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| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 56200 | 2 November 2022 10:01:00 | The following information was provided by Fairbanks Morse (FM) via email: Facilities affected: FM Sales Order Item Affected Facility Serial Number 40135890 12996949 Farley 22436624 40132483 12996949 Limerick 22444358 40130845 12996949 Limerick 22444359 40130158 12996949 Hope Creek 22277182 Basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Emergency Diesel Generator Electronic Speed Control Module, Woodward 2301A Nature of defect: In some 2301A controls, 1 nF capacitors may have been loaded in place of 150 pF capacitors. This could affect circuitry controlling the units' crystal, speed signal and reset dynamics, and power supply operation. Safety hazard which could be created by such defect: This issue can prevent affected 2301A controls from starting up or may lead to unscheduled shutdown of affected controls. It can also prevent the prime mover from obtaining a stable speed response, causing it to hunt or overspeed. In some cases, the RESET potentiometer may run out of range to adjust the unit for stable operation or desired prime mover speed response, resulting in prime mover performance outside of specification limits. Fairbanks Morse Engine will notify affected licensees no later than 3 Nov 2022, and repair returned affected units. Additional corrective actions will be documented in the Fairbanks Morse corrective system under PD-1102. Any installed affected Speed Control should be removed from service as soon as practical and returned to Fairbanks Morse for repair. If affected controller is installed and licensee experiences unstable speed response, the electronic speed control should be turned off and the emergency diesel generator should be allowed to operate using the mechanical governor system. POC: Martin Kurr, Quality Assurance Manager (608) 364-8247 |
| ENS 55951 | 17 June 2022 13:18:00 | The following was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (IEMA) via email: Representatives for Bard Brachytherapy contacted IEMA at close of business on 6/16/22 to report a shipment of I-125 brachytherapy seeds in route from their Carol Stream, IL facility to Tortola in the British Virgin Islands could not be accounted for after a flight change in Miami, FL. The shipment consisted of two overpacks: One containing five boxes with 350 seeds and a cumulative activity of 241 mCi, and one containing four boxes with 385 seeds and a cumulative activity of 265 mCi. The licensee shipped the packages on 6/7/2022 to O'Hare airport where they were received (and) placed on a commercial flight to Miami. After arrival at Miami, the packages missed two different flights scheduled for Tortola. After an inquiry by the licensee, the carrier reported the package could not be immediately accounted for. The incident was reported to IEMA shortly before 1600 CDT and then notification was received at 1627 CDT that the packages were located. This matter is considered closed. There were no breaches to packages reported and no resulting public exposures. The packages remained incident to transportation and secure. Due to the activity involved (A > 1000x the value in Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 20), the loss is immediately reportable under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 340.1210 and 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i). Unlike missing shipments of lesser activity, a review of SA-300, Appendix A reporting requirements doesn't give the same caveat that the package must still be missing at the time of reporting. Illinois # IL220020 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 55950 | 17 June 2022 12:39:00 | The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile: On June 16, 2022, vendor Nutherm International, Inc. was informed that a defect caused the failure of Arnold Magnetics power supply PBM-24-106. The unit had been supplied by Nutherm to a nuclear power plant. The unit failed on or before March 15, 2022 during a 24-hour burn in period and was returned to Nutherm which did an inspection and analysis. Nutherm then returned the unit to Arnold Magnetics, the manufacturer, which completed further analysis. The manufacturer determined the unit failed due to the EMI filter assembly not functioning as designed as a result of the manufacturer's assembler not installing no-mex paper and thus not in accordance with manufacturer's procedure. Both the manufacturer and Nutherm have initiated corrective actions to prevent recurrence. One facility is listed as being affected: TVA - Browns Ferry. Nutherm notified the affected facility on June 17, 2022. If you have any questions or wish to discuss this matter or this report, please contact: Adrienne Smith at adrienne.smith@nutherm.com or at (618) 244-6000 x3034. |
| ENS 55952 | 20 June 2022 14:40:00 | The following was received from the state of New Jersey, Radioactive Materials Program via email: The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) of Bristol Myers Squibb notified the NJ Department of Environmental Protection that two H-3 exits signs were unable to be located and cannot be found. The RSO believes that the signs were improperly disposed of during facility renovations as demolition waste. The licensee conducted an in-depth exit sign inventory but was unable to locate the two exit signs. Loss of material was confirmed on 5/27/2022. Equipment: H-3 exit sign, SRBT model BR-20-BK, serial numbers C083389 and C083421, 21.6 Ci per exit sign. State Event Report ID Number: NJ-22-New THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf. |
| ENS 55725 | 2 February 2022 14:40:00 | The following was received via e-mail from the state of Louisiana: On January 25, 2022, at (1430 CST), LDEQ (Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality) received this event notification. The facility involved was the Northeast Louisiana Cancer Institute. In the second quarter of 2021, between 4/14/2021 and 7/14/2021, a technician's Landauer Badge report indicated an exposure of 8407 mrem. The technician worked in a CT and HDR integrated vaults. LDEQ has not received any prior information or indication of a radiation overexposure from this facility until this time. Louisiana Event Number: LA 20220002 |
| ENS 55094 | 3 February 2021 09:45:00 | At 0910 EST, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Center for Neutron Research (NCNR) test reactor declared an ALERT in accordance with their NRC approved Emergency Plan, due to the stack radiation monitor reading 100,000 counts per minute due to the release of fission products. The reactor had been operating at 50% power (10 MW), and automatically scrammed one minute prior based on the stack monitor reaching 50,000 counts per minute. When the automatic scram occurred, the facility ventilation system automatically changed to emergency ventilation mode to limit discharge to the environment. Several workers were determined to be externally contaminated and these workers were decontaminated by a change of clothes and showers. These workers are being monitored for possible uptake of internal contamination. Environmental surveys are in progress. The NRC remained in the normal mode. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, USDA Operations Center, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).
Event is downgraded to a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) based upon environmental samples at the site boundary. Members of the public are not expected to have been contaminated. Notified R1DO (Dentel), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Kennedy), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, USDA Operations Center, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email) and NuclearSSA (email).
