Semantic search
| Entered date | Event description | |
|---|---|---|
| ENS 43839 | 12 December 2007 10:54:00 | Troxler gauge stolen from storage facility. Incident discovered at 0900 12-Dec-07; this office notified at 1015 same day. Police on scene. Owner will offer reward. No further action will be taken by this office. Isotopes: Cs-137 & Am-241 Activities: 8 mCi's & 40 mCi's Material Form: By-product; Special Form Probable Disposition of Material: Material stolen and not recovered Model Number: Troxler 3430, Serial Number 32900 Organizations Notified: HSER, HSERE, St. Augustine Police Dept. Case #021610 Incident Location: 150 St. Johns Business Place Suite 303, St. Augustine, FL 32095 Location Classification: Controlled Area FL Incident Number: FL07-194 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43838 | 12 December 2007 10:53:00 | A misadministration occurred on 11-Dec-2007 this office notified at 1520 hours. The prostate was to receive 140 Gy, but received only 100 Gy. This incident referred to Radioactive Materials for Investigation. This office will take no further action on this incident. Isotope: I-125 Activity: 92 seeds at 0.295 millicuries per seed Material Form: Interstitial Brachytherapy Seeds Incident Number: FL07-193 A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
This event (EN43838) has been reviewed and determined to be a reportable medical event. |
| ENS 43803 | 21 November 2007 19:00:00 | At approximately 1115 on 11/21/07 it was discovered that the Unit 3 ERDADS long term historian data stream was not updating. This impacted the ability of the ERDS link to transmit valid data. The modem was functional, but did not appear to be receiving data from the ERDADS computers. The long term historian appears to have gone offline at 1441 on 11/12/07. The probable cause of the malfunction appears to be a post installation modification to the system. The ERDS link was restored at 1130 11/21/07 and testing has confirmed it operable. No evidence of tampering has been discovered and this failure affects Unit 3 only. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. |
| ENS 43801 | 21 November 2007 17:42:00 | At 2028 CDST, on 11-20-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7 UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System failed to function when performing the twice per shift test firing. The test firing of the PGLD detector heads is required per TSR-SR 2.4.4.1-1. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-333 Unit 6 Cell 7, Section 3, and Section 4 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this failure, unit 6 cell 7 and some areas of Section 3 and Section 4 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in the cell and in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6 Cell 7 PGLD system inoperable, none of the required cell heads and only 2 of the required 3 heads in Section 3 and Section 4 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1.B.1 and 2.4.4.1.C.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. Troubleshooting indicated the failure was not similar to writing failures recently experienced on other PGLD systems. The two components most susceptible to failure have been replaced and investigations continue into root cause. The system had functioned correctly when the previous test firing was performed at 1430 hours on 11-20-07. However, since the failure potentially occurred prior to the test firing at 2028 hours the event is being reported as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when (a) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; (b) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and (c) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function." The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event. |
| ENS 43842 | 14 December 2007 10:49:00 | This information was received via email Eustis Engineering reported an incident that occurred on November 15, 2007. At 8:00AM on this date a Troxler gauge model number 3440 with serial number 25934 was hit by a bulldozer. This gauge has a 8.0 mCi source Cs-137 and a 20 mCi source of Am241:Be. The bulldozer that hit the gauge was operated by James Construction at the Marathon GME Refinery construction site. The technician called the Eustis Engineering office immediately after it occurred. Mr. (deleted), the Eustis RSO, was dispatched to the site. The RSO arrived at 9:30AM and conducted a survey using a Trox Alert survey meter. At 30 feet away the meter reading was 0.1 Mr. At 2 feet away the meter reading was 0.2 Mr. A leak test was conducted by Gamma Tron on November 15, 2007 after the incident with the results being less than 0.005 uCi (microCuries) of removable contamination. Event Report ID No.: LA070031. |
| ENS 43780 | 13 November 2007 07:08:00 | While in a drained down condition the reactor vessel experienced an unexplained loss of reactor coolant system inventory with irradiated fuel within the vessel. Licensee entered Emergency Action Level MU-9, Unusual Event at 0632 EST. Within a few minutes after entering EAL MU-9 reactor vessel water level returned to its initial water level of 13.7 inches above the centerline of the Hot Legs of the Reactor vessel. Licensee is investigating why reactor vessel water level changed. Chairman Klein's Comm. Assist. (Bill Orders), Comm. Jaczko's Assist (T. Hipschman), Comm. Lyons Assist (S. Baggett), R1DO (M. Miller), R2DO (M. Lesser), R3DO (M. Phillips), R4DO (V. Campbell) , DHS (A. Ackers), FEMA (Sullivan), DOE (S. Bailey), USDA (Watts), HHS (C. Harper) , EPA (NRC) Chief Brown were notified.
