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At 1350 on 12/14/2012, both Control Structure Chillers at Susquehanna were rendered inoperable. This event required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 for both Units. Per Susquehanna procedures, after 1 hour, a power reduction must be commenced. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires that action be taken within one hour to place the Unit in Mode 3 within 13 hours and Mode 4 within 37 hours. Physical power reduction commenced at 1453 for Unit 1 and 1459 for Unit 2. The 'A' Control Structure Chiller was previously inoperable for routine maintenance. The system was in service for post maintenance testing and activities were underway to swap to the opposite train to allow removal of test instrumentation and fan belt tensioning for equipment associated with the 'A' Control Structure HVAC system. At 1350, the 'B' Control Structure loop circulating pump tripped, rendering the 'B' Control Structure Chiller inoperable. This condition requires immediate entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3. Both Control Structure Chillers are inoperable and this report is being made per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) as a shutdown required by Tech Specs, and 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Loss of a Safety Function required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Efforts are underway to restore at least one system to operable status in parallel with Unit shutdown activities. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be notifying the State of Pennsylvania.

• * * UPDATE FROM ALEX MCLELLAN TO JOHN KNOKE AT 2228 EST ON 12/14/12 * * *

On 12/14/12 at 1500 EST Susquehanna Steam Electric Station reported a shutdown had been commenced at 1453 EST for Unit 1 and 1459 EST for Unit 2 due to inoperability of both Control Structure Chillers. At 1750 EST the 'A' Control Structure Chiller was declared operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. Power reduction for both Units was halted at 1750 and preparations for power restoration initiated. On 12/14/12 Unit 1 power was restored to 98% at 1819 EST and Unit 2 power was restored to 98% at 1943 EST, the maximum power output possible based on grid conditions for Unit 1 and thermal limits for Unit 2. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Holody) notified.

An increased usage of Nitrogen to maintain Primary Containment pressure within specification was noticed during steady state operation. Investigation into the extra Nitrogen usage revealed that Primary Containment Leakage was in excess of that allowed per Technical Specification 3.3.3.a. No action statement is provided for leakage in excess of Technical Specification 3.3.3.a; therefore in accordance with Technical Specification 3.0.1, the reactor shall be placed in an operational condition in which the specification is not applicable. This requires the plant to be shutdown and cooled down to less than 216 degrees F. Additionally, this is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function of a system needed to control the release of radioactive material. The primary containment was declared inoperable at 1630 EST and a normal orderly plant shutdown was commenced at 1645 EST and will be less than 215 degrees F within 10 hours. Investigation of containment leakage is in progress. An update will be provided when the plant is in an operational condition in which Technical Specification 3.3.3.a is not applicable. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has notified the State of New York.

• * * UPDATE AT 0011 EST ON 12/14/12 FROM CHRISTOPHER GRAPES TO BILL HUFFMAN * * *

As of 2333 EST on 12/13/2012, the reactor is below 215 degrees F, and containment is no longer required to be operable by Technical Specification 3.3.3. As part of the shutdown, a manual reactor scram was initiated as part of the pre-planned shutdown sequence and the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated as expected. At Nine Mile Point Unit 1, a HPCI System actuation signal on low Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink. HPCI is a flow control mode of the normal feedwater systems and is not an Emergency Core Cooling System. At 1913 EST, RPV level was restored above the HPCI system low level actuation set point and the HPCI system initiation signal was reset. Pressure control was established on the turbine bypass valves, the preferred system. No Electromatic Relief Valves actuated due to the scram. Nine Mile Point Unit 1 is currently in Cold Shutdown, with reactor water level and pressure maintained within normal bands. Decay heat is being removed via shutdown cooling (SDC). The offsite grid is stable with no grid restrictions or warnings in effect." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and State authorities. Notified R1DO (Holody) and NRR EO (Lund).

Cook Nuclear Power Plant will begin a cyber security modification of Unit 1 and Unit 2 Plant Process Computers (PPCs) and associated network infrastructure on Tuesday, November 13, 2012 at 0900 EST. This includes the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) communication with the NRC Operations Center. The entire PPC for each unit will be out of service and unavailable for approximately 6 hours. During that time, the PPC satellite display systems in the Control Rooms, TSC and EOF will be unavailable. After approximately 9 hours, the ERDS will be restored to service along with the satellite display systems in the Control Rooms, TSC and EOF. Compensatory measures exist within the DC Cook Emergency Response procedures to provide plant data in the event of an actual Emergency to the NRC Operations Center until the ERDS can be returned to service. Unavailability of the ERDS and Control Room, TSC and EOF data is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as a major loss of emergency assessment capability. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. A follow-up ENS communication will be made when both units ERDS are fully restored to service. Unit 1 and Unit 2 PPC availability is expected to be restored on Tuesday, November 13, 2012 at 1500 EST. ERDS communication with the NRC Operations Center is expected to be restored on November 13, 2012 at 1800 EST.