At 1935 EST, NIST terminated the Notification of Unusual Event. The basis for termination was that all air samples were normal. Notified R1DO (Dentel), NRR EO (Miller), IRD (Kennedy), NPR PM (Torres and Montgomery), NPR (Takacs), DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA Central, USDA Operations Center, HHS Operations Center, DOE Operations Center, EPA Emergency Operations Center, FDA EOC (email), FEMA NWC (email), FEMA NRCC SASC (email) and NuclearSSA (email). |
| ENS 54562 | 4 March 2020 15:35:00 | At 1205 EST, on March 4, 2020, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 initiated a manual reactor scram due to lowering Electrohydraulic Control System (EHC) level in the turbine control system. The cause of the lowering level was a leak in the EHC system piping. All control rods inserted. There were no safety system actuations. The cause of the EHC leak is being investigated. The NRC Resident has been notified. Additionally, the licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission. |
| ENS 54474 | 13 January 2020 15:08:00 | A non-licensed contract employee supervisor tested positive for alcohol at another facility. The employee's access to Fermi 2 has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 54473 | 13 January 2020 15:05:00 | Six bottles of flavoring extracts (rum, peppermint, lemon, and almond) containing varying amounts of alcohol content (12 -84 percent) were located in the NFS onsite cafeteria. The items were turned over to NFS Security for control and disposition as necessary. NFS Security and the Plant Superintendent conducted an additional search of the cafeteria and did not identify any additional items. There was no indication that the items had been utilized for consumption by any onsite personnel. A problem was entered in the site Problem Identification Resolution Correction System (PIRCS) for reference (P78223). The cafeteria is located inside the protected area. The event was terminated at 1200 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 54475 | 13 January 2020 17:47:00 | The following was received from the agreement state via e-mail: On January 13, 2020, a licensee reported to the Agency that on January 12, 2020, it had discovered a shutter on a fixed nuclear gauge was stuck in the open position, which is the normal operating position for the gauge. The device is a Ronan SA-1 containing 5 milliCuries of Cs-137. The licensee stated that there is no concern of overexposures due to this equipment malfunction. A service company has been onsite and plans to remove the gauge on January 17, 2020. At that time, a decision will be made whether to repair or replace the gauge. An investigation into this event is ongoing and more information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Source: Cesium-137, 5 milliCuries (original activity 10/07/1996), SN: 2263GQ, manufactured by Amersham Texas Incident 9731. |
| ENS 54470 | 9 January 2020 19:25:00 | The Division I Control Building Chiller 'A' failed to start during post maintenance testing. By design, the Division II Control Building Chiller 'B' should have started automatically but did not. Operators then manually placed the Division I Control Building Chiller 'C' in service. This condition rendered both Divisions of the Control Building Air Conditioning System Inoperable. The applicable LCO was entered and exited 10 minutes later with all required actions and completion times met. The cause of the failure is not known at this time. The plant was at 100% power at the time of the event and is currently stable at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 54469 | 9 January 2020 12:50:00 | EN Revision Imported Date : 2/7/2020 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE COULDN'T BE RETRACTED The following was received from the Agreement State via e-mail: RSO reported inability to retract a 40.2 Ci Ir-192 source (Source Model A424-9), (Source Serial No. 89706G) into the Sentinel/QSA 880 Delta exposure device (Serial No. D12297) during the period of 12/31/2019 to 1/1/2020. Licensee notified of 24 hour reporting requirement and to send written 30-day report. Mississippi report number: MS-200001.
The state of Mississippi sent the following update by email: (State Health Physicists) investigated the inability to retract the source, and the RSO reported that corrosion inside the crank cables caused the cable to hang up. The crew followed their emergency procedures and called the RSO. The RSO retracted the source into the fully shielded position and OSL (optically stimulated luminescence) badges were processed showing that no over exposure occurred, and the occupation exposure limits were maintained in compliance. Notified R4DO (Taylor) and NMSS Events Group by email. |
| ENS 54441 | 13 December 2019 10:17:00 | The following report was received from the Georgia radioactive materials program environmental protection division via email: Augusta University Medical Center had an incident yesterday (December 5, 2019) in the Interventional Radiology (IR) Suite during a Y-90 TheraSphere procedure. The Y-90 TheraSphere delivery was performed in the usual fashion, per TheraSphere protocol, with 3 flushes of the administration vial. Both delivery and nuclear medicine pre-procedure preparation was performed per standard radiopharmaceutical (TheraSphere) protocol. During administration, the remaining undelivered dose became stuck/trapped in the transport vial and could not be administered. About 40 percent of the prescribed radiation dose was delivered to the patient, which is less than the criteria in Rule 391-3-17-.05.(115)a.1(i), which states, 'The total dose delivered differs from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more.' A small amount of the Y-90 microspheres spilled onto the administration table, which was covered with absorbent towels. Augusta University staff isolated the contamination, scanned all IR Suite staff to ensure the contamination was not spread outside the immediate area, and called for assistance with clean-up. All contamination was located and cleaned-up, and all swipes have been counted and the results show no residual contamination in the suite or on any equipment in the suite. All radioactive material has been collected and is being stored and managed as radioactive waste. A formal written notification to your office will be submitted within 15 days of the event. This formal written notification will include all of the information required by Rule 391-3-17-.05.(115). Georgia Incident No.: 22 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 54412 | 26 November 2019 13:53:00 | The following information was received via phone call: A member of the public earlier today identified a container on National Forest Service land near Globe, Arizona that is labeled as having radioactive material. Pictures of the container show "B of E permit 681, Serial Number D-8011, Radiation, Return to Dow Chemical Company, Rocky Flats." This is an initial report. Arizona Department of Health Services personnel will investigate presently and provide an update.