Termination of Unusual Event. EAL classification of MU9 is no longer applicable. Investigation of the unplanned Reactor vessel level showed no indication of leakage into any building containing RCS piping. The apparent cause of the event is due to a slight negative pressure in the RCS. When the OTSG lower manways were installed with HEPA filters fan units running, the indicated RCS level lowered and stabilized due to the HEPA units drawing air from the RCS. No actual RCS inventory loss occurred. When the HEPA units were turned off the RCS level returned to the indicated Reactor vessel level prior to the event. In accordance with station procedures this EAL event was terminated at 0929 on 11/13/07. The licensee notified the Resident Inspector, State and Local Officials of this event update R1DO (D. Holody), NRR EO (J. Dozier), IRD (B. McDermott) , DHS ASWO (Ed Hoisinton) and FEMA (D. Sullivan) were notified of the termination of the Unusual Event. |
| ENS 43763 | 2 November 2007 10:33:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor, not involved in plant operations, had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's unescorted access to the plant has been denied. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. |
| ENS 43743 | 24 October 2007 16:48:00 | Licensee called 10/24/07 at 1640 hours and reported that a Troxler gauge is missing. It was last seen on 10/24/07. Troxler gauge was sitting on tailgate while operator was writing paperwork in vehicle cab. Operator drove off with gauge on tailgate. Wingerter employees searching area for gauge. It was reported missing to the North Miami PD. The Radioactive Materials Office is investigating. No further action will be taken by this office. Incident Location: Intersection of Curtiss Drive and Pervis Avenue Opalocka, FL Isotope(s) Cs-137; Be:Am-241 Activity(s): 8mCi; 40mCi Material Form: Chemical Form; Physical Form: By-product; Special Form Probable Disposition of Material: Material stolen and not recovered. Emergency Groups at Scene: North Miami PD Incident Number: FL07-163
The lost Troxler was recovered by the licensee at the intersection of NW 103rd St and NW 27th Ave Opalocka, FL. The device appears to have fallen off the vehicle tailgate at this location. The case was damaged but the source remained unharmed and locked in the shielded position. Surveys taken revealed no external contamination or indication of leakage. The device will be returned to the manufacturer for repair. Notified R1DO (Caruso), ILTAB (Via E-mail) and NMSS EO (Morell). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43725 | 16 October 2007 16:05:00 | 10/16/07 at 1100 EDT a Troxler 3401; 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241/Be, was run over by a bulldozer while the gauge operator was driving the drive rod into the ground (was going to test the compaction of the soil). The gauge operator was about 15 to 20 feet away from the gauge when it was run over. The top handle and the top of the source rod were sheared off. The Radiation Safety Officer came to the site and took surveys. Surveys found no contamination and the gauge is presently in its locked position on the tail of a truck. The survey readings of the gauge from 2 feet away ranged from 0.06 to 0.1 millirems per hour (survey readings were taken using a TroxAlert meter). The RSO will have the gauge leaked tested and then he plans to ship the gauge back to Troxler for repairs/disposal. Serial number of the gauge is 5323. This incident occurred at 6825 West Jefferson Ave., Detroit, MI at a basement excavation site. NRC Region 3, Darrel Wiedeman, was notified of this incident by Jim Meehle. |
| ENS 43739 | 22 October 2007 14:21:00 | Received the following information via e-mail: On October 22, 2007, a letter, dated 10/17/07, was received from Haytham (deleted), RSO, reporting a stolen nuclear gauge (Troxler 3400 Series, S/N 14411). The incident happened on 10/15/07 at San Bernardino County. According to the incident report, the nuclear gauge was taken to Southwest Calibration in San Bernardino for repair. After the repair, at about 5:30 pm, the field technician stopped at an automobile garage in San Bernardino to have the company truck tail light repaired. The nuclear gauge metal box was bolted close to the tail light access location and was asked by the shop technician to remove the box so they can repair the tail light. The metal box was placed on the side near the waiting room. Then, the technician went inside the waiting room. After the tail light was repaired, the technician went outside and did not find the nuclear gauge. The technician called the RSO and left a message. The incident was reported to San Bernardino County Sheriff's Office (Police Report # 030705898) and an ad was placed in the 'SUN', San Bernardino newspaper for seven days. RHB - South RAM office will investigate this incident. 5010 Number (Date Notified): 102207 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43723 | 15 October 2007 13:16:00 | At 0950, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP) was notified in regards to a Turbine Lube Oil spill of approximately 350 gallons. The notification, to the FDEP, was required due to the inability to reach clean-up target levels within 30 days. In addition, the State Warning Point was notified at 1010. This non-emergency notification is being made, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), due to the notification of outside government agencies in response to this environmental event. The cause of the oil spill is still under investigation. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43720 | 12 October 2007 18:02:00 | This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the fact that Exelon Nuclear has informed the Illinois Emergency Management Agency and Illinois Environmental Protection Agency of recent groundwater monitoring results at Quad Cities Station. This notification was made at 16:04 hours CDST on October 12, 2007. As part of the Station's continuing environmental monitoring and sampling program, new wells were recently installed on Station property to better characterize the known, on-site tritium plume previously identified during Exelon's fleetwide tritium study conducted in 2006. Samples from some of the new wells have indicated elevated levels of tritium requiring notification of the State of Illinois. Based on well data to date, the tritium in the groundwater is confined to Exelon property and poses no threat to public health or safety. The Station continues to track this issue by monitoring the existing wells, installing new wells for further assessment, and pursuing underground pipe integrity testing. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43677 | 1 October 2007 00:57:00 | A problem with voltage sensing circuit for 4 KV Bus G Startup power supply caused Diesel Generator 2-1 to automatically start. Loss of Startup voltage to a vital bus is an automatic start signal for the associated diesel generator. Startup power has been declared inoperable to 4 KV Bus G. All indications for Startup power to the other 2 vital busses remain normal. All systems functioned correctly in response to the sensed undervoltage condition. Unit 2 is in a 72 hour shutdown action statement per T. S. 3.8.1. An automatic start of a Diesel Generator is reportable per 10CFR50.72(B)(1)(iv)(A). The Diesel Generator has been shutdown per the annunciator response procedure and remains operable. One of the four undervoltage relay starting power fuses for EDG 2-1 was found blown. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
This update is changing the reporting criteria from a valid system actuation 8-hour report to a invalid specified system actuation 60-day report. This 60-day notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(i), which states that in case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), other than the actuation of the Reactor Protection System when the reactor is critical, the licensee may provide a telephone notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written Licensee Event Report. On September 30, 2007, at 19:58 PDT, EDG 2-1 automatically started, but did not load, due to a failed power supply fuse to an undervoltage sensing relay. EDG 2-1 was shutdown and placed in standby with the undervoltage sensing relay isolated from service. No actual undervoltage condition existed. EDG 2-2 and 2-3 were unaffected by this event. The affected sensing relay circuit was successfully completed. On October 1, 2007, at 18:09 PDT, TS 3.8.1 was exited. The consequences of this event are limited to the unplanned start of EDG 2-1. The EDG started and functioned in accordance with its design. Since no actual vital bus undervoltage condition existed which required the EDG to start, and since the start occurred inadvertently as a result a single component failure, this event has been classified as an invalid actuation. The original 8-hour notification made under 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) is therefore retracted and replaced by this 60-day telephone notification. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Nease). |
| ENS 43676 | 29 September 2007 02:19:00 | On September 28, 2007, while reducing power for a planned refueling outage with the reactor at approximately 30 percent power in MODE 1, an unplanned actuation of the reactor protection system occurred. At 2232 a fault pressure trip signal was received on the A Startup Transformer (SUT), causing a loss of power to Aux Buses D, A & C electrical buses as well as the A-SA safety bus. The loss of A & C buses initiated the RCP underfrequency trip which tripped the Reactor and all three RCPs as designed. The A Diesel Generator automatically started and reenergized bus A-SA as designed. The auxiliary feedwater system actuated as expected due to undervoltage on the A-SA safety bus and loss of the main feedwater pumps. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The operations staff responded to the event in accordance with applicable plant procedures. The plant stabilized at normal operating no-load reactor coolant system temperature and pressure following the reactor trip. Steam generator water levels are being maintained using auxiliary feedwater. All emergency core cooling system equipment is available. The plant electrical system is being restored at this time. The A SUT remains out of service. The cause of the loss of power from A SUT is under investigation. This condition is being reported as an unplanned reactor protection system actuation and specified system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. The plant was in natural circulation for approximately 1 hour. The Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) were manually isolated per procedure due to loss of EHC indication. Presently the B RCP has been restored to service, MSIVs are still closed, and the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps are feeding the Main Steam Generators. There are not any leaking steam generator tubes. The A EDG will be secured after backfeeding of the deenergized buses have been established. |
| ENS 43681 | 2 October 2007 09:55:00 | The following Agreement State report from Wisconsin was received via Facsimile: License No.: Non-licensee Licensee: Non-licensee Event Location: Gorden Schneider Property Event Type: Scrap Yard Detector Notifications: Phone call from Sadoff yard on 9/28/07. DHFS was contacted on 9/28/07 concerning a rejected load from Sadoff scrap yard in Fond du Lac. The yard made the initial contact and had the individual with the load talk to DHFS before leaving the yard. A hand monitor (survey) gave radiation reading of 200 microR/hr on the outside of the trailer. A metal tank was observed where the reading was noted. He was told to off load and cover it with plastic until DHFS responds. The individual with the rejected load contacted DHFS on 10/01/07 requesting what to do about the load. Evidently, the individual had made a second attempt to sell the material to Sadoff. When contacted, he reported there were CRM labels on the device. It was reported to be about a foot long, with 8 prongs and 3 fins. A label stated that it was sold under Gen. Lic. No. CL 1933-70. The label for NDC listed Duarte, CA, 91010. The individual was requested to not handle the device and to place it in a secure location. No information on this device was in the DHFS GL database. DHFS contacted NDC and was informed that it was a Model 103 with 150 mCi of AM-241. The gauge had been sold to Sabee Co, 1718 West Eighth St, Appleton, WI on 12/12/85. The last contact that NDC had with the gauge was 11/20/95. A call was made to Sabee Co in Appleton. An individual there reported that the company was divided in 2002 and management changed in 2003. The company used to do film extrusion. The individual promised to follow up with someone who had been there for a long time and might remember more about the film extrusion process. Contact nos. were given to two former owners. DHFS plans to investigate on October 3, 2007. Media attention: None Event Report ID No.: WI070026. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43610 | 30 August 2007 17:16:00 | Event Description: Reactor scram (4 hr notification) automatic scram Primary containment isolation of Groups 2,3,4, and 5 due to RPV Level < low level setpoint (<127") due to reactor scram. (8 hr notification). Actions Taken (reference applicable Technical Specifications): Implemented OT 3100 (Reactor Scram Procedure) EOP-1 (RPV Control). Placed the plant in a stable condition and implemented OP 0109, Plant Restoration. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. Reactor was initially at approximately 63% power due to cooling tower damage which occurred more than a week ago. License was performing a surveillance test of the # 2 turbine stop valve. The valve was shut per the surveillance test procedure but they were unable to open the valve. Personnel were in the heater bay and mechanical assistance was applied to open the valve. The valve opened quickly at which point the licensee received a turbine stop valve closure signal which generated an automatic reactor scram. All rods fully inserted into the core. Reactor vessel water level decreased below 127 inches, due to the reactor scram, which caused primary containment isolation of groups 2,3,4 and 5. Reactor vessel water began to increase because Reactor feedwater pumps "A" & "B" were still operating. Reactor feedwater pump "B" was secured. When reactor vessel water increased to 173 inches, high level alarm, reactor feedwater pump "A" automatically tripped. Highest reactor vessel water level increased to was approximately 179 inches. No SRV's opened. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems, EDGs are fully operable if needed and the electrical grid is stable. Reactor vessel water level is being maintained using a reactor feedwater pump. Only other anomaly was that for some unknown reason automatic pressure control went to mechanical pressure control during the transient. Licensee is investigating the event. |
| ENS 43599 | 27 August 2007 06:48:00 | A shipment failed to arrive on time. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified. Contact HOO for further details.
Shipment arrived on site at 0720 EDT. R1DO (J. Dwyer), FSME (C. Flannery), IRD (T. Blount ) and ILTAB (L. English) notified. NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee.
While the shipment did not arrive on time, it was enroute to the station in the custody of the driver the entire time in question. Therefore the shipment was never lost and this event is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Burritt), FSME (McConnell), IRD (McDermott), and ILTAB (email). |
| ENS 43579 | 19 August 2007 02:23:00 | On August 18, 2007, at about 1955 PDT, both of SONGS Unit 3 Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) were found in a condition that was not seismically analyzed. At about 2015 PDT on August 18, 2007, both of SONGS Unit 2 EDGs were found to be in the same unanalyzed condition. The condition involved EDG maintenance work platforms that had not been properly restrained, and, in the position found, could potentially render the EDGs inoperable during a seismic event. SCE is reporting this occurrence as a potential loss of safety function in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). SCE took immediate actions to properly restrain the EDG work platforms, and an evaluation will be conducted to determine the cause of this event. At the time of this occurrence, Unit 2 was operating at about 99% power and Unit 3 was operating at about 100% power. SCE has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector about this occurrence and will provide them with a copy of this report.
