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05000443/FIN-2018003-0130 September 2018 23:59:59SeabrookSelf-revealingPressurizer Safety Valve Outside of Technical Specification LimitsA self-revealing Severity Level IV NCV of Technical Specifications, All pressurizer code safety valves shall be OPERABLE with a lift setting of 2485 psig +/- 3%, was identified when one of the pressurizer code safety valves failed as-found set point testing. Specifically, it was determined that the safety valve had a high as-found set point pressure after the valve was removed from service during the previous refueling outage in April, 2017 (OR18) and the inoperable condition existed for a period of time longer than the allowed T.S. ACTION time.
05000443/FIN-2015301-0131 March 2015 23:59:59SeabrookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationAccording to 10 CFR 55.49 licensees are required, in part, to not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. Contrary to this requirement, on February 21, 2105, the licensee identified a vulnerability in the protection of the NRC exam simulator scenario files that were being stored on the simulator workstation computer. Although the files were password protected, the licensee determined that exam security could be bypassed due to an error in file designation. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program (AR 02027235). This violation is subject to traditional enforcement because of the potential impact upon the regulatory process of issuing licenses to applicants who could have had access to the scenarios prior to the exam administration. This issue meets the criteria for a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a nonwillful compromise of an examination required by 10 CFR Part 55.
05000443/FIN-2014008-0131 March 2014 23:59:59SeabrookNRC identifiedSecurity
05000443/FIN-2012007-0230 June 2012 23:59:59SeabrookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationA violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified in that NextEra improperly made a change to the UFSAR using the 10 CFR 50.59 process that required NRC review and approval prior to implementation. Specifically, in 2010, NextEra changed a graph in the UFSAR used to determine the reactivity in a fuel bundle based on burn-up so that the fuel could be safely placed in the spent fuel pool. This change to the UFSAR was made using the 10 CFR 50.59 process. However, because this same graph is in the Technical Specifications, the 10 CFR 50.59 process could not be used and a licensee amendment under 10 CFR 50.90 was required. Traditional enforcement applied because the change impeded the regulatory process. The issue is more than minor because the change was made without NRC review and approval prior to implementation. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, because it was a spent fuel pool issue that did not result in a loss of SFP cooling, did not involve a fuel handling error, and did not result in a loss of SFP inventory. Subsequent to making the change to the UFSAR, NextEra submitted a license amendment request (LAR 11-04) in January 2012 to obtain approval for the change. NextEra entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR 1744734) for evaluation and resolution.
05000443/FIN-2011010-0331 December 2011 23:59:59SeabrookNRC identifiedFailure to Properly Complete a 50.59 Screen for EC272057The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59(d)(1), Changes, Tests, and Experiments, because NextEra did not adequately evaluate a use-as-is determination, resulting in a defacto design change, for certain ASR impacted safety related structures. Specifically, NextEra did not complete a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, to ensure that the identified reduction in concrete modulus of elasticity did not present a more than minimal increase in the likelihood of the occurrence of a malfunction of a structure, system, or component (SSC) important to safety previously evaluated in the updated safety analysis report (USAR) prior to implementing changes to the facility as described in the engineering change EC272057 issued on April 25, 2011. The failure to evaluate changes to the facility as described in EC272057 was contrary to 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) and was a performance deficiency warranting a significance evaluation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Manual for Traditional Enforcement and IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Disposition Screening. The violation was determined to be more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, because it could not reasonably be determined that the changes would not have ultimately required prior NRC approval. In accordance with Section 6.1.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation is categorized as Severity Level IV because the resulting changes were evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (Green), because it was a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in an actual loss of safety function and because further evaluation determined that the structures remained operable despite the degraded modulus condition. The finding had a cross cutting aspect in the area of human performance - work practices, H.4(b), because NextEra personnel did not follow procedures. Specifically, NextEra personnel did not follow the requirements of Section 5.2.2 of the 5059 Resource Manual when preparing the 50.59 screen for EC272057.
05000443/FIN-2009007-0230 September 2009 23:59:59SeabrookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, requires that measures be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified and corrected. In the case of significant conditions adverse to quality, the measure shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined and corrective action is taken to preclude repetition. The Florida Power and Light (FPL) Energy Quality Assurance Topical Report (QATR) was written pursuant to the above and states in Section A-6 that FPL implements a corrective action program to promptly identify and correct conditions adverse to quality. Procedure PI-AA-205 requires that significant conditions adverse to quality be resolved through corrective actions to prevent recurrence. Contrary to the above, NextEra Nuclear Oversight issued a finding on April 9, 2009, (QR 090-017) after determining that past corrective actions for B EDG turbocharger vibration issues were inadequate and have not been effective based on a past and recent history of increased vibration, bolt failures, bolt loosening, turbocharger related coolant piping weld failures, coolant system leaks and a failure in some instances to document these conditions in the condition reporting system. The failure to resolve long standing and increasing vibration and related issues for the B EDG constituted ineffective corrective action. The finding was more than minor because the ineffective action to resolve turbocharger vibrations impacted the availability and reliability of a mitigating system. Further, turbocharger vibration was causal to the B EDG failure on February 25, 2009 (reference Section 1R18 above). The finding had very low safety significance because it did not involve a loss of safety function or impact the safety function for a time greater than the allowed outage time in the technical specifications. While increased vibrations were causal to the February 25th B EDG failure, they were not the root cause since the cooling water system would have failed due the inadequate gasket design and irregular flange conditions. Further, the finding identified in QR 09-017 is separate from NRC Violation 20090701 since the inadequate design change resulting in the February 25 B EDG failure occurred during the discrete time period of January 29-31, 2009, whereas the corrective actions for the B EDG turbocharger vibrations have been ongoing for a longer period of time (reference 2001 CR 200107312). The inspectors determined that the Criterion XVI violation was licensee-identified. NextEra entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 00194370.
05000443/FIN-2006002-0131 March 2006 23:59:59SeabrookNRC identifiedInappropriate 10CFR50.59 Safety ScreenThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59; Changes, Tests, and Experiments. Specifically, Seabrook adversely changed the bases of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.10, Structural Integrity, to make it applicable to only the reactor coolant system pressure boundary piping, and not all American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) code class piping. This, in effect, changed the intent of TS 3.4.10 without a license amendment. Following identification of this issue, Seabrook entered the issue into their corrective action program as condition report 06-03108. This finding was addressed using traditional enforcement since it potentially impacted or impeded the regulatory process in that Seabrook used the 10 CFR 50.59 process to change the intent of an existing TS. This is contrary to the regulatory process that allows licensees to make changes without a license amendment provided that licensees comply with the 10 CFR 50.59 process. The finding is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change would have required Commission review and approval prior to implementation. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not require a quantitative assessment based on the shutdown risk mitigation capability of other available equipment.