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The licensee was performing maintenance on "D" Steam Generator Low Level bistables when 4 (four) out of 8 (eight) trip control breakers opened possibly due to a 24 V DC power supply transient to 2 (two) of 4 (four) logic matrix relays. The reactor trip logic was verified to be functional and capable of processing valid reactor trip signals. The actuation was invalid as no plant transient occurred and no process variable was exceeded which would otherwise have required a reactor trip. The licensee notified the State and the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * RETRACTION ON 08/14/06 AT 0947 ET BY M. EWER TO MACKINNON * * *

Upon further review, the initial notification of this event is determined to have been conservative. A review of NUREG 1022, Rev. 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines, 10 CFR 50.72 and 50.73,' as well as the supporting comments in the notice of final rulemaking for changes to 10 CFR Parts 50 and 72 contained in the Federal Register on October 25, 2000, indicates that these documents stress the need for reporting of system actuations. As stated in NUREG 1022, 'actuation of multichannel actuation systems is defined as actuation of enough channels to complete the minimum actuation logic. Therefore, single channel actuation logic,' Per the final rulemaking, 'the principal reason for reporting an actuation of one of these systems is that it is indicative of an unplanned plant transient that the NRC needs to evaluate to determine if action is necessary to address a safety problem.' In the event described in CR-06-06880, a portion of the RPS actuation sufficiently to cause four of the eight TCBs to open (i.e, a half trip), but not enough channels actuated to complete the minimum actuation logic for RPS (i.e, insufficient channels to fulfill the safety function of the RPS to deenergized the control rod drive mechanisms to shutdown the reactor). There was no unplanned plant transient as a result of the half trip. Determination Based on the above assessment, this condition in NOT reportable per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). Accordingly, the report of a 4 hour non-emergency event under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(b) for a half RPS trip actuation should be withdrawn. R1DO (Lorson) notified. The NRC Resident Inspector will be notified by the licensee of this retraction.

Licensee was performing work on pavement at State Route 22, Indiana County, PA when a Moisture Density Gauge was damaged by compacting equipment. The damage to the gauge was restricted to the casing and the licensee has confirmed that the sources are in their retracted safe positions. The damaged gauge was moved off the pavement and a perimeter was established around it. Contact readings were recorded as 60 millirem/hr. The licensee has contacted Northeast Technical who is the service provider. The gauge will be temporarily transferred to office storage and will be subsequently transported to the service provider for repairs. The density gauge is a Troxler model 3450, serial number 00397 containing 8 millicuries Cs-137, 40 millicuries Am-241/Be (source numbers 750-6096 and 47-28081 respectively).

• * * UPDATE ON 6/21/06 AT 1100 EDT FROM CALVIN OVERDORFF TO GERRY WAIG * * *

The licensee called to correct the radiation contact reading reported above. The contact reading originally reported as 60 millirem/hr should read 6 millirem/hr to 11 millirem/hr. Notified R1DO (M. Sykes) and NMSS (G. Morell). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

The following information was received from the state via e-mail:

(The licensee's) Radiation Safety Officer (RSO), Illinois Dept. of Transportation (Radioactive Material License No. IL-1100-01), called to report (to Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency) that a Troxler moisture density gauge, Model 3440, serial no.16550 (Cs-137 Source S/N 50-5822, 8 millicuries; Am-241/Be Source S/N 47-11975, 40 millicuries) was stolen from one of their vehicles assigned to their Edwards subsite (Peoria area). The open bed Dodge Ram truck was at a Peoria asphalt plant when the discovery was made.  The user went to use the device this morning at the site and when he opened the back of his vehicle to remove the gauge, he noted the gauge was missing from the transport container although initial appearances suggested the container was still secure and intact.  The transport container is bolted and padlocked to the bed of the vehicle. In addition the transport case has a locking hasp which is padlocked.  This locking device was damaged and the gauging device subsequently removed.  It is not known at this time when the device was actually stolen.  It was last used on April 17, 2006.  Peoria County Sheriffs personnel have been contacted as well as the Illinois State Police.

(The RSO's) investigation this afternoon showed that no other tools or equipment had been taken from the vehicle although other items contained in the transport case were missing such as the reference block, and cleaning kit. The operator indicated that he could not consciously remember verifying the security of the transport container since the last time the gauge was used in April, only that it appeared to be locked. He was able to confirm that the handle of the gauge had been secured and padlocked following its last use. Illinois Emergency Mgmt. Agency Item No: IL060020

• * * UPDATE AT 16:20 ON 5/30/2006 FROM D. PERRERO TO ABRAMOVITZ * * *

On May 29, 2006 the Agency was contacted by the Peoria Fire Department (PFD). The PFD had responded to a request from the Peoria Police Department to investigate a moisture/density gauge which had been found by a member of the public in Kickapoo Creek. Upon investigation by the PFD, it was determined that the radiation levels from the device were as expected for an intact device with no shielding failure. The device was taken into custody and secured by the Peoria Police Department in a remote portion of their Police Property Division. The information on the identification plate on the device was used to positively determine ownership as the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT). On Tuesday morning, the IDOT Radiation Safety Officer was contacted and advised of the situation. Arrangements were immediately made for him to personally go to Peoria to identify the gauge, inspect its condition and safely transport the gauge back to their Springfield, IL offices for further repair and evaluation. Upon his arrival he determined that the gauge handle was still locked in the safe position and there was no structural damage to the gauge. The gauge was field tested with negative results for contamination due to leakage. IDOT intends to have the gauge cleaned, serviced, calibrated and put back into service after replacement of the electrical components. Pending receipt of the final report from the IDOT RSO which details the correct action taken to prevent a recurrence, we are considering this matter closed. Notified NMSS (Morell), R3DO (Kozak) and ILTAB (via E-mail). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

While performing semi-annual criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) testing, one unit in a pair of detectors failed to initiate the site wide alarm. Spare unit was immediately installed and all systems successfully tested. Production facility covered by this CAAS (was) in a shutdown status at the time of testing. Subsequent troubleshooting indicated a faulty electronic relay contact in the failed unit. Testing of CAAS is conducted on a semi-annual basis in accordance with procedure, NFS-HS-A-80, Sections 5.5 & 5.6. (The) Detector pair on 2nd floor of Oxide Conversion Facility did not activate site-wide alarm as expected. Alarm indication did occur as expected at the local read-out panel, and at the central alarm panel located in an adjacent building occupied by security guards. Investigation revealed failed relay contact in Eberline Instruments Model RMS-3 read-out meter. (The) Unit (was) replaced, and (a) subsequent test (was) satisfactory. No actual safety consequences occurred as a result of this event; however, there was a risk of potential health and safety consequence to the occupational workforce, involving significant radiation exposure from accidental criticality event with no warning to initiate prompt site-wide evacuation. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL TESTER TO HUFFMAN AT 1626 EST ON 2/06/06 * * *

Following evaluation of this event by the licensee's Part 21 review committee, Nuclear Fuel Services has reached the conclusion that this event was the result of a design defect in the relay used in the RMS-3 read-out meter. This event is being updated to reflect the Part 21 reportability conclusion. The Eberline RMS-3 read-out meter is manufactured by Thermo Electron Corporation. Nuclear Fuel Services has been in contact with Eberline during its investigation and Eberline is aware of the conclusions. The defective relay is manufactured by Potter and Brumsfield. Immediate corrective actions included replacement of the defective equipment, and re-testing to ensure operability; long term corrective action includes design and installation of PLC based surveillance equipment to continuously monitor the function of system components by NFS Engineering Department in approximately 3 - 6 months. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Bernhard), NMSS EO ( Janosko) and Part 21 coordinator (Markley) have been notified.

• * *UPDATE BY HUFFMAN ON 2/7/06 * * *

This event has been decontrolled to make it publicly available and permit information about this problem to be shared with all affected parties. NRC management has determined that the report does not contain information about sensitive operations at the NFS site. R2DO(Bernhard) and NMSS (Morell) notified.

A licensee's employee had his 1988 Cadillac Brougham stolen while it was parked in front of his house in Westland, MI and a Troxler moisture density gauge was inside the vehicle (Model 3440, S/N 13815, containing 8 millicuries of Cs-137 and 40 millicuries of Am-241:Be). The gauge was locked in its wired down casing. The vehicle was stolen sometime between 1900 and 0400 hours on 12/21/05 and 12/22/05 respectively. The licensee contacted NRC Region III, the Westland Police (report No.0542989) and the State Police who subsequently contacted the State Homeland Security.

• * * UPDATE AT 1705 ON 12/22/05 FROM J. KALISZ TO A. COSTA * * *

The licensee reported that the automobile was taken away at the owner's location by a car repossession company. The gauge and its case were intact inside the car and have been recovered by the licensee. Notified R3 DO (Peterson), NMSS EO (Camper) and TAS (email). THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

Due to an electrical fault in the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF), the power to the building has been removed. Testing and repairs are underway and expectations are that power will be restored in approximately 6 hours. The EOF is located approximately 30 miles from the Susquehanna plant and the loss of power does not effect plant operation. Until repairs are complete communications and accident assessments will be made in the on site Technical Support Center (TSC). The Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency, Luzerne and Columbia Counties have been notified by the Susquehanna Emergency Planning Organization. The NRC and PEMA will be notified upon power restoration. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE ON 10/26/05 AT 1500 EDT FROM JIM HUFFORD TO ARLON COSTA * * *

As of approximately 1300 hours on 10/26/2005, power was restored to the Susquehanna Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) and the facility is considered operable. The NRC Resident Inspector will be updated. Notified the R1DO (Silk).