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following: On August 18, 2007, SCE reported that Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) work platforms on both Units 2 and 3 had not been properly restrained. This resulted in a condition unanalyzed for seismic events. Consequently, both trains of EDGs on both Units 2 and 3 were declared inoperable. SCE evaluated configuration of the platforms for vulnerabilities to a design bases event. SCE concluded that the DGs were operable as-found. Consequently, SCE is retracting the phone report to the NRC (Event Log No. 43579)." The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Jones). |
| ENS 43577 | 18 August 2007 00:02:00 | On the evening of 8/17/07 several light(n)ing strikes were noted in the Vogtle Electric Generating Plant area during a rain storm. Information Technology (IT) personnel were dispatched to check for proper operations of IT equipment and found the primary transmitter for the offsite public alerting sirens to be damaged and out of service. IT personnel swapped the offsite public alerting sirens over to a secondary transmitter and verified that they were operable and returned them to service @ 22:01 hrs on 8/17/07. The primary transmitter will be repaired next week. This is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). (8 hour notification) The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43574 | 17 August 2007 11:00:00 | Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Energy Northwest hereby informs the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) of an intent to report a undeclared shipment of hazardous material to the Department of Transportation (DOT). Energy Northwest recently discovered that two EntryScan Explosive Detectors, each containing a 10 mCi (millicurie) Nickel-63 source, were transferred to PPL Susquehanna, LLC without designating the shipment as Radioactive Material, Excepted Package, Instruments or Articles, 7, UN2911 and received in Berwick, PA on April 17, 2007. Energy Northwest has confirmed that the devices are under the control of an entity licensed to possess such material. There were no consequences associated with this incident and the potential for radioactive exposure of any individual as a result of this shipment was negligible. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43558 | 9 August 2007 10:41:00 | Event: On August 7, 2007, Duke Energy (Duke) completed a reportability determination which concluded that two relays contained deficiencies and were reportable under Part 21. The relays were Commercial Grade Items dedicated by Duke. Following dedication, a bench test performed on August 26, 2004 revealed that relay contacts were not set up properly at the factory. Eight other relays from the same purchase order were acceptable. The relays were Magnecraft Struthers-Dunn part number 219ABAP-115/125D. The Part 21 evaluation in 2004 was terminated based on incorrect guidance in the applicable Duke administrative directive. The directive error was identified March 29, 2007 and a review of prior Part 21 reportability determinations was initiated. The original 2004 problem report on these relays was reopened, leading to this Part 21 report being made at this time. Initial Safety Significance: None. The defective relays were never installed. The intended applications could not have resulted in a significant safety hazard. However, the Duke administrative directive on Part 21 evaluations states that all potential applications where the component might be installed as a substitute must be considered. Duke has concluded that installation in some unspecified application 'could have resulted in a significant safety hazard' and therefore the issue is being reported. Corrective Action(s): In 2004: There were eight (8) additional relays from the same purchase order. These were retested and found acceptable. The two identified defective relays were returned to the manufacturer. The manufacturer concluded that the relay contacts were improperly assembled. They consider this an isolated case. In 2007: The Duke administrative directive on Part 21 evaluations was corrected. Previous Part 21 determinations were reviewed, leading to this report. NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this Part 21 notification by the licensee. |
| ENS 43543 | 1 August 2007 17:26:00 | On August 1, 2007, at 1200 Eastern Daylight time the prompt notification system (PNS) monthly test was performed and 77 of the 108 PNS sirens were not responsive to the test. This is considered to be a major loss of offsite response capability. Testing is being performed to ensure operability of the PNS sirens, trouble shooting has not identified the current problem with the system. 34 of the 77 sirens have been successfully tested and testing of the remaining sirens is being conducted. State, Local and the NRC Resident Inspector have been notified of this by the licensee. |
| ENS 43536 | 30 July 2007 16:25:00 | The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for The United States Environmental Protection Agency located in Cincinnati, OH reported they are missing a 15 millicurie Ni-63 source. The source was last seen December 01, 2006 when its 6 month leak test was performed. After the source was leak tested, the source was placed back in an unlocked drawer, where it has been kept since December 2001. The source was located below the HP Model # 5890 Series II Gas Chromatograph in which is it was used. The RSO said that they have been looking for the missing source since early June and they have been unable to find the source. The RSO said that anybody working for the US EPA in their building can enter the room in which the source was stored. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43517 | 24 July 2007 19:51:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been revoked. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event notification by the licensee. |
| ENS 43507 | 19 July 2007 17:08:00 | EVENT: Radioactive Material (RAM) found - sealed License Number: "Unlicensed The agency received a call at 2:15 p.m. today (7/19/07) from DSHS Food & Drug Inspector, (DELETED) inquiring about four radiation devices found with 1994 inspection stickers on each of them. She said there appears to be some concern as of what company owns them and the facility they are located at. She gave me three names of possible companies, or owners: I Q Distributors Diversified Materials Services Diversified Medical Services Inc. The facility is located at: 2400 Central Parkway, Suite LP in Houston, Texas 77092. She is currently on location. Agency Action Taken: Region 6 RAM Inspector to go to the facility as soon as possible to conduct incident investigation & identify sources. Texas Incident Number: I-8428 * * * RETRACTION FROM L. HANSON TO P. SNYDER AT 1657 ON 9/4/07 * * * The NRC received the following information from the Agreement State of Texas via facsimile: On 08/23/07, the Agency received a telephone call from the individual who received the gauges from Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR) & was given the following information: The individual stated that on 03/03/06, he purchased a portion of the building at 2400 Central Parkway, Ste. L, Houston, Texas. The purchaser reported to the Agency that he was not aware that the portion of the building he just bought, Suite L, contained the alloy analyzers found by DSHS inspectors until he was recently contacted by the agency. He stated he thought he bought lab equipment only & was unaware that the building purchase included the alloy analyzers. The other suite, Suite P, is not owned by him & overseen by the initial individual contacted at the site by the agency's inspectors. He is not sure why this individual did not make the suite distinction with the inspectors nor contact him to let him know the building was being inspected. He contacted the agency's general licensing acknowledgement (GLA) division & was given the following information: These devices with Fe-55 and Cd-109 sources and no longer issued a GLA so anyone can possess these devices if transferred by manufacturer/distributor. A transfer is allowed if the devices are transferred in their physical location, which occurred when he bought the building. Additionally, the agency received documentation from the manufacturer that they removed the RAM sources from the two empty analyzers & shipped the analyzers back to KBR in 1997. The two analyzers which had very low-strength RAM sources were transferred in accordance with the above stated allowance. The purchaser asked if the agency could give him information on how he could dispose of the analyzers. The agency responded by forwarding information to the purchaser for possible contacts who could assist him with disposal. BASED ON THE ABOVE INFORMATION, THE AGENCY IS REQUESTING A RETRACTION OF THIS INCIDENT, SINCE IT IS NOW DEEMED NON-REPORTABLE. Notified R4DO (T. Pruett) and FSME (J. Davis). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 43509 | 20 July 2007 17:28:00 | On 07/20/07 at 1445 CDT the Radiation Safety Officer for Becton-Dickinson Infusion Therapy System, Inc Pool Irradiator located in Broken Bow reported a component failure at the Pool Irradiator. The irradiator was operating on 07/19/07 when one of the totes carrying medical supplies to be sterilized became jammed in the irradiator. The alarm sounded as expected. The source of the Pool Irradiator went back to its shielded position, lowered back into the pool. The Control Panel for the pool irradiator did not indicate, light did not come on, that the source had gone back into the pool. The licensee went to the penthouse, above the irradiator pool, and found that there was no extra cable in the penthouse which indicated the source had gone to its safe position, entered the pool. Radiation readings taken in the penthouse also indicated that the source was in the pool. The licensee tried to unlock the door to enter the maze to unjam the tote but they were unable to unlock the door because the control panel indicated that the source had not gone to its safe position. The licensee then called MDS Nordion, manufacturer of the irradiator and owner of the irradiator fuel, and informed them of the problem. MDS Nordion informed them how to over ride the access system. After three tries they successfully over rode the access system, required 3 people at 3 different locations at the same time to over ride the system. After opening the access door 2 people with 2 separate radiation survey meters entered the maze. Normal background radiation levels were detected. It was found that the control switch indicating that the source was in its safe position was not in its correct position, down. The switch was replaced. As of 07/20/07 the Pool Irradiator is operating. |
| ENS 43506 | 19 July 2007 14:16:00 | On 07/18/07 at 3:50 pm, the agency received a telephone call from (deleted), the Chief Tech for the licensee, reporting the misadministration of patient involving Thallous Chloride. The nuclear medicine tech reported that a patient was injected twice with a total of 4mCi of Thallous Chloride. The licensee reported that the patient was informed the same day of the misadministration. Licensee was informed that the 30-day report is due 08/17/07. Agency Action Taken: The licensee will submit the required written report within 30-days as per 25 Texas Administrative Code (TAC) 289.202(xx). Texas Incident number: I-8427 * * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY CINDY FLANNERY TO JEFF ROTTON AT 0741 ON 07/24/07 * * * This event (EN43506) has been reviewed and determined to NOT be a reportable medical event. |
| ENS 43539 | 31 July 2007 15:40:00 | RSO telephoned DHFS July 31, 2007. The RSO notified DHFS by telephone of the possible loss of two Pd-103 implant seeds. The two seeds were unaccounted for following a July 16, 2007 prostate seed implant procedure. During the procedure, the Physicist was making the strands using the BARD QuickLink system. About half way through the case he made a relatively long link. When the authorized User tried to load this link it was easily traveling through the implant needle so he retracted it and emptied the entire strand on the OR table backwards through the needle. A new link was made and properly implanted into the patient. Because they needed to use nearly all the ordered seeds for the procedure, the Physicist attempted to take apart the problem link using a pair of tweezers. This required some force to separate the links and seeds. While doing this at least two of the links separated and 'flew' off the table. The past experience with seeds falling in the operating room was that they were relatively easy to find immediately post procedure with the survey meter, so they completed the implant. The on-going inventory indicated there would be 5 leftover seeds. Multiple surveys of the operating room resulted in the recovery of 3 seeds. Surveys of all bed linens were conducted, no additional seeds were located. The patient will be returning to the facility for routine post implant CT imaging. The implant seed count will be repeated at that time. Event Report ID No.: WI070015
DHFA has received additional information from the licensee. The patient returned to the facility for routine post implant imaging. The implant seed count was repeated at that time. The seed count performed at the time of the implant indicated 115 seeds had been implanted. The additional imaging has identified the presence of 117 seeds. R3DO (J. Lara) & FSME (C. Flannery) notified. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43475 | 7 July 2007 11:51:00 | At 11:03 hours EST, on July 7, 2007, the Plant Information Computer System (PICS) was removed from service to perform a planned modification to install and test a Standard Digital I&C System Platform (DICSP) infrastructure and to update the network configuration of PICS. The expected duration of PICS inoperability is approximately 24 to 36 hours. PICS provides monitoring and communications capability for plant data systems including the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Plant Process Computer System (PPCS), Emergency Response Computer Logger (ERCO-1), Meteorological Data link system and the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor (ICCM). The loss of PICS requires alternate methods, as described in plant procedures, to be used for the above described functions. Therefore, appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications can still be made, if required, during the time that PICS is inoperable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability or offsite communications capability. As previously stated, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications and accomplish required communications, as necessary. An additional notification will be provided when PICS operability is restored. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Engineering change (EC) of PICS continues. Testing of the installed modifications is now in progress. As stated above, alternate means remain available to assess plant conditions, make notifications, and accomplish required communications, as necessary. Testing of the EC and EC turnover is expected to be completed on 07/09/2007. The plant computers, including SPDS, are presently running providing plant data thus are available but not operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Henson)
Crystal River Unit 3 initially reported removal of its Plant computer systems from service for planned modification on 07/07/07 at 11:51 and made the required notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Engineering change associated with the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and the Plant Information Computer System (PICS) has been completed and the systems are currently running providing data. Modification testing has been completed and the systems are considered operable. The compensatory measures put in place to assure appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications and communications have been terminated. Licensee also stated that the ERDS system is now operable. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Hopper) |
| ENS 43433 | 20 June 2007 16:35:00 | On June 20, 2007, a disturbance on the transmission system was experienced causing a loss of 13 of 44 emergency sirens (approximately 30 percent) for Clinton Power Station. At 1355 hours (CDT), since power was not restored to these sirens within one hour, this event was determined to be a major loss of emergency assessment capability. At 1512 hours, only 6 sirens (14 percent) remain out of service. At this time, an estimated return to service has not been provided for the remaining sirens. DeWitt County, Illinois Emergency Management Agency, and the NRC Resident have been informed of this information. |
| ENS 43429 | 18 June 2007 14:31:00 | At approximately 0800, lost all FMB control room monitors associated with Digital Control System (DCS). Several valves in UF6 process failed in unexpected position. No release and no exposures. System immediately put in a safe configuration. Root cause has begun and system will be kept in safe configuration for now (not restarted) until cause determined and corrected. This is a Courtesy Notification. The NRC Resident Inspector and the NRC Regional Project Manager (Pelchat) were informed of this information call by the licensee.
