capture Detector (ECD) in storage as part of 6-month cycle. ECD contained 15 mCi Ni-63 source. Results came back indicating leaking source at 2000 pCi. No contamination of the ECD was found. The ECD will be permanently taken out of service and returned to manufacturer. Licensee name updated to full name: Eurofins Environment Testing North Central, LLC Notified R3DO (McCraw) and NMSS Events via email.

ENS 5585825 April 2022 11:31:00The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: GE Healthcare in Arlington Heights, IL shipped a Type A package containing one (1) 10mL vial of Indium-111 liquid within a standard 6mm lead shielded container on 3/4/22 to Cardinal Health in Sioux Falls, SD. The outer package is a corrugate box, measuring (L)16.1 x (W)16.1 x (H)16.5cm. The last viable scan was 3/7/22 at the (common carrier) hub under tracking number 270485520236. At the time of shipment, the package contained 3.201 mCi, but is decayed at the time of writing this report to 0.58 mCi. The package was expected to arrive 3/7/22. After no available status updates, (common carrier) dangerous goods advised GE Healthcare to consider the package lost in transit. The licensee reported the matter timely. The licensee advised there were no available updates as of 4/11/22. There have been no available updates since this date and this package is considered lost in transit. The activity is now less than 1.0 microcurie and does not represent a significant public hazard. This matter is considered closed. The package has now decayed beneath the NRC reportable quantity and does not represent a significant radiation hazard. No indication of intentional theft or diversion and the contents would not be useful to illicit intent. Illinois Event Number: IL220010 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5592031 May 2022 17:10:00

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) via email: The RSO ((Radiation Safety Officer)) for the licensee contacted IEMA to report that on March 2, 2022, a patient was administered a 100 mCi I-131 dose. A pregnancy test was performed in advance of the administration and indicated negative (not pregnant). On April 13, 2022, the RSO received a call notifying him the patient was determined to be 7 days pregnant when the administration occurred. The patient was informed and returned to the hospital to do a whole-body count as a means to estimate biological half-life. The licensee has calculated upwards of 20 microCi of I-131 was retained by week eleven of the pregnancy and 75 percent was taken up by the fetus. Dose prior to eleven weeks was reportedly estimated as that to the maternal uterus (ICRP 88 states this is accurate to 8 weeks). It is unclear if the calculation methodology used was consistent with RG 8.36 (NUREG/CR-5631) or ICRP 88 but will be reviewed when staff investigate. The licensee is estimating the dose to the fetus through 12 weeks of development as 266 mGy (26.6 rads). Illinois Item Number: IL220018

  • * * UPDATE FROM GARY FORESEE TO BRIAN PARKS AT 1526 EDT ON 6/16/2022 * * *

The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IMEA) via email: A reactionary inspection was performed 6/2/22. The required 15-day report was received on 6/12/22 and put forward root cause and corrective action. The cause of the event was determined to be the ineffectiveness of the pregnancy testing policy to account for very early stage (i.e., first week of gestation) pregnancies that standard pregnancy tests cannot detect. The licensee revised its pregnancy testing policy to include patient instruction to abstain from intercourse for at least ten days prior to the administration of the dose. The licensee will be cited for failing to provide timely notification and corrective action to prevent a recurrence sought in the response. Pending no further developments and resolution of appropriate enforcement action, this matter is considered closed. Notified R3DO (Feliz-Adorno) and NMSS Events Notification E-mail Group.

ENS 5575825 February 2022 16:10:00The following information was provided by the licensee: On 2/25/22, at 1133 EDT, the Technical Support Center (TSC) high temperature alarm annunciated in the Control Room due to an equipment malfunction that resulted in an unplanned loss of the TSC for greater than seventy-five minutes. If an emergency had been declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC would have been staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. If relocation of the TSC had been necessary, the Emergency Coordinator would have relocated the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the equipment malfunction affected the functionality of an emergency response facility. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5575725 February 2022 14:53:00The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: A non-licensee contractor supervisor had a confirmed positive for a controlled substance during a fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5596728 June 2022 11:28:00The following is a summary of a report received from Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (the Bureau) via email: On February 24, 2022, at 0920 EST, the Vice-President of Imaging Physics at Landauer Medical Physics at the Cleveland Clinic Martin South Hospital called the Bureau to report a missing source. A 15 mCi Co-57 Med 3709 (s/n 2281-093, reference date February 1, 2022) source was ordered from Primestar to be delivered to the Nuclear Medicine (NM) Department. The order shipped January 12, 2022, at 1104 EST, and delivery was signed for, but the individual who signed for delivery did not remember seeing a radioactive box. The source was never received in NM. The South Hospital facility and all other NM departments checked for the source the week of the February 14 but were unable to locate it. The source was considered missing/lost by February 21, 2022. The Bureau received an update on February 25, 2022, at 1647 EST. The Department Heads met to see how something could be received and not accounted for. The theory was that the person that signed for the package did not have the best handwriting, and the intraoffice label may have been misunderstood, sending it to nutrition instead of nuclear. A search of the nutrition storage shed at the South Hospital revealed the source. The shed is a secure, unoccupied space away from any staff, with limited access. This incident is considered closed. Florida Incident Number: FL22-027
ENS 557357 February 2022 15:49:00The following information was provided by the licensee via telefone: A non-licensed contractor superintendent had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a for-cause fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5566821 December 2021 11:13:00The following was received from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) via e-mail: On December 20, 2021, at approximately 1:55 pm, Central Standard Time, (the) Radiation Safety Officer for Rubicon, LLC, notified LDEQ of equipment malfunctions. Three Ohmart Model SH-F1 level/density gauges experienced shutter malfunctions, two installed on a vessel within the MDI-III process unit and one Model SH-F1 gauge installed on a vessel in the MDI-I processing unit. The gauges in the MDI-III unit possess two nominally 20 mCi sealed sources of Cs-137 and the gauge in MDI-I possesses a nominally 70 mCi sealed source of Cs-137. The above gauges were undergoing routine annual shutter tests when the above malfunctions were observed. The first gauge sealed source, 1566CG, installed on October 15, 2001, item 73 on the licensee's source inventory, is mounted on vessel MM-9303 in the MDI-3 unit. The second gauge source, 1567CG, installed on October 15, 2001, item 74 on the licensee's source inventory, is also mounted on vessel MM-9303. The third gauge source, 72930, installed on January 19, 1998, item 38 on the licensee's source inventory, is mounted on the P1 PI scrubber in the MDI-1 unit. (The) Zone Maintenance Coordinator, notified (the RSO) concerning the shearing of screws even with the top of each rotor on the two gauges in the MDI-III unit. (The Zone Maintenance Coordinator) also reported to the RSO that the source holder in the MDI-1 unit experienced a problem with the rotor mechanism not aligning with the shutter handle, which prevented the gauge shutter from closing fully. (The Zone Maintenance Coordinator) learned of the malfunctions during annual inventory work and reported the problem to the RSO on December 16, 2021 at approximately 2:30 pm. The situation with each gauge is under the licensee's control, and there were no exposures to members of the public approaching regulatory limits. Currently, the shutters on gauges, 73, 74, and 38 remain in the open position, as the gauge sources are needed to operate process control equipment. The gauges cannot be locked out in their current state. As a result, no vessel entries will be conducted on either vessel MM-9303 or the P1 PI scrubber vessel until the gauges are repaired by BBP Sales (BBP). Work orders have been written to correct the malfunction of all three devices. The licensee will continue to monitor the gauges and their status of repair. The licensee stated they would keep the LDEQ updated on progress of the repairs." Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA 210012
ENS 556874 January 2022 13:47:00The following was received from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (the Bureau) via email: On Friday, December 31, 2021, the Bureau was contacted by (the Radiation Safety Officer) to report a medical event at Horizon Medical Services that occurred on December 15, 2021. The medical event was the (high dose rate therapy) treatment of the incorrect hand using iridium-192 to a single dose fraction of 250 cGy ((250 rem)) to a depth of 3mm below the skin surface. The licensee's report to the Bureau stated, "Remedial action included an immediate in-service discussion of this event with the entire clinical staff to verify the correct anatomical treatment site regarding all patient prescriptions. The patient has been informed of this medical event. Florida Incident No.: FL 21-152 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5570212 January 2022 09:44:00The following is a summary of information received from the licensee via telephonic communication: On December 10, 2021, 15 packages were scheduled to be delivered by a common carrier to multiple locations in New York. It was then discovered that two packages were missing. The packages contained 44 mCi of Ga-67 and 7.2 mCi of Cu-64, both in liquid form and used for nuclear medicine diagnostic testing. The carrier investigated and searched for the packages but was unable to locate them and they were declared lost on Dec. 17, 2021. The licensee will notify the Region III office and the New York Department of Health. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5560424 November 2021 09:05:00

