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05000272/FIN-2017003-0130 September 2017 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedExpiration of Periodic Inservice Testing of 14 Service Water PumpInspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SLIV) non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.55a(z) when a periodic Inservice Test (IST) of the 14 service water (SW) pump and its strainer outlet check valve was not completed prior to expiration of its testing frequency on August 4 without Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) authorization. PSEGs corrective actions (C/As) included making repairs to the 14 SW strainer, satisfactory completion of the 14 SW IST on August 21, chartering an apparent cause evaluation (ACE), and entering the issue in their Corrective Action Program (CAP) as notification (NOTF) 20772390.The issue was assessed in accordance with IMC 0612 and traditional enforcement applied since the issue impeded the regulatory process. Specifically, PSEG did not perform the prescribed IST or obtain prior NRR authorization for an alternative measure in accordance with 10 CFR 50.55(a)(z). The Reactor Oversight Processs (ROP) significance determination process does not specifically consider regulatory process impact in its assessment of licensee performance. Therefore, it was necessary to address this violation,which impeded the NRCs ability to regulate, using traditional enforcement to adequately assess the non-compliance. The violation was determined to be a SLIV since: 1) the delay in the inservice test required, and PSEG did not obtain, prior Commission review and approval, 2) the associated consequence was minor or of very low safety significance, and 3) the NRC would have likely approved an alternative, given reasonable assurance of operability of the 14 SW train, in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The NRC also determined this violation was associated with a minor ROP performance deficiency. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects.
05000272/FIN-2014005-0531 December 2014 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Manual Reactor TripInspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SLIV) NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) when PSEG failed to make the required event notification within four hours for a valid actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor was critical. Inspectors determined that a manual reactor trip on October 19, 2014, was not in accordance with PSEGs preplanned documented procedural sequence and, therefore, reportable. PSEG entered this in their CAP (20668967) and reported this RPS actuation by updating a previous report (EN 50550) on November 24, 2014. Failing to submit an event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 within the required time was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within PSEGs ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Since the failure to submit a required event report impacts the regulatory process, traditional enforcement applied and the violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72, the issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. The inspectors reviewed the condition for reactor oversight process significance and concluded there was no associated finding. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612.
05000272/FIN-2014404-0130 June 2014 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedSecurity
05000272/FIN-2014404-0230 June 2014 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedSecurity
05000272/FIN-2012012-0131 December 2012 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedFailure to provide complete and accurate decommissioning status reportsDuring an NRC investigation completed on November 22, 2011, and a supplemental investigation completed on October 10, 2012, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.75(a) establishes requirements for indicating to the NRC how a licensee will provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for the decommissioning process and states that for power reactor licensees, reasonable assurance consists of a series of steps as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (e), and (f) of 10 CFR 50.75. 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2) states, in part, that power reactor licensees shall report at least every 2 years on the status of its decommissioning funding for each reactor or part of a reactor that it owns; and, that the information in this report must include, at a minimum, the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). 10 CFR 50.75(b)(1) states, in part, that for a holder of an operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, financial assurance for decommissioning shall be provided in an amount which may be more, but not less, than the amount stated in the table in paragraph (c)(1) adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in paragraph (c)(2). 10 CFR 50.75(c)(1) states the minimum amount required to demonstrate reasonable assurance of funds for decommissioning by reactor type and power level. 10 CFR 50.75(c)(2) requires, in part, that an adjustment factor be applied, which is based on escalation factors for labor and energy, and waste burial. 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2005, March 31, 2006, March 31, 2007, and March 31,2009, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) provided information on the status of its decommissioning funding that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, when it submitted the decommissioning funding status (DFS) reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75. Specifically, the March 31, 2005, March 31, 2007, March 31, 2006, and March 31, 2009, DFS reports stated that the decommissioning funds estimated to be required for each of the reactors, as listed in the report, were determined in accordance with 10 CFR 50.75(b) and the applicable formulas of 10 CFR 50.75(c). However, in multiple instances, the amount reported was a discounted value that was less than the minimum required amount specified by 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). This is a Severity Level IV violation.
05000272/FIN-2011002-0131 March 2011 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedUnit 1 Main Generator Voltage RegulatorThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Reporting System, because PSEG personnel did not provide a written report to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of a condition prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.1, Containment lntegrity. This was an NRC-identified violation of reporting requirements and potentially impacted the regulatory process. This type of violation is dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process defined in the NRC Enforcement Policy. In accordance with Section 6.9.d of the Enforcement Policy, this violation is categorized as a Severity Level lV violation. PSEG documented the issue in their corrective action program and conducted an evaluation to determine why the assignment to submit an LER was missed. The inspectors determined that this traditional enforcement violation did not involve a Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) finding, therefore, no cross-cutting issue was assigned
05000272/FIN-2011002-0231 March 2011 23:59:59SalemSelf-revealingFailure to Submit an LER for a Condition Prohibited by TS Associated with Containment lsolationA self-revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified for the failure of PSEG to resolve a long standing issue with the reliability of the Unit 1 main generator voltage regulator (VR). A failure in the Unit 1 main generator VR resulted in an automatic reactor trip due to a turbine trip above 50 percent power. Corrective actions include the planned replacement of the VR with a nuclear industry proven design during the October 2011 refueling outage. PSEG entered this issue into their CAP as notification 20481250. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The finding was evaluated under IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because it does not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. The inspectors determined that this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because PSEG affected long term plant safety by not minimizing long-standing equipment issues. Specifically, considering the increase in the number of Unit 1 main generator VR failures since 2007, PSEG did not resolve the lack of vendor and part support for the Unit 1 main generator VR in a timely manner. (H.2(a))
05000272/FIN-2007003-0130 June 2007 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedFailure to obtain code relief for incomplete inspections of Class 1 and Class 2 welds during the second ISI interval within the required time period. (Section 1R08)During an NRC inspection conducted between April 2, 2007, and April 27, 2007, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iv) states in part that where an examination requirement by the code or addenda is determined to be impractical by the licensee and is not included in the revised inservice inspection (ISI) program as permitted by paragraph (g)(4) of this section, the basis for this determination must be demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Commission not later than 12 months after the expiration of the initial 120-month period of operation from start of facility commercial operation and each subsequent 120-month period of operation during which the examination is determined to be impractical. 10 CFR 50.55a(g)(5)(iii) states in part that if the licensee has determined that conformance with certain code requirements is impractical for its facility, the licensee shall notify the Commission and submit, as specified in Section 50.4, information to support the determinations. Contrary to the above, PSEG Nuclear LLC determined that conformance with the code requirement for 100% inspection of 69 Class 1 welds and 29 Class 2 welds at Salem Nuclear Generating Station, Unit 2, during ISI interval 2 (May 10, 1992 - November 23, 2003), was impractical, however, (1) the basis for the termination was not demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Commission within 12 months after the expiration of ISI interval 2; and, (2) while PSEG notified the Commission of its determination on March 21, 2006, 28 months after the end of ISI interval 2, it did not submit the information necessary to support the determinations. This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I). Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, PSEG Nuclear LLC is hereby required to submit a written statement or explanation to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555-0001 with a copy to the Regional Administrator, Region I, and a copy to the NRC Resident Inspector at the facility that is the subject of this Notice, within 30 days of the date of the letter transmitting this Notice of Violation (Notice). This reply should be clearly marked as a Reply to a Notice of Violation EA-07-149 and should include: (1) the reason for the violation, or, if contested, the basis for disputing the violation or severity level; (2) the corrective steps that have been taken and the results achieved; (3) the corrective steps that will be taken to avoid further violations; and (4) the date when full compliance will be achieved.
05000272/FIN-2006201-0130 September 2006 23:59:59SalemNRC identifiedSecurity