The cause has been determined to be attributable to a UPS failure. This UPS failure resulted in a re-initialization of system configuration which, upon power restoration, caused process valves to move to the system's default configuration for the subsequent re-start mode. This default configuration was not correct for the state the system was in at the time of the re-initialization. The programming logic for valve alignment in the event of a re-initialization has since been corrected. There was no release and no exposure, and the system was immediately put in a safe configuration. The root cause is continuing. This is an update to the Courtesy Notification made on 6/18/07. Notified R2DO (Hopper), FSME (Burgess). |
| ENS 43431 | 19 June 2007 14:41:00 | This Agreement State report from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts was received via facsimile: Cat moved (kicked) during I-131 injection resulting in a couple of drops on veterinarian gloved hands, exam table, and floor. Contaminated Area subsequently mopped which seemed to spread more than clean the area. Contaminated area covered with plastic and access was restricted for more than 24 hours. Inside the room, the highest measurements on the floor, with a Ludlum 44-88 GM, was 12 Mr/hr on one spot, and 2-5 Mr/hr in all other floor areas - all measurements are at 1 cm. There was no personal contaminations and one small spot on a technicians sweatshirt sleeve which measured 15 mR/hr at 1 cm. With the 44-88 GM. All thyroid measurements indicate no internal intake of I-131. Event type Description: Contaminated Area restricted for more than 24 hours. Cause of Description: Cat moved (kicked) during I-131 injection resulting in a couple of drops on veterinarian gloved hands, exam table, and floor. Contributing Factor: Contaminated Area subsequently mopped which seemed to spread more than clean the area. Docket No.: 06-7113 |
| ENS 43417 | 11 June 2007 16:57:00 | This event was received via facsimile from the State of Alabama SUBJECT: Alabama Incident 07-25 - Damage to Instrotek Model 3500 Moisture Density Gauge. On the morning of June 11, 2007 at approximately 8:05 am CDT, the Alabama Office of Radiation Control received a phone call from a representative of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources advising the Agency that a moisture density gauge containing radioactive material had been run over by a dozer at a temporary job site in Phenix City, Alabama. The gauge was an Instrotek model 3500, serial number 583 containing 10 millicuries of Cs -137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be. The licensee, Building and Earth Sciences of Columbus, Georgia notified the Georgia Department of Natural Resources at the time the incident occurred. Upon notification, the writer called the licensee's technician at the site to check the status of the incident. According to the licensee, the sources were in the shielded position and the area was restricted. The licensee's Radiation Safety Officer arrived at the scene and surveyed the area, the dozer and the gauge. Radiation levels around the gauge were found to be within the normal range. The gauge was placed in the transport container and returned to the licensee's facility and a leak test was performed. Leak test results are pending. Building and Earth Sciences is authorized to possess and use radioactive material under their Georgia Radioactive Material License No. GA. 1136-1. This is all the information that this Agency has at this time and is current as of 3:00 pm CDT, June 11, 2007. |
| ENS 43413 | 8 June 2007 10:49:00 | During the performance of quarterly HPCI valve testing in accordance with OP4120 one of the two injection valves, HPCI-19, did not stroke open as required. Prior to testing the HPCI system was in normal standby line up. HPCI-19 was stroke tested during the outage on 6-1-07 and operated normally. HPCI-19 was also tested and verified to open during the ECCS test on 6-1-07. HPCI was declared inoperable per Technical Specification 3.5.E.2 (14 day Limiting Condition of Operation). All other ECCS systems and the EDGs are fully operable and the electrical grid is stable. The licensee has initiated repair efforts. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43403 | 4 June 2007 10:10:00 | The following event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to partial loss of the Public Prompt Notification System. On 6/4/07 at 06:55 the Tone Alert Radio System went out of service This was communicated by the Oswego County Emergency Operations Center at 08:30. The loss of the Tone Alert Radio System is a result of a loss of Verizon phone service in the Binghamton, NY area where the Tone Alert Radio System is controlled from. The cause of Verizon phone service being out of service is unknown. Preliminary information estimates several hours until restoration complete. The county alert sirens, which also function as part of the Public Prompt Notification System are operable. The licensee notified State/local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE FROM J. DRISCOLL TO P. SNYDER AT 1922 ON 6/4/07 * * * On 6/4/07 at 06:55, the Tone Alert Radio System was lost due to a loss of Verizon phone service in the Binghamton, NY area, which controls the Tone Alert Radio System. At 10:10, this event was reported by ENS communication in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) for a partial loss of the Public Prompt Notification System. On 6/4/07 at 14:05, the Oswego County EOC notified Nine Mile Point that the Tone Alert System was returned to service. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley). |
| ENS 43402 | 4 June 2007 09:58:00 | At 0830 on June 4, 2007, with the James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, Oswego County Emergency Management notified JAF that the National Weather Service had notified them that the Tone Alert Radios had been out of service since 0655. This impacts the ability to readily notify a portion of the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) Population for the Nine Mile Point and JAF Nuclear Power Plants. This failure meets NRC 8 hour reporting criterion 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The National Weather Service is currently working to determine the cause of the failure and time frame for system restoration. The loss of the Tone Alert Radios constitutes a significant loss of emergency off-site communications ability. Compensatory measures have been verified to be available should the Prompt Notification System be needed. This consists of utilizing Local Law Enforcement Personnel for 'Route Alerting' of the affected areas of the EPZ. Oswego County Emergency Management has verified that the Oswego County Sheriff's Department is on standby for Route Alerting. The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed and the state PSC will also be notified.
