Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateSiteIdentified byTitleDescription
05000458/FIN-2018012-0730 June 2018 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Main Feedwater System Sparger Nozzle DamageThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 , Changes, Tests, and Experiments, for the licensees failure to provide a written safety evaluation for the determination that operation with compensatory measures for damaged feedwater sparger nozzles did not require a license amendment pursuant to 10 CFR 50.90, Application for amendment of license, construction permit, or early site permit. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that compensatory measures prohibiting operation in single loop conditions required technical specification changes, and as such required prior NRC approval.
05000458/FIN-2018002-0130 June 2018 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Correct Inadequate Technical Specification Pressure Temperature CurvesThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for the licensees failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, after receiving vendor information indicating that existing technical specification pressure temperature (PT) curves were inadequate, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct the condition through the license amendment process.
05000458/FIN-2018012-0430 June 2018 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Submit a Licensee Event Report for a Manual ScramThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, for the licensees failure to submit a required licensee event report (LER). Specifically, on February 1, 2018, after an unexpected trip of the recirculation pump B, the licensee initiated a manual scram of the reactor that was not part of a preplanned sequence and failed to submit an LER within 60 days.
05000458/FIN-2015004-0431 December 2015 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Make a Notification to NRC Operations Center Regarding a Radioactive Spill Reported to Another Government AgencyThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because the licensee failed to notify the NRC Operations Center within four hours of a reportable event. The event was related to the health and safety of the public and protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies was made. Specifically, the licensee informally communicated information related to an August 1, 2015, spill of 60,000 gallons of radioactive condensate water in the turbine building with a credible mechanism to reach groundwater to the NRC resident inspector, other NRC regional staff, the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality, and West Feliciana Parish (of Louisiana) government authorities. However, the licensee failed to notify the NRC Operations Center as required. The event was documented in the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2015-05530 and CR-RBS-2015-05541. The licensee documented this violation in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2015-08838. The failure to notify the NRC about a notification to another government agency as required by 10 CFR 50.72 was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was evaluated using traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was evaluated using the criteria contained Section 6.9(d)(9) of the NRCs Enforcement Policy and determined to meet the criteria for disposition as a Severity Level IV violation. The licensee took immediate corrective action following identification of the issue by making the notification to the NRC Operations Center (EN 51599) on December 10, 2015. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000458/FIN-2013005-0231 December 2013 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Periodically Update the Updated Safety Analysis ReportThe inspectors identified two examples of a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for failure to update the Updated Safety Analysis Report. Specifically, the licensee failed to adequately describe the Low-Level Radwaste Storage Facility and the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation in the Updated Safety Analysis Report in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.70, Revision 3. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2013-07265. The failure to update the Updated Safety Analysis Report to reflect changes made to the facility was a violation of regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.71(e), Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports. This issue was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The issue was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, issued January 28, 2013, because the erroneous information in the Updated Safety Analysis Report was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there is no cross-cutting aspect (Section 2RS8).
05000458/FIN-2011008-0631 December 2011 23:59:59River BendNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain NRC Approval for Change to Ultimate Heat Sink Inventory RequirementsThe team identified a Severity Level IV, noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests and Experiments which states, in part, that a licensee shall obtain a license amendment pursuant to Section 50.90 prior to implementing a proposed change, test, or experiment if this activity would; result in more than a minimal increase in the likelihood of occurrence of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report (as updated). Specifically, from December 16,2002, to October 27,2011, the licensee changed the design basis of the ultimate heat sink inventory requirements to provide a 30-day cooling water supply without makeup capability to providing a less than 30-day cooling water supply with makeup capability without obtaining a license amendment. This finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2011-07674. The team determined that the failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a proposed change, test or experiment to the ultimate heat sink requirements was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was evaluated using traditional enforcement because the finding has the ability to impact the regulatory process. The finding was more than minor because it involved a change to the updated final safety analysis report description where there was a reasonable likelihood that the change would require NRC approval. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the team used insights from MC 0609, Significance Determination Process, to determine the final significance of the finding. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the finding represented a loss of system safety function in that the ultimate heat sink could not meet its 30-day mission time to provide decay heat removal. Therefore, a Phase 2 evaluation was necessary. The significance of the finding could not be assessed quantitatively through a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis. Consequently, an assessment was performed in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the frequency of events that would require long term use of the ultimate heat sink is very low and the difference in the failure probability to replenish the ultimate heat sink in 10 days versus 30 days is very small. This was because an early depletion of the inventory would be easily detected and would become a priority. At the time that replenishment would be needed, plant conditions should be stable and local transportation arteries should be restored. Therefore, since the finding had very low safety significance, the finding was determined to be Severity Level IV, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding did not have a crosscutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance