|Start date||Site||Identified by||Title||Description|
|05000254/FIN-2018003-02||30 September 2018 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Failure to Follow Procedures for Forced Helium Dehydration of a Multipurpose Canister||The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 72.150 when the licensee failed to follow procedures for the setup of the MPC FHD system. Specifically, during the setup for processing MPCs during the 2018 ISFSI loading campaign, the licensee failed to follow procedure OUMW671200, MPC Processing FHD for BWRs, Revision 1, Attachment 9, Step 1.2.1,which connected inlet and outlet hosing between the FHD skid and FHD manifold.|
|05000254/FIN-2018001-01||31 March 2018 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Repeat Use of Written Exams During Licensed Operator Requalification Examinations||The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 55.49, Integrity of Examinations and Tests, due to the licensee engaging in an activity that compromised the integrity of an examination. Specifically, the Quad Cities 2015 Licensed Operator Requalification (LOR) written examinations were duplicated from the 2013 LOR written examinations, the 2017 LOR written examinations were duplicated from the 2015 LOR examinations, and four individuals were administered the same written examinations from the previous requalification examination cycle.|
|05000254/FIN-2014005-02||31 December 2014 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Failure to Submit a Report Required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)||The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-citied violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) when licensee personnel failed to submit a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 for a loss of emergency assessment capability when an unplanned loss of the station seismograph was identified. Specifically, the licensee declared the station seismograph non-functional on October 7, 2014, and failed to report the condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72. The licensee entered this issue into their CAP as Issue Report 2415243, A Potential Issue Related to the QDC Seismic Monitor. The inspectors determined that this issue had the potential to impact the regulatory process based, in part, on the generic communications input that 10 CFR 50.72 reports serve. Since the issue impacted the regulatory process, it was dispositioned through the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors determined that this issue was a Severity Level IV violation based upon Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example d.9 in the NRC Enforcement Policy. Example d.9 specifically stated, The licensee fails to make a report requirement by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. Because a more-than-minor Reactor Oversight Process finding was not identified, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation.|
|05000254/FIN-2012012-01||31 December 2012 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Failure to provide complete and accurate decommissioning status reports||During an NRC investigation completed on November 22, 2011, and a supplemental investigation completed on October 10, 2012, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.75(a) establishes requirements for indicating to the NRC how a licensee will provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for the decommissioning process and states that for power reactor licensees, reasonable assurance consists of a series of steps as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (e), and (f) of 10 CFR 50.75. 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2) states, in part, that power reactor licensees shall report at least every 2 years on the status of its decommissioning funding for each reactor or part of a reactor that it owns; and, that the information in this report must include, at a minimum, the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). 10 CFR 50.75(b)(1) states, in part, that for a holder of an operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, financial assurance for decommissioning shall be provided in an amount which may be more, but not less, than the amount stated in the table in paragraph (c)(1) adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in paragraph (c)(2). 10 CFR 50.75(c)(1) states the minimum amount required to demonstrate reasonable assurance of funds for decommissioning by reactor type and power level. 10 CFR 50.75(c)(2) requires, in part, that an adjustment factor be applied, which is based on escalation factors for labor and energy, and waste burial. 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2005, March 31, 2006, March 31, 2007, and March 31,2009, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) provided information on the status of its decommissioning funding that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, when it submitted the decommissioning funding status (DFS) reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75. Specifically, the March 31, 2005, March 31, 2007, March 31, 2006, and March 31, 2009, DFS reports stated that the decommissioning funds estimated to be required for each of the reactors, as listed in the report, were determined in accordance with 10 CFR 50.75(b) and the applicable formulas of 10 CFR 50.75(c). However, in multiple instances, the amount reported was a discounted value that was less than the minimum required amount specified by 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). This is a Severity Level IV violation.|
|05000254/FIN-2011009-06||31 December 2011 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Failure to Update the FSAR With the Safety Analysis Performed In Response to GL 2008-01||The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.71, Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports, for the failure to update the final safety analysis report. Specifically, the final safety analysis report was not updated to reflect the analysis requested by the Commission in Generic Letter 2008-01. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program. The performance deficiency was determined to involve a traditional enforcement violation because it impacted the regulatory process. The traditional enforcement violation was determined to be more than minor because the information that was not included in the Final Safety Analysis Report had a material impact on safety and licensed activities. The traditional enforcement violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the failure to update the final safety analysis report to reflect the analysis performed in response to Generic Letter 2008-01 did not result in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. An evaluation for cross-cutting aspect was not applicable because this was a traditional enforcement violation.|
|05000254/FIN-2010503-01||30 June 2011 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||(Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL Basis Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plan without Prior NRC Approval||The inspector identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for failing to obtain prior approval for an emergency plan change which decreased the effectiveness of the plan. Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EAL HU6, Revision 26, which indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner. The violation affected the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without NRC approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program and revised the EAL basis to restore compliance. The finding was more than minor using IMC 0612, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the performance deficiency was a finding. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspector determined that the finding had a very low safety significance because the finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green finding because it involved one Unusual Event Classification|
|05000254/FIN-2000008-01||30 June 2000 23:59:59||Quad Cities||NRC identified||Corrective Action for Delinquent ASME Code Work Packages|
The inspectors identified a failure of the corrective action program where ASME Code Class 1, 2 and 3 Replacement and Repair program requirements for work package reviews were not met. On four occasions the licensee did not realize that the Code work packages were not meeting 10 CFR 50.55a ASME Code requirements. In each case, corrective actions were not taken to correct the situation. Failure to promptly identify and correct the failure to meet ASME code requirements for work packages was considered a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI.
The safety significance of this issue was considered very low based on the absence of adverse consequences and the fact that no technical problems were identified.