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ENS 5599515 July 2022 15:21:00The following report was received by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: The Agency was contacted 7/15/22 by GE Healthcare (RML, IL-01109-01) to advise that a radiopharmaceutical package containing two vials of Iodine-123 had not arrived at an Atlanta, Georgia radiopharmacy as scheduled. The package contained two vials of Iodine-123, each with an activity of 32 millicuries at the time of shipment (shipment date 7/13/22). The last confirmed scan was 7/13/22 at 2022 (EDT) at the Atlanta Airport. The package now contains approximately 3.3 millicuries. The licensee is in continuous communication with the carrier, who is still actively searching for the package. This matter has a 30-day reporting requirement to the USNRC and was phoned into the NRC HOO. There is no indication of intentional theft or diversion and the contents would not be useful for illicit intent. Updates will be provided as they become available. Illinois Event Number IL220024 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5597330 June 2022 18:07:00The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: At 1445 (CDT) on June 30, 2022, with Grand Gulf Nuclear Station in Mode 1 and at 100 percent power, the reactor was manually scrammed due to the loss of balance of plant (BOP) transformer 23. All control rods fully inserted into the core and all systems responded appropriately. Reactor level is being maintained with condensate and feedwater. Reactor pressure is being maintained with turbine bypass valves. The cause of the loss of BOP transformer 23 is under investigation at this time. Standby Service Water 'A' and 'B' were manually initiated to supply cooling to Control Room A/C, ESF switchgear room coolers, and plant auxiliary loads. This event is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as an event or condition that resulted in actuation of the Reactor Protection System and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) due to the actuation of Standby Service Water. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5591627 May 2022 12:48:00

The following report was received via e-mail from the Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (the Agency): The licensee (QSA Global, Inc., License No. 12-8361) reported at 0851 (EDT) on May 27, 2022 that it discovered on the same day (May 27, 2022) at 0750 (CDT) that a package (Yellow-III, T.I. 2.6, Type A) containing 9 sealed sources (Cs-137; 13.89 Ci total) was reported missing by the shipper. The package was shipped in a 924CO Type A with P496 lead shield pot. The package was shipped on April 15, 2022. The destination for the shipment is Schlumberger Technology Corp (c/o: NSSI), Houston, TX, 77087, TX License: L02991. QSA Global received email update on May 27, 2022 that the (common carrier) couldn't physically locate the package. The last known location according to the (common carrier) is their facility in Memphis, TN. Schlumberger Technology Corp confirmed that they have not received the package on May 27, 2022. The reporting requirement is immediate and is of 105 CMR 120.281(A)(1), missing licensed radioactive materials in aggregate quantity equal to or greater than 1,000 times quantity specified in 105 CMR 120.297, Appendix C. The Agency considers this event to be open.

  • * * UPDATE ON 06/03/2022 AT 1433 EDT FROM BOB LOCKE TO OSSY FONT * * *

The following information was provided by the Agency via email: The licensee reported at 1014 EDT on June 2, 2022, that the package had been found at the Houston, TX (common carrier) facility. It was delivered to its intended destination undamaged at 1500 EDT on June 2, 2022. Notified R1DO (Jackson) and NMSS Events Notification and ILTAB via email. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Category 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example: level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ENS 5591827 May 2022 22:53:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: On 5/25/2022 at 1354 (CDT), during the replacement of two detectors, a halon actuation occurred which resulted in an unintentional release of approximately 384 pounds of halon gas into an enclosed room in the Unit 1 Electrical Auxiliary Building. There was no impact to plant operations or plant personnel. The room was verified by station Safety Personnel to be safe for normal access. On 5/27/2022 at 2038 (CDT), Region 12 (Houston) of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) was notified of an event which met the requirements of "Emission Event" for the TCEQ of a halon release that exceeded the reportable quantity threshold of 100 pounds in a 24 hour period. The halon discharge was contained within the site protected area. Therefore, this event is not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5589916 May 2022 19:51:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: Unit 2 experienced multiple electrical transients resulting in a Group I Primary Containment Isolation Signal (PCIS) isolation and subsequent unit reactor scram. Low reactor water level during the automatic scram caused PCIS Group II and III isolation signals. Following the PCIS Group I isolation, all main steam lines isolated. All control rods inserted and all systems operated as designed. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee via phone in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: Peach Bottom Unit 2 automatically scrammed from 100 percent power due to an electrical transient and subsequent PCIS Group I isolation (Main Steam Isolation Valve closure). Unit 2 lost main feedwater due to the PCIS Group I isolation, however, all other systems responded as expected following the scram. High Pressure Coolant Injection is maintaining pressure control while Condensate Pumps are maintaining inventory. The unit is currently stable and in Mode 3. Peach Bottom Unit 3's Adjustable Speed Drives were impacted by the electrical transients and the unit reduced power to 98 percent power. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5589411 May 2022 22:25:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: During performance of High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Pump and Valve Operability surveillance in accordance with procedure 24.202.01, the turbine tripped without operator action. The plant was operating in Mode 1 at 10 percent power with the HPCI turbine running in a test mode at 5100 gpm with all surveillance criteria met. The surveillance was near completion at the point where the HPCI turbine is manually tripped. Before the manual trip was performed, the HPCI turbine tripped without operator action. Prior to performance of the surveillance, HPCI was provisionally operable with only satisfactory completion of Post Maintenance Testing (PMT) surveillance remaining to declare HPCI operable. HPCI surveillance testing was performed at low reactor pressure (165 psig) in Mode 2 satisfactorily. Investigation into the cause of this trip is in progress. HPCI has been declared inoperable from the time of release of the surveillance. Reactor Coolant Isolation Cooling (RCIC) was verified to be operable prior to and after the surveillance in accordance with Technical Specifications 3.5.1 condition E.1. This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) based on an unplanned HPCI inoperability. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5589311 May 2022 18:12:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a follow-up fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant is on hold in accordance with the licensee's fitness-for-duty policy. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
ENS 5589110 May 2022 23:42:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: At 1359 CDT on May 10, 2022, the 1B LPCI Loop Upstream Injection valve (1-1001-28B) was found to have a motor operated torque switch issue and inadequate lubrication. This issue called into question the ability of the valve to close when required. At 1746 CDT on May 10, 2022, both trains of Unit 1 LPCI were made simultaneously inoperable. TS 3.6.1.3 Condition A required de-activation of 1B LPCI Loop Downstream Injection valve (1-1001-29B) which was completed at 1746 CDT. Because of the de-activation of the 1B LPCI Loop downstream injection valve and LPCI Loop select logic, both trains of LPCI were made inoperable. Due to this inoperability, the system was in a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(V). Unit 1 HPCI and both loops of Core Spray are operable. After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