Notified the NYS PSC at approximately 10:30 EDT (regarding original event notification). The failure of the Tone Alert Radios was determined to be a loss of telephone interconnection service between Binghamton and Syracuse. The Tone Alert Radios were restored to service at 14:05. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the NY PSC. Notified the R1DO (Barkley). |
| ENS 43385 | 24 May 2007 12:26:00 | A required 24-hour notification was made by Paducah Regulatory Affairs to EPA Region IV in Atlanta, GA at 0815, 5-24-2007. The notification was made concerning a PCB spill of greater than the agreed upon action level of 10 pounds of PCBs confined within a building. The approximate 3 gallon PCB oil spill was from an electrical capacitor located inside the C-333 Process Building. The oil spilled onto a concrete floor and was contained to the immediate area. The area was flagged and posted as a PCB spill area and clean up is in progress. This event is reportable as a 4 hour event as required by the NRC NUREG 1022, a specific report made to a government agency. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-1362; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-06; Worksheet No. 43385. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43388 | 24 May 2007 17:14:00 | The following event was received via e-mail On April 23, 2007, 101 I-125 seeds (10 strands, each strand containing 10 seeds, and one calibrated seed) were received by the Nuclear Medicine Hot Lab and transported from the Nuclear Medicine Hot Lab to Rad Oncology for assay on April 24, 2007. All seeds were accounted for. One strand was dismantled and all 10 seeds were assayed and stored in a lead pig. The area was surveyed at the end of the assay process, and the seeds were maintained under lock until the next morning when they were retrieved for the procedure. The following morning the strands were taken to the Operating Room for the procedure. The 10 loose seeds used in the assay were loaded in a Mick Cartridge (a device used for surgery) and transported to the OR. After the procedure all seeds implanted, seeds in strands and the cartridge (as a whole and not counting the seeds loaded in it) were accounted for. All strands were stored in a lead pig, and the cartridge was stored in a second pig. The package containing both pigs was transported to Rad Oncology and was kept under lock at all times. On May 23, 2007, a re-count of the seeds was completed before sending them to the manufacturer. The calibrated seed and the seeds from the strands were accounted for. The cartridge contained 9 out of the 10 seeds it was supposed to be holding. The seed activity at the time it was missed (5/23/07) was 0.361 mCi. The area where the cartridge was loaded and unloaded was surveyed as well as the two units that were used to sterilize the seeds. Surveys of some of the areas where the package was transported are still in progress. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43386 | 24 May 2007 12:45:00 | Rogers Group Company conducted a test at mile marker 63 on Edward T. Breathitt Parkway. After the test was completed they placed the Troxler 4640-B Moisture Density gauge (S/N 1772), 9 millicuries of Cs-137 (Sealed Source Model No. A-102112), in the back of the bed of truck, did not store it or tie it down, and they drove 3.5 miles South on Edward T. Breathitt Parkway at which time they turned around and drove back to mile marker 63. When they arrived back at mile marker 63 they discovered that the gauge was missing, believe that the gauge had fallen out of the truck while it was being driven. They retraced their route that they had taken and asked several working crews if they had seen the missing gauge. The gauge was not found and the licensee believes that a motorist had stopped and picked up the gauge. The licensee notified the State Police of the missing gauge. Reference Number: KY070002 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The Troxler Gauge has been found and returned to the licensee. Apparently, the gauge was recovered on 5/22/07 by a former employee of the Rogers Company, in the same general area where it was lost. The former employee took the gauge to his home in Vansans, Indiana. The individual reported the recovered gauge to the Vansans Police Department who contacted the Kentucky State Police. Both law enforcement agencies were able to confirm the identity of the gauge, and the gauge has been placed in the custody of the licensee. Notified R1DO(Doerflein), R3DO(Phillips), and FSME(Morell) |
| ENS 43347 | 5 May 2007 15:00:00 | Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality notified of an oil spill while backwashing a screen in the intake structure. Approximately 2 gallons of oil was spilled . Most of the oil spill was contained and was wiped up using oil drip pads. There is no evidence that oil was released to the Missouri River. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this offsite notification by the licensee. |
| ENS 43345 | 4 May 2007 16:01:00 | At approximately 1256 CDT on May 4, 2007, a manual reactor scram was initiated following the loss of cooling to the no. 2 main transformer. Reactor power at the time of the scram was approximately 70 percent (initially 100% power). Following the scram, reactor water level briefly decreased below Level 3, resulting in the automatic closure of containment isolation valves in the suppression pool cooling system. This isolation was confirmed to have occurred as designed. Reactor pressure and water level control were promptly established. All control rods inserted, and no emergency injection system operation was required. This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a condition resulting in a manual actuation of the reactor protection system. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43343 | 4 May 2007 12:40:00 | A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access has been suspended. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 43342 | 4 May 2007 11:40:00 | The following information was provided via e-mail: On Friday, May 4, 2007, around 10:20 a.m., the Agency received notification by Alliance Laboratories, Inc., that a 2002 metallic gray Dodge Ram 1500 pickup truck that was carrying a moisture/density gauge, Humboldt Scientific Inc, Model 5001, SN#4455, with two sources 11 mCi of Cs-137, SN 1654CM, and a 44 mCi Am-241, SN NJ04752, was stolen sometime between 0600-0800 hrs. from an apartment complex in Houston, Texas. Houston Police Department has been notified and the case number is 06-4781007B. The Agency also notified the (Headquarters) Operations Officer at the NRC, at 1040 hours, and the event number is 43342. Texas Incident Number: I-8409. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43314 | 23 April 2007 16:24:00 | The licensee provided the following information via e-mail The licensee received six model 880-12-6-20 self-luminous signs from Safety Light Corporation in May of 1994. The report from Safety Light did not list serial numbers. The licensee's facility was remodeled in 2005. They have done a number of searches for the missing signs and have not been able to locate them. The licensee does not know where they are. They assume that the signs were misplaced during the remodel. This Department does not have the model numbers as they were not a part of the report from Safety Light in 1994. The licensee previously had not done a complete inventory to record the serial numbers. Event Cause: Inattention to Detail Corrective Action: No Corrective Action Taken Each of the three missing Safety Light Corporation signs initially contained 11.5 cuires/425.5 GBq of Tritium Event Date: 07/01/2005 Reporting Requirement: 20.2201(a)(1)(i) - Report of theft or loss of licensed material > 1000 x App C value Reference Number: 04-20-07 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source |
| ENS 43362 | 14 May 2007 08:48:00 | On March 30, 2007 a patient was given 5 millicuries of Iodine-131 to his thyroid. On April 2, 2007 the patients thyroid was removed and processed by the Lab. The thyroid was kept by the Sentara CarePlex Hospital located in Hampton, VA for 2 weeks in case there were pathology questions. On either April 16 or 17, 2007 the thyroid was sent to Stericycle Autoclave Facility located in Baltimore, MD. Stericycle Autoclave Facility, received the thyroid on April 17, 2007 and discovered that the thyroid was still radioactive. Sentara CarePlex was informed of this and they contacted one of their contractor RSOs. The RSO picked up the thyroid and has stored it for future disposition. The thyroid was calculated to have 200 microcuries of Iodine-131 as of April 17, 2007.
