Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 40197 | 24 September 2003 16:52:00 | Notifications will be made to the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Brigintine Marine Mammal Stranding Center due to a live sea turtle retrieved from the Oyster Creek dilution plant. This notification and report is required by the Oyster Creek Environmental Technical Specifications. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40170 | 18 September 2003 15:43:00 | The following was received via fax from the licensee: As of 2:33 PM EDT, more than 20% of the offsite emergency sirens were inoperable for greater than one hour due to loss of power caused by Hurricane Isabel. Currently 27 of 81 sirens are out of service. The State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone were notified and are in stand-by to implement mobile route alerting if needed. At this time, Harris cannot estimate the time of siren recovery. This requires an 8-hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed.
The licensee is updating this report to include that less than 20% of the emergency sirens are inoperable as of 2000 hours 9/18/03. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Boland). |
| ENS 40166 | 17 September 2003 17:44:00 | The Indian Point Unit 2 Technical Specification 3.14.A requires prompt notification of the NRC when hurricane force winds are within 500 nautical miles of the plant. Indian Point will continue to monitor the situation and update as necessary. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40169 | 18 September 2003 12:33:00 | The following was received via email from the State of Illinois: On 9/16/2003, the agency was contacted by (DELETED) RSO at the Chicago Prostate Cancer Center in Westmont, IL (IL-02015-01). He indicated that on 9/11/2003, a package of unused radioactive seeds was being prepared to be returned to Amersham Health/Medi Physics in Arlington Heights, IL. At that time they noted that the package contained only 6 'strands' of sources whereas the paperwork for receipt on 9/4/2003 indicated 7 'strands' of sources to be present. The I-125 seeds are contained in a special rigid plastic carrier. This carrier has a marketing name of 'rapid strand'. Each 'strand' contains ten I-125 seeds in a rigid plastic holder which is then placed in a stainless steel holder with an opening at one end. When the seeds are in the holder, radiation readings are at or very near background levels of radiation. This holder has been sterilized at Medi Physics and as a result it is placed in a sealed pouch until it is ready to be used in the operating room. A full description with some diagrams can be found at http://www.hsrd.ornl.gov/sources/pdf/01360338.pdf. The package containing the six strands of seeds was picked up by Federal Express and returned to Medi Physics on 9/17/2003. (DELETED), RSO of Medi Physics participated in the inspection of the package to be sure that the problem was not just an administrative error. His inspection did not turn up the missing 7th strand. An inspection of previously used shipping containers from this site that had been returned to Medi Physics did not result in the recovery of the missing strand either. (DELETED) also had production perform an accounting check as well to see if perhaps only 6 strands had been originally shipped as a mistake. The check showed no outstanding seeds or strands from that lot that could not be accounted for, or shipped to another client as a result of a substitution. An agency inspector also visited the Chicago Prostate Cancer Center in Westmont on 9/17/2003 and attempted to locate the strand through radiation monitoring. He was not successful in recovering the strand. As a result, one strand containing a total activity of 5.94 (milliCuries) mCi (10 seeds with 594 micro Curie each) is missing. The licensee will continue its attempts to locate the missing seeds and will keep the agency updated with its efforts. The licensee was also advised that a written report is due to the Agency in 30 days. |
| ENS 40141 | 9 September 2003 00:01:00 | The following was received via fax from the California Radiation Control office: At about 9:30 a.m. on 09-08-03, an Ir-192 source (4.6 Ci (Curie)) failed to retract following a patient treatment. The source became stuck in the transfer tube. The physicist started his stopwatch, entered the room and attempted to manually retract the source. Manual retract failed. The physicist called the physician, who was waiting outside the room. The physician entered the room and disconnected the apparatus from the patient and dropped the transfer tube into a lead pig. The physicist and physician moved the patient out of the room. The physicist stopped the watch and it showed that 2 minutes had elapsed. The physicist surveyed the patient and obtained no measurement above background. The physicist re-entered the room and performed a radiation survey, and found the hot spot along the transfer tube to be in the pig. The pig measured 10 mR (millirem) /hr at 3 feet. The room was locked and posted until arrival of the manufacturer's representative, who also was unable to make the source retract. The manufacturer's representative placed the transfer tube into a shipping container and shipped it back to the manufacturer for further investigation. Doses to the patient, physicist and physician were estimated as follows: patient skin dose (10cm from source for 2 minutes) = 9 rem; physicist for 2 minutes = 45 mrem (millirem); physician 125 mrem (millirem) whole body and 15 rem extremity. The device used was a Nucleotron MicroSelectron HDR (High Dose Rate) model number 31324 (Serial Number D36A4476). The malfunction of the device is under investigation. |
| ENS 40131 | 4 September 2003 04:18:00 | The following was received via fax from the licensee: Radiation protection technician passed away due to what appears to be a heart attack. On-site emergency medical attention was given and the individual was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. Although this event occurred on-site, the individual was not within the Controlled Access Area (CAA) and was not contaminated. The licensee made an offsite notification to the Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) and notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40130 | 3 September 2003 21:57:00 | The following report was submitted by the licensee via fax: This 24-hour report is being made as required by Braidwood Unit 1 License Condition 2.G and Braidwood Unit ~ License Condition 2.G as a potential violation of the maximum power level (3586.6 MWt) as stated in Unit 1 and Unit 2 License Condition 2.C(1). Braidwood received Nuclear Safety Advisory Letter (NSAL) 03-6 from Westinghouse Electric Company. This NSAL documented that errors were found in calculations that may result in the use of a non conservatively high net heat input value to the plant calorimetric calculation. The net heat input is the difference between the reactor core power and the nuclear steam supply system power. The values used in the NSAL were based on generic values for certain operational parameters. The NSAL documented that an increase in actual reactor power could be as much as 0.4 MWt. This equates to an error in reactor power of approximately 0.011%. Braidwood reviewed the power history and 8-hour average calorimetric values on Unit 1 and Unit 2 since full power uprate was applied on each Unit. Several time periods were identified on each Unit where the 8-hour calorimetric value exceeded the license thermal power limit when the 0.011% error was added to the 8-hour calorimetric value. Therefore, the licensed power limit of 3586.6 MWt was slightly exceeded on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. The power level on both Units was reduced to less than 100% to account for the 0.4 MWt error. The calorimetric program was then updated to account for this error. This issue was identified at 0730 on September 3, 2003, and has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. Additional information will be contained in the 30-day licensee event report. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 40127 | 2 September 2003 19:11:00 | A U.S. Army Chemical Agent Alarm (SN #Z03-D-17464, Source # Z03-C-17468) has been reported missing from its unit, normally stationed in Fort Lee, Virginia. This device was sited before it was deployed overseas with the 319th Engineer Company in Kuwait. Upon its unit's return, the alarm could not be located. The device contains an Americium-241 source (300 microcuries). This alarm is used for perimeter warning of chemical attack. The U.S. Army is investigating as to the whereabouts of this device. Any findings made will be reported as updates to this event report. |
| ENS 40121 | 29 August 2003 23:37:00 | At 1505 hrs. on Friday August 29, 2003, TMI Unit 1 determined that there had been a degradation of the emergency preparedness response capabilities when there was a loss of the Emergency Notification System (ENS), the Health Physics Network (HPN) and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). In addition most site telephone lines were inoperable. The loss of these communications systems was most probably caused by a lightning strike. Limited telephonic communications remains with the TMI 1 control room, i.e., one commercial phone exchange, a satellite phone and the emergency management phone circuit remain operable. TMI 1 has verified operability of the ERO notification system (pagers), and the communication circuit used to notify the state and local counties. The siren system for local counties was unaffected by loss of site telephone systems. Plant page and radio systems remain operable. Adequate communications capabilities are operable at this time to implement the emergency plan. Repairs to restore the inoperable telephone systems are in progress at this time. A return to service time for all systems is to be determined. However, at the time of this report, the ENS line has been restored to an operable status. TMI 1 has determined that this event is reportable to the NRC as an 8-hour non-emergency report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Pennsylvania, and local authorities have been notified by the licensee.
The licensee reported that the Emergency Notification System (ENS) was restored to service on 8/29/03 at approximately 2100 hours EDT and the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) was returned to service on 8/29/03 at 2212 hours EDT. Notified R1DO (James Trapp). |
| ENS 40118 | 29 August 2003 21:08:00 | During performance of routine operability testing, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) tripped and restarted due to an as yet undetermined cause. The trip and restart sequence occurred twice in close succession approximately 20 minutes into a normal run before the operator took action to manually trip the turbine. Investigation into the cause of the malfunction is on-going. The HPCI system has been declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specifications. The operability of all other Emergency Core Cooling System components has been verified. There was never any actual coolant injection by the HPCI system during this event. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified by the licensee. The State of Massachusetts will also be notified. |
| ENS 40113 | 28 August 2003 22:01:00 | At 1618 EDT on 08/28/03, an Alert was declared at Sequoyah Unit 1 due to a failure of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) to auto-trip the reactor following a turbine trip. Turbine oil trip testing was in progress when at 1604, the main turbine tripped. The reactor trip breakers were opened by manual operator action approximately 20 seconds after the valid reactor trip signal. Following the trip, all systems operated as required. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed based on indication of steam flow and a throttled steam dump valve. No primary system or steam generator safety valves opened. The unit is currently stable with temperature controlled using atmospheric relief valves. The Auxiliary Feedwater System received an auto-start signal and successfully operated. All control rods were fully inserted into the core. There was no release of radioactive material. The licensee has initiated an investigation into the cause of the incident. The NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Tennessee were notified by the licensee. The NRC notified FEMA (Steiner), DOE (Morroni), USDA (Beers-Block), HHS (Williams), DHS (Glick), and DOT/EPA/NRC (Threatt). The NRC entered monitoring phase of normal mode with Region 2 in the lead at 1735 EDT.
At 2030 EDT on 08/28/03, the licensee terminated the Alert at Sequoyah Unit 1. The reactor is stable and in Mode 3, Hot Standby. This termination is based upon containment integrity, Emergency Core Cooling System and Engineered Safety Features operability, availability of heat sink, onsite and offsite electrical system and Emergency Diesel Generator operability, radiation monitor operability, availability of technical support personnel, and activation of a forced outage recovery team. Reactor coolant samples were taken, which showed no increase in activity. The NRC notified FEMA (Austin), DOE (Morroni), USDA (Beers-Block), HHS (Hogan), DHS (Van Buskirk), and DOT/EPA/NRC (White). The NRC exited monitoring phase of normal mode at 2045 EDT. |
| ENS 40128 | 3 September 2003 20:11:00 | Upon receiving a package (small gray suitcase) of bulk Techneticum-99m (75 millicuries), a technician at Tobey Hospital detected high surface contamination readings on the case. The case was not open and showed no damage. Hospital staff isolated the case until the shipper could arrive. The shipper, Mallinckrodt, arrived at the hospital and performed their own tests on the package. There were two "hot spots" detected: one 3.5 to 4.0 millirem/hr on contact on the plastic auxiliary pouch, and one 0.3 to 0.4 millirem/hr on the side of the suitcase. Upon opening the package, a survey of the Tc-99m pig and inside foam showed almost no contamination. The driver of the delivery truck and the vehicle were immediately surveyed and showed no detectable activity. Surveys of the hospital lab and the lab where the suitcase was packed both showed no evidence of contamination. At this time, it is uncertain as to where the contamination originated. The package has been isolated and will be allowed to decay to background before the case is returned to service. |
| ENS 40120 | 29 August 2003 22:52:00 | Subject: Event Report # WA-03-034 ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health (DOH) on-site investigation; media attention) The license's representative, (...), reported that sometime between the evening of 27 August and the morning of 28 August that a Troxler, Model 3411B, moisture density gauge, Serial Number 13050, was stolen out of the trunk of the operator's transport vehicle parked outside the operator's residence in Everett, Washington. A police report was filed on 29 August and a reward posted. The operator violated several DOH requirements that contributed to the theft to the device. DOH requires that portable gauge licensees prohibit operators from taking gauges to residences if the work site is within 50 miles of the primary storage location. The gauges must be returned to that location. This didn't happen. Also DOH requires two independent layers of protection to keep the transport box, with secured gauge inside, secured to the vehicle. The licensee had not been using the two-layer method. And, gauges are not allowed to remain in the transport vehicle overnight as did happen. The licensee will be cited for at least 3 violations as a result of the event. A full report provided by the licensee, should be in the office, by the week of 1 September. This report will be updated after that. No media attention noted at present. Corrective actions will be discussed with the licensee. What is the notification or reporting criteria involved? 24-hour Activity and Isotope(s) involved: 370 megaBq (10 millicuries) Cesium 137 and 1850 megaBq (50 millicuries) Americium 241/Beryllium. Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence) N/A Lost, Stolen or Damaged? STOLEN (mfg., model, serial number) noted above Disposition/recovery: pending Leak test? Unknown Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number) Unknown Release of activity? N/A Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: N/A Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: N/A Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A Was written report provided? Pending Was referring physician notified? N/A Consultant used? N/A |
| ENS 40112 | 28 August 2003 18:29:00 | The following report was received via fax from the Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency: On August 25, 2003, at approximately 5:30 PM, while making an exposure at valve #14 (Iverton Rd. and Contractors Way in Tucson, Arizona) the source assembly unintentionally disconnected from the drive cable in the end of the six foot collimating guide tube. The exposure device being used was an INC - IR100, SN-4015, containing a 61 Curie IR-192 source, Model #87703, capsule #08809B. A 35 foot set of NDT (Non Destructive Testing) drive cables and a NDT guide tube were being used. The source was removed from the guide tube and collimator, reattached to the drive cable and cranked back into the exposure device, plugged, locked, and the drive cables removed. Pocket dosimeters indicated that whole body exposures were approximately 30 mR (millirem) and a hand exposure to the individual recovering the source was calculated to be 200 mR. The exposure device and drive cables are being sent back to AEA in Baton Rouge, LA to determine the cause of the disconnect. |
| ENS 40096 | 22 August 2003 15:33:00 | During a recent inventory check at MacDill Air Force Base in Florida, six Chemical Agent Monitors (15 milliCuries each) containing Ni-63 were found to be missing. In February 2002, these devices were scheduled to be shipped to Kimhae, Korea. The monitors were submitted to the shipping department at that time. During an inventory check in May 2003, it was determined that these sources could not be found in either Korea or MacDill AFB. The U.S. Air Force is unsure whether the materials were lost after the shipment commenced or whether the materials were even shipped at all. Searches at a MacDill AFB warehouse are scheduled for next week in an attempt to locate these devices. The licensee notified NRC Region IV. |
| ENS 40163 | 16 September 2003 16:14:00 | U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) was notified by U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) on September 16, 2003 of an accident at Fort McCoy, WI on July 19, 2003. On July 19th, a M109 howitzer was being transported by a HumV when the HumV rolled over. Responders to the scene of the accident observed no physical damage to the M14 quadrant of the howitzer, which contains 2.2 Curies of tritium. Since no physical damage was observed, no wipe test was performed. On or near September 10, 2003, the howitzer was sent to a combined support maintenance shop (CSMS) for repair. At the CSMS site, a wipe test was performed on the quadrant (per procedure: prior to any repair on tritium fire control devices, a wipe test is performed). The quadrant was wipe tested on September 15, 2003 at a location inside the dial cavity and showed removable tritium contamination at 300,000 decades per minute. CECOM reported the incident to TACOM on September 16, 2003. Direction was given by TACOM to remove the device from the M109 howitzer, double bag it, and transfer to waste disposal. The area on the howitzer where the M14 quadrant was mounted is to be decontaminated and retested. Leak test results will be forthcoming from the CECOM lab to TACOM. |