The following update was received from the Arizona Department of Health Services via email: The container turned out to be a metal lid based on the orientation of the data plaques and the safety top. We (Arizona Department of Health Services) performed exposure and contamination surveys onsite and everything came back at background. Notified the R4DO (Pick) and NMSS via email. |
| ENS 53988 | 9 April 2019 15:20:00 | The following report was received from the State of California via e-mail: On April 9, 2019, the (Radiation Safety Officer) RSO for GeoSolutions in San Luis Obispo, CA notified the RHB (Radiologic Health Branch) Brea office that a moisture density gauge had been reported stolen from his employee's vehicle that was parked overnight at a residence in Orcutt, Santa Barbara County, CA. Reporting person states that a Humboldt Scientific Instrument 5001C nuclear moisture density testing device, serial number 1749, was stolen. The device contained 0.37 GBq (10 mCi) Cs-137 and 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-241. The theft has been reported to local law enforcement, Santa Maria Police report number 2019R03937, and to the local service provider Pacific Nuclear Technology. The device was in a locked protective case at the time it was stolen; its transport index is 0.2; DOT class 7 type A package. The owner found the chain securing the device to the truck bed was also cut. The operator reported that the Cs-137 source rod was locked in the safe position on the gauge. The device was stolen on 4/9/2019 at an unknown time during the night. RHB will continue to investigate. California 5010 number: 040919.
The following was received via e-mail: The moisture density gauge that was reported stolen was reported by the licensee to have been recovered on 4/11/19. The gauge, inside its transportation container (the transportation container lock was missing, but the gauge was locked in the shielded position), was found in a trash dumpster at a local convenience store. Police are currently reviewing security camera tapes in an attempt to determine who placed the gauge in the convenience store trash dumpster. Notified the R4DO (Pick) and NMSS (via e-mail). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 53987 | 9 April 2019 14:39:00 | The following report was received from the State of Illinois via e-mail: The Agency (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) was contacted at approximately 1213 CDT on 4/9/19 by the radiation safety officer (RSO) for Heuft USA to advise that a 0.88 Ci shipment of Am-241 sealed sources enroute to their facility did not arrive as expected by April 8, 2019. The shipment was found as of 1330 CDT by the carrier at their terminal in Illinois. The shipment was not a Cat 1 or Cat 2 quantity. The shipment was labeled White-I and packaged in a 28 pound, 5 gallon, Type A drum. (Prior to being found), the package's last known (physically confirmed) location was the (common carrier's) facility in Columbus, OH on 4/5/19. A manifest was present at (the common carrier's) Chicago Heights facility, indicating it may have arrived there. The RSO for the licensee was the individual who personally packaged the sources and offered them for consignment to (the common carrier). There was no indication of intentional theft or diversion. Heuft USA is a licensee of the Agency (IL-01354-22) authorized for the possession, installation and maintenance of Am-241 fill level gauges. This shipment contained (2) QSA Global AMC.17 fill level gauges containing 300 mCi each, (1) XN.240 fill level gauge containing 100 mCi, and (4) AMC.25 fill level gauges containing 45 mCi each. State of Ohio radiation control program staff were notified. While writing the report, the carrier located the package on their dock and began to finalize the shipment to the licensee. Pending confirmation of receipt by the licensee, this matter is considered closed. Illinois item number: IL190011. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 53985 | 8 April 2019 15:17:00 | The following was received by e-mail from the state of Louisiana: On 4/8/19, Georgia Pacific Consumer Products (GA-PAC) reported that an additional level density gauge malfunction was discovered during process unit decommissioning. The first gauge was reported on 3/11/19 via a phone call to Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) - see EN 53927. This second gauge was reported via e-mail on 4/8/19 to LDEQ as part of the written follow-up to the first gauge. A level density gauge on a process (unit) had a shutter malfunction. GA-PAC was attempting to inventory and package (the gauge) for disposal. In the lock-out/tag-out process, they discovered the shutter handle would not turn to completely close the shutter. The gauge is a RONAN SA8-C5 device/source holder, S/N 9775GG with a 50 mCi Cs-137 source. GA-PAC called a service contractor, BBP Sales, to evaluate the situation and determine the best course of action to correct the problem. The sources and gauges were packaged by BBP Sales and sent to QSA Global for disposal on 4/2/19. GA-PAC is decommissioning this unit. This is not a radiation exposure hazard and does not pose a health and safety situation for the GA-PAC employees or the general public. This event is considered closed by LDEQ. This event is being reported to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) and LAC 33:XV341.B. LA Event Report ID No.: LA-190005.
