|Entered date||Event description|
|ENS 48059||29 June 2012 21:15:00||On June 29, 2012, at 1746 EDT hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power, the following informational statement was issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding a medical emergency involving a member of the Pilgrim Station Security Department. This afternoon, a security employee at Pilgrim Station who appeared to be in medical distress was immediately transported to the hospital for observation and professional medical care. The individual was observing and monitoring union picket line activities and was not filling a position required by the Pilgrim Station Security Plan. The Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will notify the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.|
|ENS 48055||28 June 2012 20:44:00||At 1353 EDT on 06/28/2012, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station experienced a loss of power from one of two offsite power sources when transformer 20 shutdown automatically. All ESS (Engineered Safeguards System) electrical busses fed by this transformer automatically transferred to the other offsite power source (transformer 10). Additionally, startup bus 20, which is normally fed from transformer 20, automatically transferred to transformer 10. On each unit, multiple system containment isolation valves closed as a result of the electrical transient. Operators were able to reset and restore each system. On unit one, residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling ceased operation during the transient. Shutdown cooling was restored within one hour by control room operators in accordance with off-normal procedures. Unit two remained at 100% power throughout the event. This incident is being reported as an unplanned actuation of systems that mitigate the consequences of significant events per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The licensee is in a 72 hour LCO on Unit 2 as a result of the loss of offsite power. All emergency diesels generators are available. The licensee is investigating the cause of the transformer 20 shutdown. The NRC Resident Inspector and the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency (PEMA) have been notified.|
|ENS 48054||28 June 2012 14:18:00|
The following was received from the Commonwealth of MA. via fax. An automobile with a Nuclear Density Gauge stored in its trunk was stolen from a work site in Roslindale, MA. The nuclear density gauge was manufactured by Campbell-Pacific, Model No. MC3, Serial No. M390204846, containing sealed sources of Cs-137 and Am-241, of less than 10 millicuries and 50 millicuries, respectively. The gauge is licensed with the MA Radiation control Program, with Miller Engineering & Testing of Northboro, MA under license No. 23-4571. A police report for the stolen property is being filed with the Boston Police. Agency (state) continues with the investigation into this matter, and has asked the licensee for a copy of the police report and subsequent findings. Thus, the investigation remains open.
The Boston Police Department has recovered the stolen vehicle with the gauge intact in the trunk of the vehicle. The radiation profile is normal for the gauge and the police have notified the company to come and recover the gauge. Notified R1DO (DeFrancisco) and FSME/ILTAB via e-mail THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
|ENS 48051||27 June 2012 17:10:00||On 06/27/2012, it was identified that a void existed in the common suction header for Safety Injection. The void was of the size such that operability was maintained. However, this was nonconforming to the Kewaunee Power Station licensing basis. At 1446 on 06/27/2012, the Kewaunee Power Station declared both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B Inoperable due to venting of the common suction line to remove the void. LCO 3.0.3 was entered as directed by LCO 3.5.2. ECCS Operating. This loss of safety function is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The void in question has been reduced to an acceptable size with the common Safety Injection suction piping full. Both Safety Injection Train A and Safety Injection Train B have been restored to Operable status and LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1500 on 06/27/2012. The condition was detected by ultrasonic testing as part of a surveillance for RHR pump and valve testing. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47997||6 June 2012 00:47:00||On June 6, 2012, at 0045 EDT hours and the reactor at 100% core thermal power the following press release being issued by Entergy Nuclear regarding the status of the ongoing labor negotiations. Plymouth, Mass. - Entergy Nuclear, the company that owns and operates the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is implementing a contingency staffing plan after weeks of negotiations between the Company and the Utility Workers Union of America Local 369 leadership were unsuccessful in reaching an agreement for a new union contract. Local 369 has stated flatly that while its members are not on strike, they reserve the right to walk off the job at any time, without any notice, and leave the nuclear power plant critically understaffed and in violation of the plant's operating license. This disregard for public safety is unacceptable. Accordingly, the company's contingency plan is being implemented. The contingency plan for temporary alternate staffing is consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations and is in the interest of safety and maintaining formal organizational controls on the plant site. Highly qualified individuals from within Pilgrim's management team as well as the Entergy nuclear fleet will be filling the necessary positions. The NRC Resident Inspector staff has been informed of this press release and notification. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee will be notifying the Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency.|
|ENS 47976||30 May 2012 16:26:00||The following information was received via fax: Nature of Defect: RSCC Wire & Cable LLC's Firezone 3HR 600V cables may have been installed in a configuration not tested by RSCC. RSCC has only tested the Firezone 3HR 600V cable while installed in a tray with no additional cables. The actual installation at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant of the Firezone 3HR 600V cable was in a tray with other non-fire rated cables. The guidelines given by UL in FHIT.Guide Info and FHIT.31 are not specific enough to cover this case. RSCC Wire & Cable LLC conservatively concludes this may be a potential defect. Potential Hazard: Under fire conditions in a tray with other non-fire rated cables, Firezone 3HR 600V cables may not function as tested and qualified in accordance with UL 2196. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: RSCC has issued a Corrective Action Report (CAR 12-19) to address requirements that include documented installation procedures for Firezone 3HR 600V cables. Robert Gehm, Applications Engineering Manager for RSCC Wire & Cable LLC, has been designated as the responsible individual for action(s) to be taken. Completion of the corrective action is expected by June 29, 2012. Notification will be made to Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant and the Dresden Nuclear Power Plant for their evaluation regarding the condition as described. Notification will be made by May 31, 2012.|
|ENS 47962||24 May 2012 21:59:00||On 5/24/12, it was identified that a conduit flood seal was missing between an outside manhole and the interior of the switchgear rooms. The missing flood seal compromised the interior flooding design for both East and West Switchgear Rooms. Repairs were made by procuring and installing a 4" flood seal so that the flood path has been plugged. The conduit plug seal is now functional. The event is being reported under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as internal flooding of both Switchgear Rooms could possibly affect (a.)safe shutdown, (b.)removal of decay heat, (c.)control of release of radioactive material and (d.)mitigating an accident. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47959||24 May 2012 17:31:00||On 5/24/2012 at 1541 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made after the discovery of a visible oil sheen on waters of the U.S. (the Tennessee River side of Sequoyah's intake forebay skimmer wall). The source of the oil appears to be a tipped or overflowing catchpan located in the Essential Raw Cooling Water (ERCW) pumping station. All catchpans in the pumping station have been emptied to eliminate them as immediate potential source of oil released to the environment. The following agencies have also been notified: EPA Region 4, and the Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA). The Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC) will be notified. Cleanup is in progress. Measures to prevent recurrence are being taken. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.|
|ENS 47960||24 May 2012 18:04:00||At 1348 CDT on 5/24/12 with the Reactor at 33% power, River Bend Station operators inserted a manual reactor scram based on loss of high pressure feed to the reactor following a loss of a 13.8 Kv switchgear. The Control Room team observed an electrical transient in the Control Room concurrent with the start of Reactor Feed Pump "B". The crew identified that no high pressure feed was aligned to the reactor and inserted a manual scram. Based on the configuration of the electrical plant during startup, all circulating water and Normal Service Water (NSW) was supplied from NPS-SWG1B. MSIVs were closed based on loss of circulating water and Standby Service Water (SSW) initiated automatically based on loss of NSW. EOP-0001, 'RPV Control' was entered on reactor high pressure and reactor low water level. EOP-0002, 'Primary Containment Control' was entered based on primary containment pressure high and suppression pool level high. EOP-0003, 'Secondary Containment Control', was entered on annulus pressure high. Reactor water level control is being maintained with Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC). High pressure core spray was manually started but was not required and was subsequently shut down. Pressure control is via RCIC and Safety Relief Valves (SRVs). Safety related busses are aligned to offsite power as normal. They were not affected by the electrical transient. Immediately after the scram at 1350, a report from the Turbine Building indicated smoke was seen around the Reactor Feed Pump 'B' termination cabinet. The Fire Brigade was activated. At 1358, the Fire Brigade reported that there was no fire. A review of the Emergency Action Levels (EALs) was performed. No emergency declaration was required. Initial investigation shows damage to cabling and circuit boards associated with Reactor Feedpump 'B' in the Turbine Building, but no fire was ever observed. In addition, the Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operations Support Center (OSC) lost power. At the time, both facilities continued to be in a state of readiness and emergency functions could be performed. At 1526, power was restored to both facilities, including the ventilation systems. All rods inserted into the core. The unit is stable at 230 psi and 391 degrees F. Reactor pressure is maintained by RCIC and decay heat removal via safety relief valves to the suppression pool. The unit is in a technical specification for suppression pool high level. There were no safety system failures. There is one non safety related 13.8 switchgear out of service due to this event and NNS-Switchgear 2A out of service from an event three days ago. Offsite assistance was not required. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47956||24 May 2012 13:14:00|
At 0833 on 05/24/2012, an uncleared vendor employee was piggybacked by a cleared vendor employee through a security gate into the x3012 Security Area. The uncleared employee was removed from the area. There is no known compromise of classified information. This incident is reportable to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as an 8 hour Security Event in accordance with American Centrifuge Administrative Procedure ACD2-RG-044, Nuclear Regulatory Event Reporting, Appendix B, Section K2, IMI-3#14, which states, 'Circumvention of established access control procedures into a security area (excluding Property Protection Area). The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (Hartland).
Update: On 07-18-12 at 1017 the NRC Event has been retracted on the guidance of the Regulatory Organization for the following reason: It has been determined that the two previously reported DOE IMI-3 events for 2012 did not meet the requirements for an NRC reportable event and should have been entered into the written log in accordance with 10 CFR 95.57. While they did meet the criteria for an 8-hr reportable event to the DOE they did not meet the NRC requirements for reporting to the NRC Operations Office. We hereby request that both NRC Events 48084 and 47956 be retracted." Notified R2DO (Desai).
|ENS 47957||24 May 2012 15:21:00||On May 23, 2012, at approximately 1700 hours, a beer bottle was discovered in a trash can inside the protected area. The bottle was discovered during trash collection by housekeeping personnel who reported the discovery to their supervision. The bottle was determined to contain remnants of moisture and had an odor of beer, constituting the potential presence of alcohol. This report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 26.719 (b)(1) based on the presence of alcohol in the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. We do not know if it was consumed in the Protected Area. It was found in the Construction Support Building, not in a Vital Area. This has been entered into the Corrective Action Program and investigation has been in progress".|
|ENS 47961||24 May 2012 19:04:00|
The following was reported from the state via e-mail: A Kennewick licensee who manufactures and distributes hand-held devices used to analyze metal alloys notified the Materials Section of an incident that occurred with one of their General License customers in California. The shutter in the device which shields the radioactive material remained in the open position even after disengaging the trigger mechanism to close the shutter. This allowed radiation to stream from the device unabated. The California customer packaged the device for shipping knowing the shutter was open with nothing shielding the radiation and sent it back to the manufacturer in Kennewick for repairs. When the manufacturer received the device, a radiation reading in excess of the package limitations was noted and promptly reported to us. The licensee informed us this is the first shutter malfunction ever for this device model, which has been in service without any similar problems for many years. The Materials staff is working with the licensee to identify compliance issues and to prevent recurrence. The Bruker AXS hand held XRF analyzer contains 5.9 milliCuries of Co-57. Incident Number WA-12-037
The XRF device is owned by Benchmark Environmental. Benchmark Environmental shipped the device to Bruker on May 22, 2012. Based on the dose rate measurement taken by Bruker prior to opening the package and removing the instrument, the Washington State Department of Health doesn't believe there were exposures to any member of the public in excess of regulatory limits. A dose rate measurement at 3 feet was 0.3 mR/hr as measured by their Bicron Surveyor 50 (cal date 1/19/12). Reading at approximately six inches from the surface pegged the dose rate meter on the 0 to 0.5 mR/hour scale. Bruker did not take measurements on higher scales. At that point, Bruker's shipping and receiving took the MAP FA4C1 analyzer out of the case and carried it at arm's length to the shielded source exchange pit. The instrument was evaluated inside the pit and the shutter was found partially open. The Co-57 source was removed from the analyzer and put into a shielded pig. Bruker examined the analyzer and found the source block was defective and (the analyzer was) sent to production for a replacement source block. The licensee provided corrective actions in the NMED data entry form. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg) and FSME (via email).
|ENS 47950||22 May 2012 22:31:00||On May 22, 2012 at 1732 (CDT) Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (MNGP) was notified by the Wright County siren vendor of an equipment malfunction with the siren activation system. Due to this issue, they are unable to activate any sirens in Wright County. The vendor discovered the issue during the completion of siren work in the county today. The vendor requested the dispatcher to issue a cancel test. The cancel test did not work. The issue is affecting both the primary and back up activation systems. The vendor will be following up until the issue is resolved. 58 sirens are impacted. The vendor anticipates investigation and repairs to be completed this evening. A compensatory measure, route alerting, is in place. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. MNGP was notified by the vendor at 2120 (CDT) on 5/22/2012 that the issue had been resolved and the sirens are now functional. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47948||22 May 2012 19:22:00||On May 22, 2012 it was determined that more than 20% (3 of 8 barrels) of the Amertap balls used for condenser cleaning on May 18, 2012 were not able to be recovered by normal means. Observers were stationed at the discharge structure during the process and it is not believed that balls were released to the river. The current agreement with the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency dated September 12, 2008, requires XCEL Energy to make a report to the MPCA whenever more than 20% (1.5 barrels or approximately 7,500 balls) of the Amertap balls are not recovered. The MPCA was notified May 22, 2012. Approximately, 15,000 Amertap balls have not been recovered by the normal strainer system and may be in the discharge canal. The licensee is investigating the cause of the event. The NRC Resident Inspector, Wright County Sheriffs Department, and Sherburne County Sheriffs Department have been notified.|
|ENS 47946||22 May 2012 16:35:00||A patient scheduled for a lymphoscintigraphy procedure was incorrectly injected with 25 milliCuries of Tc-99M Medronate instead of the prescribed 3 milliCuries of Tc-99 Sulphur Colloid. The cause of the event was human error. The patient and physician have been notified. The physician believes there will be no long term adverse effects due to this error. In order to prevent reoccurrence, the nuclear medicine staff will add this event to staff training to ensure that staff double check the label and the dosage and drug. Other options are still being assessed. The licensee also notified NRC Region 3 (Bob Gattone). A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
|ENS 48058||29 June 2012 15:59:00|
The following was received via e-mail: On 6/28/12 Saint Joseph Hospital personnel were surveying a packing materials used to ship I-125 seeds, for a procedure conducted earlier that day, when they noted elevated readings. Further surveys revealed that the elevated readings were not coming from the packing material associated with the 6/28/12 procedure but from packing material that was used to ship I-125 seeds for a previous procedure, which was in the area of the survey. Surveys of the packing material revealed no loose contamination on the exterior or interior of the box but elevated readings of 2500-350000 cpm and .2 mrem/hr. Receipt and post procedure surveys of the procedure associated with contaminated box did not reveal any abnormal readings. The Saint Joseph RSO assumes the material is I-125 but they do not have the capability to verify this. No loose seeds were found in any of the packing material. The I-125 seeds were accompanied by the manufacturers leak test report which indicated no contamination. The patient, whose procedure was associated with the contaminated packing material, will be evaluated on Monday 7/2/12 to determine if there was any uptake in his urine or thyroid of I-125 as a result of leaking seeds. CA Report Number: 062912 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
This is a follow up of an incident, as information only, on Friday, June 29, 2012. Radiologic Health Branch reference would be 5010 #062912. The notification was about contaminated packaging that had contained Best Medical I-125 seeds. A thyroid count was performed on the patient who had the seeds implanted in May. The thyroid count verified that there had been an uptake of iodine by the thyroid. Below is the write up and preliminary dose estimate from the licensee regarding. Based upon this morning's patient measurements, instrument-manufacturer supplied efficiency data, and reference data for dose conversion, we estimate the patient involved received a thyroid uptake of 0.1 mCi of I-125 and a dose to the thyroid of 300 cGy. 1) Conversion of counts per minute (cpm) to activity Two(Pi) counting efficiency for I-125 (per manufacturer) is 133.5% fraction of 2(Pi) solid angle subtended by a 2 inch diameter detector at a distance of 30 cm from the thyroid is 10.13 squared cm / 5654.9 squared cm = 0.00179 overall efficiency = 1.335 x 0.00179 = 0.00239 (190493 - 30) net cpm / 0.00239 x 4.505x10-10 mCi/dpm = 0.0359 mCi present thyroid burden. Back-correcting 60 days to time of implantation (conservatively assuming that all uptake occurred at that time) with 42-day effective half-life, initial uptake given by 0.0359 / 0.3715 = 0.0967 approximately 0.1 mCi 2) Taking the value quoted by Chen et.al. (attached) from NUREG/CR-6345, we assume the dose to thyroid is 780 cGy per mCi of I-125 administered, and this value assumes 25% uptake into the thyroid. Our calculated estimated thyroid burden of 0.1 mCi then gives an estimated absorbed dose of 0.0967 mCi x 780 cGy/mCi / 0.25 (since we measured actual thyroid burden v. amount administered) = 302 cGy approximately 300 cGy (rad) to thyroid. 3) Whole body committed effective dose equivalent (CEDE) from a 300 rad dose to the thyroid (using a thyroid weighting factor of 0.04) would be 12 rem. Notified R4DO (Allen) and FSME (Einberg).
EVENT SUMMARY: While surveying an empty brachytherapy seeds package for return to Best Medical hospital personnel discovered contamination on the interior of the package. Follow up thyroid scans of the patient who was implanted with the seeds associated with the package verified an uptake of I-125 by the patient's thyroid. The initial report to RHB was intended, by the licensee, to be a notification of a Medical Event. REPORTING: This event was reported to the NRC, by phone, on 4/13/12, at 8:50 am via email. HEALTH AND SAFETY: Based on surveys of the packing material all contamination was contained within the package and did not pose a threat to hospital personnel. The estimated dose to the patient's thyroid was calculated to be approximately 330 rad with a CEDE of 12 rem. ADDITIONAL DETAILS: The RSO conducted an investigation of the incident and could not find any indication that there were any irregularities with the implantation procedures. Hospital personnel associated with the procedure indicated to the RHB inspector that there were no irregularities with the procedure. In addition receipt surveys of the package did not reveal any contamination of any of the packaging material. The RSO concluded that the cause of the contamination was due to a manufacturing error. The RSO of Best Medical conducted an investigation of the production of the seeds implanted in the patient. All records at Best Medical indicate that all QC tests of the seeds were done satisfactorily. The RSO concluded that the seeds had been damaged in transit or that Saint Joseph personnel must have damaged the seeds either during the initial surveys or during the implantation. The Best Medical RSO was unable to explain how the seeds could have been damaged and still be implantable. The Virginia Department of Health inspected the Best Medical facility and concluded that all QC testing on the seeds had been completed satisfactorily with no abnormalities noted. After interviewing Saint Joseph and Best Medical personnel RHB personnel concluded that the most logical explanation for the leaking seeds was a manufacturing error, however, without samples from the same lot of seeds implanted available for analysis this can not be proven conclusively. The hospital has changed suppliers for the brachytherapy seeds. In addition they have initiated a procedure where the needles containing the seeds are wiped after they have been removed from the shipping container. ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: The hospital was not cited for this incident. INVESTIGATION STATUS: This investigation is closed. Notified R4DO (Spitzberg) and FSME Event Resource via email.
|ENS 47952||23 May 2012 16:38:00||The following the received via e-mail: On May 23, 2012, the Agency (State of Texas) was notified by the licensee that on April 10, 2012, while the licensee was performing a routine quality assurance test using a beta catheter system device, the 50.2 milliCurie Strontium-90 source train jammed as it began to move from the transfer device to the test catheter. The source train was lodged near the transfer device exit port and could not be returned to the home position. After a few failed attempts to retract the source train, the applicator and phantom were covered with a lead apron, and the manufacturer's Radiation Safety Officer was notified. A manufacturer's technician arrived at the licensee's Hot Lab the morning of April 11, 2012. The technician was not able to return the source to the shielded position. The device was returned to the manufacturer's facility for analysis. Since this fault occurred during routine quality assurance testing, no patient was involved in the procedure. The manufacturer inspected the catheter and found a deformation in the catheter that would have interfered with the source movement. The source was leak tested, and the results indicated that the source was not leaking. The source train has been removed from service. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300. TX Incident # I-8956|
|ENS 48057||29 June 2012 14:00:00||It was discovered on 2/13/12 that the mass control limit in the gadolinia pellet press operation was exceeded. An improperly installed valve allowed a total of 43 kg of uranium powder into the favorable geometry press feed tube, exceeding the 36 kg limit. This resulted in a failed item relied on for safety (IROFS) < 1 hour condition where a criticality control was not maintained. The press feed mass control is a sole IROFS for a fire accident sequence. Control indications functioned as designed and provided notification of the malfunction to the operator and the operation was secured. The other controls on geometry and moderation were maintained at all times. At no time was an unsafe condition present. The gadolinia pellet press operation was shut down and the powder was removed by 1000 on 2/13/2012. Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS: At no time was an unsafe condition present SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS: Equipment was shut down and powder removed STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS: Additional corrective actions, extent of condition, and extent of cause have been documented. This event is being communicated in order to administratively meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR70, Appendix A. The licensee has spoken with Region 2 (Thomas) regarding this issue, and discussed the issue in a Reply to Notice of Violation dated 6/29/2012 letter book number SPM12-030.|
|ENS 47658||10 February 2012 18:54:00||During a review of the station's procedures for responding to external flooding conditions, it was determined that the guidance is not adequate to mitigate a design basis flood event (1014 feet mean sea level (msl)). Compensatory actions have been identified and are being implemented. Additional corrective actions are being evaluated. The plant is currently in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown, with a river level of 986 feet 2 inches msl with no predictions for river level to pose a threat to safety related components. NRC inspectors identified procedural inadequacies relating to the mitigation of flooding. The licensee is addressing the procedural inadequacies. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47623||26 January 2012 15:22:00|
A patient received 100% more than the prescribed dose of thallium. The patient was to receive 3.5 milliCuries of thallium followed by 30 milliCuries of Cardiolite, a Tc-99M radiopharmaceutical. Instead, the patient received 3.5 milliCuries of thallium then received an additional 3.6 milliCuries of Thallium. The technician stated that he got confused where the patient was in the treatment process. The patient and physician have been informed. The licensee is awaiting dosimetry results to determine the organ dosage but does not believe there will be any recurring medical effects from this event.
The licensee is retracting this event report after a review and evaluation of the doses administered. The licensee has determined that this event is not reportable based on the unintended dose being less than 5 Rem effective dose equivalent and therefore not reportable under 10 CFR 35.3045. The licensee has discussed this conclusion with NRC Region 1 (Lanzisera). R1DO (Dental) and FSME (McIntosh) have been notified.
|ENS 47606||18 January 2012 15:41:00|
The U.S. Army Life Cycle Command was informed by the Combined Support Maintenance Shop in Richmond, Virginia that a range indicator containing 4 sources of 0.8 Curies each of Tritium may be damaged. Apparently, the range indicators appear cracked and are not illuminating properly. The range indicator is locked inside a secured area with no access allowed. The U.S. Army is waiting for results of swipe surveys to determine if there is an actual spread of contamination.
The licensee is retracting the event based upon swipe survey results being less than the lower limit of detectability. There was no spread of contamination and the device will be disposed of in the future. The licensee notified Bill Lin (Region 3). Notified R3DO(Peterson), R1DO(Bellamy) and FSME(McIntosh).
