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The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 2224 EST on February 15, 2024, with both units 1 and 2 in mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) system on 1A-A, 1B-B, and 2B-B EDGs occurred while removing clearances. The 2A-A EDG did not start because it was still under a clearance. The reason for the emergency diesel generator system auto-start was clearance removal sequencing errors. The emergency diesel generator system automatically started as designed when the common emergency start signal was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the emergency diesel generator system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

• * * RETRACTION ON 2/21/2024 AT 1549 EST FROM TYSON JONES TO KAREN COTTON * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: In accordance with NUREG-1022, Section 2.8 and Section 4.2.3, Watts Barr is retracting the previous report EN 56970 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The start signal for the 1A-A, 1B-B, and 2B-B emergency diesel generators (EDG)s was from activation of the common emergency start of the 2A-A EDG. The actuation was not from a loss of offsite power (LOOP) to any shutdown board or from any parameters that would initiate a safety injection (SI) signal, for which the EDG is designed to provide a design basis safety function. Also, the starts were not from intentional manual actuation. Starting the EDGs did not make them inoperable and each EDG was able to perform its design safety function. The common emergency start relay for each diesel is not safety related. It is an anticipatory and redundant circuit to start other EDGs in the event of a LOOP or SI related to the specific EDG. With the 2A-A EDG out of service, the associated common emergency circuit would not be required to perform any function. The starts were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Since the starts were not initiated via an automatic signal from a LOOP, SI, or traditional operator action, the signal is not a valid actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). Therefore, EN 56970 is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Miller)

The following information was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email. On Thursday, January 11, 2024, the Agency received written notification from the radiation safety officer (RSO) at a nuclear pharmacy of an elevated dosimetry badge report for a worker in Romeoville, IL. The whole body dose reported would exceed the occupational limits in 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.210. The information provided indicates the worker received 162,926 mrem during the week of December 11, 2023, which exceeds the annual limit of 5,000 mrem. This is a reportable incident under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1230, and will be reported to NRC and NMED. While an investigation is underway to determine the cause of this overexposure, after speaking with the RSO, it is likely the result of a spill/splash event. If this spill resulted in an occupational exposure in excess of the limits, it is also reportable under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(b) and will be reported to the NRC today. In the next week, Agency inspectors will perform a reactionary inspection to inspect the adequacy of the licensee's investigation, compliance with the Agency's regulations, and determine the root cause. NMED Item Number: IL240002

• * * UPDATE ON 1/24/2024 AT 1557 EST FROM GARY FORSEE TO KAREN COTTON * * *

A reactive inspection was conducted on 1/19/24. Reportedly on 12/11/2023, the technician noted a pressure issue within an F-18 synthesis cell. While containing approximately 9.9 Ci of F-18, the technician opened the synthesis cell to diagnose the issue. The magnitude of the resulting whole-body exposure is an unknown component of the reported 162 rem. Extremity badges reported only 447 mrem for this wear period. Movement of the synthesis tubing resulted in an undetermined quantity of F-18 contaminating the upper chest, neck and underarm of the technician. The technician reports feeling `wetness' as a result of the contamination event. Licensee staff estimated 3-5 minutes passed before decontamination efforts were initiated. Initial survey readings on the technician were 12 mR/hour from the neck and chest after shirt and lab coat were removed. No assessment of uptake/intake was performed, nor were any bioassays performed. No medical assessment was performed for blood changes or impacts to the skin. The corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was not notified until the dosimetry report was returned nearly 30 days later. At the time of the inspection, no medical conditions had emerged that were indicative of radiation exposure. The technician's badge was not evaluated for contamination, simply assumed to be contaminated and sent for reading. The badge did not show evidence of contamination when received by the dosimetry processor - however, that may have been due to decay. The licensee did not cease or limit any work with radioactive materials assigned to the individual. The employee has continued work in 2024, as the elevated exposure was attributed to the 2023 annual limit. Inspectors believe there is some portion of the exposure recorded on the optically stimulated luminescence (OSL) (dosimeter) that was not a true whole-body exposure (resulting from contamination and storage in the bunker). However, the lack of adequate records or timely assessment makes any quantification impossible. While an undetermined fraction of the recorded 162 rem was likely not a whole-body dose to the technician; there are certainly exposure avenues which could have led to at least 5 rem whole body. Until data is presented which indicates otherwise, this matter is being treated as an occupational exposure in excess of the 5 rem limit. While 16 mL containing 9.9 Ci of F-18 was in the synthesis cell, there is no accurate account on the amount of activity deposited on the technician's skin/clothing. (The syringe containing the F-18 was not used and allowed to decay within the cell. No volume or activity assessment performed). The only data allowing an estimate is the initial 12 mR/hour exposure rate, which would be close to 13 microcuries of activity incident to the detector active surface area. I.e., if the badge was surveying 12 mR/hour at one inch, that would equate to approximately 13 microcuries of F-18 incident to the probe. The exposure to the OSL over the mean life of this F-18 is estimated at 20 Rem. No data is available to estimate committed dose. While a VARSKIN+ analysis is pending, initial estimates indicate skin dose is likely less than 10 percent of the occupational limit. If the entirety of the 162-rem exposure was suspected to have come from contamination, the initial contamination of the badge would have needed to exceed 100 microcuries. This would have an exposure rate in excess of 100 mR/hour - inconsistent with the recorded exposure rates. Occupational whole body dose year to date, prior to this incident, was recorded at 974 mrem. Average weekly whole-body dose was 19 mrem. The area was isolated due to the spill and this incident is likely also reportable under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1220(b), equivalent to 10 CFR 20.2202(b). The investigation is still in process. Notified R3DO (Orlikowski), NMSS Event Notifications (Email), and NMSS/MSST Division Director (Williams)

• * * UPDATE ON 3/18/2024 AT 1440 TO FROM GARY FORSEE TO SAM COLVARD * * *

A notice of violation was issued on 2/6/2024. A response was received on 3/6/2024 and included proposed corrective actions and steps to prevent recurrence. The licensee contracted a qualified consultant to perform skin dose calculations, and to further evaluate likely whole-body doses. The consultant calculated a skin dose of 89 rem from contamination, and a total whole-body dose of 100 mrem resulting from this incident. The licensee submitted information to indicate a 2023 proposed adjusted (deep-dose equivalent) (DDE) of 1.278 rem and a proposed adjusted (shallow-dose equivalent) (SDE) of 90.2 rem as detailed in the consultant report. The Agency has reviewed and concurs with the licensee's calculations for skin dose resulting from this incident. This matter will remain reportable, but on the basis of a skin dose exceeding the regulatory limit. Pending no further developments and appropriate enforcement action, this matter is considered closed. Notified R3DO (Hills), NMSS Event Notifications (Email), NMSS Regional Coordinator (email) (Rivera-Capella), NMSS/MSST Division Director (Williams), Director, Division of Radiological Safety and Security, R3 (email) (Curtis)

The following is a synopsis of information that was provided by Tioga Pipe Incorporated via fax: On November 15, 2023, nine pieces of one-inch buttweld long radius 90 degree elbows were determined not to meet correct thickness requirements. Three of the nine fittings were installed in the plant. The supplier requested that the uninstalled material be quarantined and tagged as nonconforming. The supplier doesn't know where the fittings were installed in the plant. Brunswick Nuclear Generating Station is the only plant affected. For questions concerning this 10 CFR 21 issue, please contact: Bryan Nichols Director of Quality Assurance Tioga Pipe Incorporated (484) 546-5613 bnichols@tiogapipe.com

• * * UPDATE ON 12/11/23 AT 0959 EST FROM SHANNON ECHOLS TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

Duplicate Part 21 notification made by Mackson Nuclear, LLC. This notification is identical to the Part 21 notification made by Tioga Pipe Incorporated via fax to NRC on Friday, December 8, 2023. No additional information was provided. Brunswick Nuclear Generating Station is the only plant affected. Notified R2RDO (Miller) and Part 21 Group via email.

• * * UPDATE ON 02/02/24 AT 1001 EST FROM WILLIAM KOTCHER TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *

The following is information that was provided by Tioga Pipe Incorporated via fax: The licensee, Duke Energy - Brunswick Nuclear Plant, evaluated the installed elbows for acceptability in accordance with their corrective action program. Brunswick inspectors performed UT thickness evaluations of the installed nonconforming elbows (Fitting IDs: 16836-1-3, -14, and -20) and the results were used to confirm that the subject system remained operable. The remaining six nonconforming elbows (Fitting IDs: 16836-1-1, -6, -7, -11, -15, and -21) have been returned to the manufacturer, Flowline, and are being processed and controlled under Flowline's nonconforming items program. The faxed information includes an attached E-mail chain of seven E-mails related to the Tioga Part-21 notification. Questions are directed to William Kotcher, (713) 512-35699, or Bryan Nichols, (484) 546-5613. Notified R2RDO (Miller) and Part 21 Group via email.

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 0449 (EDT) on 7/12/2023, Millstone Unit 3 declared the 'B' train of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS) inoperable due to a degraded damper associated with the ventilation support system for the 'B' charging pump. At the time of this event, the 'A' train of service water was already inoperable due to planned maintenance on a breaker that would have prevented an 'A' service water valve powered from this breaker from closing on a safety signal. This configuration resulted in the possibility that the 'A' train of ECCS would not have been available to fulfill its design function under all postulated accident conditions. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), '(any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (B) remove residual heat).' Subsequently, the 'A' train of service water was restored to operable at 0548 on 7/12/2023. Repairs and investigation continue on the 'B' train ECCS damper. The NRC resident has been notified. This event did not impact Millstone Unit 2. There was no impact to the public.

• * * RETRACTION ON 7/31/2023 AT 1400 EDT FROM JAMES KELLY TO JOHN RUSSELL* * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via email: The condition was reported to the NRC pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), via an 8-hour report as an event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat. A subsequent engineering review of the conditions that existed at the time determined that, based on area temperature response, any impact on ventilation flows into and out of the `B' charging pump cubicle did not generate an observable change in the temperature trend. Based on this, it is concluded with reasonable assurance that the functional requirement of the support system was maintained and the `B' charging pump would have continued to perform its safety function until the `A' train of service water was restored to operable and as a result safety function was not lost. Therefore, this condition is not reportable and NRC Event Number 56620 is being retracted. The basis for this conclusion has been provided to the NRC Resident Inspector." Notified R1DO (Bicket).

The following information was provided by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Group) via email: On February 21, 2023, the Group was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that a cobalt-60 source was stuck in the unshielded position. The source is used in a teletherapy unit for non-human experimental irradiation. The source is pointed towards the floor. The RSO stated they contacted their service company and was told it is probably caused by low air pressure as air pressure is used to drive the source. The RSO stated the source/unit was located in the basement of the facility. The RSO stated they performed radiation surveys in adjoining rooms and the room above where the exposed source is located, and all dose rates were normal (less than 200 microrem/hr). The service provider will be at the licensee's location on February 23, 2023, to inspect the unit. The access door has been locked and 'Caution' tape has been placed on the door jam. No over exposures have occurred due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-9991

• * * UPDATE ON 02/22/23 AT 2049 EST FROM ART TUCKER TO KERBY SCALES * * *

The following update was received from Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: On February 22, 2023, the licensee's RSO notified the Agency that they had just talked with the service company that would retrieve the source and discussed the operation. The job is expected to start at 0830 CST on February 23, 2023. The RSO stated the individual will enter the room wearing a Personal Radiation Dosimeter (PRD), an OSL (Optically Stimulated Luminescence) dosimeter, and an Instadose for exposure monitoring. Alarms will be set on the PRD. The RSO stated they will have a pre-job safety briefing before the technician enters the room and will establish turnback values for the job. The technician will enter the room and rotate the source head to point the source away from them. They will then force the source back into the shield. The service company estimates the technician will receive 500 millirem for the job. The RSO stated the room has video surveillance and will also have audio capabilities. The RSO stated the job is anticipated to take less than 15 minutes. The RSO will notify the Agency when the technician enters the room for the first time and leaves the room when the job is completed. The Agency has requested additional information.

• * * UPDATE ON 02/23/23 AT 1307 EST FROM ART TUCKER TO IAN HOWARD * * *

The following update was received from Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: On February 23, 2023, the licensee notified the Agency that the service company was able to return the source to the fully shielded position by manipulating the systems air pressure. No individual received any significant radiation exposure from the operation. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Notified R4DO (Roldan-Otero) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

• * * UPDATE ON 02/28/23 AT 2250 EST FROM ART TUCKER TO ERNEST WEST * * *

The licensee's radiation safety officer provided the following additional information: `(The teletherapy unit that had a stuck source) is a Theratron 780C, and it was the Numatics Mark 8 solenoid valve that failed.' Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Notified R4DO (Vossmar) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

The following is a summary of information provided by the licensee via email and phone: A patient, accompanied by her daughter who is the patient's preferred translator, was receiving the first of four Lutathera infusions. The physician, registered nurse, nuclear medicine personnel and radiological safety team members were present for the infusion. The Lutathera infusion was performed per protocol without any issue. Post infusion it was determined through the patient's daughter that the patient had had a lanreotide injection last week on 1/12/23. Per protocol Lutathera is to be given four weeks after a lanreotide/octreotide injection has been administered. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.

• * * RETRACTION ON 2/1/23 AT 1040 EST FROM SANDRA PHILLIPS TO ADAM KOZIOL * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via telephone: Further review from hospital staff in coordination with NRC Medical Health Team determined this is not a medical event. Notified R1DO (Lally) and NMSS (email).