The following information was reported by the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality via email: The reported information was not a new event. This was follow up information for two previously reported events. Notified the R4DO (Werner) and NMSS_Events (via email). |
| ENS 53990 | 10 April 2019 14:57:00 | The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania via fax: On April 8, 2019, the (Department of Environmental Protection) DEP was notified of a Cs-137 source that was discovered at a metal recycler, reportable per 10 CFR 20.2201(a)(1)(i). On April 8, 2019, a radiation portal monitor alarmed at a metal recycling facility in Slippery Rock, PA. The load was reading approximately 4 mR/hr at a distance of 4 ft through scrap metal. The load was transferred back to its origin at Mercer Lime and Stone where it could be off-loaded and sorted. DEP representatives oversaw the emptying of the load at Mercer Lime and Stone. An intact gauge was found bolted to a plate. A representative noted bolts for another gauge, but no gauge was found. The found gauge, Nuclear Chicago, series: PNA, model: 5193, serial number: 219, manufactured: 2/8/74, containing 200 mCi of Cs-137, was secured in a building on site. The current activity is 70.7 mCi. The remaining site has been cleared except for a few remaining buildings. Mercer Lime and Stone has a general license with DEP but did not notify the DEP of intent to terminate their license nor to vacate their licensed location. Upon later review of their license, it was noted they possessed two of the same model gauges, serial numbers 219 and 220. The whereabouts of serial number 220 are unknown at this time. The DEP is currently working to locate the owner of the site, and location of the (still) missing gauge. The DEP will update this event as soon as more information is provided. Event Report ID No.: PA190012 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf Note: This device is assigned an IAEA Category 3 value based on the actual radioactivity of the source, not on the device type. (Reference IAEA RG-G-1.9) |
| ENS 53984 | 8 April 2019 14:25:00 | The following was received from the state of New York via fax: The New York State Department of Health (NYSDOH) was notified that on Saturday, April 6, 2019, at approximately 0930 (EDT), a bearing in the pulley that is part of the 'slack cable' switch/mechanism failed to function as intended. The failure caused the source cable to bind where it passes through the slack cable switch, which prevented the source from reaching its full down/safe position. When the licensee freed the cable from the slack cable switch, the source easily returned to its down/safe position. The radiation levels in the irradiator confirmed that the source was in its shielded position. The licensee repaired the slack cable switch (in a way that will prevent re-occurrence) and cycled the source up and down many times with no further incident. Pall Hauppauge is licensed to possess cobalt 60 for use in a Nordion International panoramic dry (source) storage irradiator. The licensee sent an email and left a voice mail to the NYSDOH mail log, which was not read or listened to until 0830 (EDT) on Monday morning. The licensee failed to contact the NYS Warning Point who would have then immediately notified responsible individuals within NYSDOH. NYSDOH will conduct a site visit since this is the second time in less than a year that they have had issues with source retraction. The earlier event was on 11/9/18 reported in EN53729. Incident Report#: NY-19-05. |
| ENS 53819 | 9 January 2019 13:23:00 | At 1034 EST on January 9, 2019, with the reactor at 100% power, an automatic reactor trip was initiated. The trip occurred while Reactor Protection System testing was in progress. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally following the rip. Troubleshooting and investigation of the cause is ongoing. All full-length control rods inserted fully. Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated as designed in response to low steam generator water levels. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3 (hot standby). Decay heat is being removed by the turbine bypass valve. This condition has no impact to the health and safety of the public. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 53757 | 28 November 2018 12:30:00 | At 0752 CST, on November 28, 2018, Dakota County inadvertently actuated their sirens while performing a scheduled weekly (Emergency Planning Fixed Siren Test). All seven (7) Dakota County sirens actuated for approximately 9 seconds before Dakota County Dispatch canceled the activation. This 4-hour non-emergency report is being made per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Offsite Notification (which was made to Dakota County Dispatch). Capability to notify the public was never degraded during this time. All Emergency Notification sirens remain in service. No press release is planned at this time. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 53759 | 28 November 2018 17:25:00 | On November 28, 2018, while performing an engineering review of the bases for environmental qualification (EQ) requirements for the Atmospheric Steam Dumps (ASDs), it was determined that applicable EQ requirements had not been applied to a key component of each of the ASDs. The result of this issue is that it the availability of the ASDs for a controlled plant cooldown following a postulated steam line break outside containment cannot be assured. Callaway is developing a compensatory action temporary plant modification to install insulation that will protect the affected ASD components from the post Main Steam Line Break temperature. This condition is reportable 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) for any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (B) remove residual heat, or (D) mitigate the consequences of an accident. The issue places the plant in a 24-hour Technical Specification (TS) Limiting Condition for Operations (LCO), 3.7.4. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 53758 | 28 November 2018 17:10:00 | The following information was received from the State of Texas via email: On November 28, 2018, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee that while performing a shutter test on an Ohmart-Vega Model SH-F1 gauge containing a 20 milliCurie (original activity) Cs-137 source, the shutter would not close. Open is the normal operating position for the gauge. The gauge is in a location that does not present an exposure risk to any individual. The licensee has contacted a service provider to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: I-9640. |
| ENS 53755 | 26 November 2018 15:51:00 | The following report was received from the State of California via email: On November 26, 2018, at approximately 1015 (PST) .., (the) RSO (Radiation Safety Officer) of RMA Group, Radioactive Materials License #8054-37, contacted RHB (Radiologic Health Branch) Brea concerning the moisture/density gauge, Troxler 3430, Cs-137 serial #750-4104, Am-241 serial #47-26740 (Cs-137, 0.333 GBq, Am-241, 1.6 GBq) that had been found missing during a semi-annual inventory of the radioactive gauges possessed at the permanent storage facility at 6976 Convoy Court, San Diego, CA 92111. (The RSO) will contact local law enforcement in San Diego and will fill out a police report with them. A copy of the theft report will be forwarded to the RHB Brea office to be included as part of this report. (The RSO) will contact local newspapers to attempt to retrieve the stolen radioactive gauge as well as notifying local servicing vendors of radioactive gauges to be alert for the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up for service. The investigation will continue to determine if the radioactive gauge can be found and determination can be made on how it was lost at the permanent storage location. This is being reported to the NRC Operations Center as a 24-hour report under 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2) since the radioactive gauge has been lost and it can not be determined what condition the sources are currently in. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 53428 | 27 May 2018 00:40:00 | County and state governments were notified due to the spurious actuation of a single emergency notification siren located in New London County in the Town of Lyme. The siren was silenced. If required, alternate notification of the public in the area will be through local Emergency Operations Center route alerting. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 53012 | 13 October 2017 15:46:00 | A series 50 nuclear accident dosimeter S/N AP237 with a 1 gram 62 mCi Pu-239 source was determined missing on 10/13/17. The dosimeter was one of 14 received by Idaho State University from the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1991. In 2003, this particular dosimeter was found to have detectable surface contamination and determined to have a compromised source. The device was removed from local inventory in 2003 pending transfer. Attempts were made to transfer the device to Idaho National Lab (INEL), but were declined. The device is believed to have been placed in the Idaho State University nuclear waste stream, and may have been transferred in 2006 or 2011 with other waste via Thomas Gray to US Ecology, but there are no supporting records. Investigation is ongoing. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52981 | 20 September 2017 16:39:00 | Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality called to report a potential overexposure. Welding Testing X-Ray, Inc., contacted Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality to report an irregular excessive whole body badge exposure for a radiographer. The badge was for August 2017 reporting period of August 1 through 31, 2017. The whole body badge exposure reflected 754 rem. This individual worked as part of a two man crew at various jobsites. All of the other crew members readings were within the expected range for typical trained radiographers. The individual was advised to contact REAC/TS (Radiological Emergency Assistance Center / Training Site) in Oak Ridge, TN for blood testing and cytogenetic testing. The individual did not exhibit any skin irritations or other signs of radiation sickness. The licensee is investigating the exposure. Louisiana State advised the licensee to remove the individual from radiation work until the issue is resolved. Event Report ID No.: LA-2017-0015 |
| ENS 52982 | 20 September 2017 16:03:00 | The following information was received via e-mail from the state of Ohio: On 9/15/17 at approximately 11:15 AM, the Ohio Department of Health (ODH) was notified by GPD Geotechnical Service, LLC. that a portable gauging device (CPN Model MC-1-DRP which contained a 10 mCi Cesium-137 source and 50 mCi Americium-241:Be source) had been run over and that the device had sustained heavy damage to the casing and the source handle was broken off. The gauging device was run over by a piece of construction equipment at their jobsite located at 225 Elyria Street, Lodi, OH 44254. An ODH inspector, responded to the location of the incident and was met by the licensee's RSO. The inspector was lead to the gauging device which had been surveyed and had been determined to have no abnormal radiation readings and that both radioactive sources were intact and properly secured with in the device. The device was secured in its transportation case and placed in the field technician's vehicle. The inspector also conducted a wipe test with no abnormal readings observed. In an interview with the field technician the inspector determined that the technician was approximately 10 to 15 feet away from the device but did not have direct line of site to the device as it was partially obstructed due to the construction equipment. It was also observed by the inspector that the equipment operator's view of the gauging device was obstructed due to the configuration of the equipment and the proximity in which the device was placed on the ground in front of the equipment. Licensee's leak test showed no removable contamination and the device has been sent to a service provider for repair. Item Number: OH170005. |
| ENS 52640 | 25 March 2017 09:28:00 | While performing a purification subsystem alignment on the Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank, an inadvertent transfer of Refueling Water Tank level to the common Spent Fuel Pool occurred. This transfer resulted in lowering Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank level below the Technical Specification (TS) required limit for the current mode of operation at 0142 (EDT) on 3/25/17. Upon recognition of the inadvertent transfer, Operations secured the lineup and restored Unit-2 Refueling Water Tank level to its normal operating band at 0225 on 3/25/17. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) '...any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.' With less than the required Technical Specification volume in the Refueling Water Tank, insufficient volume existed in the Refueling Water Tank to maintain 30 minutes of full flow Safety Injection, and subsequent continued pump operation after transition to recirculation mode of operation. This level is required by Technical Specification 3.5.4.B and has a one hour action statement to restore level. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The purpose of this notification is to retract ENS notification 52640 made on March 25, 2017 for Calvert Cliffs. After further evaluation, it has been determined that the volume of water in the Unit 2 Refueling Water Tank was never below the TS required volume of 400,000 gallons. The evaluation considered the as-found condition of the level transmitter and the existing environmental conditions of the tank in determining the actual RWT water volume on the day of the event. Therefore, this event does not meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) and the ENS report is being retracted. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Cook). |
| ENS 52631 | 23 March 2017 07:24:00 | River Bend Station personnel declared the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system inoperable at 0256 on 3/23/2017. During performance of the HPCS Pump and Valve Operability Test, the operators observed an unusual system response after E22-MOVF023 (HPCS Test Return to the Suppression Pool) was stroked closed. A field check showed that the key that connects the E22-MOVF023 valve stem to the anti-rotation device had become dislodged. E22-MOVF023 is a Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) and is designed to close automatically on an ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System) initiation signal to ensure that injection flow is directed to the reactor vessel. Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1.3 requires that containment penetrations associated with an inoperable PCIV be isolated. E22-MOVF023 was declared inoperable at 0028. Operators were unable to close or demonstrate that E22-MOVF023 was fully closed as required by TS 3.6.1.3 and proceeded to isolate the associated containment penetration by closing other system valves. This action was completed at 0320. The net effect of the actions taken to isolate the containment penetration is that HPCS is inoperable as of 0256. This results in 14 day LCO. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Event Time was 0028 CDT rather than 0256 CDT. "The scheduled surveillance test of the high pressure core spray system was initiated at 2355 CDT on March 22, and the pump was secured at 0028 CDT on March 23. The inspection of the HPCS test return valve to the suppression pool occurred at 0050 CDT, and it was at that point that an apparent malfunction of the valve had occurred to the extent that it did not appear to be able to perform its safety function to close upon receipt of a design basis system initiation signal. Thus, the event time for this condition would be more accurately defined as 0028 CDT. Notified R4DO (James Drake) via e-mail. |
