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 Entered dateEvent description
ENS 5143229 September 2015 14:56:00On 9/29/15 at 1020 EDT, the 'B' train of Standby Gas Treatment System was declared inoperable for planned testing. On 9/29/15 at 1030 EDT, during performance of a surveillance on Unit 1 Reactor Pressure Vessel water level instrumentation, one channel was found to not meet acceptance criteria. The failed level channel is part of the initiation logic for the 'A' train of Standby Gas Treatment. This resulted in a loss of safety function for the Standby Gas Treatment System. On 9/29/15 at 1145 EDT, the 'B' train of Standby Gas Treatment was restored to operable by restoring from the planned testing. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(c) and per the guidance of NUREG 1022 Rev 3 section 3.2.7 as a loss of a Safety Function. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5142525 September 2015 12:09:00On September 25, 2015 at roughly 0430 EDT, four employees were in the work area when high temperature water and steam released from a wash operation in the Final Assembly Area. The cause of the water/steam release is unknown at this time, and a comprehensive investigation is underway. The area is in a safe, shutdown state, and is roped off to preserve the scene. The event did not involve any special nuclear material or contamination and is classified as an industrial safety incident. Three of the four employees were affected by the high temperature water/steam and were transported by ambulance to the hospital for treatment. This concurrent report is being made under Paragraph c of 10 CFR 70, Appendix A because in-patient hospitalization requires a 24 hour report to the South Carolina Department of Labor. The licensee will notify NRC Region 2.
ENS 510578 May 2015 11:02:00On May 7, 2015, at 1515 hours, B&W NOG-L Security management determined alcohol had been inadvertently introduced into the Protected Area through the shipping and receiving process. 10 CFR 26.719(b)(1) requires that the licensee report to the Operations Center within 24 hours of discovery, the use, sale distribution, possession, or presence of illegal drugs, or the consumption or presence of alcohol within a protected area. The item in question was a six pack of bottled beer which was part of a box of promotional items personally delivered by a sales representative from Graybar Electric. The B&W employee addressee first became aware of the package through an email and voicemail left by the salesman advising of a package delivery and indicating the presence of alcohol in the package. The B&W employee immediately contacted Shipping and Receiving management at approximately 1300 hrs. in an effort to intercept the package before delivery; however the package had already been processed into the Protected Area. Shipping and Receiving Management contacted the delivery driver via radio and instructed the driver not to deliver the package. The delivery driver separated the package from the delivery items. The package was removed from the Protected Area and returned to the Shipping and Receiving Manager located in the Owner Controlled Area at approximately 1500 hrs. The package was returned unopened. B&W Security Management was notified of the incident at approximately 1515 hrs. All items processed through Shipping and Receiving undergo security x-ray inspection. Containers of liquid are commonly processed items and therefore did not create an elevated level of suspicion which would have led to the officers conducting a visual inspection. B&W NOG-L Management will conduct an evaluation of the incident to include root cause analysis and corrective actions to prevent recurrence. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 510467 May 2015 07:11:00At 0700 on 5/7/15, Indian Point Unit 3 commenced a shutdown due to the inability to isolate a steam leak on a feedwater instrument line. Offsite power is available. Indian Point Unit 2 is unaffected and remains in Mode 1 at 100% power. The NRC Resident Inspector, the NYISO (New York Independent System Operator), and NY Public State Commission have been notified.
ENS 510425 May 2015 10:44:00Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), (the Veterans Health Administration (VHA) is) reporting receipt of a package of radioactive material with removable surface contamination on the outside of the package greater than NRC reporting limits. The package was received today (May 5, 2015) and surveyed for contamination around 0615 CDT by Captain James A. Lovell Federal Health Care Center, North Chicago, Illinois. The health care center holds permit number 12-10057-04 issued by VHA per the MML (Master Materials License). Wipe tests performed on the external surface of the package indicated a removable contamination level of 690 dpm/cm2 as compared to the regulatory reporting limit of 240 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters. The package contained five unit dosages of Technetium-99m (about 144 millicuries total) and was shipped and delivered by Triad Isotopes in Elk Grove, Illinois. The nuclear medicine technologist who surveyed the package immediately notified, by telephone, the Pharmacy Manager at Triad Isotopes about the contaminated package. The exterior of the package was able to be decontaminated by the nuclear medicine technologist to levels below reporting limits by performing successive wipes on the surface. The inner packaging materials and dosage containers were surveyed and no contamination was identified such that the dosages were not impacted. There was no spread of contamination at the health care center from the package. The contaminated materials have been isolated in a restricted area at the health care center and will be held for decay. Veterans Health Administration (T. Huston) has also notified NRC Region III (K. Null) by telephone of this event.
ENS 510487 May 2015 09:46:00A consolidated package was shipped to New York on April 7. When the shipment arrived it was missing one of the packages within the consolidated shipping container. At the time of shipment, the package contained 12.7 mCi of In-111 (half-life 2.8 days). The package was a UN 2915 Type A with a 0.1 TI (transportation index) and a weight of 3 lbs. An investigation was conducted with the common carrier. The package was not located. It was declared lost on April 21. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5099720 April 2015 17:57:00The licensee discovered evidence of prohibited material inside the protected area. The material has been removed. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5098213 April 2015 14:51:00A patient was receiving brachytherapy treatment using a SAVI device that used 11 channels. The patient was treated with 2 channels when the dummy wire jammed in the out position. The patient was prescribed a fractional dose 340 cGy, but received only received 60 cGy. There are no adverse effects expected to the patient. The prescribing physician has been informed. The licensee has contacted a company to repair the device and has ceased all operations until repairs can be made. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 509719 April 2015 16:44:00The following was received from the State of Florida via email: The RSO for Georgia-Pacific Corporation, Palatka, Florida called to report a fixed Cesium-137 source installed on a tank has the shutter stuck open. The device is 936 mCi (Cesium-137), Kay-Ray Sensall Model 7063P. It is located in the overhead in an isolated area. They were in the process of conducting an inspection and leak test of the device when it was discovered. The last time the shutter was cycled was last year. The RSO reports there is no over exposure of personnel, no leaks. The location of device prohibits access to personnel so there is no chance of accidental exposure. The area has been posted and a work order has been submitted to replace/repair the device. Florida Incident Number: FL15-035
ENS 5099620 April 2015 16:43:00

The following was received from the State of Louisiana via email: A radiography inspection was being performed on a Central Testing crew at the Tri-7 facility in Sulphur, LA. At a point during the inspection, the inspector requested that the crew demonstrate a misconnect/disconnect test on the camera and drive cables in use. The crew stated that the equipment had passed the test before the equipment was put into service for the day. However, during the demonstration, the 'control assembly' on the crankout set functioned in a test failure mode. The control assembly easily slipped into position without the drive cable being attached to the source assembly, 'pigtail.' With this failure, the RSO was contacted and an additional set of crankouts were brought to the jobsite. The crankout was evaluated and it was determined that the control assembly is what failed during the test. The control assembly was replaced on the crankout and it corrected the misconnect/disconnect test failure. This test is to be performed on the equipment daily with use. This is a requirement of LA Radioactive Material License LA-2393-L01A, Condition # 16.

The exposure device was a SPEC Model 150 camera, S/N 1057, loaded with a 63 Ci Ir-192 source, SPEC Model G-60. The associated equipment was manufactured by SPEC, crankout and control assembly, with unknown model and s/ns. When the equipment was replaced, the radiography crew was allowed to resume their work. LA Event Report ID: LA 15-0004

ENS 5087510 March 2015 12:28:00The air monitoring vacuum pumps were disabled for approximately 20 minutes. Due to an unplanned power outage, the soft water supply to the air monitoring vacuum pump seals on the 2nd floor of the Feed Materials Building (FMB) was lost. These pumps provide vacuum for the stack monitoring and personnel area monitoring systems in the FMB. The secondary and tertiary water supplies to the pumps were not available when needed. This caused the vacuum pumps to be shut down until a temporary water supply could be established. A temporary water supply was reestablished to the pump seals. The pumps were restored to service at approximately 1520 CDT on 03/09/2015. The licensee has contacted NRC Region II inspector David Hartland regarding this event.
ENS 508572 March 2015 18:31:00On March 2, 2015, Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) had a non-licensed supervisory contractor employee confirmed positive result for alcohol during a fitness-for-duty test. The contractor employee's unescorted access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5085227 February 2015 16:10:00At 1518 EST on Feb 27, 2015, the Perry Shift Manager received notice from the Radiation Protection group that an Exclusive Use closed transport vehicle arrived on site exceeding the 10 CFR 71.47 radiation levels on contact with a box on the vehicle. The truck that arrived had two boxes containing four rebuilt control rod drive mechanisms to be used during the Perry refueling outage. One of the boxes had a contact dose reading of 1290 MR/HR. This is above the 1000 MR/HR limit as noted in 10 CFR 71.47. No other limits were exceeded on the exterior of the vehicle. Specifically, the cab of the truck was reading 0.1 MR/HR which is less than the 2 MR/HR limit. Also at 2 meters around the truck, the highest level reading was 1.2 MR/HR which is below the 10 MR/HR (limit). Also on direct contact with the outside of the vehicle, the highest reading was 30 MR/HR, which is below the 200 MR/HR limit. The Site Radiation Protection Shipping Coordinator contacted the shipping organization of this finding at Perry. This was the Director of Operations of Energy Solutions in Memphis, Tennessee. The box was taken into the Perry Fuel Handling Building and is posted per the Perry Radiation Control Program. The vehicle is parked outside the Fuel Handling Building and is being controlled. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5087710 March 2015 16:50:00

The following was received from the State of Arizona via email: On February 27, 2015, the licensee received notification from Landauer that one of their nuclear medicine technologists received a dynamic whole body dose of 11 Rem for the wear period of September 1, 2014 to October 31, 2014. The technologist only works at the hospital 1 day a week. The Agency (State of Arizona) continues to investigate the event. Arizona First Notice: 15-006

  • * * UPDATE ON 7/13/15 AT 1650 EDT FROM BRIAN GORETZKI TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

The following update was received from the State of Arizona via email: The Agency (Arizona Radiation Regulatory Agency) has made a determination that the 11 Rem exposure to the individual at Phoenix Baptist Hospital is valid and has assigned the technologist 10 Rem in year 2014 and 1.01 Rem in year 2015. Notified R4DO (Gaddy), INES National Officer (Milligan) and NMSS Events (via email).

ENS 5085126 February 2015 16:39:00On February 26, 2015, at 1511 EST, with Unit 1 operating at 95% power in an end of cycle coastdown, the 'B' Main Feedwater Reg Valve failed closed which resulted in a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip due to 'B' Steam Generator low/low level. The operations crew entered the reactor trip procedure and stabilized Unit 1 in Mode 3 at normal operating pressure and temperature. All control rods fully inserted into the core following the reactor trip. This reactor protection system actuation is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps actuated as designed as a result of the reactor trip and provided makeup flow to the steam generators. The automatic start of the Auxiliary Feedwater system is reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the valid actuation of an ESF system. The Auxiliary Feedwater pumps were subsequently secured and returned to automatic. Decay heat is being removed by the condenser steam dump system. Unit 1 is in a normal shutdown electrical lineup. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified and are in the Control Room. The Louisa County Administrator will be notified.
ENS 5090219 March 2015 10:39:00A Mo-Tc Generator was sent to Baptist Hospital in Miami, Florida. The generator was used for approximately 2 weeks before being shipped back on 1/18/14. It was picked up by the common carrier on 1/19/14. The Mo-Tc generator did not make it back to the Mallinckrodt facility. A search was initiated at the Mallinckrodt facility and Baptist Hospital. When the Mo-Tc generator could not be located, it was declared missing on 2/26/15. The generator is approximately 65 lbs. total and contains 8.1 mCi of depleted uranium-238. The shield was stamped with the number 2116. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5100322 April 2015 14:18:00On February 24, 2015, at approximately 1702 CDT, while the plant was in cold shutdown, power was lost on the Division 1 reactor protection system (RPS) bus. This event resulted in the automatic closure of the Division 1 primary containment isolation valves in the residual heat removal (RHR) and reactor water cleanup systems. Additionally, the primary containment atmospheric monitoring system automatically actuated, and ventilation systems in the fuel building, auxiliary building, and control building shifted to emergency mode. The closure of the isolation valves in the residual heat removal system caused an automatic trip of the 'A' RHR pump, which had been in the shutdown cooling alignment. The equipment response to the isolation signal was as expected. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) as an invalid actuation of the Division 1 primary containment isolation system. The isolation was promptly diagnosed as having resulted from a trip of the output breaker of the RPS motor generator (MG) set 'A,' and not from a valid signal. Operators implemented the appropriate response procedures to align power to the bus via the alternate source, and began restoring the affected systems. The 'A' RHR pump was re-started within twelve minutes, during which time coolant temperature increased approximately seven degrees to a maximum of approximately 100F. Other affected systems were restored over the next few hours. The causal analysis concluded that the MG set output breaker tripped due to an overly conservative setpoint on the overvoltage trip relay. The low trip setpoint was a latent condition that had existed since the output voltage was raised in 1988 at the recommendation of the vendor, but at which time the trip setpoint was not changed. To correct this condition, the MG overvoltage trip setpoint was raised to restore adequate operating margin to the normal MG output voltage. At the time of the event, the plant was in MODE 5 with the reactor cavity flooded to greater than 23 feet above the vessel flange. The shutdown cooling system was promptly restored to service. This event was of minimal safety significance to the health and safety of employees and the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 507999 February 2015 17:17:00(The licensee) has discovered a possible assembly error that may result in compromising the capability to isolate the solenoid housing internals from a LOCA environment on some of our solenoid valve models that use grafoil packing for sealing the NEMA 4 enclosure. We are in the process of identifying the valve models affected and will notify all customers affected. Description of Defect/Non-Compliance: As noted on MRR997W the packing ring which seals the solenoid on valve model V526-5631-36 used in Qualification and Production were not matched to the procedure invoked on valve drawing.
ENS 507822 February 2015 16:54:00At 2/2/15, at approximately 0919 EST, a non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. Due to the confirmed positive test, the employee's access to the plant has been revoked. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5078131 January 2015 18:00:00At 1431 EST on 1/31/15, Oconee Unit 3 was manually tripped due to oscillations in the feedwater system in anticipation of an automatic trip. At 1427 EST, Unit 3 began experiencing small feedwater oscillations. Specifically, 3FDW-32, the 3A main feedwater control valve, appeared to be oscillating with corresponding feedwater flow oscillation. Feedwater oscillations continued to grow in magnitude and at 1431 EST a manual trip was directed by the Unit 3 control room supervisor. The shutdown was orderly and the unit is currently stable and in Mode 3 (Hot Standby). Units 1 and 2 were unaffected by the trip and are currently 100% power (Mode 1). Due to the RPS actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a 4-hour non-emergency per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Following the reactor trip, a main steam relief valve (MSRV) failed to reseat as expected. Emergency Operating procedure guidance was utilized to reduce main steam system pressure by approximately 80 psig to reseat the valve (valve reseated at 1506 EST). All of the main steam relief valves are now seated. In addition, the 3B condensate booster pump experienced a mechanical seal leak (approximately 4-5 gpm). The pump was subsequently secured at 1447 EST. All other post trip conditions were normal and all other systems performed as expected. Unit 3 is currently in Mode 3 and stable. All rods fully inserted. Main Feedwater is feeding the steam generators and decay heat is being removed to the Main Condenser. The cause of the trip is under investigation. There is no known primary to secondary leakage. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5077930 January 2015 15:42:00The following was received from the State of California via email: On January 30, 2015, a telephone report was made to the (California Department of Public Health) CDPH Director's office that a gauge had been stolen. The person making the report was difficult to understand, but the Director's office was able to ascertain the contact telephone number. Upon receiving notice of the call, a representative from (Radiologic Health Branch) (RHB) immediately called that telephone number (at approximately 1100 PST on January 30, 2015), and spoke with the RSO of Giles Engineering Associates, RML #4592-30. (The RSO) stated that a moisture/density gauge (CPN, MC-1DRP, serial #MD20506575 containing 0.370 GBq of Cs-137 and 1.85 GBq of Am-241) had been stolen from a transport vehicle in front of a Comfort Inn at 1185 Admiral Callahan Lane, Vallejo, CA. The authorized gauge user had left the radioactive gauge chained and locked in the back of his vehicle at approximately 0600 PST and went back inside the Comfort Inn to complete some paper work. When he returned to his vehicle at approximately 0625 PST to go to the worksite, (the authorized gauge user) noticed that the chains had been cut through and that the radioactive gauge had been removed from his vehicle. (The authorized gauge user) contacted the RSO of Giles Engineering Associates, who stated he had attempted to notify Local Law Enforcement officials in Vallejo to report the theft. (The RSO) was directed to fill out a report online as that was the policy of the Vallejo Police Department in regards to all theft cases not involving immediate threats to persons. When (the RSO) receives (the authorized user's) written report and the police report, he will forward them to RHB Brea. (The RSO) will utilize local papers in the Vallejo area to attempt to retrieve the stolen gauge. Additionally he will notify local vendors who service radioactive gauges to be alert for the serial number of the stolen gauge in case it turns up at any of their facilities. CA 5010 #: 013015 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 507299 January 2015 14:18:00A patient who was to be given a myocardial stress profusion exam was incorrectly given a 160 mCi dose of technetium pertechnetate (instead of prescribed Tc-99m sestamibi). The cause of the incident was the medical technologist deviated from established procedures. There is no expected adverse impact on the patient as a result. The patient and physician have been informed. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5069720 December 2014 13:39:00

At 1212 EST on December 12, 2014, D.C. Cook notified the State of Michigan and local authorities of an oil leak from the Unit 2 Main Turbine Lube Oil Cooler to Lake Michigan. Approximately 2000 gallons have leaked into Lake Michigan since October 25, 2014. No visible oil or oil sheen is present on Lake Michigan or the shore line. The leak is currently isolated as of 1030 EST on December 20, 2014. Leak repairs will be made to the cooler prior to placing back in service. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to notification of offsite agencies. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA.

  • * * UPDATE FROM PERRY GRAHAM TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1432 EST ON 12/22/14 * * *

The licensee issued a press release about this event this afternoon. Notified R3DO (Dickson).

ENS 5069619 December 2014 14:57:00A contract supervisory employee had a confirmed positive test for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5069318 December 2014 12:45:00A patient received 150 mCi instead of the 30 mCi of I-131 that was prescribed for thyroid ablation treatment. The cause of the overdose was the patient was misidentified. The patient and prescribing physician has been informed. No adverse health effects are expected. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5069017 December 2014 15:07:00This report is made due to notification from PPL Susquehanna to Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) regarding a sewerage leak at the plant property. The notification was made at 1335 EST hours on 12/17/14. During a routine inspection by a contractor who performs checks for PPL Susquehanna, an area was identified as a potential leak location. When the sewerage grinder pump was run, there was visible evidence in the soil that a leak existed. Extent and duration of the leak is not know at this time. This event requires notification to Pennsylvania DEP. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5066811 December 2014 07:45:00

Turkey Point will be conducting routine preventative maintenance on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC. The expected start of the preventative maintenance is 12/11/14, 0800 EST. Planned completion is 12/11/14, 1800 EST. This maintenance renders the TSC non-functional. The planned TSC alternative will be the Control Room. This event is reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JIM RUSSELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1625 EST ON 12/11/14 * * *

The TSC was declared operable at 1445 EST. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Desai).

ENS 505986 November 2014 13:41:00A licensed operator has been found in violation of the Northern States Power Minnesota Fitness for Duty Policy. The individual's access to the plant has been suspended and the operator has been removed from duty. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5054116 October 2014 12:12:00The following was received from the State of Texas via email: On October 15, 2014, the Agency (State of Texas) received a call from the licensee reporting that a Thermo Niton device model number XLP-818 containing 30 millicuries of americium-241 had been stolen. The device and a portable x-ray device were discovered missing from a locked cabinet on October 13, 2014. After initiating an investigation and searching for the devices, the licensee is confident that both devices were locked up in a cabinet on Friday, October 10, 2014 and went missing the following Monday morning. The licensee stated they did not believe any individual would receive any exposure due to this event. The licensee investigation is in progress. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA 300. Texas Incident #: I-9244 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5048824 September 2014 12:34:00The following was received from the State of Texas via email: On September 23, 2014, the Agency (State of Texas) was notified by the licensee of the loss of a Troxler Model 3411 moisture density gauge, serial #6329, containing a 1.48 GBq (40 mCi) Am-Be source, serial #47-2502, and a 0.3 GBq (8 mCi) Cs-137 source (serial #40-3459). The licensee stated a technician was traveling when his tailgate fell open and the container holding the locked gauge fell off the truck. The gauge was improperly secured in the back of the truck. He turned around to go back to the intersection but the gauge was missing. On September 24, 2014, a company called the licensee informing them that they found the gauge in the road. The gauge was returned to the licensee. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: I-9238
ENS 5045513 September 2014 09:53:00A fire penetration on the Unit 1 reactor building 158 foot elevation was discovered to be degraded such that the associated wall would not meet Appendix R requirements as a 3-hour barrier. In the event of a postulated fire in either of the affected fire areas, separated by the affected penetration, both Unit 1 safe shutdown paths could be compromised. Given this information, the determination was made that this condition meets the reporting criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory measures were established in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA). The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to automatic fire detection in these fire areas ensure that the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded condition can be corrected. Condition Report: 865615 The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 504244 September 2014 09:50:00

At 0843 CDT on September 4th, 2014, 1R-50 High Range Shield Building Vent Gas Monitor was removed from service for planned maintenance. This monitor provides indication of release of gaseous radioactivity to the environment. There is not a compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels when out of service: General Emergency Event RG1.1 and Site Area Emergency Event RS1.1. This results in a loss of emergency assessment Capability while 1R-50 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Unit 1 Shield Building ventilation stack is also monitored by radiation monitor 1R-22 that is used for the same purpose in Alert or Unusual Event Emergency classifications. 1R-22 is being monitored and is indicating normal values. There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Shield Building as evidenced by normal readings on 1R-50 prior to its removal from service. The maintenance is scheduled for ten hours or will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ENS 5040727 August 2014 12:24:00This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to a loss of communications capability. On August 27, 2014 at 0805 hours CDT the internal phone system, Emergency Notification System (ENS), and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) became nonfunctional because of a power supply failure. The ERDS has been restored to service and work is currently in progress to restore the internal phone system and ENS. It has not been determined at the time of this notification as to when the internal phones system and ENS will be restored to a fully functional status. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5041027 August 2014 13:35:00

At 0645 CDT on August 27, 2014, Exelon was notified that during the daily test at 0530 CDT of the offsite sirens, the vendor received an alarm on Clinton Power Station siren communications. This Emergency Preparedness (EP) siren communications issue results in 26 of the 40 EP sirens not being verified as functional, which affects 84.4% of the EPZ population. The loss of communications represents more than 25% of the EPZ population for greater than 1 hour and is therefore reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The cause of issue has been isolated to a microwave link at Clinton Power Station that communicates via radio frequency to each siren. The siren vendor is currently investigating to repair the issue. The DeWitt County Emergency Manager has been notified. DeWitt County has implemented the Emergency Message System through 'Code Red' notification in lieu of siren communications. The NRC Senior Resident has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE FROM RICH CHAMPLEY TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1755 EDT ON 8/27/14 * * *

The DeWitt County Emergency Manager has been notified. DeWitt County has implemented the backup means of notification called 'Route Alerting' in lieu of siren communications. Route Alerting consists of vehicles and public address systems. At 1400 CDT only 2 sirens remain not fully functional. These 2 sirens represent 0.7% of EPZ population. Work continues to restore these 2 sirens. The NRC Senior Resident has been informed. Notified R3DO (Stone).

ENS 5040126 August 2014 16:25:00The following was received from the State of Colorado via email: At 0948 MDT on the morning of August 26, 2014, (the State of Colorado) was notified by the ARSO at Terracon, Inc (Colorado License # 664-02) that a Troxler 3430 moisture/density gauge had been run over by a skid-steer at a temporary job site. The source was locked in the shielded position when the gauge was hit. Surveys taken at the site confirmed that the source remained shielded. The gauge was placed in its transport case (Transport index confirmed) and taken to Instrotek for leak testing and analysis. Final results should be available within a week and initial results show no evidence of leakage. The investigation is still ongoing.
ENS 5040026 August 2014 11:54:00Millstone removed their unit 2 high range site radiation monitor, RM-8168, from service for pre-planned maintenance. RM-8168 was restored to service at 1012 EDT on 8/26/14. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the State of Connecticut, and the town of Waterford.
ENS 5040927 August 2014 13:44:00The following was received from the State of Arizona via email: At approximately 9:00 AM (MDT) on August 26, 2014, the Agency (State of Arizona) was informed that the licensee had a company truck involved in a rollover accident. The truck was transporting an Iridium-192 gamma camera used for industrial radiography. The camera was not damaged in the accident and was transported by the licensee back to their Phoenix office. The gamma camera was leak tested. The accident occurred at approximately 3:30 PM on August 25, 2014. The Delta 880, Serial Number D9783, radiographic camera contains approximately 100 Ci of Ir-192. The Agency continues to investigate the event. The Governor's Office and U.S. NRC are being notified of this event. Arizona First Notice: 14-020
ENS 5040827 August 2014 12:23:00The following from the State of Arizona via email: At approximately 9:00 AM (MDT) on August 26, 2014, the Agency (State of Arizona) was informed that the licensee had a Troxler Model 3430 portable moisture/density gauge damaged at a construction site. The damage occurred at approximately 9:00 AM on August 25, 2014. The gauge was in use and was run over by construction equipment. The sealed sources were not damaged and were intact. The damaged gauge was leaked tested and will be returned to Troxler for repairs. The gauge, serial number 29852, contains 10 mCi of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi of Am:Be-241. The Agency continues to investigate the event. The Governor's Office and U.S. NRC are being notified of this event. Arizona First Notice: 14-019
ENS 5039925 August 2014 17:21:00The following was received from the State of Texas via email: On August 25, 2014, the Agency (State of Texas) received notice that a dosimetry badge for a radiographer trainee had come back with an exposure of 8.6 roentgen for the period of July 5 to August 4, 2014. The individual has stated that he dropped his badge during work and picked it up later. The trainer working with the trainee received 210mR for the same period. The trainee worked 10 days with the company in all. Currently awaiting written statements from trainee and trainer and further reports from dosimetry provider. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident #: I-9225
ENS 5040226 August 2014 17:59:00The following was received from the State of California via email: On August 21, 2014, . . . Henkle Aerospace contacted . . . RHB to report that one of their generally licensed fixed gauges (NDC, Model 103, S/N 4331 containing Am-241) had been found at a recycling facility. The recycling facility had contacted the manufacturer of the gauge (NDC) and it was returned to NDC. NDC contacted Henkel to notify them of the gauge was found at the recycling center. The source was intact and NDC has performed a leak test which indicated no contamination. On 08/26/14, . . . Henkel called RHB and provided the following information: The gauge contained 150 mCi of Am-241 (as of late 90s) and it was acquired by Henkle in 2006. This gauge was replaced by a licensed vendor in February 2010, and was set aside to be transferred to the vendor. Eventually, they lost track of the gauge, and it ended up at the recycling center with the rest of the metal Henkel had shipped to the scrap yard. Corrective actions by Henkle: After this incident they have revised their policies and procedures to keep track of the two gauges they currently possess (Sr-90 containing 250 mCi each, GL units licensed by Mahlo). Note: As of now, RHB does not have the information on current activity of the Am-241 source in the gauge. California 5010 #: 082114
ENS 5038621 August 2014 04:03:00

At 0210 EDT on August 21, 2014, D.C. Cook made notifications to the State of Michigan, local authorities and the National Response Center due to a suspected release of approximately 8,700 gallons of diesel fuel oil to the environment. The level in the buried fuel oil storage tank for the Train B Emergency Diesel Generator was found to be approximately 8,700 gallons less than measurements taken within the last 24 hours. The tank is located within the plant protected area. At this time the suspected fuel oil plume has not left the site. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) and NUREG 1022 section 3.2.12, due to notification of offsite agencies.

  • * * UPDATE FROM JAMES SHAW TO VINCE KLCO ON 8/22/14 AT 1342 EDT * * *

An event investigation determined that no spill occurred. The discrepancy in level was due to maintenance activities that caused an error in level indication. No actual loss of inventory from the fuel oil storage tank occurred. Offsite agencies have been notified that this spill event is being retracted (to the State and Offsite agencies). The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. Notified the R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 5038119 August 2014 14:29:00

At 1925 EDT on 08/18/2014 an equipment failure prevented a boundary door to the Shield Building Negative Pressure Area to latch closed upon egress, thereby preventing fulfillment of the Station Emergency Ventilation System safety function. Necessary door repairs per normal station practices were completed at 1935 EDT to establish full safety system function. This event was previously considered not reportable. Subsequent review determined the event reportable. The NRC Resident has been notified of the event. The failure to meet the 8-hour reporting requirement has been entered into the Corrective Action Program. The licensee will notify the State, Ottawa, and Lucas counties

  • * * UPDATE FROM THOMAS COBBLEDICK TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1027 EDT ON 8/20/14 * * *

At approximately 0413 (EDT) on 8/20/14, the boundary door to the Shield Building Negative Pressure Area again failed to latch closed upon egress. The door was able to be closed and latched at 0419, restoring the Station Emergency Ventilation System safety function. Door use will be limited to essential activities until final repairs to the door closure and latching mechanism are complete. The NRC Resident has been notified of the event. The licensee will notify the State of Ohio and local authorities. Notified R3DO (Passehl).

ENS 5037415 August 2014 17:04:00The following was received from the State of Oklahoma via email: Phillips 66 Co. (OK-07402-12) has reported the failure of the shutter mechanism on one of their fixed gauges. Earlier today the shutter was closed while the licensee collected a leak test sample. The RSO noted that the shutter was difficult to operate. When they returned the shutter handle to the 'open' position, the control room which monitors the gauge readings reported that the readout briefly returned to its normal level, then dropped back to zero when the shutter was supposed to be fully open. Repeated attempts showed that the gauge only operated when the shutter was approximately 75% of the fully 'open' position. The licensee has contacted the gauge manufacturer but they won't be able to supply a replacement for approximately 6 weeks. The licensee has requested permission to leave the gauge in service until a replacement is available. The gauge is installed on a stand pipe 18 feet above ground level in an oil refinery in Ponca City, OK. It is only accessible by catwalk which the RSO is going to cordon off. Material in the gauge is Cs-137, 25 mCi when new in 1993. We(State of OK) have told the RSO they may leave the gauge in operation pending the results of the leak test. If these show the source to be leaking they must immediately remove the gauge from service.
ENS 5036714 August 2014 14:16:00The following was received from the State of Massachusetts via email: Thermo Scientific received a total of 15 sealed sources, Model XFB-3, manufactured by Eckert & Ziegler Isotope Products, containing Cd-109, each with an activity of 40 mCi. As part of Thermo's inspection protocol, individual sealed sources were leak tested, and one source, serial number TR3042 tested greater than the leak test limit of 0.005 microcuries. Following the initial leak test, two additional leak test measurements were made and all three measurements were found to be in excess of the 0.005 microcurie limit, with measurements ranging from 0.0126 to 0.0184 microcuries. Eckert and Ziegler was notified immediately by Thermo Scientific, a return authorization was provided, and Thermo returned the sealed source via (common carrier) to Eckert and Ziegler on 08/11/14. The licensee reports that the area where the leaks tests were obtained was surveyed thoroughly and no contamination was found. The Agency (State of Massachusetts) considers this event open. MA Docket #: 20-1427
ENS 5099820 April 2015 21:26:00
  • * * UPDATE FROM STEVE BRUNSON TO CHARLES TEAL ON 4/20/15 AT 2126 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H594D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - Near penetration 1Z43J837D, and approximately 12" south and above 1Z43H837D, gaps were observed in the mortar joint between CMU on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A triangular gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H592D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - A gap 4" tall and 3" wide was found behind Turn Box TB1-1272 which covers penetrations 1Z43H590D, 1Z43H589D, 1Z43H588, and 1Z43H587D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 1020) - At the architectural joint between the vertical wall to the horizontal floor/ceiling assembly above door 1C-22, above and to the south of 1Z43H1105D, a gap was observed approximately 1/4" tall, 3" wide, and 6" deep on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway Foyer (separating Fire Area 1105 and Fire Area 0014K) - Gap between the grout and the conduit of penetration 1Z43H778D approximately 1/4" tall x 1.5" wide x 6" deep on the east wall of the Unit 1 130' Elevation Control Building Working Floor Hallway (separating Fire Area 0014K and Fire Area 1105) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensure the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058276; CR 10058278 The following deficiencies were also observed causing the affected penetrations to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H532D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire Area 0014M) - A gap 1/8" wide, 1" tall and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H780D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M) - A gap 1/2" wide, 1" tall, and 6" deep was located at penetration 1Z43H781D on the west wall of the U1 East Cableway (separating Fire Area 1104 and Fire 0014M). A 1/4" x 1/2" defect was also identified at penetration 1Z43H781D on the east wall of the Men's Restroom in the Control Building (separating Fire Area 0014M and Fire Area 1104) The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until degraded conditions are repaired. CR 10058277 The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM SCOTT BRITT TO DONG PARK ON 4/23/15 AT 1654 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: - A gap 1/4" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was found at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). No seal material was seen between the sleeve and the cinderblock on the north side of penetration. - A void 1" tall, 1" wide, and 7" deep was found in the south upper corner under a concrete beam at column line T12 above penetration 1Z43H941D on the east wall of the U1 RPS MG Set Room (separating Fire Area 1013 and Fire Area 0040). - At penetration 1Z43H1139D, it appears that combustible neoprene insulation is used around the pipe within the plane of the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). Combustible materials would not be part of a rated pen seal. - A gap 1" wide, 1" tall and 7" deep was observed at penetration 1Z43H1138D on the west wall of the Vertical Cable Chase Room (separating Fire Area 0040 and Fire Area 1013). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire penetrations and fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10060228 The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM STANLEY STONE TO DONG PARK ON 4/27/15 AT 2047 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional: -An opening in the grout 1/4" wide, 1/2" tall and over 7" deep was found between the wall and the outside sleeve for penetration 2Z43H028D on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). -A 1/4" diameter hole in the grout approximately 2.5" deep was found above conduit 2MI2128 on the west wall of the U2 Transformer Room (separating Fire Area 2019 and Fire Area 2016). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10061830 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Blamey).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DONG PARK ON 4/28/15 AT 1640 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the following areas were observed that caused the affected barriers in the Unit 2 Control Building 130' elevation to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway - Fire Area 2014, from the U2 West 600 V Switchgear Room - Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the south wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 2" long and probed to be at least 2 1/2" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. 2. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall in Fire Area 2016. The following conditions were located on the opposite side of the same wall. This is the north wall of the U2 West 600V Switchgear Room (Fire Area 2016): 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H668D. 4. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/8" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 3" deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H667D. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 2 1/2" wide, 2 1/2" long and probed to be at least 4" deep was identified around the 2" continuous run conduit located above cable tray penetration 2Z43H031D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (first of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 1/2" long and probed to be at least 6" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (second of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. 8. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4" wide, 3/4" long and probed to be at least 5" deep was identified above a 3/4" continuous run conduit (third of three) located at the ceiling near column line TE. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetration and fire barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10062254 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 4/29/15 AT 1804 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Unit 2 Control Building 130 foot elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018) and the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). The following conditions were located on the west wall of the Unit 2 Switchgear Access Hallway (Fire Area 2014). 1. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 2. There is insufficient masonry material to fill the full depth of the wall above the ductwork that passes through penetration 2Z43H032D. This deficiency affects a small area on the south side of the ductwork and penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. 3. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be 4 inch deep was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. A similar condition exists for this penetration on the opposite side of the wall (see Item 5 below). The following conditions were located on the east wall of the Unit 2 West DC Switchgear Room 2A (Fire Area 2018). 4. There are openings between the conduits and the wall 1/2 inch wide and 1 inch long for penetrations 2Z43H789D, 2Z43H790D, and 2Z43H791D. These penetrations are affected in Item 2 above. 5. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be greater than 6 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H671D. 6. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H673D. 7. An opening between the conduit and the wall 1/4 inch wide, 1 inch long and probed to be at least 2 1/2 inch deep, was identified for penetration 2Z43H676D. The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10062955 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 2137 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 130' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) and the Health Physics Hallway and Counting Room (Fire Areas 0014B and 0014G). - Penetration 2Z43H783D terminates open within a foot of the east wall of the Health Physics Counting Room (Fire Area 0014G) - Penetration 2Z43H603D contains no visible seal material and is located on the east wall of the Health Physics Hallway (Fire Area 0014B). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected penetrations were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional and represented degraded condition of the wall separating the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104) from the common East Cableway Foyer (Fire Area 1105). - Gap near penetration 2Z43H170D between a conduit and the concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall located on the south wall of the Unit 2 East Cableway (Fire Area 2104).

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas but were modified based on the nature of the degradations noted in the condition report and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10063642 Notified R2DO (Ehrhardt).

  • * * UPDATE FROM JOHN MITCHELL TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1638 EDT ON 5/7/15 * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147' elevation were observed that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represented degraded conditions of the following penetrations through the wall separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Computer Room (Fire Areas 0024B) as well as a discrepancy in the affected wall. 

   - In Fire Area 0024B, a small gap in the foam, approximately 6 (inch) deep was identified in Penetration 1Z43H592F.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, penetration 1Z43H325F was identified with no sealant for the penetration sleeve.  The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025.
   - In Fire Area 0024B, foam sealant was missing in cable-tray, 1Z43H061F. The adjacent Fire Area is FA 0025
   - In Fire Area 0024B, a gap was identified in a concrete masonry unit (CMU) wall joint, directly above 1Z43H062F.

The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected fire barriers were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066678 The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2151 EDT ON 05/07/15 FROM SCOTT BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, a deficiency in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation was observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. This deficiency represented degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room (Fire Area 0025) and the Cable Spreading Room (Fire Areas 0024A). - A 1/4 inch x 2 inch x approximately 4 inch deep gap in the east CMU wall of Unit 1 CO2 Tank Room above penetration 1Z43H046F. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10066844 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE AT 2029 EDT ON 05/08/15 FROM SCOTT A. BRITT TO S. SANDIN * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 147 ft. elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional. These deficiencies represent degraded conditions of the following fire barrier separating the Cable Spreading Room (FA 0024A) and the CO2 Tank Room (FA 0025). - Multiple gaps in the caulk at the top of the ceiling of the west wall of the Cable Spreading Room (separating FA 0024A and FA 0025). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10067163 The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Sandal).

  • * * UPDATE FROM PAUL UNDERWOOD TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/11/15 AT 1711 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, multiple fire penetrations on the Control Building El. 130' elevation were identified that resulted in the affected barriers being considered NON-FUNCTIONAL. An issue was identified with the wall separating the Vertical Cable Chase, Fire Area 0040, from the Unit 2 RPS MG Set Room, Fire Area 2013. - A 1/4" wide x 1/2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of a 2" continuous run conduit, 6" away from 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/4" wide x 3" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H581D was identified. - A 1/2" wide x 2" long x approximately 6" deep gap in the grout of penetration 2Z43H580D was identified. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068138 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO DANIEL MILLS ON 5/12/15 AT 2151 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection activity, a fire barrier on the Control Building El. 164' elevation was identified as being NON-FUNCTIONAL as follows; - A discrepancy was identified with the fire barrier separating the Unit 1 Turbine Building Main Floor Area, Fire Area 0101A from the Main Control Room, Fire Area 0024C. The condition consists of a small gap 1/4" wide, 3" long and probed to be greater than 6" deep between the wall and conduit at penetration 1Z43H605J on the Turbine Building side of the wall. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10068842 The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM GUY GRIFFIS TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/14/15 AT 2121 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, deficiencies in the Control Building 164' elevation were observed that caused the affected barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - A 1/4 inch x 1/2 inch x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/4 inch wide x 8 inch long vertical crack, approximately 6 inch deep was identified in the CMU below penetration 1Z43H602J was identified in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - Three abandoned anchor holes, 1/2 inch in diameter and approximately 4 inch deep, were identified below penetration 1Z43H604J in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1 inch diameter abandoned anchor hole, approximately 6 inch deep, was identified directly above a 1/4 inch pipe penetration in the east wall of the Main Control Room (separating Fire Areas 0024C and 0101A). - A 1/2 inch to 3/4 inch gap exists between the top of each of the 3 concrete block (CMU) walls enclosing the HVAC chase and the underside of the floor/ceiling assembly separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). - A 1/2 inch diameter hole exists in the CMU at the upper right corner of penetration 1Z43H1184J separating the Main Control Room (Fire Area 0024C) and the HVAC Room Chase (Fire Area 0014L). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Units 1 and 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10069898; CR 10069995 The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE FROM R.S. STONE TO VINCE KLCO ON 5/15/15 AT 1807 EDT * * *

During an expanded scope inspection for penetration seals, the following discrepancies were identified with the wall separating the Unit 1 Working Floor, Fire Area 0001, from the Unit 1 AC Inverter Room, Fire Area 1008 that caused the affected barriers to be considered nonfunctional:

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H553C.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x approximately 2 inch deep gap in the grout of the annulus of penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 1/8 inch wide x 1/2 inch tall x approximately 6 inch deep gap in the foam block out, below penetration 1Z43H546C.

A 3 inch x 3 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around a 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduit.

A 1/4 inch x 1 inch x 10 inch deep gap in the grout around 1-1/2 inch continuous run and 1-1/4 inch continuous run conduits.

2 inch deep gaps in the grout around 1-1/2 inch and 2-1/2 inch continuous run conduits.

A 1/4 inch hole x 1 inch deep gap in the grout around penetration 1Z43H060C.

A 1/4 inch x 1/4 inch x 2 inch deep gap around the annulus of a 1-1/4 inch continuous run and 2 inch continuous run conduits. The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR 10070439 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Bonser).

  • * * UPDATE ON 1638 EDT ON 05/21/15 FROM GUY S. GRIFFIS TO JEFF HERRERA * * *

During an expanded scope inspection, the following discrepancies were identified in the Unit 1 Control Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Six 3(inch) x 3(inch) holes in the wall of the Men's Rest Room (separating Fire Areas 0014M and 1104). The nonconforming conditions observed for the affected barrier were identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 1 and Unit 2. Deficiencies were also observed in the Diesel Generator Building 130(foot) elevation that caused the affected fire barrier to be considered nonfunctional: - Through-wall gap around the conduit that passes through penetration 2Y43H511D on the south wall of the U2 Diesel Generator Switchgear Room 2F (separating Fire Areas 2408 and 2409). The nonconforming condition observed for the affected fire barrier was identified as affecting both safe shutdown paths for Unit 2. Compensatory measures were already in place in accordance with the plant's Fire Hazard Analysis (FHA) as a result of previous conditions involving degraded barriers in the same fire areas and will remain in place until the fire barriers are repaired. The presence of the compensatory measures in addition to portable fire protection equipment located in adjacent areas ensures the safe shutdown paths are preserved until the degraded conditions are repaired. The expanded scope inspection activity is continuing, and this and any subsequent similar condition(s) that meets the reporting requirements will be included in an ENS Update Report as required and will be documented in a revised LER at the end of the inspection activity. CR10073041; CR10073187 The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R2DO (Ernestes).

ENS 5028115 July 2014 13:20:00The Unit 2 stack high range radiation monitor (RM 8169) was removed from service at 0940 EDT for planned maintenance. The monitor was returned to service at 1119 EDT after the completion of maintenance. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Connecticut Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, and the city of Waterford for this event.
ENS 5027914 July 2014 13:51:00The following was excerpted from a report received via fax from Westinghouse: This issue concerns the potential failure of certain Westinghouse reactor coolant pump (RCP) turning vane bolts that employs turning vane bolts that are 1.0 inch nominal size, made from A286 material. These bolts hold the turning vane diffuser assembly in place inside the RCP, above the pump impeller. Bolt failures have occurred at on plant such that the running vane-diffuser assembly dropped inside three of the four RCPs and in two of these RCPs the assembly contacted the impeller. These bolts are part of the model 93A RCPs delivered to Salem Unit 2 and Surry Units 1 and 2. Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission: James A. Gresham Westinghouse Electric Company Engineering, Equipment and Major Projects 1000 Westinghouse Drive, Suite 310 Cranberry Township, Pennsylvania 16066
ENS 5028014 July 2014 15:47:00The following was received from the Commonwealth of Kentucky via email: KY RHB (Kentucky Radiation Health Branch) was notified by telephone on 7/11/14 by Todd Ramkey, Corporate RSO at Schnabel Engineering Inc. in Glenn Allen, VA, of the fact that a CPN model MC-1 portable moisture/density gauge had been run over and crushed at a coal slurry impoundment belonging to Long Fork Coal Company in Hatfield, KY. The CPN gauge contained 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 50 mCi of Am-241/Be. Initial surveys performed by the licensee with a RadAlert GM survey instrument indicated the sources were not breached and that there was no contamination on the ground where the incident occurred or on the bulldozer involved. The shattered pieces of the device, including the two sources, were packaged on-site by the licensee into a 55 gallon drum in accordance with guidance provided by the radiation safety staff at Instro-Tek in Raleigh, NC, labeled appropriately and shipped back to the offices of Geo/Environmental Associates, Inc. in Knoxville, TN in a company owned vehicle. The shipment was met by a representative of the TN Division of Radiological Health where follow-on surveys and contamination smears were taken. They also instructed the licensee to send leak test wipes to Instro-Tek for expedited analysis and instructed the licensee to send personal monitoring for those involved in for analysis. A telephone call to RHB from the CRSO at Schnabel on 7/14/14 at approximately 1500 said indicated leak test results from Instro-Tek were less than the 185 Bq limit and that no breach of the sources had occurred. RHB gave the CRSO permission to release the control of the site and the equipment at Long Fork Coal based on these negative leak test results. The CRSO at Schnabel indicated that hardcopies of the leak test results would be provided to both RHB and TN Div. Rad Health as well as the results of personal monitoring for those involved in the incident including transportation of the gauge back to Knoxville. Reporting criteria defined in 902 KAR 100:040, Section 15(2)(b) (10 CFR 30.50(b)(2)).
ENS 5036914 August 2014 17:17:00A patient undergoing High Dose Rate Brachytherapy using Ir-192 was prescribed 700 cGy per fraction and only received 700 cGy to 60% of the planned volume. The patient was scheduled for two treatments. The first treatment was successfully administered to the patient on 6/26/14. When the patient returned for the second treatment on 7/10/14 the HDR afterloader was loaded with the treatment plan for the original treatment instead of the second treatment. This resulted in the patient not receiving the full prescribed treatment. The licensee discovered the problem during an audit when the number of catheters did not match. There are no adverse health effects expected as a result of this treatment. The licensee has contacted the vender to determine a way to remove old treatment plans from the machine to ensure this does not happen in the future. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 502648 July 2014 14:26:00At 1148 EDT, Fermi-2 Environmental Engineering identified that approximately 2500 gallons of Diesel Fuel Oil was noted to be in a secondary containment collection basin. The Control Room Staff was subsequently notified. Michigan Pollution Control (MPC) has been contacted for cleanup. DTE Energy notified Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) of the condition. Fermi-2 is making this 4-hour report to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) and NUREG-1022 (rev 3) Section 3.2.12. Investigation regarding the cause is currently in progress. No fuel oil was released to the ground or navigable waters. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
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