  • * * UPDATE AT 12:32 EDT ON 05/11/22 FROM MARK HUMPHREY TO BRIAN P. SMITH * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone call and email: The last sentence in the second paragraph, "After further engineering review, it was determined that 1B LPCI Loop Upstream injection valve condition was minor in nature and would not have affected the ability of the valve to close when required," has been deleted. The licensee is continuing to follow up on the issue and believes that sentence to be unclear and premature. Notified R3DO (Skokowski).

ENS 558887 May 2022 04:37:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax: At 2310 EDT on May 6, 2022, with Unit 3 in Mode 3, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater (EFW) System occurred while entering a planned refueling outage. The reason for the EFW auto-start was a loss of all Main Feedwater (MFDW) Pumps which occurred when the 3A MFDW Pump tripped on steam generator (SG) overfill protection due to high level in the 3B SG. The high level in the 3B SG occurred when a Startup Feedwater Control Valve (3FDW-44) malfunctioned, resulting in excessive feedwater flow to the 3B SG. Investigation and repairs are in progress. Units 1 and 2 were not affected. This event is being reported as an 8-hr non-emergency notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as a valid actuation of the EFW system. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 558785 May 2022 04:30:00The following information was provided by the licensee via email: At 1955 on May 4, 2022, a start-up transformer de-energized, resulting in a loss of power to the Unit 2 Train A 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus and the Unit 3 Train B 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus. The Unit 2 Train A Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) and Unit 3 Train B EDG automatically started and energized their respective 4.16 kV Class 1E Buses. As a result of the Loss of Power on the Unit 3 Train B 4.16 kV Class 1E Bus, the B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump automatically started, as expected. The B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was not needed for steam generator level control and no auxiliary feedwater valves repositioned. The B Auxiliary Feedwater Pump did not supply feedwater to the steam generators. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that results in a valid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems and an auxiliary feedwater system.
ENS 558805 May 2022 08:14:00The following was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency) via email: On May 4, 2022, the licensee's radiation safety officer contacted the Agency and reported one of it's Humboldt 5001EZ gauges containing an 8 millicurie cs-137 source and a 40 mCi am-241 source had been struck by a bulldozer at a temporary field site. The gauge was damaged, and the licensee stated their engineer was going to the site to inspect and recover the gauge. The RSO contacted the Agency later that day and stated the source was in the shielded position and readings on contact with the transport case was 5 millirem an hour and 2 millirem an hour at three feet. The licensee transported the gauge back to it's facility. The licensee contacted it's service provider who will dispose of the gauge. No significant exposures were received as a result of this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas Incident Number I-9930
ENS 5586528 April 2022 17:23:00The following report was received via e-mail from the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency): On April 28, 2022, the licensee notified the Agency that the shutter handle on one of its Ohmart Vega model SH-F2 gauges, containing a 200 milliCurie cesium-137 source, had malfunctioned. A service company was preparing the gauge for removal and had opened and closed the shutter. The shutter closed completely (verified by survey), but they could not lock the shutter handle. A repair kit will be ordered and upon receipt the service company will make the repair and complete the removal. The gauge is in an area of the plant that is no longer operational in a location that is inaccessible without scaffolding. The scaffolding being used at the time of this event will be removed until time for repair. There were no exposures as a result of this event. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300." Texas Incident Number: I-9927
ENS 5586327 April 2022 13:26:00The following is a summary of information received from the New Jersey Department Environmental Protection (NJDEP) by e-mail: On 4/27/2022, North State Materials notified NJDEP that an asphalt roller bumped a density gauge (Troxler model 4640-B, serial #77923 with a Cs-137 source up to 9 milliCuries) at a jobsite in Harmony, New Jersey. The incident was caused by heavy equipment operator error. The operator intended to move the roller backwards, but instead moved forward. The damage was limited to the faceplate and the plastic on one corner of the gauge. The licensee surveyed the gauge to confirm the source was properly shielded prior to transporting it to the licensee's storage location in Philipsburg, NJ. A sealed source leak test is pending. NJ Incident Number: NJ-22-0003
ENS 5591727 May 2022 15:54:00The following report was received via e-mail from the New Jersey Radiation Department and Release Prevention Program (the Department): The Radiation Safety Officer of Rutgers University informed the Department that one H-3 (Tritium) exit sign cannot be found and is considered lost. The exit sign was last inventoried in October 2021 and was noticed to be missing in April 2022. After extensive investigation/searching, the licensee considers the sign lost. The Exit sign in question is an Isolite H-3 Exit sign, model 880-126R10BA, S/N H138883, originally containing 7.59 Ci of H-3. Rutgers will forward a written report within 30 days concerning the loss and their investigation. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5585926 April 2022 13:13:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: This 60-day telephone notification is being made in lieu of an LER submittal per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). This notification is made pursuant to the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuations of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). At approximately 0040 Eastern Standard Time (EST) on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent High-Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) initiation signals. Subsequently, at approximately 0148 EST on March 7, 2022, Unit 1 received inadvertent Low-Pressure Coolant Injection (LPCI) and Core Spray initiation signals. In addition, all four Emergency Diesel Generators auto started, Group 10 (Instrument Air) Primary Containment Isolation System actuations occurred, and the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water Booster pumps tripped resulting in a brief interruption (approximately 9 minutes) to the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) heatsink. Jumpers, installed per planned refueling outage activities, prevented discharge of Emergency Core Cooling Systems into the reactor. HPCI, RCIC, and RHR Loop `A' were removed from service and under clearance. RHR SDC remained operable via RHR Loop `B' and forced circulation was maintained in the reactor. At the time of these events, Unit 1 was shutdown for refueling and the `A' and `C' reactor water level transmitters had been isolated in preparation for planned replacement. Leak-by of the instrument isolation valves occurred on both transmitters. Leak-by on the `C' instrument occurred at a faster rate with the `A' instrument providing the confirmatory signals resulting in Low Level 2 (LL2) and Low Level 3 (LL3) indication at approximately 0040 EST and 0148 EST, respectively. All actuations occurred as designed for LL2 and LL3 signals. During these events, reactor water level remained stable at the Reactor Vessel Head Flange and the `B' and `D' reactor water level transmitters remained off-scale-high, as expected under these conditions. Therefore, the actuations were not initiated in response to actual plant conditions, it was not an intentional manual initiation, and there were no parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation of the system (i.e., there was no low reactor water level condition). Considering the above, these actuations were invalid. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel.
ENS 5575022 February 2022 01:44:00