| ENS 52630 | 23 March 2017 02:48:00 | On March 23, 2017, at 0014 EDT, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 2 (WBN2) experienced an unplanned trip of both Turbine Driven Main Feed Pumps (TDMFP) following a loss of Main Condenser Vacuum. The trip of both TDMFPs caused an automatic start of both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pumps and the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feed Water Pump. (The) cause of the loss of Main Condenser Vacuum is currently under investigation. The plant was performing a normal startup, and had just synced the main generator to the grid. Subsequent to the event, the plant was transitioned to Mode 3. All rods are fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via the atmospheric relief valves. Unit 1 remains in Mode 5 for a refueling outage. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 52419 | 9 December 2016 05:29:00 | On 12/08/16 at approximately 2237 (EST), the Unit 2 HPCI (High Pressure Coolant Injection) system failed to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Operations declared the HPCI system inoperable and entered Technical Specification 3.5.1 Condition C for HPCI being inoperable. Other standby systems (Reactor Core Isolation Cooling and low pressure emergency core cooling systems) are operable. HPCI is a single train system. Therefore, per NUREG-1022, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system required to mitigate the consequences of a design event. This condition has been entered into the Corrective Action program (IR 3951006). Investigation of the exact failure condition is in progress so that repairs can be made. At the surveillance flow of 5,000 gpm, the system was approximately 80 psi below the required pressure of 1,278 psi. Technical Specification 3.5.1, Condition C, is a 14-day Limiting Condition of Operation. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report: This is a retraction of an event notification made on 12/09/16 at 0529 EST (EN #52419). This event was initially reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as a condition that, at the time of discovery, was believed to have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function. On 12/08/16 at 2237 EST, the Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failing to meet surveillance testing requirements for achieving rated flow at greater than or equal to a minimum test pressure established per the surveillance. Prompt troubleshooting was performed and it was determined that an adjustment to the HPCI turbine governor control system was required. This adjustment was performed and HPCI was returned to an operable status on 12/09/16. Subsequent to this occurrence, Engineering has completed an evaluation that concluded that HPCI was capable of fulfilling its safety function and that the associated Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.1.8 was met. The evaluation concluded that HPCI was degraded, but met the threshold for TS operability. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed of this retraction." Notified R1DO (Kennedy). |
| ENS 52416 | 8 December 2016 02:29:00 | At 2240 (CST), December 16, 2016, it was identified that HV-SW-(SF-C-1A)(CS), control switch for supply fan SF-C-1A for HV-FAN-(SF-C-1A), main control room A/C unit supply fan had been inadvertently been placed to OFF, leaving no supply fan running as required to maintain CREFS (Control Room Emergency Filtration System) operable. This was discovered following the performance of 6.1HV.302 Essential Control Building Ventilation Functional Test (DIV 1). It is estimated that the control switch was placed in OFF at approximately 2220 during preparation of 6.1HV.302 per S.O.P. 2.2.38. Time of discovery was 2240. This resulted in an unplanned LCO entry for the CREFS. CREFS was subsequently declared inoperable and LCO 3.7.4 Condition A was entered, with required action A.1 to restore CREFS to operable status within 7 days. The switch was restored to its required position at 2247 and CREFS was subsequently declared operable and the referenced LCO was exited. CR-CNS-2016-08744 was written to document the unplanned inoperability." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 52417 | 8 December 2016 10:51:00 | On 12/7/16 at approximately 1030 MST, surface contamination was discovered on the interior of a High Dose Rate (HDR) afterloader. The contamination is limited to the inside of the housing and the interior portions of the transfer cables. The contamination was discovered by the manufacturer when the manufacturer was replacing the Ir-192 seeds used by the afterloader. Direct radiation readings could not be taken due to the proximity to the sources. Wipes were observed at 200 to 4000 counts per minute. There was no observed damage to the sources. There was no contamination of personnel. The room has been secured. The resolution planned is for the manufacturer to replace the afterloader. |
| ENS 52411 | 7 December 2016 11:27:00 | At approximately 1030 EST, a QSA 880 industrial radiography camera containing an Ir-192 source of approximately 26.3 Ci (source serial number - 32186G) was lost when the barge named Exito sank in the Bering Sea outside Dutch Harbor, Alaska. The ship was in transit and the camera was stored in a pelican case and not in use, with the source in the protected position. There were no unintended exposures to individuals. The licensee has notified the local area Coast Guard command. Notified the following Federal Agencies: DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC. Notified the following Federal Agencies via email only: FDA EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA National Watch Center, and DNDO-JAC. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 52420 | 9 December 2016 10:54:00 | The following was received from the state of Ohio via e-mail: On 12/9/16, the licensee reported a medical event that occurred on 12/7/16 and was discovered on 12/8/16. During a prostate seed implant procedure, the patient received a dose that was 30.57% less than the prescribed dose. The patient was informed and the physician is evaluating if a boost will be administered. The patient is not expected to have any adverse affects. Ohio report: OH160010. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| ENS 51945 | 19 May 2016 22:08:00 | The following information was received via E-mail: Event Type: 30.50(b)(2), Events in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed. Event Narrative: On May 19, 2016 the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while performing routine shutter checks, the shutter on an Ohmart model SHLM-BR4 could not be closed. The gauge contains a 5.0 curie cesium-137 source. Open is the normal operating position of the gauge. The source does not create any additional risk of exposure to the workers or members of the general public. The RSO stated they will call their service company to repair the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge is scheduled to be replaced during their next outage this fall. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: I-9405. |
| ENS 51940 | 17 May 2016 23:06:00 | On May 17, 2016, at 1630 hours while restoring from a plant modification related to new 'loss of phase' circuitry, the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss de-energized resulting in a loss of voltage on the buss. The loss of voltage was caused by the loss of voltage relays that separated offsite power from the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss. At the time, the 1 B-B emergency diesel generator was removed from service for planned maintenance. In response to the loss of power on the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss, the operators entered abnormal operating instruction, AOI 43.02, Loss of Unit 1 Train B Shutdown Boards, and started emergency diesel generators 1 A-A, 2 A-A, and 2 B-B. All equipment operated properly. The emergency diesel generators were not required to be paralleled to the boards. Offsite power was restored to the 1 B-B 6.9kV buss at 1802 hours on May 17, 2016. This condition did not result in any adverse impact on the health and safety of the public. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section, except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.' The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51938 | 17 May 2016 15:51:00 | The following report was received from the manufacturer via fax: Nutherm International, Inc. reported on a defect found in "Moore Industries SCT Signal Converter (Part Number SCT/4-20MA/10-50MA/117VAC/UB) based upon the failure analysis of a failed component. The conclusion was that the wire insulation in T2 transformer was damaged by the transformer manufacturing facility during assembly. This damage reduced the insulation resistance and dielectric breakdown between the windings of the transformer. These damaged transformers were subsequently installed by Moore Industries into the signal converters. The failure of the transformer resulted in early, catastrophic failure of the signal converter. Moore Industries tested the transformers remaining in stock and found one (1) of the remaining two-hundred nineteen (219) transformers exhibited this condition. In all documented cases involving failure of this transformer, the impacted units had passed pre-installation functional testing but failed within four months after installation. Affected nuclear power stations include: Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station and the Sequoyah Nuclear Station. |