The following was received via email from the Mississippi State Department of Health (the agency) via email: On 22 November 2021, the licensee notified the Agency by email regarding an incident that took place on 19 November 2021. The (Berthold Technologies) reciprocity crew, working under reciprocal recognition, was conducting turn around, replacing three gauge systems at the Licensee plant's Operating Processes. Two of the three sources retracted while one source was discovered to be stuck in the dip tube (Source Information: Co-60, 7.43 mCi, Manufacturer/Model: EG&G Berthold Model P-2608-100, Serial #: 1540-08-05, Device Information: Manufacturer EG&G Berthold, Device Model#: LB 7671, Serial Number: TBD). Reciprocity personnel attempted to dislodge the source to get it to retract but all attempts failed. The technician attached a blind plate (surveys below background) to prevent access and he documented surveys which the reciprocity personnel stated will be provided at a later time. According to the reciprocity licensee personnel, surveys were approximately 0.2 to 0.3 mR/hr at the detector side. Licensee personnel stated that the source is secured and remains shielded. Reciprocity licensee stated that they will continue to consider options to dislodge the source. The investigation into this event is ongoing and information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Mississippi Item Number: MS-210003

  • * * RETRACTION ON January 10, 2022 AT 1726 EST FROM ROBERT SIMS TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

The following information was received from the Mississippi State Department of Health (the agency) via e-mail: Investigation findings indicate this event is not reportable. The highest survey reading is 0.2 mR per hour. This does not exceed public dose limit or an exposure that would cause a 25 milllirem TEDE. It is not lost or stolen. The source activity is 0.64 mCi. The source is at the top of the dip tube in the normal operating position in a safe position. The tank is approximately 30 foot tall and 20 foot wide in which the tank and the fluid is shielding the low activity source. The source will not expose the workers. The tank and gauge are on the 3rd floor of the refinery and only RSO's and workers supervised by RSO are allowed in this area. The engineer tried to remove it from this position for a scheduled source change out, and it could not be removed. At present, without shutting the production line down which makes plastic, this could cause a revenue loss of millions of dollars to the company. In the opinion of the Mississippi Health Physicist, this is not reportable. It does not meet SA 300 reporting requirements. The RSO has agreed to perform surveys at shift change and report any changes. This event is closed. If any changes occur and are reported. The agency will meet reporting requirements. Notified R4DO (Groom) and NMSS Events (by email).