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 2207 (EST) on 2/21/2022 with Unit 2 in Mode 1 at 68 percent power, the reactor was manually tripped due to lowering water level in the 2A Steam Generator. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 3 were not affected. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non- emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

  • * * UPDATE ON 3/23/22 AT 1643 EDT FROM CHRIS MCDUFFIE TO TOM KENDZIA * * *

The following information was provided by the licensee via phone and email: On 2/21/2022, Unit 2 was in Mode 1 increasing reactor power following startup from a forced outage. At 2205 (EST) with Unit 2 at 68 percent power, a feedwater control valve failed to properly control feedwater flow to the 2A Steam Generator and the Integrated Control System initiated an automatic runback. At 2207 (EST), the reactor was manually tripped from 39 percent power due to lowering water level in the 2A Steam Generator. Immediately following the manual reactor trip, an actuation of the Emergency Feedwater System (EFW) occurred. The 2A and 2B Motor Driven Emergency Feedwater (MDEFW) pumps automatically started as designed when the 'low steam generator level' signal was received for the 2A Steam Generator. The trip was not complex with all systems responding normally post-trip. Operators responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat was removed by discharging steam to the main condenser using the turbine bypass valves. Units 1 and 3 were not affected. Unit 2 was restarted on 2/27/2022 following repairs. Due to the Reactor Protection System actuation while critical, this event was reported on 2/22/2022 as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). Following further evaluation, it was determined that a valid EFW actuation occurred, therefore this event is now also being reported as a late 8-hour non-emergency notification of a valid actuation of the EFW system in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A). There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified the R2DO (Miller).

ENS 5570717 January 2022 15:44:00The following report was received from the California Department of Public Health via email: On Monday, January 17, 2022, the licensee's radiation safety officer reported the theft of a CPN MC-1DR (MD30406938) containing sealed sources of Cs-137 (10 mCi) and Am-241:Be (50 mCi), leak tested 4/2021. The theft occurred overnight between Friday and Saturday 1/14/2022 - 1/15/2022 at an authorized gauge user's (AU) residential home. The AU returned home urgently on Friday due to a family member's illness. The AU did chain the gauge case to the door inside the truck cab but failed to lock the truck before entering his home. The AU discovered that the gauge case was missing early Saturday morning while the truck was parked in the driveway of the home. The CPN nuclear gauge handle was locked to prevent operation, the gauge was locked in its transport case, and the transport case was chained to the door inside the truck cab, but the chain was cut and case/gauge was taken, apparently the only item stolen. The gauge and case had a company name and phone number label adhered to it in case of loss or theft. A police report was filed with the Corona police department (22-03047). The licensee will submit a lost/reward ad in the local paper/website and gather additional information for the follow up investigation. California Event Number: 011722 THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 5570514 January 2022 17:13:00The following report was received by the Texas Department of State Health Services (the Agency): On January 14, 2022, the Agency was notified by the licensee that a Troxler model 3430 was damaged at a temporary job site. The gauge contains a 40 millicurie americium - 241 source and an 8 millicurie cesium - 137 source. The gauge was run over by a Bobcat machine, damaging the gauge body and separating the cesium source rod and handle from the base of the device. The cesium source was in the fully shielded position at the time of impact. The cesium source was determined to be intact and still attached to the source rod. The technician contacted the radiation safety officer (RSO). The RSO visually inspected the device, returned the device to its transport container, and confirmed that the radiation profile had not changed from the manufacturer's specifications. The gauge was returned to the licensee's facility. The gauge will be sent to the manufacturer. No individual received a significant exposure due to this event. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300. Texas State Incident Number: I-9910
ENS 556947 January 2022 09:32:00The following information was provided by the licensee via fax or email: At 0120 (CST) on 01/07/2022, a partial loss of the 25KV Power Distribution System caused a loss of both the Primary and Backup Meteorological Towers at the Comanche Peak Nuclear Power Plant. This resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability with regard to meteorological conditions. A backup diesel generator for the primary Meteorological Tower did not start due to a dead battery. After the battery issue was resolved, the diesel generator started but it subsequently tripped due to a loose fuse. The 25 KV Plant Support Power Loop feeds certain non-safety-related equipment and does not affect plant operation. Power was restored to both Meteorological Towers at 0305 (CST) on 01/07/2022 and proper operation was verified. The following additional information was obtained from the licensee in accordance with Headquarters Operations Officers Report Guidance: The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 5561024 November 2021 21:42:00A violation occurred concerning Comanche's Peak's Fitness-For-Duty Program. Two empty mini-bottles of alcohol were discovered in a trash can within the protected area. The event has been documented in the corrective action program. The resident inspector has been notified.
ENS 5560323 November 2021 19:43:00The following was a summary of an e-mail received by the state of California's Radiation Health Branch (RHB): The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at the licensee facility contacted the RHB and Los Angeles County Radiation Management (L.A. County) on November 22, 2021, to report a medical event. The event occurred on November 19, 2021. According to the RSO, a patient, who was part of a clinical trial, was under-dosed during a therapeutic treatment procedure for prostate cancer that involved the injection of actinium 225 (Ac-225) in the peripheral vein. The prescribed dose to the patient was 150 microcuries; however, the dose delivered was only 114 microcuries due to an accidental discharge of the radioisotope on the chux pad before it was administered to the patient. There was no spread of contamination. A site visit will be conducted to gain a better understanding of the details of the event. California Event Number: 112221 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5560724 November 2021 14:23:00The following report was received via email from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: While conducting the routine spot check prior to patient treatment with an Elekta Leksell Gamma Knife ICON unit, serial number 6114, the unit's shutter doors failed to close during the "Emergency Off" button test. The licensee's authorized medical physicist (AMP) followed emergency procedures and entered the room to manually close the doors. The doors closed, but the AMP decided to try again with the same result. The AMP carried a handheld survey meter with them each trip. Their calculated total exposure for their trips based on the exposure rate was 0.575 mR. There was no patient involvement. The unit is secured and Elekta is in the process repairing the unit. The licensee will follow-up with a full report.
ENS 5560524 November 2021 12:21:00The following is a synopsis of information received via facsimile: The hinge pin retainer plug used on an emergency diesel generator (EDG) stainless steel check valve exhibited low breakaway torque and thus minimal resistance to loosening when subjected to engine operating vibrations. The EDG check valve is used specifically for lube oil (LO) applications in the gallery fill line between the LO cooler and main engine pressure pump discharge elbow. Consequently, if the plug were to completely dislodge, followed by the associated hinge pin, the pressure boundary of the LO system would be compromised and oil would discharge through the 3/16 inch opening. The dedication procedure for this check valve is currently undergoing revision to incorporate a rework activity that will eliminate unintended plug loosening from future shipments. The vendor expects this to be completed by December 7, 2021. The potentially affected components were shipped to the following plants: Beaver Valley, Browns Ferry, Dresden, and Surry. Technical questions concerning this notification can be directed to Dan Roberts, Quality Manager and John Kriesel, Engineering Manager at (252) 977-2720.
ENS 5554325 October 2021 16:36:00The following information was received from the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection via email: At 1030 EDT on October 25, 2021, a package containing Zr-89 was received from the common carrier (airway bill number 770242368189) at the licensee's facility in New Jersey. At 1045 EDT, the package was wipe tested by a licensee employee and results indicated a high level of removable contamination. The bottom of the box read 217,410 counts per minute (cpm), while the background read 1,510 cpm. The box was opened and the top of the lead pig which holds the vial of liquid (approximately 200 microliters) radioactive Zr-89, which was 2,139 MBq at time of packaging on October 22, 2021, was found to be detached from the bottom of the lead pig. Pieces of the vial were observed to be outside of the lead pig which indicates the vial was indeed broken. The box was re-sealed and placed into the cyclotron vault at the licensee's facility for safety and containment purposes. At 1100 EDT, the Zr-89 manufacturer and shipper were notified of the situation. The box has been secured and contained within the cyclotron vault, 50 feet away from personnel at the facility.
