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05000280/FIN-2016003-0130 September 2016 23:59:59SurryLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe licensee identified a non-cited violation of very low safety significance of 10 CFR 72.150,Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings. Title 10 CFR 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, requires, in part, that activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented procedures of a type appropriate to the circumstances and be accomplished in accordance with these procedures. The licensee established PBF5101, Fuel/Insert/Component Movement Authorization, Revision 17, as the implementing procedure for dry fuel storage fuel loading, an activity affecting quality. Procedure PBF5101 contains instructions for fuel handlers to move specific fuel assemblies from specific spent fuel pool locations into specific dry shielded canisters (DSCs) and DSC locations. Contrary to the above, on July 18, 2016, the licensee failed to follow PBF5101. Specifically, the licensee was utilizing a PBF5101 labeled for DSC25 during the loading of DSC24. This resulted in three fuel assemblies being incorrectly loaded into DSC24. The license entered the issue into its corrective action program under AR 02144237, dated July 18, 2016, and initiated actions to perform an apparent causal evaluation. The inspectors identified that DSC24 and DSC25 have identical design characteristics and therefore there was no actual safety significance to this event. Consistent with the guidance in Section 2.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, ISFSIs are not subject to the Significance Determination Process and, thus, traditional enforcement will be used for this issue. However, the inspectors determined that the violation significance could be informed by the significance determination process as no similar violations existed in the enforcement policy violations examples. The inspectors determined that the violation could be evaluated using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 04, Initial Characterization of Findings, and Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions. This resulted in the violation screening as Severity Level IV.
05000280/FIN-2014406-0130 September 2013 23:59:59SurryLicensee-identifiedOn Duty Security Officer Confirmed Positive Test for AlcoholThe purpose of the investigation was to review the facts and circumstances involving a positive for-cause alcohol test result that revealed that a security officer (SO) was not fit-for-duty, approximately 5 hours into his armed shift at the Surry Power Station (SPS) on December 7, 2012. Specifically, at approximately 11:30 p.m. on December 7, 2012, co-workers at SPS detected the odor of alcohol on the SOs breath, and immediately reported this observation to site security supervision. At the time, the SO was assigned to security duties in the Owner Controlled Area (OCA). In response, the SO was promptly for-cause tested for alcohol, and test results confirmed a Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC) level of 0.139 percent. Because the BAC exceeded Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 26.103 limit of 0.04 percent, SPS declared the test result for alcohol as a confirmed positive test result, and the SO was relieved of duty. Based on the confirmed positive test and the fact that the SO had been on duty approximately 5 hours at the time of testing, the NRC concluded that the SO was unable to effectively perform his assigned OCA security duties. His deliberate actions caused SPS to be in violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii). This regulation requires the licensee to provide continuous surveillance, observation, and monitoring of the OCA, as described in its physical security plan, to detect and deter intruders and ensure the integrity of physical barriers, or other components and functions of the onsite physical protection program. In this case, the SOs actions did not adversely affect the health and safety of the public because there was no security event necessitating a security response at SPS, and because of the multi-layered security measures that are required at SPS and at all NRC licensed power reactors. Additionally, SPSs continual behavior observation program and followup responses to this issue were prompt and effective. Your followup response included a review of the SOs work history, termination of the SOs access to the facility, and a flagged entry of the SOs name into the nuclear power industrys Personnel Access Data System (PADS). Based on the above and in light of the deliberate aspects of the SOs actions, the NRC has concluded that this violation of 10 CFR 73.55(i)(5)(ii) should be characterized at Severity Level IV. Because this violation was identified by the licensee and meets the non-cited violation criteria of Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, it is being dispositioned as a non-cited, Licensee Identified Violation. For administrative purposes, this letter is issued as NRC Inspection Report Numbers 05000280, 05000281/2014406.
05000280/FIN-2011003-0830 June 2011 23:59:59SurryLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationNUHOMS Certificate of Compliance 1030, Amendment 0, Technical Specifications 2.1.c, Functional and Operating Limits, requires, in part, that the spent nuclear fuel stored in each 32PTH DSC/HSM-H at the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) is to be qualified for four (4) heat load zones designated as Zones 1a, 1b, 2 and 3. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee identified that it failed to properly load fuel assemblies into four NUHOMS Dry Shielded Canisters (DSCs) resulting in the fuel assemblies exceeding the decay heat limit for the loading zones in two of the four center zones. Specifically, the Zone 1a and Zone 1b locations were reversed, resulting in the DSC Zone 1b heat load limits being slightly exceeded (less than one per cent in the worst case) at the time of loading. An evaluation performed by the licensee showed that all of the affected DSCs are currently in a safe condition as loaded in the HSMs. This issue is in the licensees CAP as CR419237, NUHOMS DSCs Loaded to Incorrect Heat Load Limits for Specific Orientation. This Severity Level IV violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2.b of the NRC Enforcement Policy; specifically, the violation was identified by the licensee, the issue was placed into the licensees CAP, the violation was not repetitive as a result of inadequate corrective action, and the violation was not willful.
05000280/FIN-2011012-0131 December 2010 23:59:59SurryNRC identifiedInaccurate Fire Watch RecordsThe licensee identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.48 Fire Protection requirements when it was determined that a laborer failed to conduct a roving fire watch patrol. The licensee took substantial disciplinary actions and entered the deficiency into the corrective action program for resolution as CR 379888. This issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement due to the deliberate aspects of the performance deficiency. Furthermore, the failure to provide complete and accurate information has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. An individual assigned as a fire watch deliberately documented the completion of fire watch rounds (Fire Watch Tour Documentation Sheet, Attachment 14) for locations in which he did not conduct the fire watches. This issue was considered more than minor due to the deliberate aspects of the performance deficiency. In accordance with the guidance in Supplement VII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue is considered a Severity Level IV violation because it involved information that the NRC required to be maintained by a licensee that was incomplete or inaccurate and of more than minor safety significance. No cross-cutting aspect was identified because this performance deficiency was dispositioned using traditional enforcement.
05000280/FIN-2006501-0131 December 2006 23:59:59SurryNRC identifiedProtective Actions for Sever Reactor AccidentsNo Color: The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for implementing a change which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without prior NRC approval. The licensee implemented an Emergency Plan change that modified the default Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) for the General Emergency classification to evacuate to 5 miles in all directions. The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impacted the regulatory process, in that, NRC approval was not requested prior to licensee implementation of the change. This finding is of more than minor concern because the change made may be overly conservative in such a way as to place members of the public at unnecessary risk during evacuation of an area unaffected by a radiological release which would be more appropriately recommended for sheltering. The finding was determined to be a noncited Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
05000280/FIN-2006005-0131 December 2006 23:59:59SurryNRC identifiedProceduralized Departures from TSNo Color: The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments. Specifically, the licensee implemented proceduralized departures from the approved station technical specifications (TS) without the required NRC approval in procedures AP-13.0, Turbine Building Flooding, revision 13, and FCA 6.01, Uncontrollable Turbine Building Flooding, revision 2. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement since it impacted or impeded the regulatory process in that the licensee improperly used the 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, process to incorporate operator actions inconsistent with the TS. This finding was of more than minor safety significance because the procedure changes improperly bypassed the required NRC review and approval prior to implementation. The unapproved procedural actions would only be involved at the end of a very rare accident sequence. Given the time during the accident sequence in which these actions were to be accomplished, the actions were not a determent to core damage. Therefore, the violation was of very low safety significance. The finding is identified as Severity Level IV because the noncompliance is not considered to be of more than very low significance based on risk.