This event is being reported as 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. A postulated fire water system line break did not take into consideration the movement of a fire door boundary. Consequently, the break may affect safe shutdown of the plant. The door boundary was moved in May 1999. While assessing a calculation to update fire pump curves (CR 04-00422-04) it was found that the calculation does not appear to have been updated for the tornado depressurization event modifications (DCP 99-05014). Specifically, door DG-112 was moved to the control complex wall from the diesel generator wall. This door movement isolates the rattle space that was previously credited as a relief path for this internal flood. A full break is postulated for this line as the result of a safe shutdown earthquake. As the result of the postulated pipe break, both fire protection pumps are expected to auto start resulting in a break flow rate into the hallway of approximately 6,000 gpm. Standard Perry design practice is to assume a 30 minute duration for the pipe break flow isolation unless justified otherwise. The line in question was isolated at 2027 on 10/21/05. The valves are being maintained closed under administrative controls. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• • • • RETRACTION ON 10/28/05 AT 1748 EDT FROM H. KELLY TO P. SNYDER ****

An 8-hour notification was made on October 24, 2005 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The report was made due to a postulated break for a non-safety non-seismic fire water pipe that could possibly affect safe shutdown of the plant. An evaluation was completed on October 28, 2005. This evaluation confirmed that the current plant configuration is consistent with the design basis. The evaluation used for the original event notification assumed a full break of the involved piping. Perry design basis for this moderate energy system is a leakage crack. The postulated leakage from the crack in the piping remains within design basis and does not significantly degrade plant safety. Since Perry remains in compliance with design basis and there is no unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, there is no reportable condition. Therefore, ENF 42072 is retracted. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

At 2240 09/20/2005 an engineering evaluation concluded that the Residual Heat Removal Containment Sump Isolation Valves were inoperable based on their inability to open against a higher differential pressure than had been previously evaluated. Historically Wolf Creek has operated with the Component Cooling Water isolated to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers. If the pumps started during accident conditions there is a potential that the pump heat generated could cause system pressure to increase to the suction relief valve setting of 450 psig. Testing of the valves has shown that they are capable of opening with 207 psid across the valve. Technical Specification 3.0.3 was entered at 2240 9/20/2005 due to the inoperability of both Residual Heat Removal trains. Power reduction was commenced at 2340. Component Cooling Water was aligned to the Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchangers at 0004 9/21/2005 restoring operability of the Residual Heat Removal trains. At 0017 9/21/2005 actions were commenced to restore power to 100%. This event is reportable under 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(i) Technical Specification required shut down (4 hour) and 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) Event or Condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a Safety Function (8 hour). The NRC Resident has been contacted.

• • • UPDATE AT 15:39 EST ON 11/08/05 FROM DEES TO KNOKE ***

Evaluation of the Residual Heat Removal Containment Sump Isolation Valves concluded that the valves were operable and the Residual Heat Removal trains were capable of fulfilling their safety function. Therefore, this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R4DO (Whitten).

On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours (EDT), Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 (EDT), eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected. The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

• * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *

On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County. The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).

• * * UPDATE AT 1639 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM DANIEL HARDIN TO J. ROTTON * * *

On September 14, 2005, at 1411 hours, the Brunswick plant provided a notification (reference Event Number 41991) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the loss of function several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. This update is to notify the NRC Operations Center that as of September 15, 2005, at 1600 hours, all but 3 of 36 sirens have been restored and the condition no longer meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). Restoration efforts for the remaining sirens are in progress. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday)

On September 12, 2005, at 2300 hours, a hurricane warning was issued, which resulted in the declaration of an unusual event for both units. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating at 100 percent of rated thermal power. The plant area is not currently experiencing any hurricane force winds. The wind speed at the site is approximately 24 miles per hour. State and county emergency response organizations have been notified. The resident inspector has been notified. There is no significant impact to the safety of the plant at this time. The plant is currently in Abnormal Operating Procedure 0AOP-13.0, 'Operation During Hurricane, Flood Conditions, Tornado, or Earthquake,' and Plant Emergency Procedure 0PEP-02.6, 'Severe Weather,' in preparation for hurricane conditions. On-site facilities are not being activated at this time. No off-site assistance is requested. Request suspension of additional follow up notification unless plant conditions change. All Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency Diesel Generators are fully operable if needed. The electrical grid is stable.

• * * UPDATE AT 0758 EDT ON 9/14/05 FROM BRUCE HARTSOCK TO S. SANDIN * * *

Commenced reduction in power on Unit 2 in anticipation of exceeding 74 mph winds. Prediction revised to maximum of 64 mph onsite. Power reduction stopped. Plant stabilized. Power will be restored. Notified RCT (Hasselberg) and R2IRC (Casto).

• * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *

As of 2300 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, the Hurricane Warning south of Cape Fear, North Carolina, has been discontinued; therefore, the Unusual Event has been terminated. Entry into the Unusual Event was reported by Event Notification 41983. Both Unit 1 and Unit 2 continue to operate at 100 percent power. There has been no damage affecting safety equipment or causing operational constraints as a result of Hurricane Ophelia. The licensee notified state/local agencies and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday), NRR (Mayfield), IRD (McGinty), FEMA (Snyder), and DHS (Gomez).