|ENS 47608||18 January 2012 16:50:00||On January 17, 2011 the licensee's radiation safety officer called (the state) to advise that a portion of a shipment of radiological material to be used for medical purposes had not arrived at its intended destination. A package containing two doses of Thallium-201 of nominally 20 milliCi each was picked up by the Texas licensee, Pan Handle Nuclear, on January 14, 2012 in Amarillo. However, the package showed signs of repaired damage and when inspected, the third dose of Thallium-201 was missing from the package. The manufacturer was alerted on the morning of January 16th and they subsequently contacted the carrier, regarding the package. HazMat Personnel from (the shipping company) conducted a trace of their facilities associated with the transfer which resulted in the missing vial being identified as 'found' in the Memphis 'Over goods' holding area. Apparently, the package had become damaged early in the morning on January 14th during the shipping process such that one of the three vials had escaped the packaging. The damage to the package was noted and repaired, however an accurate count of the contents was not conducted and, contrary to standing instructions from the manufacturer, the package was forwarded to the intended recipient rather than being returned to the manufacturer. The 'missing' vial was subsequently found on the same day later that morning, some hours after the package was processed through the Memphis hub. The vial was identified as hazardous based on the trefoil which appeared on the shielded and intact container and the manufacturer's name. It was isolated and placed into an over pack that same day. The slightly damaged, but intact shielded container was then returned to the manufacturer as of January 18, 2012 after it was determined to be the 'missing' third vial. Surveys of the returned vial conducted by the manufacturer showed that there was no external contamination on the shielded vial, there was no damage to the vial and all the expected material remained present. Illinois Item Number: IL 12004|
|ENS 47540||21 December 2011 06:14:00|
On 12/21/11 at 0046 Secondary Containment integrity was lost when both U2 Reactor Building interlock doors were open simultaneously. Interlock door electrical checks were in progress. TS LCORA 126.96.36.199.Condition A was entered. Reactor Building differential pressure remained within Tech Spec limits. The doors were both open for approximately 9 seconds. The cause of the event is being investigated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois Inspector will be notified.
On 12/21/2011, EN 47540 was made describing a condition where secondary containment was declared inoperable due to not meeting the surveillance requirement for having one access door closed. This was reported as a loss of safety function for the secondary containment. This condition occurred during a planned maintenance activity. During a maintenance activity both doors unexpectedly opened. As a part of the maintenance, the inner door was opened by maintenance personnel using the normal control pushbutton. Upon personnel observing the outer door opening, the inner door button was released and the functional door automatically closed. Although both doors were briefly open, the negative pressure required to ensure secondary containment integrity was maintained at all times. Based on the door immediately closing and negative pressure being maintained, this is not considered a loss of safety function. Therefore this EN is being retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Giessner).
|ENS 47535||20 December 2011 08:14:00||At 11:30 AM December 19, 2011, the licensee's radiation safety officer provided a 24-hour telephone report notification of a shutter failure on a gauge. The gauge involved was an Ohmart SH-100, serial number 70230, containing 10 mCi of CS-137, with an assay date of Aug 1981. The shutter mechanism is a lead block screwed to a sliding aluminum plate. The licensee was removing the gauge from its mounting to replace it with a different new gauge as permitted by their license. When the licensee removed the gauge from its mounting, the lead block separated from the aluminum plate. The licensee replaced the lead shielding and secured it in place. The licensee secured the gauge from unauthorized access and will return it to the manufacturer for disposal with other gauges they are replacing. The licensee states that no personnel received radiation doses during this event. Ohio Report #OH110005|
|ENS 47524||15 December 2011 07:30:00|
The St. Lucie Unit 1 Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) will be removed from service for system modification following completion of core offload for the current cycle 24 refueling outage, currently scheduled for 12/15/2011 at 0900. The ERDADS system will be functional prior to core reload (Mode 6) and fully operational prior to the plant startup. This is an informational notification of a planned loss of emergency assessment capability. Control room indications including annunciators are available as alternate means to monitor critical data. An update to this notification will be provided when the system is restored to service. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The St. Lucie Unit 1 Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System (ERDADS) has been restored to service. Some area rad monitoring functional testing remains in progress; however full assessment capability is functional via the control room indications and alarms. All ERDS link data points provided by the Emergency Response Data Acquisition and Display System have been restored to service and fully operational to support plant start up. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Guthrie).
|ENS 47525||15 December 2011 10:41:00||Control room area chilled water system 'B' train tripped while control room area chilled water system 'A' train was isolated for maintenance. Unit 1 and Unit 2 entered technical specification 3.0.3 at 0739 EST. Unit 1 shutdown commenced at 1030 EST. Unit 2 shutdown is scheduled to commence at 1100 EST. This plant condition also requires a notification under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). The licensee is investigating the cause of the trip on the 'B' train and is taking actions to restore the 'A' train to service and exit the shutdown. The electrical lineup is normal and all safety systems are operable. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The states of North Carolina and South Carolina will be notified. Local county governments of York, Gaston, and Mecklenberg counties will also be notified.|
|ENS 47458||18 November 2011 15:45:00||A patient had a mass surgically removed from both sides of the nose and was undergoing a topical treatment for microscopic disease using a Nucletron HDR containing 8.52 curies of Ir-192 with a Valencia Model H3 skin applicator containing a platinum filter. The planned administration was 7 fractions of 600 centigrays each on both the left and right side of the nose. During the initial planning for the treatment, an error was made in calculating the dwell time for each location and this incorrect data was entered into the HDR system. As a result of the error, the patient received 54% during each fraction (treatment) during two of the seven fractions on each side of the nose. Prior to the third fraction, the medical team is required per procedure to check calculations and caught the error before the third fraction (treatment) was performed. The patient and prescribing physician have been informed, and there is no long range medical concern for disease as a result of this error. The total dose treatment has not been exceeded. The state's licensee is revising procedures in order to prevent recurrence, and the state will be submitting an NMED report. New Jersey Incident Number: #410674 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
|ENS 47453||17 November 2011 17:17:00||A notification was made to the National Response Center and the Kansas Department of Health and Environment of a 7-10 gallon release of diesel fuel oil to the environment. The leak originated from a temporary diesel fueled heater in place for freeze protection for a temporary fire pump. The fuel oil was not released to surface water, and has been isolated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47454||17 November 2011 18:00:00||On Thursday, November 17, 2011, at 1515 hours, with the reactor at approximately 50% core thermal power, the station entered a 24 hour cold shutdown action statement due to the inability to provide a manual isolation for a main feedwater line check valve that had been declared inoperable due to a leak. As background, the reactor was at reduced power in order to perform a planned main condenser thermal backwash. While at reduced power an inspection of the main steam tunnel (a normally locked closed high radiation area) was performed as part of a scheduled system inspection. The inspection identified a leak on the feedwater line 'B' outboard check valve (6-CK-62B). The feedwater check valve was declared inoperable and the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) for Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.A.2.a.5 was entered. Because there is no ability to manually isolate the primary containment penetration the station is required to be in cold shutdown within 24 hours per TS 3.7.A.5. Currently, preparations are being completed to conduct the reactor shutdown and to initiate check valve repairs. This event had no impact on the health and safety of the public. The USNRC Senior Resident Inspector was onsite and has been notified. The electrical lineup is normal and all safety related equipment required for shutdown and cooldown are operable.|
|ENS 47452||17 November 2011 16:58:00||On November 17, 2011, at 1345 Eastern Standard Time (EST), it was determined that an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety existed on Unit 2 following a mid-cycle maintenance outage which required reactor vessel disassembly. Unit 2 had reached Mode 2 (i.e., Startup) during the power ascension, when elevated drywell leakage was identified and the plant was shutdown (see EN#47444). Unit 2 was subsequently operating in Mode 4 (i.e., Cold Shutdown) to allow for drywell entry. During leak investigation activities, it was determined that the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head was not fully tensioned. This condition is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as a condition of the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The safety significance of this event was minimal. Unit 2 was in power ascension operating at a maximum of approximately 7% of rated thermal power. Control Room Operators took appropriate action to shutdown the Unit when elevated drywell leakage was identified. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47414||3 November 2011 23:51:00||On November 3, 2011, at 1550 PDT, operators determined that control room ventilation system (CRVS) contained a single failure vulnerability whereby unfiltered air supplied to the control room could exceed the flowrates used in the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident (DBA) consequences. This vulnerability was discovered during performance of control room inleakage testing required by TS SR 188.8.131.52. It was determined that the control room pressurization system airflow could bypass the supply filter if the CRVS booster fan in the associated train was not operating. This would allow as much as 800 cubic feet per minute of unfiltered air to be delivered to the control room following an accident that results in initiation of the CRVS pressurization mode. Operators would correct the condition approximately 10 minutes after a safety injection by manually selecting the train's redundant booster fan in accordance with existing proceduralized actions specified in the DCPP emergency procedure E-0 Appendix E. This period of unfiltered air supply to the control room due to a single failure of a CRVS booster fan had not been previously analyzed and could have potentially resulted in operator dose greater than contained in plant analyses. Plant staff verified that all components and redundant components in each ventilation train are currently OPERABLE. Plant staff has implemented additional compensatory measures by issuing a shift order to require that TS Action 3.7.10.A be entered for unavailability of either of the two CRVS booster fans in each CRVS train. Additionally, evaluation of the new unfiltered inleakage may result in more restrictive administrative controls to ensure operator doses are maintained less than the FSAR accident analyses. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 47388||28 October 2011 22:11:00||A non-licensed supervisor was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.|
|ENS 47387||28 October 2011 19:09:00|
At 1430 (EDT) on 10/28/11, it was discovered that due to an Equipment Clearance Order (ECO), the HVAC recirculation capability of the Technical Support Center (TSC) was lost. The TSC dampers were deenergized in the non-emergency position while the ECO was in effect. The ECO was put into effect on 10/10/11. The ECO was released at 1630 (EDT) on 10/28/2011 and functionally tested restoring TSC HVAC recirculation capability. While the ECO was in effect and under certain accident conditions, the TSC may have been unavailable due to the inability of the charcoal filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. The alternate TSC remained available, during the time the ECO was in effect, as defined in the Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures. This 8 hour notification is required per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The alternate TSC remained available during this period. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
A Functionality Assessment (FA) has concluded that the Turkey Point TSC was able to perform it's intended function of ensuring habitability to TSC responders during the period 10/10/11 through 10/28/11 with the TSC ventilation system in the degraded condition. A dose analysis was performed, modeled after the design basis LOCA analysis for the TSC, using alternate source term, no filtration, containment leakage based on the most recent ILRTs, current data on ECCS leakage, and meteorological conditions existent during the period. Dose to TSC responders would have been less than the general design criterion limit of 5 REM. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
|ENS 47383||27 October 2011 19:08:00||At approximately 1715 EDT on 10/27/11, a Security Officer accidentally discharged his weapon and wounded himself in the foot. An ambulance and Monroe County Sheriff reported to the site. The officer was transported offsite to a local hospital. This is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The officer was clearing his weapon following his shift when the accident occurred. No other individuals were hurt. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47378||27 October 2011 12:12:00||The state's licensee reported that they lost a NRD Nuclecel Device Model P-2021-8201, serial number A2HH880, which was shipped to the company on 09/01/10. The company noticed the device was missing on October 4th. However, the company also believes it could be installed somewhere in the facility in a location where it cannot be seen. The State's licensee has implemented the following corrective actions: 1) We will assign 1 device to its own machine cell and it will not be moved. 2) We have stopped the use of quick push/pull connections and replaced with threaded connections. 3) All Nuclecel devices are attached with yellow air hose ... and we don't use yellow air hoses on anything else. 4) We have added the devices to our month end inventory count. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 47380||27 October 2011 14:33:00||On October 26, 2011 at approximately 3:00 p.m., a deficiency was identified during a routine criticality safety review of a proposed revision to an operating procedure for transporting and storing 3-gallon cans. One of the controls needed to meet double contingency was not available to restrict the movement of cans that exceed the specified mass limit for these storage locations. This resulted in a condition where the mass control documented in the criticality safety analysis had not been maintained. The second control, geometry, was maintained. There are no uranium cans of this particular material type currently in these storage locations and no unsafe condition is present. All movement of this material type to these designated storage locations has been suspended. Additional corrective actions and extent of condition are being evaluated. This event is being reported pursuant to GNF-A internal procedure reporting requirements due to a loss of double contingency. The licensee will notify Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection, and New Hanover County Emergency Management.|
|ENS 47367||22 October 2011 01:56:00||At 0857 on 10/21/2011 a condition was reported identifying that 10CFR Part 26 requirement for the FFD Lab Director to be subject to the FFD Rule was not met for the period of 12/12/2010 to 4/28/2011. 10CFR 26.4(g), 'FFD program applicability to categories of individuals,' provides specific requirements for FFD program personnel. Contrary to the above, the FFD Lab Director was not included in the (licensee's) random drug testing program as required by the regulation. This event is reportable under 10CFR26.719(b)4 requiring a 24 hour ENS notification. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47363||21 October 2011 11:13:00||The following was received from the state via fax: The on-duty State Response Coordinator (SRC) for the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) received a phone call at approximately 3:30 am that a moisture density gauge had been struck by a motor vehicle. The incident occurred at a road construction site near 1221 Northport Drive, Madison, WI. The gauge was in use with the operator in contact with it, when a car veered out of traffic into the construction lane. The operator was forced to jump out of the path of the vehicle, leaving the gauge. The vehicle struck the gauge, shattering the housing. The source rod with the Cesium-137 source detached from the housing. The Americium/Beryllium source remained within the housing. The SRC and licensee's RSO responded to the scene to supervise source recovery. The Cesium source was leak tested in-situ and determined to be intact. Surveys were performed in the affected area, with no contamination detected. A portion of the housing designed to hold the retracted Cesium source rod was found partially intact. The Cesium source was placed within the cavity and securely taped. The housing assembly was placed in the transport container for transport back to a licensed service provider for assistance with disposal. The driver who struck the gauge has yet to be located by the police. The licensee will be submitting a 30 day written report concerning this event. Event Report ID Number: WI110017|
|ENS 47350||18 October 2011 05:59:00|
At 0450 (CDT), on October 18, 2011, the Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was removed from service for preplanned maintenance. The expected duration of the maintenance is 12 hours. Normal power to the TSC will be available for the duration of the maintenance. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The Duane Arnold Energy Center (DAEC) Technical Support Center (TSC) Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was returned to service at 1637 CDT on 10/18/11. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Daley).
|ENS 47381||27 October 2011 15:26:00||The following was received from the state via e-mail: On October 13, 2011, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee that while exercising the shutter handle on a Berthold nuclear gauge containing 20 milliCuries of cesium - 137 the handle broke off flush with the gauge housing. The gauge shutter is in the open position, which is the normal operating position of the shutter. No individual will receive any additional exposure due to the failure. The manufacture has been contacted to repair the gauge. The licensee stated that no entry to the vessel will be allowed until the gauge has been repaired. The cause for the failure is unknown at this time. Additional information will be supplied as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-8895|
|ENS 47338||12 October 2011 02:33:00||Automatic Reactor Trip due to Turbine Auto Stop Valve Closure and Actuation of Auxiliary Feedwater System. At 2328 on 10/11/2011, the reactor tripped due to a RPS actuation Signal from a turbine trip, which was caused by a Turbine Auto Stop signal. All control rods inserted on the trip, RCS pressure is currently 2235 psig and stable, and RCS average temperature is 547 degrees and stable. Decay heat removal is being controlled by auxiliary feedwater which auto started as expected and steam generator atmospheric relief valves. The licensee is investigating the cause of the Auto Stop Signal. The plant will be maintained in MODE 3 until the cause of trip is determined. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. There is no primary to secondary leakage. Offsite power is normal and all EDG's are available.|
|ENS 47339||12 October 2011 08:30:00|
The following was received via fax: On October 11, 2011, the Agency (state) was notified by the licensee that on October 10, 2011 while performing radiography operations in one of their shooting bays, they were unable to retract an 89 Curie Iridium - 192 source into a SPEC model 150 camera. The licensee used their video surveillance cameras to verify that nothing had fallen on the guide tube to prevent movement of the source. No obstructions were observed. A technician approved for source retrieval inspected the camera and associate equipment and determined that the crankout being used was not working correctly. The crankout was disassembled and the drive cable was pulled by hand until the source returned to the fully shielded and locked position. The licensee inspected the crankout device and found that there was a slight misalignment between the drive cable and the gear. The device was adjusted, tested and operates smoothly. The crankout device will be sent to the manufacturer for further evaluation. No additional exposure was received by any individual during this event.
Texas Incident No. I-8890
|ENS 47323||5 October 2011 19:17:00||At 0930 on 10/5/11, a fuse failure in a 1E to non - 1E interface failed causing a false run signal to the water treatment system for a standby station service water pump. The water treatment system responded by opening the injection valve for the out of service pump. With the associated pump out of service, the sodium hypochlorite can communicate with the Delaware river. This was discovered at 1553 and immediately terminated. This resulted in the discharge of approximately 195 gallons of 15% sodium hypochlorite to SSW intake which communicates with the Delaware river. The associated service water pump was started thus withdrawing residual product from the intake. A portion of the discharged sodium hypochlorite may have entered the Delaware river. A sample was obtained from the Delaware river just outside the intake structure and there was no detectable chlorine in the sample and there were no abnormal conditions noted on the river. Based on Environmental Licensing review, this was reportable to the state of NJ within 15 minutes. The report to the state was initiated at 1608 on 10/5/11. Subsequent calls were made to the Hope Creek Senior NRC Resident, the National Response Center and the US Coast Guard. Affected systems are limited to the Station Service Water (SSW) system and the sodium hypochlorite water treatment system. There was no impact on plant operations and these systems remain fully operable. Evaluation is underway to fully understand the impacts of the fuse failure to prevent reoccurrence. There was nothing unusual or not understood. All safety related equipment continues to function as required. There were no injuries or reported wildlife impact.|
|ENS 47321||5 October 2011 15:50:00|
Unit 2 was shut down at 1048 CDT on October 4, 2011 due to 22 Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) low seal leak off flow. At 0727 CDT on October 5, 2011 with Unit 2 in Mode 4 and 22 RCP secured, 21 RCP was also secured due to low seal leak off flow. It was determined that the station would not consider RHR (residual heat removal) available for decay heat removal per Technical Specification (TS) due to a procedural issue related to component cooling shutdown lineups. RCS temperature is being maintained stable in Mode 4 between 320 and 340 degrees Fahrenheit using natural circulation and the steam dump to the condenser. No operations were permitted that would have caused introduction into the RCS, coolant with boron concentration less than required to meet the Shutdown Margin. At approximately 1329 CDT, 21 RCP was restarted after the flow transmitters were vented and 21 RCP seal leak off flow was determined to be acceptable. The RHR procedural issue has been resolved. Per TS LCO 3.4.6, 'Two loops consisting of any combination of RCS loops and residual heat removal (RHR) loops shall be OPERABLE, and one loop shall be in operation.' This condition is reportable as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function under 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). During this event, RHR could not be credited because the utility was not able to valve in component cooling water to a SFP heat exchanger due to procedural issues. With the restart of 21 RCP and shutdown cooling water alignment, TS 3.6.4 A and B statements have been met and exited. 21 RCP loop in operation and 22 RHR is operable and can be aligned for shutdown cooling. Both Unit 2 EDG's are available and offsite power is normal electrical lineup. The licensee is no longer in any TS LCO statements. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
An eight hour report (EN #47321) per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) was conservatively reported because both trains of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system and both trains of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) were thought to be unavailable. Additional review indicated that 21 RCP and 22 RCP were undamaged, functional, and available for loop operation; therefore, there was no loss of safety function as RCPs were available. The station evaluated 21 and 22 RCP seal leak off flow performance and subsequently restarted 21 RCP and restored forced cooling. The 21 RCP seal leak off flow has remained stable in the acceptable range. 21 RCP was available throughout this evolution. If needed in Mode 4, 22 RCP was also available. The procedures that were in place and available to the operators prior to 1320 CDT on October 5, 2011, would have allowed RHR operation; however, to supply RHR to Unit 2, Unit 1 would have entered an LCO (for supplying Component Cooling (CC) water to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) heat exchangers) to maintain RHR's safety function. After 1320 CDT, procedure revisions allowed operation of RHR without an associated Unit 1 LCO entry. RHR remained operable throughout this evolution. In summary, a loss of safety function for both trains of RHR and RCS did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) report (EN # 47321) is retracted. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. R3DO(Phillips) notified.
|ENS 47320||5 October 2011 15:24:00||At 0812 EDT on October 5, 2011, Millstone Power Station determined that a condition exists affecting Emergency Preparedness Capabilities due to a major loss of offsite communications capability. Specifically, Millstone Power Station was notified by an offsite vendor that the system relied upon for offsite communications in accordance with the Millstone Emergency Plan using a pager system is not functioning reliably. The Millstone Emergency Plan will be implemented by the approved, pre-existing alternate notification method. Appropriate officials are being notified that the alternate method is being employed until the primary means is restored. This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The paging system is being repaired and the utility has an alternate communication method in place. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified as well as Waterford local government and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection. IRF Number: 2011066|
|ENS 47319||4 October 2011 19:33:00||At 1430 CDT, 10/4/11, the licensee Main Control room received an emergency phone call for medical assistance. The caller reported that he had a person down in the auxiliary building. On-site medical response team reported the person was not breathing and not responsive. The symptoms were non-occupational. The person was transported off site via ambulance to the local hospital. At 1635, 10/4/11, the licensee was informed that the individual was declared deceased. OSHA is being notified pursuant to the requirements of 29CFR1904.39. This ENS report is being made in accordance with 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) There was no radioactive contamination involved in this event. The licensee does not plan any media or press release and have not notified any other government agencies besides OSHA. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.|
|ENS 47317||3 October 2011 15:00:00|
At 0400 EDT on Tuesday, October 4, 2011, the Cook Nuclear Plant (CNP) Technical Support Center (TSC) air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems will be removed from service for scheduled maintenance. Under certain accident conditions the TSC may become unavailable due to the inability of the air conditioning and charcoal filtration systems to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC personnel to the unaffected unit's control room, if necessary. TSC ventilation system maintenance is scheduled to be completed by 1500 EDT on Tuesday, October 4, 2011. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility.
The TSC ventilation system maintenance began at 0504 EDT on 10/04/11 and the system was restored to service at 1430 EDT on 10/04/11. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO(Phillips)
|ENS 47300||28 September 2011 12:02:00||Due to unsatisfactory performance of TSC HVAC operation per Condition Report 355263, the TSC HVAC is considered non-functional until performance of the corrective work activity is performed. If an emergency condition occurs during the time these work activities are being performed, which requires activation of the TSC, the contingency plan calls for utilization of the TSC, as long as radiological conditions allow for habitability of the facility. Procedure 73EP-EIP-063-0, Technical Support Center Activation, provides instructions to direct TSC management to the Control Room and TSC support personnel to the Simulator Building to continue TSC activities if it is necessary to relocate from the primary TSC so that TSC functions can be continued. This event is reportable per 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 1 since this activity affects the functionality of the TSC emergency response facility for the duration of the evolution. The licensee corrected an issue with the electrical power fuse block and returned the unit to service at 1210. The licensee cleared the associated action statement for this issue at 1350. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 47301||28 September 2011 17:23:00||The following was received via fax: Component Description: International Rectifier (IR) and Vishay 150 amp clamp diodes with either forward or reverse bias These are Ametek Solid-state Controls part numbers 07-600150-00 and 07-600151-00. Diodes can be either installed in Ametek Solid-state Controls UPS equipment or provided as a spare part. The diode failures due to this suspected defect have occurred generally at around the third or fourth year of operating life of the device. There are no warning signs that a failure is imminent, or detection method for predicting an approaching failure. The investigation has revealed that the diode failures were due to voltage transients or punch through. A failure analysis by Southwest Research concluded that the device having an 'alloy junction' can deteriorate after three to four years of operation resulting in a 'punch through' condition within the device causing the diode to short. The actual cause has not been determined; however it is suspected that the alloy junction type device may have sensitivity to age or voltages causing the device to more rapidly degrade. The failures described above, could result in loss of output voltage and transfer of the static switch to the bypass source which could result in a potential damage to the load. We have only two known failures in systems at this voltage level. We feel the failure rate has been extremely low and the risk is minimal. Each operating facility will need to evaluate the potential risk to their operation. The licensee did not indicate which NRC licensees, if any, are affected by this notice.|
|ENS 47318||3 October 2011 18:48:00||The following was received from the state via e-mail: On September 27, 2011, RHB (Radiologic Health Branch) was informed by Pacific Nuclear Technology (PNT) that they collected a moisture density gauge that was left on the adjacent office porch of the BSK & Associate office. The gauge was discovered by BSK & Associate's employee, and according to PNT service records, the gauge belonged to J. Yang and Associates. The gauge was delivered to CDPH-RHB on 09/27/11 by PNT. RHB will investigate to determine how the gauge was lost. Mr. Yang terminated his CA License in 2008, but apparently did not relinquish all of his licensed materials. CA 5010 Number: 092711|