• * * UPDATE FROM BRADDOCK LEWIS TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1559 EST ON 11/13/12 * * *

The licensee notified the Operations Center that the PPC work was delayed and, as a consequence, ERDS restoration will be delayed. Work on the PPC continues. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner) and ERDS Group (via email).

• * * UPDATE AT 1908 EST ON 11/13/12 FROM GREG KANDA TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

ERDS was declared operable at 1815 EST. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Giessner) and ERDS Group (via email).

The following information was provided by the State of Texas via email: On November 1, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency that one of its Campbell-Pacific Model MC-3 moisture/density gauges had been run over by a pickup truck at a temporary work site in Houston, Texas. The gauge contained one 10 millicurie cesium-137 source and one 50 millicurie americium-241/beryllium source. The sources were in the safe position when it was run over. The source rod was broken off at the top of the housing. The gauge was taken to a gauge service company where it was checked. There was no leakage of radiation. A determination will be made by the licensee as to whether they will have the gauge repaired or replaced. There was no exposure to any individual as a result of this incident.

"Gauge Information:
Mfg:  Campbell-Pacific
Model:  MC-3
SN:  M38118595

"Source Information:
cesium-137 -- 10 millicuries -- SN: C8595
americium-241/beryllium -- 50 millicuries -- A8595

Texas Incident Number: I-9005

Seabrook personnel determined that the Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) is unavailable due to a malfunction of its process computer. The condition occurred around 0430 EDT today after a plant electrical bus was de-energized and subsequently reenergized during a maintenance activity. The plant is presently in a refueling outage with the reactor vessel defueled. Following repair of the process computer, Seabrook expects to return ERDS to service later today. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii), loss of emergency preparedness capabilities, for loss of the ERDS function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

• * * UPDATE FROM MIKE TAYLOR TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1333 EDT ON 10/1/12 * * *

The ERDS system has been returned to service. The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Schmidt).

The following information was provided by the State of Arkansas via email: While conducting an investigation of a citizen's allegation on September 20, 2012, the Department (Arkansas Department of Health) recovered a generally licensed device in a scrap yard in Dermott, Arkansas. The device is: Ohmart Beta Gauge: Model BAL Gauge Serial Number: 3780BC Isotope: SR-90 Activity: 25 millicuries This device was retrieved and transported to the Department's (Arkansas Department of Health) storage location in Little Rock at approximately 1800 CDT on September 20, 2012. Ohmart provided information concerning the shipment date (12/1994) and the location. The device was shipped to Burlington House Mill in Monticello, Arkansas. Ohmart also informed the Department (Arkansas Department of Health) that a second device had also been shipped with this source. The source holder serial number for this device is 3779BC. Health Physicists visited the old Burlington site after finding the device in the scrap yard in Dermott, Arkansas. Health Physicists returned on September 21, 2012 to the Monticello and Dermott areas to search in locations where the second device may have been disposed. At the time of this notification, the Department (Arkansas Department of Health) considers the second device to be missing. The Department (Arkansas Department of Health) has notified the Mississippi Department of Health. The Department (Arkansas Department of Health) is still investigating and searching for the missing device. An investigation is on-going to identify the possible owner of the devices. The Department (Arkansas Department of Health) considers this event open at this time pending the completion of the investigation. Arkansas Incident Number AR-2012-009.

• * * UPDATE AT 1014 EDT ON 10/02/12 FROM ROBERT PEMBERTON TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following update was received from the State of Arkansas via email: On October 1, 2012, while conducting a follow-up investigation of allegation ARK-2012-009, the Department recovered the second generally licensed device originally shipped to the Burlington House Mill in Monticello, Arkansas. The device is described as follows: Manufacturer: Ohmart S.O. : AR940603068A Source Holder: BAL Source Serial Number: 3779BC Isotope: Sr-90 Activity: 25 mCi Date 12/94 The device was retrieved from property on East Calhoun Street, Monticello, Arkansas and transported to the Department's storage vault in Little Rock. The device housing was not damaged and preliminary wipes of the device showed no removable contamination. An investigation is on-going to identify the possible owner of the devices. The Department considers this event open at this time pending the completion of the investigation. Notified R4DO (Powers), FSME RESOURCE and ILTAB via email.

• * * UPDATE FROM THE ARKANSAS DEPT. OF HEALTH VIA FAX ON 11/9/12 AT 1530 EST * * *

On November 9, 2012, both recovered sources were picked up for disposal from the Department's storage vault in Little Rock Arkansas. Neither source has been found to be leaking. The Department has completed its investigation and considers this event closed. Notified R4DO (Farnholtz) and FSME Resources email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This is a non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the work activity affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Planned maintenance activities are being performed today to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF)/Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The work entails replacement of a pressure switch. The filtration portion of the system will not be affected by this work. This work activity is planned to be performed and completed expeditiously within about 3.5 hours including establishing and removing the clearances and performing post maintenance testing; however, restoration time required during the maintenance could exceed the time required to activate the TSC.

If an emergency condition occurs that requires activation of the EOF and TSC, plans are to utilize the EOF and TSC during the time this work activity is being performed as long as habitability conditions allow. The Emergency Response Organization team members will be relocated to alternate locations if required by habitability conditions in accordance with emergency implementing procedures. Alternate emergency response facilities will remain available in the event that relocation is necessary." The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Licensee has also notified state and local agencies.

• * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE CURTIS TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1025 EDT ON 9/8/2012 * * *

The maintenance work was completed. The TSC and EOF were declared operable as of 1025 EDT. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Lesser).

On August 28, 2012, 17:00 PDT, Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) identified additional release pathways that could affect the control room (CR) operator dose following a Large-Break Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LBLOCA). Consequently, PG&E declared the control room envelope (CRE) inoperable and is establishing mitigative actions in accordance with TS 3.7.10, Action B.1, 'Initiate action to implement mitigating actions' immediately, and Action B.2, 'Verify mitigating actions ensure CRE occupant exposures to radiological hazards will not exceed limits, and CRE occupants are protected from smoke and chemical hazards' within 24 hours. PG&E is establishing mitigative actions in accordance with TS 3.7.10 and RG 1.196. These mitigative actions are for operations control room personnel to administer potassium iodide and don self-contained breathing apparatus equipment in a timely fashion should a LBLOCA occur. They will be communicated and controlled by a standing order to the control room staff. PG&E previously established controls on other release pathways that offset the potential increases to the maximum predicted offsite dose due to the new release pathways. No increase in maximum predicted offsite dose is expected from the new release pathways. Diablo Canyon (DCPP) is making this 8-hour, non-emergency notification under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Plant personnel notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1600 EDT ON 9/8/12 FROM GLEN GOELZER TO PETE SNYDER * * * 

PG&E is retracting EN 48246, based on the results from a new dose analysis coupled with compensatory measures implemented to ensure that the analysis input parameters and assumption will not be inadvertently exceeded. The analysis concluded that the CRE was operable and that CR doses remained below regulatory limits. Plant personnel notified the NRC resident inspector. Notified R4DO (Gaddy).

On 8-20-2012 during scheduled surveillance testing, the Reactor Water Cleanup (RWCU) System Isolation Differential Flow - High function was discovered to be inoperable at 1520 CDT. The high differential flow signal is provided to detect a break in the RWCU system when area or differential temperature would not provide detection (i.e. cold leg break). This instrumentation provides isolation signals to both inboard and outboard isolation valves and its loss is being reported pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

• * * RETRACTION AT 1513 EDT ON 9/27/2012 FROM BOB MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

Subsequent to the initial report, NextEra Energy Duane Arnold (NextEra) has determined that the RWCU Differential Flow High instrument loop was, at all times, capable of performing its TS function. Specifically an engineering analysis of the impact of the instrument as-found and as-left values on the overall instrument loop setting was performed. The analysis determined that the instrument in question was set at a value which would have isolated the RWCU Primary Containment Isolation Valves prior to reaching the Technical Specification (TS) allowable value and therefore the instrument loop remained capable at all times of performing its TS function. This event is not considered a Safety System Functional Failure or a Condition Prohibited by TS and is not reportable to the NRC as a Licensee Event Report (LER) per 10CFR50.73. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R3DO (Lipa).