ENS 5554225 October 2021 15:40:00The following report was received by the Ohio Bureau of Radiation Protection via email: The licensee reported a Varian Varisource 200 HDR unit failed to indicate the source was fully retracted at the conclusion of patient treatment. The licensee initiated emergency procedures and entered the room. Surveys confirmed the source had fully retracted into the unit and the patient did not receive any additional dose beyond what was prescribed. The unit console has been locked and placed out of service until the manufacturer can inspect and repair the device. Ohio Report Number: OH210008 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5553821 October 2021 18:46:00A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5553921 October 2021 19:01:00Plant cafeteria workers discovered that four gallons of cooking wine were included in a delivery to their inventory within the plant protected area. Security took possession of the sealed unopened containers and removed the alcohol from the protected area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been informed.
ENS 5553721 October 2021 17:02:00The following report was received from the Illinois Emergency Management Agency (the Agency) via email: The Agency was contacted on the afternoon of 10/21/21 by the University of Chicago to advise of a reportable medical event that occurred the day before. A human research subject was reportedly administered 79.8 mCi of a prescribed 100 mCi dose of I-131 under the therapeutic portion of a study protocol. There is no root cause available at this time, although the licensee suspects an inadequate volume of saline flush. Inspectors will evaluate any other contributing factors including equipment, personnel involved and unique procedures for this study protocol. At this time, the licensee is not expecting any adverse impact to the patient and they are following up with the study sponsor to determine if additional treatment is required. The referring physician has been notified and the licensee is aware of the requirement to notify the patient. This matter is reportable under 32 Ill. Adm. Code 335.1080(a) for a dose differing from the prescribed dose by 20 percent or more. The administration was started at 1420 CDT on 10/20/21 and the matter reported to the Agency at 1219 CDT on 10/21/21. The reporting criteria has been met. In accordance with Agency policy, inspectors will perform a reactionary inspection within 10 days of the incident. Illinois Report Number: IL210032 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5553018 October 2021 14:24:00The following summary was received via e-mail from the Oklahoma Department of Radiation Management (the department): On October 18, 2021 at 13:00 CDT, the licensee contacted the department to inform them that they had discovered a density gauge Model RLL 1, Sn 209689a, Cs-137 source, 0.9 millicuries as manufactured, in an incoming load of scrap. The date of manufacture was June 2008 and does not appear to be designed to have a shutter. Contact, no shutter, open side readings were 33 mR/hour while closed side readings at 3 feet were less than 1 mR/hour. The gauge had gotten past gate monitors but triggered an alarm on the conveyer belt. The licensee contacted the vendor who told them that the gauge was sold as a general license in Texas to be used for level detection on a dredge. The gauge is currently being held in a drum onsite under lock and key.
ENS 5560924 November 2021 20:24:00This 60-day telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to report one invalid actuation of the Unit 1 Containment Isolation System Train "A" in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On October 17, 2021 at approximately 1358 (EDT), a DC breaker was opened to perform an inspection of a Containment Isolation (CI) rack. A CI signal was produced and resulted in a loss of Letdown during filling and venting the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) with the RCS at 344 psig. RCS pressure began to rise, and prompt actions were taken by the Control Room to secure a Charging Pump within 20 seconds. The RCS pressure rise continued and both Pressure Operated Relief Valves cycled at 409.9 psig as designed, lowering RCS pressure. The CI Train "A" was not part of a pre-planned sequence and the event resulted in the invalid actuation of Train "A" Containment Isolation valves in more than one system. All valves functioned successfully. The DC breaker was closed, CI signal reset, and associated CI valves re-opened. All systems functioned as required and returned to normal service. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5552315 October 2021 08:52:00At 1727 (EDT) on October 14, 2021, it was determined that a licensed operator failed a test specified by the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) testing program. The individual's authorization for site access has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5548824 September 2021 13:47:00The following is a summary of a phone call with the physicist at the licensee: The licensee reported that two small sealed sources (Ge-68, roughly 0.7 mCi each) were discovered to be missing from a mobile PET-CT coach that was parked at a location in Rensselaer, IN. This coach was being refurbished at this site. The sources were discovered missing by a service engineer working on the PET-CT unit on 9/13/2021. The entire facility was thoroughly searched with a GM survey meter and the sources could not be located. THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
ENS 554441 September 2021 03:07:00The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73. On 8/31/21 at 2050 (MST), the Seismic Monitoring System was discovered Non-Functional. This constitutes an unplanned loss of emergency assessment capability for an operational basis earthquake. There is currently no seismic activity in the area according to the U.S. Geological Survey. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of the loss of seismic monitoring capability.
ENS 5542724 August 2021 16:51:00During an extent of condition review of DC control circuits, it was identified there are additional unprotected DC control circuits which are routed between separate Appendix R fire areas. A postulated fire in one area can cause a short circuit and potentially result in secondary fires or cable fires in other fire areas where the cables are routed. The secondary fires or cable failures degrade the degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains and are outside the assumptions of the 10 CFR 50 Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis. This condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Compensatory actions for affected fire areas have been implemented. Design modifications in the affected control circuits are being developed and will be scheduled to correct this condition.