ENS 556369 December 2021 13:30:00The following is a summary of telephonic information received from the U.S. Army: On December 9, 2021, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified that a range indicator for a mortar system, containing a 3.2 Curie Tritium source, had been lost for over a year at the Iowa National Guard in Johnston. The indicator is not removable, so it is unclear how it was lost. Army leadership became aware on November 3, 2021, and a search began. The RSO was notified that the search was concluded, and the source is considered lost. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5548117 September 2021 22:14:00

The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: On September 17, 2021, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a Troxler 3411 moisture density gauge containing a 40 milliCurie americium - 241 source and an 8 milliCurie cesium - 137 source was damaged at a temporary job site. The licensee reported that while the gauge was sitting on the ground and not being used it was run over by a bulldozer, snapping the operating arm of the cesium source. The source was in the shielded position when the event occurred and a radiation survey of the gauge after the event verified it was still fully shielded. The licensee stated the gauge would be returned to its storage location and arrangements would be made to have the gauge disposed of. No individual received an exposure that exceeded any limit. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident No.: 9885

  • * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO THOMAS HERRITY AT 11:23 ON 09/20/21 * * *

The following information was received via e-mail: Received pictures of the gauge. Pictures show the rod for the cesium source was bent. The dose rate meter appears to be reading 0.8 millirem per hour. Notified R4DO (YOUNG) and NMSS Events Notification group.

ENS 5543529 August 2021 19:49:00

Waterford 3 shut down the reactor in preparation for Hurricane Ida landfall prior to this event. At 1812 CDT, Waterford 3 declared a notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1 due to a loss of offsite power as a result of hurricane Ida. Plant power is being provided via emergency diesel generators. The NRC Activated at 2016 EDT with Region IV in the lead. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 9/1/21 AT 0132 EDT FROM ALEX SANDOVAL TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

At 2345 CDT on 8/31/21, Waterford 3 terminated their notification of unusual event under EAL S.U. 1.1. Offsite power has been restored to both safety-related electrical buses. The NRC remains Activated with Region IV in the lead while reviewing additional criteria to exit Activation. Notified DHS SWO, DOE Ops Center, FEMA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, CISA Central, USDA Ops Center, EPA Emergency Ops Center, DHS Nuclear SSA (email), FEMA NWC (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email), R4DO (Josey), IR MOC (Kennedy), NRR EO (Miller), R4 (Lantz).