| ENS 51935 | 16 May 2016 21:17:00 | On May 16, 2016 at 2105, Sequoyah Nuclear Power Plant identified a nonconforming condition involving the Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fire dampers installed in Units 1 and 2. Specifically, it has been identified that if a tornado causes a differential pressure across the east and west sides of the EDG Building, this could create a high airflow rate through the EDG Building ventilation path. The fire dampers for each EDG bay (required to isolate the space for CO2 fire suppression per SQN Fire Protection Report) have not been analyzed to withstand high air flows resulting from a tornado and could possibly fail in a way that impedes airflow for EDG cooling. This is an unanalyzed condition that could prevent all EDGs from supplying electrical power as designed during a tornado or other similar weather events. All 4 EDGs are required to be operable by both units' Technical Specifications to provide electrical power to safe shutdown/safety related equipment following accident conditions coincident with a loss of offsite power. The Current Licensing Basis (CLB) requires that tornado effects be considered in the design of safety related SSCs (Systems, Structures, and Components), and it cannot be demonstrated at this time that the described SSCs will withstand the design basis tornado. It has been determined that the CLB may not adequately address possible design basis tornado scenarios. The EDGs are located inside the power plant structure and are currently capable of performing their safety function. The occurrence of such an event is highly unlikely and there is no imminent concern regarding severe weather involving tornadoes. Compensatory measures have been developed to address the associated nonconformance. The condition described above is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51934 | 16 May 2016 19:56:00 | At 1457 (CDT) on 5-16-16, U-2 (Unit 2) High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable after isolation of the system due to a steam leak on the HPCI steam inlet drain pot drain line. The event is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences an accident. This is an eight hour report requirement. The Dresden NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51937 | 17 May 2016 11:54:00 | The following was reported verbally and via email from the Illinois Bureau of Radiation Safety: On Friday, May 13, 2016, the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) contacted the Agency (Illinois Bureau of Radiation Safety) to advise that one source from a Medi+Physics sealed source brachytherapy device (44 mCi, Cs-137, Model Number CDCT1, Serial Number GA301) was missing following the treatment of a patient. During the unloading of the applicator that afternoon, only 2 of the 3 sources were recovered. Surveys were immediately conducted of the patient, the patient's room, the trash, bed and linen that remained present as well as several potential paths to and from the hot lab where the sources are stored. The facility expanded its surveys to additionally include dumpsters, roll off containers of biohazard waste and soiled linen storage without retrieving the source. Interviews with attending nursing staff showed that the patient had been cooperative throughout the 3 day treatment, did not have any visitors and had no complications where she had been found out of bed or otherwise unattended. Agency representatives were sent to the facility the following Monday to conduct confirmatory measurements of the same areas and equipment and expanded the search again to other outlying areas of the facility with no unexpected elevated readings detected in any area. Waste processing facilities were contacted and advised of the potential of a missing radioactive source in their waste stream beginning on the previous Wednesday. All indicated that they had functioning portal detection units for incoming trash/waste and that no anomalous readings had been noted. The Agency is continuing its investigation at this time and conducting additional surveys at out lying waste facilities. Hospital staff have been made aware of the event and been given a description of the source and appropriate action to take should it be discovered. This item remains open at this time. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf |
| ENS 51820 | 24 March 2016 08:58:00 | At approximately 0211 (EDT), on March 24, 2016, both control room ventilation filtration trains were declared inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.10, Condition B, due to a control room boundary door not being fully closed. Following routine security rounds, the door was unable to be fully closed due to the door's locking bolts not retracting back into the door body, causing interference between the door and door frame. Mitigating actions have been implemented that ensure control room envelope (CRE) occupant radiological exposures will not exceed limits, and CRE occupants are protected from chemical and smoke hazards. Repairs to the door are currently in progress. Technical Specification 3.7.10 allows control room boundary doors to be opened intermittently, under administrative control for preplanned activities, provided the doors can be rapidly restored to the design condition. Previous evaluations of the door not being fully closed for a limited time concluded no loss of safety function had existed. This condition had no impact on the health and safety of the public. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 51815 | 22 March 2016 13:59:00 | On March 22, 2016, at 1131 EDT, the Watts Bar Nuclear Plant Unit 1 (WBN1) reactor tripped due to the actuation of the Over Temperature Delta Temperature bistables. Concurrent with the reactor trip, the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) system actuated. All control rods inserted upon the reactor trip. Engineered Safety Function systems functioned as expected. WBN1 is currently stable in Mode 3. The Reactor Coolant system is being maintained at normal operating pressure and no-load temperature with decay heat removal via the Main Condenser steam dumps and the AFW system. The station is in a normal shutdown electrical alignment. Watts Bar Unit 2 is in mode 4 preparing for power ascension testing and was unaffected by the WBN1 event. The cause of the event is under investigation. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 47850 | 19 April 2012 11:10:00 | Limerick Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 100% power at 0753 hours on 4/19/12 in accordance with plant procedure OT-112 'Recirculation Pump Trip' when both 1A and 1B Recirculation Pump Adjustable Speed Drives (ASDs) tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 144D and 114A non-safety related 480V Load Centers. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using feedwater. The manual RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2). The Technical Support Center (TSC) Normal Air conditioning systems shut down due to loss of power from the 144D Load Center. The loss of power also affects the flow indication for the Emergency Ventilation system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Emergency TSC Ventilation system is available but flow cannot be verified. During a required activation the TSC, responders would report to the TSC. If conditions required use of the Emergency Ventilation system, the Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with Station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The Technical Support Center (TSC) 144D load center has been re-energized, restoring the emergency ventilation flow indication and emergency assessment capability to its normal stand-by condition." The switchgear was inspected for any potential grounds and then reenergized at approximately 0800 EDT on 4/20/2023. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R1DO (Joustra). |
| ENS 47718 | 5 March 2012 15:39:00 | On Monday, March 5, 2012, at 1305 EST, Oswego County Warning Point notified Nine Mile Point (NMP) and NYS (New York State) Warning Point, via the RECS Line, of a loss of the Tone Alert System for greater than one hour as of 1236 EST from the National Weather Service. Site Emergency Procedures define a loss of Tone Alert System for greater than one hour as a significant loss of Emergency Communications (EPlP-EPP-30). This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the NMP and JAF (James A. FitzPatrick) Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8-hour reporting criteria 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The County Alert Sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System, remained operable. The loss of the Tone Alert System constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications capability. Compensatory measures were verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing the hyper-reach system, which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local law enforcement personnel are also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. As of 1327 EST on March 5, 2012, Nine Mile Point was notified by the Oswego County Warning Point that the Tone Alert System has been returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47717 | 5 March 2012 14:46:00 | At 1303 EST on March 5, 2012, with the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 1136 EST on March 5, 2012. The Tone Alert Radio System was restored at 1327 EST on March 5, 2012. This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The County Alert Sirens which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System remain operable. The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures were verified to have been available. This consists of utilizing the hyper reach system which is a reverse 911 feature available from the county 911 center. Local Law Enforcement Personnel were also available for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. The portion of the EPZ population affected is approximately 10%. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47665 | 15 February 2012 15:33:00 | At 12:44 on 2/15/2012, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality was notified of a sewage system release that had the potential to reach state waters. On 2/14/2012, it was identified that water was flowing from a manhole cover near the North Anna training building. Further review identified the training building sewage lift station had lost power and that the water line in the manhole discharges to the lift station. It was estimated that approximately 120-200 gallons of untreated water reached the ground around the manhole before power was restored to the lift station. Upon further investigation, the station could not confirm whether untreated water reached Lake Anna. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. |
| ENS 47133 | 6 August 2011 17:41:00 | On August 6, 2011, at approximately 1119 MST, the Palo Verde Unit 1 reactor tripped from approximately 100% rated thermal power due to a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation. The actuation was caused by a dropped Shutdown Group Control Element Assembly (CEA) during surveillance testing to exercise the CEAs. Following the reactor trip, one Regulating Group CEA indicated a failure to insert, however the CEA subsequently indicated fully inserted with no additional operator actions approximately 2 minutes after the trip. All CEAs are currently inserted fully into the reactor core. With the exception of the delayed indication of one CEA to fully insert, this was an uncomplicated reactor trip. No emergency classification was required per the Palo Verde Emergency Plan. No automatic or manual ESF actuations occurred and none were required. Safety related electrical buses remained energized during and following the reactor trip. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start and were not required. The offsite power grid is stable. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. Unit 1 is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure in Mode 3." Decay heat is being removed via the steam generators to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47131 | 6 August 2011 13:22:00 | Condition Description: During the morning of 8/05/2011, Radiation Protection personnel discovered potentially contaminated waste being stored in an unmarked container in the mass spec room. Radiation Protection Management and Criticality Safety personnel were notified. Upon learning at 4:30 pm (that) the unmarked container was not a Safe By Design (SBD) container, a criticality anomalous condition was declared at approximately 4:30 pm, in accordance with CR-3-1000-04, based on a violation of Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) guidelines and procedural requirements. Thus, at 4:30 pm, a cognizant individual was notified of the potential safety significant condition and, therefore, understood the condition could adversely impact safety. This report is being submitted as a conservative measure as the volume of waste, mostly gloves and wipes, was much less than 12 liters and could easily fit into a SBD container. The material that could be surveyed was cleared as non-radioactive material, and placed in a clean waste container. The material that could not be surveyed was transferred to a SBD container pending further analysis. The initial analysis of the material placed in the SBD container did not indicate the presence of any trace uranic material. At no time was there ever a concern of imminent criticality or for the health and safety of workers at URENCO USA. (1) Radiological or chemical hazards involved, including isotopes, quantities, and chemical and physical form of any material released: Potential Uranium 235 contaminated PFPE oil ampules in a solid state. (2) Actual or potential health and safety consequences to the workers, the public, and the environment, including relevant chemical and radiation data for actual personnel exposures to radiation or radioactive materials or hazardous chemicals produced from licensed materials (e.g., level of radiation exposure, concentration of chemicals, and duration of exposure): None. Radiological surveys were taken on the material in the container. No radiation levels or contamination levels were noted above background. All of the material, except for 4 ampules, were released as non-radioactive. Although the ampules did not have radiation levels above background, there was a slight potential for a trace level or uranic contamination. (3) The sequence of occurrences leading to the Condition, including degradation or failure of structures, systems, equipment, components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences: One 24 liter container was placed in the mass spec room. Instead of a 24 liter container, a 12 liter SBD container should have been utilized. Chemistry personnel used the 24 liter container to store potentially radioactive material. The actual quantity of material in the 24 liter container was less than 12 liters. Personnel should not have used the 24 liter container to store potentially radioactivity contaminated material. This was a violation of site procedure RW-1003-09, Rev. 5. (4) Whether the remaining structures, systems, equipment, components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences are available and reliable to perform their function: The structures, systems, equipment, components, and activities of personnel relied on to prevent potential accidents or mitigate their consequences are available and reliable to perform their function. (5) External conditions affecting the Condition: None. (6) Additional actions taken by the licensee in response to the Condition: Radiation Protection Technician notified her supervisor who notified criticality safety, who then notified the shift manager. The 24 liter container was removed from the mass spec room. Radiological surveys were taken and all material released as clean except for 4 potentially contaminated ampules. Initial surveys did not find radiation levels above background on the 4 ampules. The 4 potentially contaminated ampules were placed into a 12 liter SBD container until they undergo a final analysis to determine if they contained trace uranic material or not. Actions have been initiated to establish a waste accumulation area in the mass spec room in accordance with RW-3-1000-09. Meetings have been set up with Chemistry personnel to review control of potentially contaminated material. The Criticality Safety Officer generated Condition Report 2011-2560 -- Use of non-SBD Container to collect potentially uranic contaminated waste. (7) Status of the condition (e.g., whether the condition is on-going or was terminated): The condition is not ongoing as the material has been placed in a SBD container. (8) Current and planned site status, including any declared emergency class: Plant is operational; condition is non-emergency. (9) Notifications, related to the condition that were made or are planned to any local, State, or other Federal agencies: None (10) Status of any press releases, related to the Condition that were made or are planned: None. |