ENS 5542624 August 2021 12:31:00The following was received from the Point Beach Station Radiation Protection Manager (RPM) via phone call to the Headquarters Operations Officer: Per 10 CFR 20.1906(d)(1), the Point Beach Station RPM reported to the NRC receipt of a package of radioactive material (new fuel shipment) with removable surface contamination greater than NRC reporting limits. The package was received Tuesday, August 24, 2021, at 0645 CDT. The package was surveyed and it was determined that the external surface of the package contained removable contamination that exceeded the regulatory limit of 240 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters. The measured level of removable contamination was 337.3 dpm/cm2 for beta-gamma emitters and contained Cobalt 60. The licensee's corrective actions were to conduct additional smears of the package, trailer, and truck, and to frisk the truck driver to ensure no further contamination. No contamination has been identified.
ENS 5553118 October 2021 16:18:00The following is a summary of the report provided by Engine Systems Inc.: The vendor supplied information to the NRC involving a defect and/or failure related to a pressure regulator valve installed on an emergency diesel generator at Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. The valve did not properly regulate starting air pressure and allowed equalization of inlet pressure to outlet. Subsequent investigation by the vendor revealed a raised edge on the metal seating surface of the valve that caused the PTFE (Teflon) seat to tear. Equalization of starting air pressure is undesirable since it may inhibit operation of the downstream starting air solenoid valve, thus compromising the ability of the emergency diesel generator to start and support safety-related loads. The evaluation is complete. This Part 21 applies only to valves in the Brunswick Nuclear Power Plant. Corrective Actions: Brunswick continues to monitor the outlet pressure from the regulator and verify the inlet and outlet pressures have not equalized. The vendor also recommends that existing regulators have an inspection performed on-site and at the vendor. The vendor will add inspections to the dedication package for new and refurbished pressure regulator valves to verify a smooth, rounded transition at the valve seat of the throttling sleeve. Technical questions concerning this notification can be directed to Dan Roberts, Quality Manager, and John Kriesel, Engineering Manager.
ENS 5537925 July 2021 16:00:00At 1238 EDT on July 25, 2021, the Unit 2 Ice Bed became INOPERABLE due to SR (Surveillance Requirement) 3.6.12.1 exceeding its surveillance interval. LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) 3.6.12 was declared not met as required by SR 3.0.1. SR 3.6.12.1 to verify maximum ice bed temperature is less than or equal to 27 degrees F could not be completed due to a failed temperature recorder. The results of the backup method of temperature verification were verified satisfactory at 1258 EDT and the LCO condition was then exited. The ice bed is a single train system which functions to control radiation release and mitigate the consequences of an accident by scrubbing radioactive iodine and providing a heat sink to limit containment pressure within design limits, therefore the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72 (b) (3) (v) (C) and (D) were met. There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 5534910 July 2021 14:58:00At approximately 1730 (EDT) on July 9, 2021, the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified per State code requirements that the fire suppression system encompassing the Fuel Manufacturing Operation (FMO) was impaired. The backup diesel fire pump experienced a cooling system failure. As a result, the diesel fire pump was placed in the manual 'Off' position. The diesel fire pump could still be operated manually in an emergency for a short time. The electric fire pump remains fully operational and available to perform its safety function. Because the New Hanover County Deputy Fire Marshall was notified, a concurrent notification to the NRC Operations Center is being made per 10 CFR 70, Appendix A(c). From the discussion between the licensee and the Headquarters Operations Officer, the vendor plans to be onsite Monday July 12, 2021 to conduct repairs.
ENS 553448 July 2021 15:00:00The following event synopsis was received by the licensee via phone call: The Headquarters Operations Officer (HOO) was notified by the licensee that during operations a source was disconnected from its drive cable and required retrieval. The licensee established a 2 mRem perimeter as well as other safety precautions in preparation for retrieval. The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was able to arrive and successfully retrieve the source. A formal report will be subsequently issued for the event. Wyoming is still considered a non-agreement state regarding material events with the only exception being uranium recovery events.
ENS 5533130 June 2021 10:42:00The following event report was received via e-mail from the Florida Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC): The vice president (VP) of the licensee called the BRC at 1015 EDT to report that a SMDG ((small moisture density gauge)) was hit or run over by a front end loader at 1010 EDT this morning. The location is a construction site north of the intersection of Connorton Blvd. and US-41 Land O' Lakes, FL 34637. The VP intends to evaluate SMDG, then send it to Troxler. The VP will provide a written report to the BRC. Florida Incident Number: FL21-087
ENS 5533030 June 2021 09:24:00The following event description was received via e-mail from the Virginia Radioactive Materials Program (VRMP): On June 29, 2021, at 1039 EDT, a representative of the VRMP received a report from a licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) via telephone call that a portable nuclear moisture/density gauge was damaged when hit by a car at a jobsite. The report indicated that a Troxler density gauge (Model 4640-B, containing 9 milliCuries of Cesium-137) was being used for asphalt testing when a car drove into the closed lane and hit the gauge. During the accident, the gauge housing was damaged but the source appeared to remain intact within the housing. The licensee's survey of the gauge yielded readings of 0.05 mR/hr at about 3-4 feet distance from the gauge. The gauge was taken to the licensee's office in its transport container and then was sent for further evaluation and leak testing on the morning of June 30, 2021. The VRMP is working with the licensee to obtain additional information. This report will be updated once the licensee's investigation is complete and the information is received. According to the RSO, no public exposure occurred. Virginia Event Report Number: VA21003
ENS 5532925 June 2021 18:15:00The following report was received from the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section (the State): On June 25, 2021, the licensee reported to the State a misadministration of Y-90 Theraspheres on the morning of the same day. The prescribed dose was 126 Gy to the right lobe of the liver, corresponding to 2.31 GBq. After the administration was complete, the licensee surveyed the residual material and noticed that an unusually high amount of material was still present in the administration setup. Initial calculations indicate that approximately 1.572 GBq of material was delivered to the patient. This corresponds to 68.8 percent of the prescribed dose resulting in a dose to the right lobe of the liver that differed from the prescribed dose by 39.2 Gy. The technologist notified the Authorized User immediately and the Authorized User then notified the patient. No unusual circumstances or events were noted during the administration, and there are no suspected spills or outside exposures resulting from this event. The State will continue to follow up on the event. Wisconsin Event Report: WI210005 A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5532624 June 2021 21:56:00

The following synopsis was received via phone call from the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer (RSO): At 1800 EDT on June 24, 2021 at the licensee facility, an employee left the work site unaware that he was contaminated on his skin and his clothing. The only places the individual traveled to were his car and his home before being called back to work at 1924 EDT to investigate the contamination event. When the individual came back to the facility, contamination was found on his hand including Sr-82, Sr-85, Rb-83, and Rb-84. The activity was 600,000 counts or 0.18 micro curies. Dose calculations have not been performed, however, the RSO does not believe the dose will be near any federal limits. The work area has been decontaminated and the individual's car has been surveyed and no contamination was found. The licensee plans to survey the individual's home as well as contact the NRC Region 3 materials inspector. The licensee is reporting the event under both 30.50(a) and 30.50(b)(1) as a precaution as more data is being collected.

  • * * Update from Matthew Trusner to Donald Norwood at 1914 EDT on 6/25/2021 * * *

The following information was received via E-mail: On June 24, 2021, at approximately 1800 EDT, Curium-Noblesville RSO became aware of a radioactive spill in a restricted (production) area. The spill occurred behind the production hot cells. The affected area is designated as a triple shoe cover area and cordoned to limit access. The RSO directed a Radiation Safety Technician to respond to and initiate the investigation and data collection. The Radiation Safety Technician performed contamination surveys and found a maximum count rate of 800,000 cpm. The Radiation Safety Technician subsequently remediated the spill to 70,000 cpm (below the administrative level of 100,000 cpm) within minutes of completing the survey. The spill initiated when a Chemist tried to manually un-crimp a vial containing approximately 695 mCi of Sr-82 and 703 mCi of Sr-85. As the the Chemist tried to un-crimp the vial, the glass below the crimp broke leading to a few drops to fall on the concrete floor behind the hot cells. During the initial investigation surveys, the RSO discovered that the production batch record was contaminated. This prompted the RSO to find the Chemist to ensure he was free of contamination. The RSO discovered that the Chemist had already left the site. The RSO immediately contacted the Director of Health Physics for assistance. They made the decision to bring the Chemist onsite for a survey. The RSO discovered that the Chemist's work clothes presented spots reading approximately 600,000 cpm on contact with the pants and 200,000 with the shirt. The RSO also found contamination on the right hand reading approximately 34,000 cpm. Because the Chemist had left the site, the RSO surveyed the Chemist's car and did not identify contamination above background levels. The RSO communicated the findings to the Director of Health Physics and initiated the decontamination activities for the Chemist. Prior to decontaminating the Chemist's hand, the RSO obtained a gamma spectrum to identify the radioactive contaminants. He found a mixture of Sr-82, Sr-85, Rb-83 and Rb-84. The Director of Health Physics reviewed the notification requirements prescribed in Part 20 and Part 30 and escalated the event to Curium management and legal teams. Curium made the decision to proactively report the event to the NRC Operations Center under 10 CFR 30.50(a) given that the notification was required within 4 hours of discovery and Curium had not acquired enough data to verify if any regulatory limit was exceeded or not. After the notification, the RSO stopped the decontamination activities after no further contamination was being removed. The RSO measured a residual contamination of 4,200 cpm on the hand. He then followed the Chemist to his home and performed a contamination survey of the areas in which the Chemist indicated that he had been present after leaving the work site that day. The RSO found no contamination above background levels. The Director of Health Physics performed an initial dose estimate on June 25, 2021. The RSO used Rb-84 as the most restrictive nuclide that yielded the highest dose in the mixture. The estimates indicated that the Chemist received approximately 1,203 mrem to the maximally exposed shallow dose equivalent (extremity), 636 mrem shallow dose equivalent (whole body) and 13 mrem deep dose equivalent. The RSO performed 24-hour urinalysis and did not find the presence of the radionuclides. All license material was accounted for. Curium personnel discussed the incident with NRC Region-III on June 25, 2021. Curium is in the process of completing formal root cause analysis. Notified R3DO (Stone) and the NMSS Events Notification E-mail group.

  • * * RETRACTION ON 07/20/21 AT 1506 EDT FROM MATTHEW TRUSNER TO SOLOMON SAHLE * * *

The following retraction is a summary received from the licensee via phone: As part of an internal investigation, the licensee determined that neither the employee nor any member of the public received any exposure exceeding regulatory limits. The licensee will notify the NRC Region 3. Notified R3DO (Pelke) and NMSS Events Notification via email.

ENS 5532524 June 2021 14:56:00This is an eight-hour, non-emergency notification for a loss of Emergency Assessment Capability. This event is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) because the Technical Support Center (TSC) supply fan belt had failed, which affects the functionality of an emergency response facility. Corrective maintenance activities will be performed to restore functionality. The work includes replacing the failed belt and restarting the TSC supply fan. The work duration is approximately 8 hours. If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological, or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the Emergency Director will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures. (The Emergency Response Organization team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to relocate during an emergency.) There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector and Illinois Emergency Management Agency have been notified.
ENS 552978 June 2021 08:37:00A contract employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
ENS 552968 June 2021 06:34:00The following event was received from the South Carolina Department of Health (the Department) via email: The licensee notified the Department on June 7, 2021 at 1300 (EDT) that it had determined at 1200 (EDT) a medical event had occurred because of a Y-90 Therasphere procedure that occurred on June 4, 2021. The licensee is reporting that the administered dose differed from the prescribed dose by more that 20 percent. The written directive specified that the patient was to be administered with 135.5 mCi of Y-90 Therasphere to the left lobe of the liver. During the procedure it was discovered that there was an apparent leak in the microcatheter. The dose delivered calculated to be less than 93 mCi. The remainder of the dose had leaked onto the floor. The licensee has decontaminated the room. The On-call Duty Officer is meeting with the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer on June 8, 2021 to investigate this incident. This is an initial notification and further updates will be forthcoming once the investigation is complete. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 5526820 May 2021 16:53:00The following e-mail was received from the Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) at Kootenai Health: A misadministration occurred at Kootenai Health in the Interventional Radiology Lab (ID 83814) during a Therasphere Y-90 Microsphere treatment. The prescribed dose was 66.36 mCi to segment 8 of the liver. The microspheres infusion started at 0943 PST when the micropsheres became visually clumped in the tubing of the administration set (distal to the box, prior to the microcatheter connection). Troubleshooting methods were performed, but the microspheres did not move through the tubing with multiple saline flush attempts. The infusion was aborted at 1016 PST. The room was surveyed per protocol and there was no contamination. The jar containing the tubing and microcatheter were measured per protocol. Calculations determined the patient received 12.8 mCi which was 20 percent of the prescribed dose. The RSO was notified at 1058 PST, the referring physician (was notified) at 1128 PST, and the patient (was notified) at 1150 PST. A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
ENS 553458 July 2021 20:07:00This 60-Day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of containment isolation signal affecting more than one system. On May 13, 2021, during the restoration of the Unit 2 Refuel Floor High Radiation Isolation Logic an invalid isolation signal was received. The condition requiring an isolation signal was verified not to be present prior to restoring the logic; however, it was not recognized that a previous isolation signal was latched in and had not been reset. When the isolation logic was restored, the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolated on the invalid signal. The systems successfully completed the isolation per the plant design and plant configuration. The following systems actuated due to the Unit 2 PCIS Group 6C Isolation: - Isolation of Containment Hydrogen and Oxygen Sampling Valves, - Start of the 2A Reactor Enclosure Recirculation System, - Trip of the Units 1 and 2 Refuel Floor HVAC, - Start of the A and B Trains of Standby Gas Treatment Systems. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
ENS 553479 July 2021 15:23:00The following is a summary of the defect described in an initial report received from the vendor via facsimile: The vendor notified the NRC of a defect involving two instances of loose or dislodged zinc anodes (P/N 1335BEM2P) supplied by the vendor. The anodes are installed in the cooling water enter and exit and return channels of the jacket water heat exchanger of the emergency diesel generator. Each heat exchanger contains eight zinc anode assemblies that consist of a zinc rod threaded into a steel pipe plug. The zinc acts as a sacrificial anode to protect the pressure boundary metals from degradation due to galvanic corrosion. In the case of a loose or dislodged zinc anode, the zinc rod may become foreign material that remains trapped in the vessel, potentially impacting and damaging the tube ends where they project from the tube sheet. Alternatively, an anode located in the exit channel may by carried away from the heat exchanger and potentially damage downstream components. The corrective action being recommended are as follows: It is recommended to perform an inspection to verify tightness at the zinc rod to pipe plug interface. The rod should be threaded into the pipe plug snug tight and, if required, may be tightened to a maximum of 15 ft-lbs. If desired, the zinc rod may be removed and eliminated from the assembly leaving only the steel pipe plug. Inclusion of the zinc anode is not required for the EDG heat exchanger application at TVA-Browns Ferry. This component was supplied to the Browns Ferry Nuclear Power Plant. Point of contact: Dan Roberts Quality Manager Engine Systems Inc. 175 Freight Rd. Rocky Mount, NC 27804 (252) 977-2720
ENS 552302 May 2021 09:10:00The following report was received by the California Department of Public Health, Radiological Health Branch: At approximately 0140 (PDT), the licensee received several alarms for the Cell B irradiator. An attempt to lower the source racks normally was unsuccessful. At approximately 0400 (PDT), the source racks were successfully lowered to the bottom of the pool following emergency operating procedures (EOP-034, Stuck Source Rack) for manually lowering the source rack. During this time, the irradiator entrance door remained secured by the safety system interlock system. After some review and troubleshooting, the licensee determined that there was an electrical fault in a junction box which was later determined to have been caused by a degraded wire that short circuited to ground causing the electrical malfunction. The licensee subsequently replaced this degraded wire with new components. Once repairs to the electrical system were completed and a functional safety system check of the irradiator was performed to determine that all safety systems were operating correctly, the licensee resumed operations." California NMED Report Number: 050121