Sandy Wolff, a Radiation Safety Officer for Sentara, spoke to Sandy Gabriel, NRC Region I and was told that this is not a reportable event. Since the administration of the radionuclide was not intended to remove the patients thyroid gland, Ms. Wolff was told that the licensee is not expected to keep track of the removed organ. Notified R1DO (Perry) and Cynthia Flannery (FSME). |
| ENS 43303 | 15 April 2007 23:30:00 | At 0930 hours, Autoclave (AC) # 2 in the X-344 Facility experienced a Steam Shutdown due to high condensate level alarms (A) and (B) actuating. The AC was in applicable TSR Mode II 'Heating' for 45 minutes when the actuation occurred. This is considered a valid actuation of a 'Q' Safety System. The autoclave was placed in MODE IV 'Shutdown' and declared inoperable by the Plant Shift Superintended (PSS). An investigation is underway to determine the cause of the actuation. No release of radioactive material occurred as a result of the incident. This event is being reported in accordance with UE2-RA-RE1030 Appendix D. J. 2. Safety Equipment Actuation. The NRC was notified of this by the licensee. |
| ENS 43291 | 9 April 2007 04:26:00 | Energy Northwest is reporting initiation of a planned shutdown of Columbia Generating Station Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(i), 'The initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's technical specifications.' This plant shutdown is undertaken prior to 1032 PDT on 4/9/07 which is the expiration of the completion time of Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.7 Required Action C. This plant shutdown is undertaken due to complications from recovery of the failure of a backup power supply to power converter E-IN-2A/2B reported in event notification # 43290. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 43285 | 6 April 2007 11:59:00 | At 1143 on 4/6/07 the licensee declared an Unusual Event due to a main transformer explosion in the protected area. The event was declared in accordance with EAL 8.2.2. Unit 3 automatically tripped due to a load reject at the main generator. The Unit is currently stable at normal operating temperature and pressure. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps to the main condenser. All emergency diesel generators are available if needed but safety buses are currently supplied with offsite power. At the transformer site the deluge system actuated and the fire brigade responded. The fire was out at the time of the report The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 1232 ON 4/6/07 FROM LAUGHLIN TO HUFFMAN * * * The offsite local fire department was called by the licensee but their support was not needed and they were released. * * * UPDATE AT 1259 ON 4/6/07 FROM LAUGHLIN TO HUFFMAN * * * The licensee exited Unusual Event at 1247 based on the fact that the fire was confirmed to be extinguished, there was no damage to safety equipment and the plant was in a safe and stable condition. * * * UPDATE AT 1440 ON 4/6/07 FROM PRUSSMAN TO KNOKE * * * On April 6 at 1143 hours, an unusual event was declared based on Emergency Action Level 8.2.2, an explosion in the 'B' phase of the 31 main transformer. This is a one hour reportable event to the NRC made at 1159 hours. This is an update of EN 43285. The NUE was terminated at 1247 hours. The State and County were also notified of the unusual event. A press release was made. Although no one was injured as a result of this event, a four hour report is being made since this is related to on-site personnel safety. The main generator tripped and this resulted in a consequential reactor trip. The Reactor Protection System shut down the reactor at 1109 hours, a four hour report. The plant operated as designed and the Auxiliary Feedwater System actuated, an eight hour report. The fire was reported to the Control Room at 1111 hours. The fire was put out in less than 15 minutes. The event is currently under investigation. The header information in this event was revised as a result of this update to indicate 'Offsite Notification.' |
| ENS 43284 | 6 April 2007 11:20:00 | Pinnacle Food Group located in St. Elmo, IL reported that between March 13 through 20, 2007 they were performing general maintenance for the up coming canning season. After the cleanup they discovered that a Industrial Dynamics Model FT50 fixed gauge containing 100 millicuries of Am-241 used for fill level measurements was taken as scrap metal to either Grossman Iron & Steel or PSE Metals which are both located in St. Louis, MO. These scrap metal yards were both notified on 04/05/07 by Pinnacle Food Group that their scrap yard may have the missing gauge in their yard. Pinnacle Food Group has hired a consultant and he arrived at the scrap yards on 04/06/07 and he is looking for the missing gauge. So far no contamination has been detected in either scrap yard. IL. Incident # IL-070020. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| ENS 43279 | 5 April 2007 11:38:00 | At 1023 Central Daylight Time the licensee declared an Alert due to a transformer fire in the non-safety related PN08 transformer phase 'A.' There were no visible flames seen by onsite licensee personnel but an area of the transformer was glowing with a smokey haze in the area. The fire brigade responded. The plant was already in a shut down condition entered on 4/1/07 for a refueling outage. Decay heat was being removed using Residual Heat Removal the train 'B.' The licensee declared the alert based on a potential impact to the operating Residual Heat Removal train. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * UPDATE AT 1215 ON 4/5/07 FROM LICENSEE COMMUNICATOR TO SNYDER * * * The licensee exited the Alert condition at 1215 Eastern Daylight Time based on their assessment that no impact to operating safety related RHR equipment occurred and any impact would have been conservative in that flow to the core would not have been interrupted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |