|Entered date||Event description|
|ENS 55363||19 July 2021 18:27:00||On July 19, 2021 at 1316 EDT, an individual experienced a non-work related medical emergency. The onsite fire brigade and emergency medical technicians administered first aid, but the individual was unresponsive. The individual was transported to the local hospital. At 1458 EDT, the local hospital notified the station that the individual was deceased. The individual was outside of the radiological controlled area and was not contaminated.|
|ENS 55362||19 July 2021 16:10:00||The following is a synopsis of information received via e-mail: The Mistras Director of Radiation Safety was notified by a Mistras radiographer (working in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska) that an exposure device had been left unsecured in a truck in an ammo can with no lock and without the alarm set. The truck had then been turned in to the Tarmac shop for maintenance. The Tarmac shop discovered the device in the truck around 0200 AST. Upon discovery of the device, they immediately closed the truck and notified security. They did not handle the device. The device was retrieved by approved Mistras personnel and placed into the vault at MCC Camp. After being notified of the event, the Director personally verified that the exposure device was secured in the vault. The exposure device involved is Serial Number: D10742, containing 81 Curies of Ir-192. The location of the event in Prudhoe Bay is a secured location with no access to or from the camp without proper security clearance. The Tarmac shop services all vehicles on the North Slope as they are owned by a Mistras customer.|
|ENS 55361||19 July 2021 16:02:00||The following information was received via E-mail: On July 19, 2021, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) that one of its radiographer's personal dosimetry badge results for the monitoring period of June 2021 indicated a deep dose equivalent (DDE) of 5,114 millirem. The radiographer had terminated his employment with the licensee on July 6, 2021. The licensee has contacted the radiographer by phone and the radiographer stated he did not know how it could have happened. The licensee is investigating to determine if the dose was to the radiographer or to the badge only. The licensee also reported that the radiographer had more than one day of work and that the dose to this badge did not occur all within a 24 hour period. An investigation into this event is ongoing. Texas Incident No.: 9870|
|ENS 55358||16 July 2021 16:26:00||The following information was received via E-mail: At 1400 CDT on July 16, 2021, the State was contacted by a representative of the licensee to report a radiation event that had been identified at 1530 CDT on July 15. The licensee was performing routine checks on a fixed gauge device. As part of the checks, they ensure that the shutter is able to be opened and closed. The individual servicing the gauge identified that the shutter was unable to be closed. All indicators are functioning as required to alert that the gauge is open. Staff who work in the area have been instructed that the device is unable to be closed, and to avoid working around the gauge even when it is not being utilized. The device is a Mahlo Model 11-200933, SN: 11-011988-ah-4868. It contains an Eckert and Ziegler Pm-147 source, SN: AH-4968. It has an assay date of 4/15/16, 1000 mCi. It currently contains approximately 250 mCi. No exposures of any individuals are suspected. The manufacturer was notified and is currently coordinating with the licensee to get a service engineer on site. The department will continue to follow-up with the licensee as arrangements are made. Wisconsin Event Report ID No.: WI210006|
|ENS 55328||25 June 2021 15:27:00||The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail: The individual informing the Commission is Michael J. Yox, 7825 River Road, Waynesboro, GA 30830. The activities which fail to comply include construction processes including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment at the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project. The primary construction firm for the Vogtle 3 and 4 construction project is Bechtel Power Corporation (Bechtel). This report is being provided based on construction nonconformances including, installation of some electrical and mechanical commodities, and control of measuring and test equipment for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances affect cable separation and other raceway structural elements. The extent of condition for the measuring and test equipment issue is under evaluation and may impact additional safety-related work. The identified construction nonconformances are a small fraction of the overall structures and components. There is no specifically identified substantial safety hazard (SSH) for these nonconformances. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that the issues could be related to an SSH. These issues were discovered while the facility is under construction. The identified conditions will be corrected prior to completion of the facility. The evaluation for this report was completed on June 24, 2021. As stated above, there are no specifically identified basic components that have been identified to contain a defect for Vogtle Units 3 and 4. The nonconformances identified affect some safety-related components and based on this it was conservatively judged that these conditions involve a failure to comply that could be related to an SSH. The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken include: Comprehensive extent-of-condition reviews and correction of identified conditions are being conducted. The actions to identify and resolve the nonconforming conditions are in process and will be completed in accordance with the site corrective action program. Bechtel, and other subcontractors as needed, will implement actions to correct the identified conditions and ensure that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences. Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) is the organization responsible for ensuring Bechtel and the other subcontractors complete the required actions to correct the nonconforming conditions and ensuring that processes are in place to avoid future occurrences.|
|ENS 55327||25 June 2021 13:47:00||The following information was received via E-mail: On June 25, 2021, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) that while conducting radiography in their shooting bay, they experienced a source disconnect. The disconnect involved a QSA 880D exposure device containing a 60 curie iridium-192 source. The RSO stated the radiographer had completed an exposure and was entering the bay to exchange the film. As they passed the entrance beam the radiation alarm went off. The radiographer exited the area. The licensee was unable to retract the source. They contacted a service company who came to the licensee's location. It was determined that the ball on the drive cable had broken free of the drive cable. The service company was able to retract the source into the exposure device. No overexposures occurred due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: I-9860.|
|ENS 55301||10 June 2021 15:58:00||The following information was received via E-mail: On June 10, 2021 at approximately 1030 CDT, a source hang out incident occurred while an industrial radiography crew was working at Shell Chemical, LP in Norco, St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. The radiography crew was working on the top level of a 100-foot tower located in the Geo-1 South unit. The crew observed after performing the exposure that the source could be cranked back almost all the way, except for approximately one half turn of the crank handle. Several more unsuccessful attempts were made by the crew to crank in the source. The source was then cranked out to the 4-HVL collimator and the crew expanded the restricted area boundary on the East side so that the entire boundary was at 2 mR/hr or below. The crew then contacted their site supervisor at approximately 1040 CDT, who in turn immediately contacted the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO). At approximately 1140 CDT, the source hang out incident was reported to the Department (Louisiana DEQ) Radiation Hotline by the Corporate RSO. A source retrieval trained radiography instructor was promptly tasked by the licensee with conducting a source retrieval. Six radiographers, including both of the crew members whose source was hung out, worked the restricted area boundary at ground level to prevent exposure to members of the public. After observing the placement of the collimator and source guide tube for approximately five seconds from five different locations at a distance of approximately 10 feet, the other source retrieval trained radiographer used a set of six-foot tongs to grab and shake the collimator and source guide tube. This loosened a bind in the source guide tube at the outlet nipple of the exposure device and permitted the source to be promptly afterwards retracted into the shielded position. The source was hung out for approximately three hours. The radiography instructor who conducted various observations of the guide tube in preparation for the retrieval received three mR of exposure and the other retrieval trained radiography instructor, who performed the source retrieval received one mR of exposure. An additional certified radiographer who also assisted in the retrieval operation received one mR of exposure. All other personnel on site for the licensee received less than one mR of exposure from the hung out source. No members of the public were exposed. The radiography exposure device was a QSA Model 880 Delta, device serial number, D13738. The source was Ir-192 with 55 Ci of activity. The source serial number was 30128M. Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20210006|
|ENS 55302||10 June 2021 19:36:00|
The following information was received via E-mail: Event description: portable gauge came out of truck bed during transport. Event location: South Broadway and 340, Grand Junction, CO. Event type: Lost portable gauge, Troxler 3430 SN 26906, 333 MBq (9 mCi) of cesium-137 and 1.63 GBq (44 mCi) of americium-241:beryllium; or 2.44 MBq (66 microCi) of californium-252. Colorado Event Report ID No.: Pending
The following update was received via E-mail: The portable gauge reported lost by Colorado on 6/10/21 has been found. The gauge was found by an employee at the worksite where the gauge fell off the back of the truck and was secured. The licensee was notified and has recovered the gauge. Notified R4DO (Drake) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
|ENS 55299||9 June 2021 15:02:00|
At 1115 EDT on June 9, 2021, during a siren activation test, a loss of the capability to activate the sirens from both Surry local activation sites was identified. The Virginia EOC was participating in the activation test and is aware of the issue and notified the local government authorities in the Surry EPZ of the situation. The NRC Resident has been notified of this issue. The station telecommunications department has been contacted and is aware of the issue. In the event that a radiological emergency should occur at the Surry Power Station, Primary Route Alerting procedures will be put in use by the local jurisdictions. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to notification of other state and local government agencies of the failure of the Alert & Notification system for Surry.
Surry Power Station Event Notification 55299 is being retracted based upon further evaluation. Surry has three localities (State SAU, James City, and Surry County) with access to the redundant activation trains (primary and backup systems). The actuation tests only one primary and one backup activation panel at two localities, only primary at the State SAU (Situational Awareness Unit) and back up at James City County were tested. Follow-up telecom and vendor investigation revealed that the primary server was functional from James City County that would have actuated all 71 sirens; Consequently, it was concluded that all of the sirens were fully functional from the James City primary system and there was no loss of all sirens as originally reported on 6/9/2021 (EN 55299). EN 55299 also contained a 4-hour Offsite Notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) that is unaffected. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Miller).
|ENS 55300||10 June 2021 15:56:00|
Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21 (d)(3)(i), Paragon Energy Solutions is providing initial notification of the identification of a deviation. Condition that requires evaluation: NLI 280-ton Custom Chillers, Serial Numbers XHX-0001A / XHX-0001B / XHX-0001C. The Chillers were originally supplied by Nuclear Logistics under PO: NU-02SR726683 in 2010. The original seismic qualification was questioned by plant personnel related to the size of the bolting utilized for the diagonal cross braces on the two lower chiller frames. Paragon performed a review and additional analysis of the original qualification report. It was confirmed that the bolting which was utilized to install the pinned diagonal braces on the condenser and compressor frame sections does not have a sufficient load bearing capacity to support the application loading during a seismic event. The upset and emergency loading for the diagonal brace is 5.59 kip and 8.59 kip, respectively. Compared to the load capacity of 2.32 kip and 3.09 kip for upset and emergency, respectively, for the 3/8" bolt in single-shear configuration with threads included in the shear plane. This condition does not affect normal operation of the chiller. However, this deviation has the potential to impact the ability to maintain structural integrity during a seismic event. Date of Discovery: 6/8/2021 Formal notification will be submitted on or before 7/8/2021. Paragon contact: Tracy Bolt, Chief Nuclear Officer, Paragon Energy Solutions, 817-284-0077, email@example.com. This equipment was supplied to V.C. Summer Nuclear Station.
The following information was recevied via E-mail: Pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(b), Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC is providing written notification of the identification of a deviation. On 6/24/2021, Paragon has determined that we do not have the capability to perform the evaluation to determine if the deviation, if left uncorrected, could create a substantial safety hazard. VC Summer has been notified within five working days of this determination so that they can evaluate the deviation or failure to comply, pursuant to 10 CFR 21.21(a). Condition that requires evaluation: NLI 280-ton Custom Chillers, Serial Numbers XHX-0001A / XHX-0001B / XHX-0001C. The Chillers were originally supplied by NLI to VC Summer station under PO: NU-02SR726683 in 2010. Ref. P21-06102021-IN, Rev. 0 (ML21174A009) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: Tracy Bolt, Chief Nuclear Officer. Paragon Energy Solutions, LLC, 7410 Pebble Drive, Ft. Worth, TX 76118. Notified R2DO (Miller), R4DO (Werner), and the Part 21/50.55 Reactors E-mail group.
|ENS 55288||3 June 2021 10:04:00||Event meets ACD2-RG-044 App. B N.1 'The licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or onsite personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality or inadvertent release of radioactively contaminated materials.'" Received preliminary notification from TestAmerica Colorado that there was an exceedance of the Total Suspended Solids NPDES permit limit at Outfall 013. This was not unexpected with the current state of the settling pond above Outfall 013. An Ohio EPA (OEPA) 24 hour non-compliance notification form was filled out and sent to OEPA NPDES inspector. Notification (to NRC) concurrent to the OEPA notification.|
|ENS 55272||24 May 2021 12:01:00||Unit 2 is not impacted and remains stable in Mode 1 at 100 percent power. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the AFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. No relief valves opened. All Rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed by Auxiliary Feedwater via the steam dumps. The plant is in a normal post-trip electrical line-up.|
|ENS 55200||20 April 2021 15:36:00||A non-licensed, employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 55204||21 April 2021 12:05:00|
The following information was received from the Minnesota Department of Health via E-mail: On 4/15/2021, 3M Company received three of four boxes containing radioactive material shipped from NRD, LLC, in Grand Island, NY. The fourth package, containing one NRD model P-2042 static eliminator with an activity of 5 milliCuries of Po-210, was not received with the other three. 3M contacted NRD and the common carrier to inquire about the status of the missing package. The common carrier's website indicates that the package in question is still in shipment. The common carrier initially stated that they believed the package was delivered on 4/15/2021 with the other packages in the shipment. When the package did not arrive on 4/15/2021, 3M started looking for the missing package in case it actually had been delivered and misplaced on the shipping dock, but the package has not been located. 3M has requested that a formal investigation be performed by the common carrier. The investigation is ongoing at the time of this notification.
The following information was received via from the Minnesota Department of Health via E-mail: Minnesota Department of Health was informed by the licensee that the source has been recovered. It was at the licensee's facility and had arrived in a mislabeled package from the manufacturer. State Event Report ID No.: MN-21-0002 Notified R3DO (Peterson), ILTAB, NMSS Events Notification, and CNSC (Canada) via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
|ENS 55172||6 April 2021 04:32:00|
At 2149 EDT on April 5, 2021, with the power plant in Mode 2 at zero percent power, an actuation of the RPS system occurred following the decision to abort plant start-up. The reason for the RPS actuation was to align the plant to Mode 3, from Mode 2, following manually inserting all control rods using the Rod Control System. The RPS system initiated as designed when the mode switch was taken from 'Start-up' to 'Shutdown' to align the plant to Mode 3 from Mode 2. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This is a retraction of an event notification made on 4/6/2021 at 0432 EST (EN#55172). This event was initially reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of the RPS System. This event was later determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Technical Specifications, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). On the evening of April 4, 2021, while commencing reactor start up, it was determined that control rod withdrawal to add positive reactivity for the start-up would not overcome the negative reactivity of plant heat up. The control room team determined that the proper course of action would be to insert all control rods . The control room briefed and notified the Outage Control Center about its decision, then proceeded to insert all control rods. The control room manually inserted all control rods using the control rod hydraulic system. Following insertion of all control rods, the mode switch was taken to the shutdown position to meet the prerequisites of the procedure for maintaining hot shutdown. This action establishes Mode 3 in accordance with Technical Specifications and aligns the plant to perform the necessary work prior to a plant restart. By placing the mode switch in the shutdown position, a scram signal is generated for 10 seconds. NUREG-1022 offers guidance that states 'Actuations that need not be reported are those initiated for reasons other than to mitigate the consequences of an event.' The actions the operating crew took that night are accurately described by this statement in NUREG-1022 'shifting alignment of makeup pumps or closing a containment isolation valve for normal operational purposes would not be reportable.' In this situation, the Mode switch was taken to shutdown to align the plant to mode 3 for normal operational purposes, and not to mitigate a significant event. When the mode switch was taken to shut-down, RPS initiated as designed, there was no mis-operation or unnecessary actuation. This actuation was determined to be pre-planned, in accordance with Tech Specs, and not the result of a significant event, therefore not meeting the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident has been notified. Notified R3DO (McGraw).
|ENS 55119||1 March 2021 16:31:00|
The licensee reported to the Agency (Massachusetts Radiation Control Program) at 1400 EST on March 1, 2021, that it discovered on March 1, 2021 at 1200 EST that a package (Yellow-III, T.I. 2.6, Type B, UN 2916) containing seven sealed sources (Ir-192; 59.9 Ci, 59.2 Ci, 58.1 Ci, 59.9 Ci, 59.5 Ci, 59.8 Ci, and 69.2 Ci) in a model 976C source changer was missing. The package was shipped by QSA Global, Inc. on February 12, 2021, for export to their customer NDT Instruments, based in Singapore. On March 1, 2021 at 1200 EST, QSA Global, Inc. discovered that the package had not been received. The carrier indicated that the package had been at their Memphis, TN facility on 2/13/2021, and that since then the location is unknown. The reporting requirement is immediate and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times the quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The four-hour reporting requirement of 105 CMR 120.077(B), missing shipment of Category 2 quantity of radioactive material, also applies. The Agency considers this event to be open. Notified: DHS-SWO, FEMA-OC, USDA-OC, HHS-OC, DOE-OC, DHS CISA Central, and EPA-EOC, Notified via E-mail: FDA- EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA-NWC, and CWMD-Watch Desk.
The following was received via e-mail from the Radiation Control Officer, Massachusetts Radiation Control Program: Licensee reports that they were notified on (5 March, 2021) that the missing package had been located in Memphis. The package was found undamaged and will continue for export to Singapore. Notified R1DO (BURKET), NMSS (RIVERA-CAPELLA), IR MOC (GOTT), and ILTAB (RICHARDSON) and via email NMSS EVENTS NOTIFICATION, and INES NATIONAL OFFICER (MILLIGAN). Also notified DHS-SWO, FEMA-OC, USDA-OC, HHS-OC, DOE-OC, DHS CISA Central, and EPA-EOC and via email FDA- EOC, Nuclear SSA, FEMA-NWC, and CWMD-Watch Desk. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "CATEGORY 2" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 2 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for a short time (minutes to hours). It could possibly be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of hours to days. These sources are typically used in practices such as industrial gamma radiography, high dose rate brachytherapy and medium dose rate brachytherapy. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
|ENS 55117||1 March 2021 14:07:00||On 3/1/21 at 1112 EST, with Unit 3 in Mode 1 at approximately 100 percent Rated Thermal Power (RTP), the reactor automatically tripped. Auxiliary Feedwater initiated as designed to provide Steam Generator (S/G) water level control. Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) have been exited and General Operating Procedures (GOPs) were entered. Unit 3 is stable in Mode 3 at normal operating temperature and pressure. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. All rods are inserted, decay heat is being removed via S/G through normal secondary systems. The plant is in a normal electrical line-up. The cause of the automatic reactor trip is (unknown at this time and is) being investigated. There was no effect on Unit 4.|
|ENS 55359||19 July 2021 13:47:00||On February 28, 2021, (at approximately 1500 EST), following recalibration of the reactor power in accordance with PUR-1 Technical Specifications, the reactor operator operated the reactor at 8.5 kW (85% of nominal power) and noticed that the rate of temperature change of the coolant was greater than expected. Noting that this presents the possibility of the power being in excess of expectations, PUR-1 was shut down and has remained shut down to date. PUR-1 staff immediately notified the Committee on Reactor Operations (CORO) and developed a plan to perform an in-depth investigation. Since then, multiple independent assessments on the reactor power have been performed, which include: Hand calculations, Monte Carlo N-Particle code (MCNP) simulations, analysis on activity measurements of irradiated materials, a thermal-hydraulic analysis using a Computational Fluid Dynamic (CFD) model of PUR-1, and a more physical assessment using resistance heaters as heat sources to determine the coolant temperature change rate as a function of power and pool temperature, which has just been completed. These five independent evaluation methods performed to determine the core power during the experiment on February 28, 2021, suggest that the reactor may have been operated for about 4 hours at a power in the range between 118.3 percent to 129.2 percent of our 12 kW maximum allowable power (per TS 2.2). While the reactor was not operated outside the bounds of the Safety Analysis Report (SAR), this represents a potential need for reporting under TS 6.7.b.1.c.vi, 'An observed inadequacy in the implementation of procedural controls...'. Staff are currently evaluating several potential corrective actions including adjustment of the current power calibration constant, which relates the activity of the gold foil to the core power, by the most conservative factor suggested by these five analyses. There was no impact to the safety of the public or PUR-1 staff and the Safety Limit was not exceeded at any point. A formal report will be subsequently issued.|
|ENS 55078||20 January 2021 21:48:00||On 1/20/2021 at 1822 EST, with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, the reactor automatically tripped due to a loss of Motor Control Center 2B2. The trip was uncomplicated with all systems responding normally post trip. Operations stabilized the plant in Mode 3. Auxiliary feed-water automatically actuated on the 2A Steam Generator post trip. Current decay heat removal is the 2B main feedwater pump to both steam generators and the Steam Bypass Control System to the main condenser. Unit 1 is not affected. This event is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 55076||20 January 2021 16:41:00|
The following information was received via E-mail: The licensee reported (to the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency)) at 1326 EST on January 20, 2021 that they had discovered on the same day at 0937 EST that a package (White 1, Type A, UN 2915) containing 583 milliCuries of C-14 in the form of solid barium cyanamide with the consistency of table salt is missing. That package was further described as being one piece with a gross weight of 4 kilograms. The White 1 package is expected to have a dose rate of less than 0.5 mrem/hour at the package surface. The package was imported from Berlin, Germany from a company named IUT and was reported to have last been observed to be at John F Kennedy International Airport (JFK), Jamaica, New York, yesterday, January 19, 2021, where it was said to have cleared U.S. Customs. The carrier intended to send the package from JFK to Logan Airport, Boston, MA where it was supposed to be picked up by the licensee's representative on January 20, 2021 and delivered to the licensee's Boston, Massachusetts facility. The licensee reported that when its representative went to Logan Airport to pick up the package, the (carrier) claimed that the package had not arrived at Logan Airport and that the (carrier) was actively searching for the package. The reporting requirement is immediate and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times the quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The Agency considers this event to be open. Massachusetts Report Number: N/A
The following information was received via E-mail: Yesterday, the Agency reported to NRC/NMED that an incoming package shipped from Germany, containing 583 mCi C-14 and destined for a licensee located in Boston MA, was reported by the licensee as 'missing in transit.' The carrier reported to the licensee the last known location of the package was JFK Airport, New York, NY. At approximately 1045 EST this morning, 1/21/2021, the MA licensee reported that the carrier notified the MA licensee that the missing package had been found at Logan Airport in Boston MA. The licensee has dispatched a vehicle to retrieve the package and transfer it to the licensee's Boston facility. Notified R1DO (Bickett), NMSS Events Notifications, ILTAB, and CNSC (Canada). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
|ENS 55075||19 January 2021 21:17:00||The following information was received via E-mail: On 1/19/21, The California Office of Emergency Services (Cal OES) contacted the Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) to report an incident involving five stolen moisture / density gauges. The initial report to Cal OES was made by the Santa Clara Fire Department. Upon receipt of the Cal OES incident report, RHB contacted the licensee and learned the following: The licensee became aware of this theft on 1/19/21, when one of their staff members attempted to collect a gauge from the authorized storage unit located at 3033 Lafayette Street, Unit A133, in Santa Clara, CA. The licensee had five gauges stored at this location. According to the Public Storage facility personnel, the theft occurred late at night on Friday, 1/15/2021, when eight units were burglarized that day. The licensee stated that they did not receive any notification from the storage unit personnel regarding the theft on Friday. On 01/19/21, the licensee notified the Santa Clara Police Department of the theft (case number: 21-115042) and dispatchers were able to recover five transport cases near De La Cruz and Hwy 101 in Santa Clara, but the gauges were all missing. The gauges that were stolen include: 1. CPN International MC-3, S/N M380709085, 50mCi of AmBe 241 and 10mCi of Cs 137 2. InstroTek MCE-3, S/N 30380, 50mCi of AmBe 241 and 10mCi of Cs 137 3. InstroTek MCE-3, S/N 30958, 50mCi of AmBe 241 and 10mCi of Cs 137 4. InstroTek Explorer 3500, S/N 3375, 44mCi of AmBe 241 and 11mCi of Cs 137 5. InstroTek Explorer 3500, S/N 3826, 44mCi of AmBe 241 and 11mCi of Cs 137 RHB will be following up on this investigation. California 5010 Number: 011921 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 55072||19 January 2021 14:46:00|
The following information was received via e-mail: On 1/4/2021, a leak test was performed on an Isotope Products Laboratories Cs-137 sealed source vial, serial number 1074-19-20, used as a dose calibrator constancy source. The current calculated activity at the time of the leak test measured 147.49 microcuries from the reference date of 9/1/2004. The measured results of the leak test revealed an activity of 0.012 microcuries on 1/4/2021 at 1253 EST. The Cs-137 sealed source was promptly sealed within its lead container and firmly taped closed. This taped pig was then placed inside of several nitrile gloves, which were also generously taped closed, adorned with radioactive material stickers and the source was placed into the facility's radioactive material waste storage closet. The visible label includes the isotope, date of storage, current activity, and signature of the individual who stored it. The same documentation was also entered into the sealed source inventory. The RSO was then promptly notified of the event. The source leak test was conducted by Alliance Medical Physics. Georgia Incident Number: 35
The following information was received via e-mail: The immediate action taken for the leaking sealed source that was discovered on January 4, 2021 is as follows. The Cs-137 source was placed back into the lead pig shield and generously taped across where the lead pig closes as well as along the vertical axis. This was then marked with the date, isotope, current activity, and signature of the individual who sealed the source up. This was then encapsulated within nitrile gloves, and generously taped closed as well, with a radioactive label adhered to the outside that was marked with the isotope, current activity, date, and signature of the individual who sealed it. While this was taking place, the nuclear medicine technologist surveyed the area with the facility's Geiger counter to look for any errant contamination. He was instructed to survey anything that he would have touched that morning. He continued to survey himself (clothing and skin), the L-block, dose calibrator, dose calibrator dipper, MCA, trash cans, keyboard, and door handles. No contamination was found during his survey. This led me to believe that the leak was captured under the rim of the sealed sources cap where it meets the vial. The enveloped source was then placed in the rad waste closet until a vendor can be found for disposal by the facility. The rad waste cabinet measured. 0.2 mR/hr at face, and 0.1 mR/hr on either side of the cabinet. The back side faces the exterior of the building and is on the 2nd floor, therefore no readings were taken there. Currently, the facility is looking for a qualified disposal vendor that can safely remove the source. Until the sealed source is removed, the facility will continue to perform weekly surveys and wipes on the cabinet and document their findings. (The representative of Alliance Medical Physics) do(es) not anticipate any readings of (greater than or equal to) 2.0 mR/hr or 2200 DPM going forward, but (has) instructed the facility to notify the RSO and (Alliance Medical Physics) if they are found. The licensee explained shielding in place until the source can be removed. The licensee informed (GA Radioactive Material Program that) they have an arrangement to return the source to Eckert & Ziegler (the week of 3/15/21). Shipping confirmation documents will be submitted. The licensee was advised to submit this information in writing. Notified R1DO (Jackson) and NMSS Events Distribution (by email).
|ENS 55035||14 December 2020 15:00:00||At 2214 EST on 12/12/20, Surry Power Station personnel identified leakage from the Unit 2 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) Cooling System to the ground. Leakage was estimated to be greater than 100 gallons and tritium concentration determined to be 4.5E07 picocuries per liter (pCi/L), requiring report in accordance with the industry voluntary groundwater protection program. As such, at 1450 EST on 12/14/2020, the Surry County Administrator, NRC Resident, Virginia Department of Health, Virginia Department of Emergency Management, and Virginia Department of Environmental Quality were notified of this release to the environment. Due to the offsite agency notifications, this 4-hour, non-emergency report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 55020||3 December 2020 17:10:00||At 0923 EST on December 3, 2020, with Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100 percent power, an actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System (Emergency Diesel Generator 1A) occurred during normal plant operations. The reason for Emergency Diesel Generator 1A auto start was due to Class 1E 4KV Bus 11 feeder breaker opening. The Emergency Diesel Generator 1A automatically started as designed when the loss of voltage signal on 4KV Bus 11 was received. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the Emergency AC Electrical Power System. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The cause of the 4KV Bus 11 Feeder Breaker opening is unknown at the present time and is under investigation.|
|ENS 55019||3 December 2020 15:19:00||The following information was received via E-mail: Acuren Inspection, Inc. contacted the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality / Emergency Response Services Division / Radiation Section on December 3, 2020, concerning an industrial radiography source that had been stuck within the source guide tube. The crew was using a QSA Global model - 880D, serial number - 14783, with an Ir-192 source, with source serial number - 11512M, with an activity of 41 Ci (1,517 GBq). On December 2, 2020, around 1640 CST, the source became stuck outside the camera in the source guide tube while performing radiography operations (when an equipment stand fell on the source guide tube leading it to become crimped). There were no excessive radiation exposures. The industrial radiography crew's pocket dosimeters did not go off scale. A source retrieval team was sent out and had the source returned back into the camera by 2000 CST on December 2, 2020. The event occurred at Enbride Venice Facility in Venice, LA. Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20200010|
|ENS 55017||1 December 2020 17:00:00||On December 1, 2020 at 1116 EST, a condition impacting functionality of the Technical Support Center (TSC) Ventilation System was discovered during surveillance testing. The issue resulted in a loss of TSC functionality due to a high flow rate measured on outside air intake fans. The cause of the high flow rate is under investigation. This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the condition affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during the non-functional period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Coordinator will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with site procedures. This condition does not affect the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 55079||21 January 2021 17:10:00||This 60-day optional telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal, as allowed by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of one of the systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At 0946 hrs on December 1, 2020, with unit 2 in Mode 5 at 0% power, an invalid actuation of the Emergency Diesel Generators (EDG) 'A' and 'B', 'A' Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Pump, 'A' Service Water Booster Pump (SWBP), and Auxiliary Feed Water (AFW) Pumps 'A' and 'B' occurred. The actuation was caused by a Safety Injection (SI) signal while installing simulations to support Reactor Safeguards testing. The SI signal occurred when two out of three logic was met for Low Pressurizer Pressure, which was caused by a high resistance connection to a test point from a loose test lead. All aligned equipment, 'A' and 'B' EDGs, 'A' RHR Pump, 'A' SWBP and 'A' and 'B' AFW Pumps, responded properly to the auto-start signal and the actuation was complete. The actuation was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system. Therefore, this event has been determined to be an invalid actuation. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.|
|ENS 55016||1 December 2020 16:35:00||The following information was received via E-mail: The Agency (Illinois Emergency Management Agency) was contacted on 12/1/20 by Sterigenics U.S., LLC to advise that one of their pool irradiator source racks at the Schaumburg location had become stuck in the unshielded position on 11/30/20. The source rack, containing approximately 1.3 MCi of Co-60, was successfully returned to the shielded position and no exposures to personnel or the public resulted. All safety interlocks functioned as designed. This event did not result in any compromises to source security or to any safety or security systems. There is no indication of intentional misuse, theft or diversion at this time. On 12/1/2020, the Agency was contacted by the Radiation Safety Officer for Sterigenics U.S., LLC, to advise that in the middle of performing scheduled routine safety checks on 11/30/2020, authorized engineers reported that the east source rack failed to return to the shielded position as designed upon completion of a check. The west source rack lowered as designed without incident. Sources contained in the east source rack remained unshielded from approximately 1400 CST until 1648 CST. The event was immediately reported to the Radiation Safety Officer by the two authorized engineers performing the safety checks that day. The Radiation Safety Officer immediately responded to the site to assist in assessment and formulation of an action plan. After consultation with the Corporate Radiation Safety Officer, the Radiation Safety Officer and staff engineers were able to use a hand winch to successfully lower the rack of sources into the shielded position within the pool. Safety and security systems remain operational and functioned as designed throughout the source lowering process. There is no immediate hazard to workers or members of the public as a result of this incident. This morning (12/1/2020), source modules were removed without incident from the east source rack and are currently shielded and in safe storage at the bottom of the pool. Sterigenics staff are continuing their investigation into the cause for the stuck rack. All interlocks and safety systems were reported as operational. An action plan was formulated in conjunction with Corporate staff to safely and slowly raise the empty east rack using a hand winch so that it can be adequately inspected. IEMA staff will follow up later this afternoon for an update. A reactive inspection by inspectors is planned for later this week. Illinois Reference Number: IL200024|
|ENS 54972||30 October 2020 03:34:00||The following information was received via E-mail: The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Empire Geotechnical reported that his CPN nuclear gauge was stolen from the back of his pickup truck sometime overnight between 2100 EDT on October 28, 2020 and 0630 PDT on October 29, 2020. CA Dept. of Public Health Radiologic Health Branch (RHB) inspector contacted the Empire Geotechnical RSO by phone and confirmed the RSO left his truck parked on the street in front of his office with the gauge secured in the rear of the pickup under a locked deck lid. The RSO is in the process of reporting the theft to the Orange Police Department. The gauge is a CPN MC1DR, (serial) number MD90204854, that contains two special form sealed sources: 370 MBq (10 mCi) of Cs-137 and 1.85GBq (50 mCi) of Am-241/Be. California 5010 Number: 102920 Cal OES control number: 20-6025, October 29, 2020 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 54970||29 October 2020 11:20:00||The following information was received via E-mail from the Kentucky Department for Public Health & Safety, Radiation Health Branch (KY RHB): Big River Electric Corporation reported a shutter failure. KY RHB was notified via email on October 28, 2020at 1511 EDT) by a representative from a specifically licensed facility, Big Rivers Electric Corporation, indicating that one fixed gauging device (Kay Ray Model 7062P, Serial Number 8555), containing a 10 mCi Cs-137 source located in the Reid/Green/HMP&L Station II had a shutter malfunction. The source was found to have a broken shutter arm. The gauge has been left in place and a contractor will be scheduled to service the gauge. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) has notified the production manager and production leaders to ensure they are aware of the issue. Reporting criteria in 10 CFR 30.50(b)(2). Kentucky Event Report ID Number: KY200005|
|ENS 54958||20 October 2020 15:20:00||During the course of operations, a potential error in the power calibration of the PUR-1, License Number R-87, was discovered. This calibration error would result in a special report requirement as specified in ((Technical Specification)) TS 6.7.b.1.c.vi, which is that an observed inadequacy in the implementation of a procedural control such that this inadequacy could have caused the development of an unsafe condition with regards to reactor operations. By extension the miscalibration caused a true reactor power higher than the measured reactor power. As such, this likely resulted in the operation in violation of the limiting condition for operation as established in TS Section 3 Table I and operation with an actual safety system setting for a required system less conservative than the limiting safety system settings specified in the Technical Specifications. These reporting requirements are Part i. and ii. of TS 6.7.b.1.c. The calibration error implicates a violation of the maximum licensed power level of 12 kW. The Safety Limit was not exceeded at any point.|
|ENS 55360||19 July 2021 15:38:00||The following information was received via E-mail: MaineHealth Maine Medical Center reported a leaking Cs-137 source (Eckert & Ziegler Model RV-137-200U, Serial No.: 1490-24-6) that contained an estimated activity of 5.84 MBq (157.8 microCi). The incident was discovered during a semi-annual leak test performed on 10/19/2020. Leak test results revealed 950.9 Bq (0.0257 microCi). The Cs-137 contamination was contained in the drawer the source was stored in. The assumption was made that the source was still leaking and MaineHealth sealed it in its storage lead pig. The outer surface of the lead pig was cleaned and wiped, resulting in removable contamination of less than 200 dpm. The pig was placed in a plastic bag as an extra means of containment and the bag was sealed and labeled. All other items that were contaminated or potentially contaminated in the clean-up process were also placed in a plastic bag, sealed, and labeled. The drawer was cleaned and a final wipe test confirmed that removable contamination was below 200 dpm. The staff who used the source were notified that it was considered out of service and should not be handled or used. The source remained stored in the hot laboratory pending finalization of plans for repair or disposal. Maine Event Report ID No.: ME 20-004|
|ENS 54942||9 October 2020 19:34:00||The following information was received via E-mail: ND Testing Inc. made a 24-hour report to the Radiologic Health Branch that on October 8, 2020, at 1256 PDT a hand-crank assembly became stuck/seized and would not allow the source to travel forward or backwards at a temporary job site. The team of two experienced radiographers contacted their Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for assistance and secured the area around their QSA Global 880 exposure device. The RSO arrived onsite at 1445 EDT with extra lead shielding and survey meters. He and the radiographers were able to place lead blankets and some solid lead blocks over the guidetube containing the Ir-192 source, open the crank assembly to remove some metal shavings and close the assembly. This allowed them to secure the Ir-192 source after approximately 2 hours at 1645 EDT. The highest individual dose received was 195 mrem by one of the radiographers. The Ir-192 source was a QSA Global model A424-9, with an activity of 67.1 Ci of Ir-192. California 5010 Number: 100920|
|ENS 54940||9 October 2020 13:42:00||The following is a synopsis of information received via phone and facsimile: The Department (Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Radiological Health) was notified around 0815 CDT on October 9, 2020, by the Nebraska State Patrol, of a lost, and subsequently recovered, nuclear gauge. The gauge was a Troxler 3400 series moisture density gauge containing a 9 mCi Cs-137 source and a 44 mCi Am-241/Be source. During the afternoon of October 8, 2020, the gauge was on the tailgate of a pickup truck. The gauge user entered the vehicle before securing the gauge package. The user was distracted and began driving away. The gauge fell out of the back of the vehicle. An employee from the Nebraska Department of Transportation (NDOT) found the lost gauge near Norfolk, NE. The NDOT employee notified the Nebraska State Patrol and the gauge manufacturer, Troxler. Using the serial number of the gauge, Troxler was able to determine the gauge belonged to Olsson Associates. Olsson Associates was notified of the recovered gauge, and the gauge user retrieved the gauge. The estimated time between the loss of control and recovery is estimated to be one hour. During the evening of October 8, 2020, the corporate Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Olsson Associates was notified of the incident. He did not report the event to the Department. A representative of the Department spoke with him at 1030 CDT on October 9, 2020. The RSO then provided a brief account of the incident to the Department representative. The RSO noted that the gauge package appeared to be undamaged. The gauge itself did not appear damaged. The gauge was surveyed to confirm the presence of the source, and a leak test will be performed immediately. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 54875||2 September 2020 16:52:00||At approximately 1027 EDT on September 2, 2020, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing a part of the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired due to planned sprinkler head modifications. Additional compensatory measures were enacted. The system was restored at approximately 1300 EDT today (9/2/2020) and the Deputy Fire Marshall informed of restoration. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). The licensee will notify Region 2.|
|ENS 54863||28 August 2020 10:22:00||At 1645 CDT on 8/27/2020, it was determined that a licensed operator tested positive in accordance with the FFD testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 54862||27 August 2020 09:34:00|
EN Revision Imported Date : 9/2/2020 AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - UNABLE TO DETERMINE IF SOURCE IN SHIELDED POSITION ON LEVEL INDICATOR The following information was received via E-mail: On August 26, 2020, the Agency (Texas Department of State Health Services) was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that while making preparations for the coming hurricane, the position of the source rod on a Tracerco, Model T-218-160032 (used for level indication) could not be confirmed. The source rod contains 10 cesium-137 sources of 10 milliCuries each (original activity.) The RSO stated when they return the sources to the shielded position, the control system does indicate the sources are shielded as indicated by a light change on the system console. When the licensee attempted to shield the sources on this day, the light did not change to indicate the sources were shielded. The gauge source rod is operated manually. They tried it a couple of times, but the light still did not change. A survey was performed on the outside of the vessel. The RSO stated there wasn't enough change in dose rate readings with shutter in the open and closed positions to determine whether the sources were shielded based on survey. The RSO stated it may be that the sources are not moving, or it may be that there is an issue within the control system causing the light not to change. They cannot determine at this time which problem is occurring. The RSO is contacting the manufacturer to send someone out after the hurricane. There is no risk of exposure. The RSO stated they will update the Agency once the manufacturer determines the problem. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number: 9787
The following information was received via e-mail: On September 1, 2020, the licensee notified the Agency (Texas DSHS) that on August 31, 2020, a service company came onsite to investigate the shutter problem they had reported, and identified that there was no mechanical issue with the shutter. The problem they had was a failure of the output signal to indicate source position. The source rod was functioning normally. Based on this information, the Agency is retracting this event. Notified R4DO (Deese) and NMSS Events (email).
|ENS 54781||15 July 2020 14:58:00||At 0835 EDT on July 15, 2020, it was discovered that the main control room (MCR) envelope was inoperable due to a MCR door being found ajar; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The door was closed, restoring the MCR envelope to operable at 0839 EDT. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.|
|ENS 54785||16 July 2020 13:09:00||The following is a synopsis of information received via E-mail and phone: On July 15, 2020, at 1445 CDT, the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) for Syngenta Crop Protection, LLC contacted the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality / Emergency and Radiological Services Division / Radiation Section to report that shutters had failed to close on two fixed density gauges during routine maintenance. The shutters are stuck in the open position and do not affect operation. The gauges are Ronan Engineering Model SAI, s/n's 5832GK and 5835GK, each with a 50 mCi Cs-137 sealed source, at the time of installation. The licensee contacted the contractor, BBP Sales, LLC, to determine whether the gauges should be disposed of or repaired. The decision will be made on July 16, 2020 on how to deal with the stuck shutters. Repair or disposal of the gauges should be accomplished by July 20, 2020. Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA20200005|
|ENS 54780||15 July 2020 12:25:00|
EN Revision Imported Date : 7/29/2020 UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A RESTRICTED RADIATION ROOM AS A TOUCHDOWN SPACE On July 14, 2020, at approximately 1115 MDT, the Radiation Safety Officer was notified that a restricted radiation room was used intermittently for 30-45 minute periods as a touchdown space for Billings Clinic's Internal Medicine residents. The room had not been decommissioned. The restricted radiation room being used was the Billings Clinic Hospital I-131 Inpatient Therapy Room (room 3501; general inpatient medical floor). This room was last used for (a 153 mCi I-131 Sodium Iodine) radiation treatment on June 21, 2017. Beginning June 4, 2020, the room began being used as a touchdown space for Internal Medicine residents. Surveys were performed on July 14, 2020 using survey meters. Wipes for removable contamination were performed on a table, two computers, phone, and the floor around the area where staff were working. All items had activity levels indistinguishable from background readings. The items were removed from the room. The room has been secured with a new lock and radiation warning signs have been reposted. The radiation signs had been removed at an unknown time between June 4, 2020 and July 14, 2020. The licensee is not aware of any radiation exposure as a result of this reported event. The licensee is making this report as a deviation from 10 CFR 35.13(f) as required by reporting requirement 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(iii).
This is a summary of information received from the licensee via telephone: After discussion with NRC RIV personnel the licensee determined that this event is not reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 30.50(b)(1)(iii). Notified R4DO (Gepford) and NMSS Events (email).
|ENS 54782||15 July 2020 14:35:00||The following information was received via E-mail: On 7/15/2020, at 1340 EDT, the licensee reported that yesterday, 7/14/2020, sometime between 0915 and 0930 EDT, a male patient receiving TheraSphere treatment was underdosed by approximately 30 percent due to a leak in the delivery assembly. This was discovered around half-way through the procedure. No exposure to anyone other than the patient occurred. Contamination has been contained and removed. The prescribed activity was 5.7 GBq and dose was 150 Gy. The actual activity delivered is estimated to be 3.99 GBq and dose was 105 Gy. The patient is scheduled to return next week for follow-up treatment. Florida Incident Number: FL20-080 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.|
|ENS 54861||26 August 2020 23:49:00||The following information was received via E-mail: The Radiation Safety Officer with Mistras Group, Inc. contacted the Radiologic Health Branch regarding an incident with an Ir-192 radiography source that was determined to be locked out of its exposure device. The source was an Industrial Nuclear Model 32 Ir-192 source, Serial Number 550F, with an activity of 63.4 Curies. The device was an Industrial Nuclear Ir-100, Serial Number 4358. The incident occurred during radiography operations at a refinery in El Segundo. After a routine exposure, the radiographer retracted the source. The radiographer then proceeded with the radiation survey that showed a dose rate of 80 mR/hr approximately 2 feet from the exposure device, indicating that the source was not in the locked and shielded position. The radiographer contacted the RSO who instructed them to readjust the restricted area boundary to maintain 2 mR/hr dose rate. After the RSO arrived at the site, they placed shielding to reduce the dose rate while performing retrieval and returning the source to the locked and secured position. The device was then red tagged and placed out of service until it could be evaluated by the manufacturer. The highest dose received by Mistras Personnel (RSO) was 20 mrem, as read by a self-reading pocket dosimeter. The licensee's investigation into this event is ongoing and will be reviewed further by the California Department of Public Health. California 5010 Number: 070820|
|ENS 54845||19 August 2020 18:08:00||The following information was received via e-mail: New owner reported one tritium exit sign lost. Model number SLXTU1RW10 containing 7.09 Ci of H-3. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 54846||19 August 2020 18:14:00||The following information was received via e-mail: One tritium exit sign, model number SLXTUIGW10, containing 7.09 Ci of H-3 was reported as missing during annual registration. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf|
|ENS 54693||4 May 2020 23:40:00|
This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function needed to mitigate the Consequences of an Accident. A through wall leak was found on piping connected to the Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water Strainer. This condition has been evaluated and the Division 3 DG Cooling Water System has been declared inoperable. The Division 3 DG Cooling Water System is a support system for the Division 3 Emergency DG and the High Pressure Core Spray System (HPCS). The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
This update retracts Event Notification #54693, which reported a condition that could have potentially prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. An evaluation of the flaw on the piping connected to the Unit 2 Division 3 Diesel Generator (DG) Cooling Water strainer concluded that the system would have remained operable. The High Pressure Core Spray system, supported by the operable DG Cooling Water system, remained operable and capable of performing its safety function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Stone).
|ENS 54692||3 May 2020 22:28:00||On 5/3/2020 at 1100 EDT, Operations identified a step change in the Main Control Room ambient noise. The cause of the noise was a rise in vibrations on the Number 11 fan motor of the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan. Another step change in noise occurred and Operations swapped from the Number 11 fan motor to its redundant Number 12 fan motor, but the noise and vibrations did not improve. The two independent motors are connected to the blower shaft with belts on either end of the shaft. This entire fan and motor assembly is contained within the Main Control Room ventilation ducting and is not visible. At 1118 EDT, Operations shut off the Main Control Room Ventilation Circulating Fan due to Number 11 fan motor vibrations, declared the Main Control Room Air Treatment System inoperable, and entered the Technical Specification 3.4.5.e, 7-day action statement. At 1750 EDT, Maintenance entered the ductwork and informed Operations that the Number 11 fan bearing had catastrophically failed and because of the extent of damage and close physical proximity to the Number 12 fan motor, jeopardized its continued operation. As a result, Operations also declared the Number 12 fan motor inoperable and determined the event was reportable as a loss of safety function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.|
|ENS 54691||3 May 2020 11:43:00||At 0821 EDT on May 3, 2020, the Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor automatically scrammed due to a trip of the Main Turbine. The Unit 1 reactor was operating at 76 percent reactor power following a ramp schedule to full power subsequent to a maintenance outage. The Control Room received indication of a Main Turbine trip with both divisions of the Reactor Protection System actuated and all control rods inserted. The Reactor Recirculation Pumps tripped on End of Cycle - Recirculation Pump Trip. Reactor water level lowered to -1 inch causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. No Emergency Core Cooling System or Reactor Core Isolation Cooling actuations occurred. The operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using Reactor Feed Water. No Steam Relief Valves opened. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Investigation into the trip of the Main Turbine is in progress. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. A voluntary notification to the Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency and press release will occur. This event requires a 4-hour Emergency Notification System (ENS) notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and an 8-hour ENS notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B).|
|ENS 54688||1 May 2020 13:16:00|
At approximately 1238 EDT on May 1, 2020, an alarm indicated smoke on a non-safety related electrical switchgear bus in the turbine building. Plant personnel were dispatched to investigate. Smoke and heat were found coming from the bus. At 1253 EDT, a Notification of Unusual Event was declared. At 1308 EDT the fire was declared out and fire watches posted. Offsite assistance was requested during the event and the Jenkinsville, SC fire department responded to the site. There were no plant personnel injuries or impact to the health and safety of the public. The cause of this event is unknown at the present time. The electrical bus has been de-energized. The unit is currently in a planned refueling outage. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
The Notification of Unusual Event was terminated at 1737 EDT on May 1, 2020. The cause of the event is currently being investigated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Miller). NRR EO (Miller), IRD MOC (Grant). Additionally, notified DHS SWO, FEMA Operations Center, CISA IOCC, FEMA NWC (email), DHS Nuclear SSA (email), and FEMA NRCC SASC (email).
|ENS 54690||1 May 2020 15:34:00||At 0831 CDT, the Main Control Room received a 'Reactor Building 903 ft. Access Both Doors Open' alarm. Investigation found the interlock between the inner and outer doors did not prevent the opening of both doors while personnel were accessing the Reactor Building. The doors were immediately closed. Based on alarm times, both doors were open for less than one second. With both doors open, SR 188.8.131.52.3 was not met and Secondary Containment was declared inoperable. This unplanned Secondary Containment inoperability constitutes a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and (d), 'An event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident.' Secondary Containment was declared operable at 0836 CDT after independently verifying at least one Secondary Containment access door was closed. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.|
|ENS 54687||1 May 2020 11:53:00|
At 1000 EDT on May 1 2020, Operations commenced a shutdown of DC Cook Unit 2 to comply with LCO 3.4.13, Condition B Reactor Coolant System (RCS) pressure boundary leakage. At 0354 EDT on May 1, 2020, Operations detected an estimated 8 gpm Reactor Coolant System leak. The source of the leak could not be identified and Tech Spec 3.4.13, Condition A was entered for unidentified RCS leakage in excess of the 0.8 gpm limit. At 0745 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, Unit 2 entered LCO 3.4.13, Condition B when the 4-hour limit to complete the required actions of Condition A could not be met. At 0945 EDT on May 1, 2020, inspections inside containment identified the leak as pressure boundary leakage from a pressurizer spray line which also requires entry into LCO 3.4.13, Condition B. At 1059 EDT on May 1, Unit 2 was tripped from 15 percent power. All systems functioned normally. This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications as a 4-hour report and under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(A), degraded condition, as an 8-hour report. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
The condition identified in EN #54687, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(a) has been evaluated, and has been determined not to be RCS pressure boundary leakage. As such, the 8-hour report is being retracted, as it is not an event or condition that results in, 'the condition of the nuclear power plant, including its principal safety barriers, being seriously degraded.' The leakage was subsequently determined to be from the tell-tale nipple of a pressurizer spray valve, not from the pressurizer spray line piping as previously reported. The Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary (RCPB) is formed by the valve body, plug, seat, body to bonnet extension, and bonnet of the pressurizer spray valve. Therefore, the leakage is not RCPB leakage. There is no change to the 4-hour report made under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction. Notified R3DO (Stone).