ENS 554009 August 2021 12:26:00The following was received from Kentucky Radiation Health Branch (KY RHB) via email: At approximately 0950 EDT, the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) of East Kentucky Power KU (Kentucky Utility) Central Lab called the Kentucky Radiation Health Branch staff to report a Perkin Elmer (gas chromatograph) Model N61000063, s/n 2089, possible leak of the Ni-63 source. A review of the most recent leak test dated 7/29/21, with results of 1.49E-3 microCi, indicated an increase in removable activity when compared to report dated 2/20/21, which demonstrated removable activity of 2.70E-5 microCi. The level of activity removed reported to be 1.49E-3 microCi and did not exceed the reporting requirements of 0.005 (5.0E-3) microCi. The RSO made arrangements for disposition of materials and will provide that document when completed. KY RHB file created for documentation and historical record. These sources had a history of reports as noted in an 8-1-2001 NRC memo. Kentucky Incident #: 2100003
ENS 5537522 July 2021 20:28:00On July 20, 2021, at 1707 EDT, an apparent non-compliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, section III.G.2 (separation of redundant fire safe shutdown equipment) was identified. This issue was initially categorized as not affecting train separation or the ability of the equipment to perform their Design Basis functions. The original concern was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR1177199. Subsequently, on July 22, 2021, at 1751 EDT, a further review of the affected control circuits for the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) output breakers and emergency bus feeder breakers identified a concern that breaker position interlocks routed to or through non-safety related components or spaces may affect the ability to provide emergency power on the affected unit due to impacts on the control power circuits during an Appendix R fire associated with a loss of offsite power. The following are the affected fire areas: - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Turbine Buildings - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Cable Spreading Rooms - Unit 1 and Unit 2 Normal (307) Switchgear Rooms This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This is also reportable as a 60-day written report pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B). This event was entered into the licensee's Corrective Action Program as CR 1177399. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.
ENS 5537322 July 2021 15:49:00The following was received from the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP) via email: On July 22, 2021, at 0950 EDT, VRMP received a report via telephone from the Radiological Duty Officer of the Virginia Office of Radiological Health that a portable nuclear moisture/density gauge was damaged when hit by a car at a temporary jobsite. At 1000 EDT, the VRMP contacted the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of the licensee. The RSO stated that a Troxler density gauge (Model 4640-B, serial number 2266, containing 8 milliCuries of cesium-137) was hit by a car at a temporary jobsite. The gauge housing was damaged, but the source appeared to remain intact within the safe position. The licensee's survey of the gauge yielded readings of 0.02 mR/hr at about a foot distance from the gauge. The gauge was taken to the licensee's office in its transport container. A survey was also performed on the ground and the reading was reported as background. The gauge will be tested for leakage and after testing, it will be sent to the Troxler Electronics Laboratories for evaluation. The VRMP is working with the licensee to obtain additional information. This report will be updated once the licensee's investigation is complete and the information is received by the VRMP. According to the RSO, no public or personnel exposure occurred. Event Report ID No.: VA210004
ENS 5537021 July 2021 20:50:00At 1826 EDT on July 21, 2021, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. Unit 1 reactor was operating at 100 percent reactor power with no evolutions in progress. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of RPS (Reactor Protection System) actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on EOC-RPT (end of cycle recirculation pump trip). Reactor water level lowered to +8 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling Systems) or RCIC (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system) actuations occurred. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3 with main condenser available. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to PEMA will be made. This event requires a 4 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8 hour ENS notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 5536620 July 2021 19:44:00The following synopsis was received from the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (the department) via phone: The department was notified that the licensee was performing radiography shots with a QSA 880D (s/n #: D11621) at the pipeline just outside Ringgold, LA. When attempting to retract, the drive cable connector came off, leaving the 73 Ci Ir-192 source (s/n: 31880M) in the collimator. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was notified and arrived to retrieve the source. The RSO covered the source with bags of lead shot and replaced the drive cable. The source was disconnected from the source cable and retrieved with tongs. The two radiographers received 30 and 29 mrem. The RSO received 189 mrem. Since the pipeline is in an isolated area, there were no other workers or member of the public around.
ENS 5548017 September 2021 16:55:00

During routine Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) maintenance on July 20, 2021, UUSA ((URENCO USA)) staff identified an area in which the CAAS alarm was not clearly audible. The alarm was (and is) functioning, but not at an adequate level of sound pressure to meet the acceptance criteria. UUSA arranged compensatory measures which achieve an equivalent safety function within 24 hours in the affected area. The affected area was in the Immediate Evacuation Zone (IEZ), outside of the area in which licensed special nuclear material is handled, used, or stored. On September 16, 2021, an NRC inspector conducting an onsite inspection informed UUSA staff that given the potential that the alarm had not been clearly audible for a period of time between surveillances, this event should have been reported within 24 hours to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when required by regulation (10 CFR 70.24). The licensee will notify the NRC Region 2.

  • * * UPDATE ON 11/8/21 AT 1502 FROM BLAKE BIXEMAN TO KERBY SCALES * * *

During the Apparent Cause Evaluation related to Event Notification 55480, an extent of condition was performed. This extent of condition revealed three historical examples of inaudible CAAS alarms that were not reported under 10 CFR 70.50(b)(2) as required by regulation. These conditions occurred on April 12th, 2014, August 15th, 2014, and August 20th, 2015. Corrective actions were implemented for these deficiencies during the approximate time period in which they were identified. The affected systems are currently compliant with 10 CFR 70.24 regulations. Details of this extent of condition are documented in UUSA's Corrective Action Program, EV 148663. The licensee notified NRC Region 2 personnel. Notified R2DO (Miller) and NMSS Event Notifications via email.

