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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 5507820 January 2021 21:48:00On 1/20/2021 at 1822 EST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Motor Control Center 2B2. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Auxiliary feed-water automatically actuated on the 2A Steam Generator post trip. Current decay heat removal is the 2B main feedwater pump to both steam generators and the Steam Bypass Control System to the main condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5503514 December 2020 15:00:00At 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program. As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 550203 December 2020 17:10:00At 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.
ENS 550193 December 2020 15:19:00The following information was received via E-mail: Acuren Inspection, Inc. contacted the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality / Emergency Response Services Division / Radiation Section on December 3, 2020, concerning an industrial radiography source that had been stuck within the source guide tube. The crew was using a QSA Global model - 880D, serial number - 14783, with an Ir-192 source, with source serial number - 11512M, with an activity of 41 Ci (1,517 GBq). On December 2, 2020, around 1640 CST, the source became stuck outside the camera in the source guide tube while performing radiography operations (when an equipment stand fell on the source guide tube leading it to become crimped). There were no excessive radiation exposures. The industrial radiography crew's pocket dosimeters did not go off scale. A source retrieval team was sent out and had the source returned back into the camera by 2000 CST on December 2, 2020. The event occurred at Enbride Venice Facility in Venice, LA. Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20200010
ENS 550171 December 2020 17:00:00On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 550161 December 2020 16:35:00The following information was received via E-mail: The Agency (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) was contacted on 12/1/20 by Sterigenics U.S., LLC to advise that one of their pool irradiator source racks at the Schaumburg location had become stuck in the unshielded position on 11/30/20. The source rack, containing approximately 1.3 MCi of Co-60, was successfully returned to the shielded position and no exposures to personnel or the public resulted. All safety interlocks functioned as designed. This event did not result in any compromises to source security or to any safety or security systems. There is no indication of intentional misuse, theft or diversion at this time. On 12/1/2020, the Agency was contacted by the Radiation Safety Officer for Sterigenics U.S., LLC, to advise that in the middle of performing scheduled routine safety checks on 11/30/2020, authorized engineers reported that the east source rack failed to return to the shielded position as designed upon completion of a check. The west source rack lowered as designed without incident. Sources contained in the east source rack remained unshielded from approximately 1400 CST until 1648 CST. The event was immediately reported to the Radiation Safety Officer by the two authorized engineers performing the safety checks that day. The Radiation Safety Officer immediately responded to the site to assist in assessment and formulation of an action plan. After consultation with the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer, the Radiation Safety Officer and staff engineers were able to use a hand winch to successfully lower the rack of sources into the shielded position within the pool. Safety and security systems remain operational and functioned as designed throughout the source lowering process. There is no immediate hazard to workers or members of the public as a result of this incident. This morning (12/1/2020), source modules were removed without incident from the east source rack and are currently shielded and in safe storage at the bottom of the pool. Sterigenics staff are continuing their investigation into the cause for the stuck rack. All interlocks and safety systems were reported as operational. An action plan was formulated in conjunction with Corporate staff to safely and slowly raise the empty east rack using a hand winch so that it can be adequately inspected. IEMA staff will follow up later this afternoon for an update. A reactive inspection by inspectors is planned for later this week. Illinois Reference Number: IL200024
ENS 5497230 October 2020 03:34:00The following information was received via E-mail: The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Empire Geotechnical reported that his CPN nuclear gauge was stolen from the back of his pickup truck sometime overnight between 2100 EDT on October 28, 2020 and 0630 PDT on October 29, 2020. CA Dept. of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) inspector contacted the Empire Geotechnical RSO by phone and confirmed the RSO left his truck parked on the street in front of his office with the gauge secured in the rear of the pickup under a locked deck lid. The RSO is in the process of reporting the theft to the Orange Police Department. The gauge is a CPN MC1DR, (serial) number MD90204854, that contains two special form sealed sources: 370 MBq (10 mCi) of Cs-137 and 1.85GBq (50 mCi) of Am-241/Be. California 5010 Number: 102920 Cal OES control number: 20-6025, October 29, 2020 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5497029 October 2020 11:20:00The following information was received via E-mail from the Kentucky Department for Public Health & Safety, Radiation Health Branch (KY RHB): Big River Electric Corporation reported a shutter failure. KY RHB was notified via email on October 28, 2020at 1511 EDT) by a representative from a specifically licensed facility, Big Rivers Electric Corporation, indicating that one fixed gauging device (Kay Ray Model 7062P, Serial Number 8555), containing a 10 mCi Cs-137 source located in the Reid/Green/HMP&L Station II had a shutter malfunction. The source was found to have a broken shutter arm. The gauge has been left in place and a contractor will be scheduled to service the gauge. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) has notified the production manager and production leaders to ensure they are aware of the issue. Reporting criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). Kentucky Event Report ID Number: KY200005
ENS 5495820 October 2020 15:20:00During the course of operations, a potential error in the power calibration of the PUR-1, License Number R-87, was discovered. This calibration error would result in a special report requirement as specified in ((Technical Specification)) TS 6.7.b.1.c.vi, which is that an observed inadequacy in the implementation of a procedural control such that this inadequacy could have caused the development of an unsafe condition with regards to reactor operations. By extension the miscalibration caused a true reactor power higher than the measured reactor power. As such, this likely resulted in the operation in violation of the limiting condition for operation as established in TS Section 3 Table I and operation with an actual safety system setting for a required system less conservative than the limiting safety system settings specified in the Technical Specifications. These reporting requirements are Part i. and ii. of TS 6.7.b.1.c. The calibration error implicates a violation of the maximum licensed power level of 12 kW. The Safety Limit was not exceeded at any point.
ENS 549429 October 2020 19:34:00The following information was received via E-mail: ND Testing Inc. made a 24-hour report to the Radiologic Health Branch that on October 8, 2020, at 1256 PDT a hand-crank assembly became stuck/seized and would not allow the source to travel forward or backwards at a temporary job site. The team of two experienced radiographers contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for assistance and secured the area around their QSA Global 880 exposure device. The RSO arrived onsite at 1445 EDT with extra lead shielding and survey meters. He and the radiographers were able to place lead blankets and some solid lead blocks over the guidetube containing the Ir-192 source, open the crank assembly to remove some metal shavings and close the assembly. This allowed them to secure the Ir-192 source after approximately 2 hours at 1645 EDT. The highest individual dose received was 195 mrem by one of the radiographers. The Ir-192 source was a QSA Global model A424-9, with an activity of 67.1 Ci of Ir-192. California 5010 Number: 100920
ENS 549409 October 2020 13:42:00The following is a synopsis of information received via phone and facsimile: The Department (Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Radiological Health) was notified around 0815 CDT on October 9, 2020, by the Nebraska State Patrol, of a lost, and subsequently recovered, nuclear gauge. The gauge was a Troxler 3400 series moisture density gauge containing a 9 mCi Cs-137 source and a 44 mCi Am-241/Be source. During the afternoon of October 8, 2020, the gauge was on the tailgate of a pickup truck. The gauge user entered the vehicle before securing the gauge package. The user was distracted and began driving away. The gauge fell out of the back of the vehicle. An employee from the Nebraska Department of Transportation (NDOT) found the lost gauge near Norfolk, NE. The NDOT employee notified the Nebraska State Patrol and the gauge manufacturer, Troxler. Using the serial number of the gauge, Troxler was able to determine the gauge belonged to Olsson Associates. Olsson Associates was notified of the recovered gauge, and the gauge user retrieved the gauge. The estimated time between the loss of control and recovery is estimated to be one hour. During the evening of October 8, 2020, the corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Olsson Associates was notified of the incident. He did not report the event to the Department. A representative of the Department spoke with him at 1030 CDT on October 9, 2020. The RSO then provided a brief account of the incident to the Department representative. The RSO noted that the gauge package appeared to be undamaged. The gauge itself did not appear damaged. The gauge was surveyed to confirm the presence of the source, and a leak test will be performed immediately. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 548752 September 2020 16:52:00At approximately 1027 EDT on September 2, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing a part of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due to planned sprinkler head modifications. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. The system was restored at approximately 1300 EDT today (9/2/2020) and the Deputy Fire Marshall informed of restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify Region 2.
ENS 5486328 August 2020 10:22:00At 1645 CDT on 8/27/2020, it was determined that a licensed operator tested positive in accordance with the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5486227 August 2020 09:34:00

EN Revision Imported Date : 9/2/2020 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF SOURCE IN SHIELDED POSITION ON LEVEL INDICATOR The following information was received via E-mail: On August 26, 2020, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while making preparations for the coming hurricane, the position of the source rod on a Tracerco, Model T-218-160032 (used for level indication) could not be confirmed. The source rod contains 10 cesium-137 sources of 10 milliCuries each (original activity.) The RSO stated when they return the sources to the shielded position, the control system does indicate the sources are shielded as indicated by a light change on the system console. When the licensee attempted to shield the sources on this day, the light did not change to indicate the sources were shielded. The gauge source rod is operated manually. They tried it a couple of times, but the light still did not change. A survey was performed on the outside of the vessel. The RSO stated there wasn't enough change in dose rate readings with shutter in the open and closed positions to determine whether the sources were shielded based on survey. The RSO stated it may be that the sources are not moving, or it may be that there is an issue within the control system causing the light not to change. They cannot determine at this time which problem is occurring. The RSO is contacting the manufacturer to send someone out after the hurricane. There is no risk of exposure. The RSO stated they will update the Agency once the manufacturer determines the problem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: 9787

  • * * RETRACTION ON 9/01/2020 AT 1406 EDT FROM ART TUCKER TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The following information was received via e-mail: On September 1, 2020, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas DSHS) that on August 31, 2020, a service company came onsite to investigate the shutter problem they had reported, and identified that there was no mechanical issue with the shutter. The problem they had was a failure of the output signal to indicate source position. The source rod was functioning normally. Based on this information, the Agency is retracting this event. Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events (email).

ENS 5478115 July 2020 14:58:00At 0835 EDT on July 15, 2020, it was discovered that the main control room (MCR) envelope was inoperable due to a MCR door being found ajar; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The door was closed, restoring the MCR envelope to operable at 0839 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5478516 July 2020 13:09:00The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail and phone: On July 15, 2020, at 1445 CDT, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC contacted the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality / Emergency and Radiological Services Division / Radiation Section to report that shutters had failed to close on two fixed density gauges during routine maintenance. The shutters are stuck in the open position and do not affect operation. The gauges are Ronan Engineering Model SAI, s/n's 5832GK and 5835GK, each with a 50 mCi Cs-137 sealed source, at the time of installation. The licensee contacted the contractor, BBP Sales, LLC, to determine whether the gauges should be disposed of or repaired. The decision will be made on July 16, 2020 on how to deal with the stuck shutters. Repair or disposal of the gauges should be accomplished by July 20, 2020. Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20200005
ENS 5478015 July 2020 12:25:00

EN Revision Imported Date : 7/29/2020 UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A RESTRICTED RADIATION ROOM AS A TOUCHDOWN SPACE On July 14, 2020, at approximately 1115 MDT, the Radiation Safety Officer was notified that a restricted radiation room was used intermittently for 30-45 minute periods as a touchdown space for Billings Clinic's Internal Medicine residents. The room had not been decommissioned. The restricted radiation room being used was the Billings Clinic Hospital I-131 Inpatient Therapy Room (room 3501; general inpatient medical floor). This room was last used for (a 153 mCi I-131 Sodium Iodine) radiation treatment on June 21, 2017. Beginning June 4, 2020, the room began being used as a touchdown space for Internal Medicine residents. Surveys were performed on July 14, 2020 using survey meters. Wipes for removable contamination were performed on a table, two computers, phone, and the floor around the area where staff were working. All items had activity levels indistinguishable from background readings. The items were removed from the room. The room has been secured with a new lock and radiation warning signs have been reposted. The radiation signs had been removed at an unknown time between June 4, 2020 and July 14, 2020. The licensee is not aware of any radiation exposure as a result of this reported event. The licensee is making this report as a deviation from 10 CFR 35.13(f) as required by reporting requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(iii).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/28/2020 AT 1428 EDT FROM CHRIS FITZ TO THOMAS KENDZIA * * *

This is a summary of information received from the licensee via telephone: After discussion with NRC RIV personnel the licensee determined that this event is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(iii). Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Events (email).

ENS 5478215 July 2020 14:35:00The following information was received via E-mail: On 7/15/2020, at 1340 EDT, the licensee reported that yesterday, 7/14/2020, sometime between 0915 and 0930 EDT, a male patient receiving TheraSphere treatment was underdosed by approximately 30 percent due to a leak in the delivery assembly. This was discovered around half-way through the procedure. No exposure to anyone other than the patient occurred. Contamination has been contained and removed. The prescribed activity was 5.7 GBq and dose was 150 Gy. The actual activity delivered is estimated to be 3.99 GBq and dose was 105 Gy. The patient is scheduled to return next week for follow-up treatment. Florida Incident Number: FL20-080 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5486126 August 2020 23:49:00The following information was received via E-mail: The Radiation Safety Officer with Mistras Group, Inc. contacted the Radiologic Health Branch regarding an incident with an Ir-192 radiography source that was determined to be locked out of its exposure device. The source was an Industrial Nuclear Model 32 Ir-192 source, Serial Number 550F, with an activity of 63.4 Curies. The device was an Industrial Nuclear Ir-100, Serial Number 4358. The incident occurred during radiography operations at a refinery in El Segundo. After a routine exposure, the radiographer retracted the source. The radiographer then proceeded with the radiation survey that showed a dose rate of 80 mR/hr approximately 2 feet from the exposure device, indicating that the source was not in the locked and shielded position. The radiographer contacted the RSO who instructed them to readjust the restricted area boundary to maintain 2 mR/hr dose rate. After the RSO arrived at the site, they placed shielding to reduce the dose rate while performing retrieval and returning the source to the locked and secured position. The device was then red tagged and placed out of service until it could be evaluated by the manufacturer. The highest dose received by Mistras Personnel (RSO) was 20 mrem, as read by a self-reading pocket dosimeter. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health. California 5010 Number: 070820
ENS 5484519 August 2020 18:08:00The following information was received via e-mail: New owner reported one tritium exit sign lost. Model number SLXTU1RW10 containing 7.09 Ci of H-3. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5484619 August 2020 18:14:00The following information was received via e-mail: One tritium exit sign, model number SLXTUIGW10, containing 7.09 Ci of H-3 was reported as missing during annual registration. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 546934 May 2020 23:40:00

This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. A through wall leak was found on piping connected to the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water Strainer. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 DG Cooling Water System has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 DG Cooling Water System is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency DG and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * RETRACTION ON MAY 8, 2020 AT 1709 EDT FROM JOE MESSINA TO BRIAN LIN * * *

This update retracts Event Notification #54693, which reported a condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An evaluation of the flaw on the piping connected to the Unit 2 Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water strainer concluded that the system would have remained operable. The High Pressure Core Spray system, supported by the operable DG Cooling Water system, remained operable and capable of performing its safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 546923 May 2020 22:28:00On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement. At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546913 May 2020 11:43:00At 0821 EDT on May 3, 2020, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. The Unit 1 reactor was operating at 76 percent reactor power following a ramp schedule to full power subsequent to a maintenance outage. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of the Reactor Protection System actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on End of Cycle - Recirculation Pump Trip. Reactor water level lowered to -1 inch causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No Emergency Core Cooling System or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling actuations occurred. The operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. No Steam Relief Valves opened. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and press release will occur. This event requires a 4-hour Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).
ENS 546881 May 2020 13:16:00

At approximately 1238 EDT on May 1, 2020, an alarm indicated smoke on a non-safety related electrical switchgear bus in the turbine building. Plant personnel were dispatched to investigate. Smoke and heat were found coming from the bus. At 1253 EDT, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared. At 1308 EDT the fire was declared out and fire watches posted. Offsite assistance was requested during the event and the Jenkinsville, SC fire department responded to the site. There were no plant personnel injuries or impact to the health and safety of the public. The cause of this event is unknown at the present time. The electrical bus has been de-energized. The unit is currently in a planned refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GEORGE SHEALY TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1754 EDT * * *

The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1737 EDT on May 1, 2020. The cause of the event is currently being investigated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller). NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

ENS 546901 May 2020 15:34:00At 0831 CDT, the Main Control Room received a 'Reactor Building 903 ft. Access Both Doors Open' alarm. Investigation found the interlock between the inner and outer doors did not prevent the opening of both doors while personnel were accessing the Reactor Building. The doors were immediately closed. Based on alarm times, both doors were open for less than one second. With both doors open, SR 3.6.4.1.3 was not met and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. This unplanned Secondary Containment inoperability constitutes a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and (d), 'An event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Secondary Containment was declared operable at 0836 CDT after independently verifying at least one Secondary Containment access door was closed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 546871 May 2020 11:53:00

At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit. At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, inspections inside containment identified the leak as pressure boundary leakage from a pressurizer spray line which also requires entry into LCO 3.4.13, Condition B. At 1059 EDT on May 1, Unit 2 was tripped from 15 percent power. All systems functioned normally. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * PARTIAL RETRACTION ON 5/15/2020 AT 1442 EDT FROM BUD HINCKLEY TO THOMAS HERRITY * * *

The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage. There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 534411 June 2018 15:50:00

The following information was received via E-mail: On May 31, 2018, during a turn-around at Calcasieu Refining Co., lockout and tagout procedures were not performed for two fixed gauges. Two non-radiation workers were over-exposed for the limit of 2 mR/hr. External radiation exposures are currently estimated at between 20 to 40 millirem whole body. The two sources were 50 mCi Cs-137 sources in Ohmart Vega Model SH-F1 gauges with serial numbers 70012 and 69998.

This event was reported by the facility on June 1, 2018. LA Event Report ID No.: LA20180010

ENS 534361 June 2018 11:39:00The following information was received via E-mail: On May 31, 2018, the Department (PA DEP Bureau of Radiation Protection) was notified by the licensee that a malfunction of a roll pin on a shutter handle occurred at a temporary jobsite in Eighty Four, Pennsylvania. It is initially reportable per 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). A roll pin, which holds the shutter handle to the shutter shaft on a Berthhold Model LB 8010 in-line density gauge containing 20 milliCuries of cesium-137 became sheared off during an attempt to move the shutter to the open position, rendering the gauge unusable. The gauge is currently being stored at their Punxsutawney, PA location. The shutter is in the closed position and the gauge is out of service awaiting repair from the manufacturer. There was no other damage to the gauge. No overexposures have occurred. Radionuclide: Cs-137 Manufacturer: Berthold Model: LB 8010 Serial Number: 10485 Activity: 20 mCi The cause of the event has been attributed to normal wear and tear on the gauge. A reactive inspection is planned by the Department. PA Event Report ID No: PA180013
ENS 5466915 April 2020 14:50:00The following information was received via e-mail: The State of Maine Radiation Control Program became aware of a breaking news item, reporting that the Pixelle Androscoggin paper mill in Jay, Maine had suffered an explosion. https://www.wabi.tv/content/news/Explosion-reported-at-Jay-mill-details-limited-569661451.html The precise location of the explosion is unknown at this time but it may be the boiler or power plant. Later report from MEMA - Maine Emergency Management Agency - says that it was 'the Digester of Pulp Mill A or maybe B.' The Maine Radiation Control Program will confirm the information as it comes in. There were no fatalities or injuries reported. 'A' Pulp Mill contains six gauges, 'B' Pulp Mill contains three gauges, and the Power Plant/Boiler contains five gauges. There could be from three to six gauges involved in the explosion, depending on which building exploded. The Maine Radiation Control Program has not been notified by the mill. This report is the first written notification to NMED. Maine Event Report ID No.: ME 20-003
ENS 5466614 April 2020 23:36:00On April 14, 2020 at 1645 CDT, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Conditioning (CREV AC) system was declared inoperable when the electrical feed breaker to the Refrigeration Compressor Unit (RCU) was found in a tripped condition. As a result, both units entered Technical Specification 3.7.5 Condition A. Investigation is in progress to determine the cause and corrective actions of the RCU feed breaker trip. The CREV AC system maintains a habitable control room environment and ensures the operability of components in the control room emergency zone during accident conditions. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) because the CREV system is a single train system, and loss of the CREV AC could impact the plant's ability to mitigate the consequences of an accident.
ENS 5466514 April 2020 17:29:00The following information was received via E-mail: 21 tritium exit signs, each containing 9.21 Ci, are unaccounted for. There has been no response for annual general license registrations since 2015. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 549419 October 2020 13:42:00The following information was received via facsimile: On April 29, 2020, the Department (New York State Department of Health, Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection) was notified of a missing I-125 localization seed (Best Medical International, Inc., Model 2301, Activity: 220 microCuries) at Roswell Park Cancer Institute in Buffalo, New York. In this incident, two seeds were placed into a patient on 4/10/2020 and removed on 4/14/2020. One of the two seeds was lost by the attending surgeon. An extensive survey of the patient was performed to verify that the seed was not in the patient and the Nuclear Medicine Department was notified. A survey of the operating room (OR) suite was conducted and the seed was not recovered. The Radiation Safety Office was notified, another survey of the OR was performed, again the seed was not recovered. The patient also had a lymphoscintigraphy with Tc-99m so the surgical trash that was still in the room was sequestered. After three days, the trash was surveyed and examined but the seed was not recovered. Searches and surveys were performed in surgery, pathology, radiation safety and environmental service areas. Trash and regulated medical waste were also surveyed and inspected. Ultimate disposition of the source is unknown and it is possible that the source may still be recovered. New York State Event Report ID No.: NYDOH - 20-05 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5465710 April 2020 10:58:00On April 10, 2020, at 0300 (EDT), an oil leak from 23PCV-12, HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) Trip System Pressure Control Valve (PCV), resulted in the system being declared inoperable. This condition is being reported as a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of a system needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 546529 April 2020 03:37:00On April 9, 2020 at 0100 EDT, while performing a containment walkdown due to a small increased Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage, a leak was identified on the 'A' Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) seal injection piping. The source of the leakage cannot be isolated and is considered RCS pressure boundary leakage. At that time, Condition B of Technical Specification (TS) LCO 3.4.13, 'RCS Operational Leakage' was entered due to pressure boundary leakage. TS 3.4.4 'RCS Loops - Mode 1 and 2' and Technical Requirement (TR) 3.4.6 'ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components' are also applicable. Unit 2 is projected to be taken to Mode 5 for repairs. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) for 'Initiation of plant shutdown required by Technical Specifications' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) for 'Any event or condition that results in the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principle safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. There is no effect on Unit 1
ENS 546498 April 2020 11:25:00The following is a summary of the report received from the licensee: On 4/7/2020 a trained technician was in the process of performing the bi-annual inventory/shutter checks when he reported that an Ohmart gauge (Model Number ED-6, Serial Number 65902, 100 mCi, Cs-137) located on 9B DTU (Deslime Thickener U/Flow) in the Deslime basement had a frozen shutter mechanism, rendering the shutter non-operable. The technician notified the Radiation Safety Officer who then instructed the technician to replace the gauge with the stuck shutter with a spare gauge. However, the replacement will not take place until the line it is on goes down for repair (estimated May 1, 2020). If the line goes down prior to this time, the licensee will replace the gauge at that time. The licensee noted that they have had events similar to this in the past and have not had an exposure to any individuals. The licensee additionally noted that in the event of an emergency, the gauge will be removed, placed on a piece of lead and brought into storage.
ENS 546549 April 2020 09:21:00The following information was received via E-mail: The aperture electronic opening and closing mechanism malfunctioned on a J.L. Shepard Mark I series irradiator while the aperture was open. There was a smell of burning wires and visible smoke. The analysts cut power to the unit and notified department management. Utilizing portable shielding, and following ALARA principles, the attenuator of the device was able to be closed, which significantly reduced dose rates. Currently, the aperture is stuck partially open and the attenuator is closed. At 1.5 meters from the point of highest dose, the rate is approximately 10 mR/hr. Both analysts were wearing Mirion Instadose dosimeters and the measured dose to both dosimeters was less than the minimum read amount of 1 mrem. The irradiator is located in a shielded calibration room located in the waste building. There is no dose rate above background in any area, accessible by either non-radiation workers or members of the public, around the building where the calibration room is located. The area has been securely locked, the door alarm is activated, and there are signs placed to remind everyone to not use the device. Utah Department of Environmental Quality, Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control personnel were notified of the incident via normal work E-mail after the conclusion of the business of the day on April 8, 2020. The notification was not read until the morning of April 9, 2020 when normal business resumed and was then assigned to appropriate staff. The device manufacturer has been contacted to determine repair options. Utah Event Report ID No.: UT 200004
ENS 546301 April 2020 19:07:00A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 545726 March 2020 15:14:00The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: At 1430 EST on 3/6/2020, the Bristol Myers Squibb Radiation Safety Officer made a notification to the New Jersey Bureau of Environmental Radiation that following the Tritium exit sign inventory for their campus, six exit signs were unaccounted for. The exit signs contained a total of approximately 130 Curies of Tritium. New Jersey State Event Report ID Number: TBD THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 548741 September 2020 14:48:00The following is a synopsis of information received from the licensee: On March 6, 2020, while at zero percent power and in Cold Shutdown - Mode 4, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) determined through surveillance testing that three Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs) did not meet their Technical Specification closure time. The cause of the MSIV failures has been determined to be delayed Air Pack response. The delay was caused by a buildup of corrosion product and waxy foreign material believed to be dried pipe thread sealant or O-ring assembly lube that accumulated on the internal surfaces of the Air Pack during refurbishment by the vendor Trillium (previously Hiller). The following is action taken or planned to be taken to prevent recurrence: A note will be added to the procurement requirement evaluation form and purchase order for MSIV Air Pack refurbishments to minimize use of O-ring lubricant and thread sealant to limit likelihood of capturing foreign material on Air Pack valve internals. The Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) component function identifier and system name of each component or system referred to above is: Component - Main Steam Isolation Valves, Air Pack. IEEE 803 Function Identifier - VOP. IEEE805 System Identification - SB. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. For further information contact: Todd Tierney Plant Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station Exelon Generation Company, LLC Brandon Shultz Site Regulatory Assurance Manager Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (315) 349-7012 .
ENS 545562 March 2020 20:45:00A non-licensed contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 545531 March 2020 13:52:00The following information was received via E-mail: This event occurred in Austin, Texas. On March 1, 2020, one of the licensee's technicians had pulled off the road and was parked in a parking area, sleeping, when local law enforcement pulled up. Local law enforcement wanted to take the technician in for suspicion of DWI. At approximately 0800 CST the technician called the site radiation safety officer and told him of the situation. Law enforcement stayed with the technician until the tow truck came and took the vehicle to impound at approximately 0830 CST. The vehicle was locked, the alarm on the dark room was activated and the technician took all the keys to the dark room and camera with him. The vehicle was carrying a radiography camera (Spec 150) containing an 80 Curie Iridium-192 source. The licensee dispatched employees to the impound yard and they arrived at approximately 1015 CST and provided surveillance of the vehicle until it was released to them. They verified that the alarm system on the dark room was still armed and that the camera was present. The truck is being returned to the licensee's facility. At last report from the licensee, law enforcement had not performed any testing to determine if the technician was under-the-influence. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: Not Yet Assigned
ENS 545542 March 2020 12:45:00

EN Revision Imported Date : 3/17/2020 STOLEN PORTABLE DENSITY MOISTURE GAUGE The licensee left a locked trailer at a job site in Rolla, Missouri Friday evening, 2/28/2020. The trailer contained a locked case, which was chained and locked to the trailer. The case contained a Seaman's portable density moisture gauge, Model Number C300, Serial Number 21274, with a 4.5 mCi Radium-226 source. The trailer, with the gauge inside, was stolen from the job site sometime between Friday evening 2/28/2020 and mid-day Saturday 2/29/2020 when employees of the licensee returned to the job site. The trailer is an enclosed trailer, approximately 14 feet in length, white in color, with no lettering or other readily distinguishable markings on the outside. The licensee notified the Phelps' county sheriff's office. The sheriff's office issued report number 20200263 for this event.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 3/16/2020 AT 1227 EDT FROM DWAYNE MULLER TO BETHANY CECERE * * *

This event is being retracted because the trailer was not stolen. The trailer was moved to the corporate location, but all parties were not aware of the move. The licensee notified the NRC R3 Inspector (O'Dowd) and the Phelps' county sheriff's office. Notified R3DO (Hanna), NMSS Events, and ILTAB. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5454827 February 2020 15:54:00The following information was received from the state of Florida via E-mail: (The licensee) reported to the BRC (Bureau of Radiation Control) on 25 Feb 2020, and e-mailed an incident report on 26 Feb 2020 at 1224 EST that on 24 Feb 2020 at 1315 EST an HDR (high dose rate) incident occurred to a patient receiving skin therapy. The patient was prescribed 7.5 Gray x 5 fractions, on five different parts of the left hand. On the first dose of the first fraction, it was observed that catheter numbers 1 - 15 were reversed, causing an underdose to the patient by 56.25 percent. No Authorized Users were exposed to the source or otherwise contaminated. Florida Incident Number: FL20-022 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5453119 February 2020 10:20:00

EN Revision Imported Date : 2/21/2020 NOTIFICATION OF UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO FIRE IN CONTROL BUILDING At 0957 EST on February 19, 2020, a Notification of Unusual Event (NOUE) has been determined to be present at the Watts Bar plant Unit 1 under criteria HU4 for a fire potentially degrading the safety of the plant (fire for more than 15 minutes). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified for this event. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * UPDATE ON 02/19/2020 AT 1151 EST FROM ANDREW WALDMANN TO DONALD NORWOOD * * *

The fire was declared extinguished at 1033 EST. The NOUE was terminated at 1126 EST. The investigation into the cause of the fire is in progress. Notified R2DO (Musser), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Kennedy). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).

  • * * RETRACTION ON 2/20/2020 AT 1453 EST FROM MICHAEL BUTHEY TO RICHARD L. SMITH * * *

Watts Bar Nuclear Plant (WBN) is retracting Event Notice 54531 (NOUE notification) based on the following additional information. WBN reported a condition that was determined to meet the definition of a FIRE in the plant Emergency Preparedness Implementing Procedures (EPIP) based on indications available to the decision-maker at the time the declaration was made. A fire, without observation of flame, is considered present if large quantities of smoke and heat are observed. Moderate quantities of smoke were observed coming from an electrical cabinet not required to support safe plant operation. Once Fire Brigade personnel were able to access the affected room, no evidence of flame or significant heat was observed. Plant personnel ultimately determined that an overheated electrical component (transformer) resulted in the smoke. As such, the actual conditions did not meet the EPIP definition of a fire. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this retraction. Notified R2DO (Musser), NRR EO (Miller), and IRD MOC (Kennedy).

ENS 5453219 February 2020 10:20:00At 0936 EST on February 19, 2020, the Watts Bar Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped while operating at 100 percent power in response to loss of control of water level for steam generator number 3. All control and shutdown bank rods inserted properly in response to the manual reactor trip. All safety systems including Auxiliary Feedwater actuated as designed. The plant is stable with decay heat removal through Auxiliary Feedwater and Steam Dump Systems. There is no impact to Unit 2. The manual actuation of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) is being reported as a four-hour report under 10 CFR 50. 72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The expected actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System (an engineered safety feature) is being reported as an eight-hour report under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified for this event.
ENS 545081 February 2020 23:06:00At 1845 CST on 2/1/2020, during surveillance testing (STS PE-015, Containment Purge Valve Leakage Test) containment leakage in excess of Technical Specification requirements was observed. A Technical Specification required shutdown was initiated at 2030 CST and Mode 3 was achieved at 2154 CST. All systems functioned as required during and following shutdown. The unit is proceeding to Mode 5. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5450531 January 2020 15:35:00The following information was received via E-mail: The Department (Arizona Department of Health Services) received notification from the licensee that a technician had backed up over a portable moisture density gauge with their truck. The gauge is a Troxler 3430, Serial Number 35062, containing approximately 8 milliCuries of cesium-137 and 40 milliCuries of americium-241:beryllium. The Department has requested additional information and continues to investigate the event. Arizona Incident: 20-002
ENS 5448115 January 2020 16:16:00The following information was received via E-mail: On January 15, 2020, at 1400 CST, the DOW Chemical Radiation Safety Officer contacted the supervisor of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality/ERSD/Radiation Section to report that a shutter failed to shut during routine maintenance. The shutter which failed to shut was found on January 14, 2020, at approximately 1500 CST, at DOW Chemicals Company. The shutter is stuck in the open condition and does not effect operation. The gauge is a Vega Americas model number SHF2B, s/n 38953125, with a 500 mCi Cs-137 sealed source, s/n 0368CR. The licensee has contacted the contractor for repair and is awaiting a date and time for the repair. Event Report ID No.: LA20200001
ENS 5447915 January 2020 11:42:00The following information was received via E-mail: An unknown device was discovered at a metal scrap yard in Ohio. The device has no markings or labels. A Cs-137 source of unknown activity was identified in the device. No loose contamination was detected. Maximum dose rate on the device is 500 mr/hr and 6 mr/hr at one meter. The device is secure at the facility pending disposal. The Ohio Department of Health will continue to track down the origin of the source. Ohio Item Number: OH200001