ENS 5536821 July 2021 17:21:00The following was received from the California Department of Public Health via email: A medical event per 10 CFR 35.3045 was determined to have occurred on July 20, 2021, during a liver cancer therapy procedure using Y-90 Nordion TheraSpheres via manual brachytherapy under 10CFR35.1000. Dose 1: AU prescribed activity of 109.5 mCi of Y-90 to the patient's liver: right lobe segments 5 and 8 and successfully delivered 104 mCi (95 percent). Dose 2: AU prescribed 153.0 mCi of Y-90 to the patient's liver: right lobe segments 6 and 7, but could only deliver 68.5 mCi (44.8 percent). During the procedure, blockage occurred in the delivery apparatus, specifically the microcatheter, that the authorized user was unable to clear to complete the procedure. Pre and post-procedural vial measurements were performed using a calibrated ion chamber by a trained CNMT (Certified Nuclear Medicine Technologist) on July 20, 2021. 5010 Number: 072121 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5535415 July 2021 10:11:00The following was received from the Ohio Department of Health via email: A patient whose thyroid had been removed was to receive treatment for the remaining nodules. The WD ((written directive)) prescribed 30 mCi I-131 NaI. However the licensee ordered and administered 100 mCi. The expected whole body dose is 26.64 rem and dose to the bladder wall is 225.7 rad. Item Number: OH210006 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5537422 July 2021 20:11:00The following was received from the California Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) via email: The licensee reported that on 7/13/2021, they received an externally contaminated package containing two unit doses of F-18 (110 minute T1/2 (half life)). The licensee's receipt survey found the outer surface removable contamination level to be 5,417,497 dpm per 100 sq cm. The inside of the package, including the F-18 vials, were not contaminated. The radiopharmacy courier was informed of the excessive contamination, and the radiopharmacy was contacted. The package radiation levels were acceptable. The package was received from Optimal Tracers (CA-RML 7975). RHB will investigate this matter further, including onsite at Optimal Tracers' facility. 5010 Number: 071921
ENS 5535515 July 2021 10:42:00The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email: On July 13, 2021, the licensee discovered a stuck shutter in the open position during a 6 month shutter test. This is the normal operating position and there is not expected to be any additional dose outside of normal operations to workers or public. The device was a Vega SH-F2B density/level gauge (serial number 3578CR), with a 200 mCi CS-137 source (serial number 3578CR). Texas incident number: I-9869
ENS 553489 July 2021 16:15:00The following was received from the Alabama Department of Public Health (the agency) via email: An agency representative received a call about 1400 CDT from the RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) of International Paper Company, license no. 222, in Pine Hill, Alabama. The RSO stated that a fixed gauge was discovered with its shutter stuck open about 1000 CDT on 7/9/2021. The RSO stated that the gauge is located on functioning process equipment; there are no health and safety issues. The RSO stated that the gauge will have shielding added, be removed, and placed in storage on the plant site, on Monday, 7/12/2021. The gauge is an Ohmart SH-L1-0 s/n M6846 with a cesium-137 source, 80 mCi on 8/1992. Alabama Event 21-22
ENS 5547017 September 2021 13:46:00The following was received from the Colorado Department of Health via email: Two exit signs, containing 7.09 Ci of tritium each, were reported as lost during annual registration. The owner recalled that the signs had been removed many years ago. NMED No.: CO210020 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5547917 September 2021 13:46:00The following was received from the Colorado Department of Health via email: Two exit signs, containing 6.2 Ci of tritium each, reported as lost during the annual registration. Licensee is unable to locate. NMED No.: CO210023 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5547817 September 2021 13:46:00The following was received from the Colorado Department of Health via email: Two exit signs, containing 9.2 Ci and 10 Ci of tritium, reported as lost during the annual registration. The timeframe of removal is unknown. NMED No.: CO210022 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf