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05000277/FIN-2017003-0230 September 2017 23:59:59Peach BottomLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 55.25 states, in part, that if an operator develops a permanent physical or mental condition that causes the operator to fail to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 55.21, the facility licensee shall notify the Commission within 30 days of learning of the diagnosis, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.74(c),which states,that the regional administrator shall be notified if a licensed operator develops a permanent disability or illness. Contrary to these requirements, as the result of Exelons medical examination audit completed September 26, 2017, Exelon identified a change in a licensed operators medical condition that was not communicated to the NRC within the required 30 days. The results of the medical examination audit were documented in IR 4054146 and subsequent notifications were made to the NRC.This violation is subject to traditional enforcement because of the potential impact upon the regulatory process for issuing restrictions to operators licenses. The inspectors determined that this issue meets the criteria for a Severity Level IV violation using example 6.4.d.1(a) from the NRC Enforcement Policy because no incorrect regulatory decision was made as the result of the failure of the licensee to report within 30 days. This is of very low safety significance because after NRC review of the subsequent notifications, no changes to license restrictions were required.
05000278/FIN-2016001-0131 March 2016 23:59:59Peach BottomLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationOn September 29, 2015, Exelon identified the door to the Unit 3 condensate backwash tank room was not secure. The room is controlled as a locked HRA, and a survey of the room indicated that actual radiation levels were greater than 1.0 rem/hour. TS 5.7.2.a requires, in part, that entryways to areas exceeding 1.0 rem/hour will be locked or continuously guarded to prevent unauthorized entry. Contrary to the above, on September 29, 2015, Exelon identified an area with radiation levels greater than 1.0 rem/hour with an entryway that was not locked or continuously guarded. Traditional enforcement applies in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, sections 0612-09 and 0612-13; and Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4.d; because the inspectors did not identify an associated performance deficiency. Specifically, the inspectors determined that because Exelon had an acceptable door maintenance program, conducted weekly checks of LHRA doors, and has not had previous issues with unsecured doors, that the failure of the door lock mechanism was not apparent and, therefore, was not foreseeable and preventable. The issue was considered to be a SL IV violation of TS 5.7.2.a in accordance with Enforcement Policy Section 6.1.d. In addition, IMC 0612, Appendix B, Figures 1 and 2, Issue Screening, were utilized in documenting this as a SL IV licensee-identified NCV. The licensee took immediate corrective actions to ensure the door remained locked and documented the issue in condition report 2562192, and the investigation determined that no unauthorized access to the room had occurred.
05000278/FIN-2013011-0131 March 2013 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identifiedFailure to Comply with a Posted High Radiation Area BoundaryThe OI investigation, which was completed on March 14, 2013, was conducted to determine whether a PBAPS instrumentation and controls (I&C) technician deliberately failed to follow posted high radiation area (HRA) requirements when he crossed a boundary to manipulate a valve. The investigation was initiated after Exelon informed the NRC, on June 28, 2012, that the PBAPS I&C technician in question had potentially willfully failed to comply with a posted HRA boundary. This was contrary to Exelon procedures which requires, as indicated in the HRA radiation work permit (RWP), a HRA briefing prior to entering a HRA. Based on the evidence gathered during the OI investigation, the NRC concluded that on June 27, 2012, the I&C technician deliberately failed to follow posted HRA requirements when he crossed a HRA boundary during a Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system test. Specifically, the I&C technician crossed a posted HRA boundary and entered the Unit 3 HPCI room without a HRA briefing or the proper RWP. This conclusion was based on the I&C technicians admission to OI that he had done the wrong thing when he crossed the HRA boundary without the correct RWP; his experience and training working in the RCA; and his acknowledgement that he had alternative options that he should have chosen before violating HRA boundary requirements. The I&C technicians actions caused Exelon to violate the PBAPS Unit 3 operating license. Specifically, Technical Specification 5.4.1 requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, dated November 1972. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Appendix A, Section G, dated November 1972, recommends procedures for control of radioactivity, including restrictions and activities in radiation areas (G.5.a), and RWPs (G.5.e). Exelon Procedure RPAA- 460, Revision 20, Section 4.3.2, requires, in part that a HRA briefing is required to enter a HRA. Because the violation was caused by the deliberate action of the I&C technician, it was evaluated under the NRCs traditional enforcement process using the factors set forth in the NRC Enforcement Policy. After careful consideration of these factors, the NRC concluded that this violation should be classified at Severity Level (SL) IV. In reaching this decision, the NRC considered that the significance of the underlying violation was minor because, while the I&C technician crossed a posted HRA boundary, the radiological conditions at the time did not actually constitute a HRA area in accordance with the regulatory definition of a HRA. However, the NRC decided to increase the significance of this violation to SL IV since it was deliberate and the NRCs regulatory program is based, in part, on licensees and their contractors acting with integrity. In accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy, and with the approval of the Director, Office of Enforcement, this issue has been characterized as a non-cited violation (NCV 05000278/2013011-01, Failure to Comply with a Posted High Radiation Area Boundary), because: (1) Exelon placed the issue in its CAP (CR No. 1382220); (2) Exelon identified the issue and immediately conducted an investigation; (3) the violation was not repetitive as a result of inadequate corrective action; and, (4) although the violation was willful, (a) Exelon identified the violation, notified the NRC, and took significant corrective and remedial actions; (b) the violation involved the acts of an individual who was not considered a licensee official with oversight of regulated activities as defined in the Enforcement Policy; and (c) the violation did not involve a lack of management oversight and was the result of the isolated action of the employee. The NRC has concluded that information regarding the reason for the violation, the corrective actions taken and planned to correct the violation and prevent recurrence, and the date when full compliance was achieved is already adequately addressed on the docket in this letter.
05000277/FIN-2012009-0130 June 2012 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identifiedFailure to perform Security post inspection and inaccurate post inspection records10 CFR 50.9(a) requires that information required by the Commission\'s regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on January 16, 2011, and January 25, 2011, a security supervisor and a security officer at Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station: 1) did not perform a post inspection of a security post, in that the supervisor did not physically access the post to monitor and assess environmental conditions and to monitor the assigned security officer for signs of fatigue and inattentiveness; and, 2) created inaccurate records when the supervisor signed post inspection forms both for himself and for the security officer assigned to the posts, indicating that the post inspections had been completed when they, in fact, had not. The records were material in that they attest to the licensees ability to meet regulatory security response requirements.
05000277/FIN-2011502-0130 September 2011 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identified(Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL Basis Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plan without Prior NRC ApprovalThe inspector identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for failing to obtain prior approval for an emergency plan change which decreased the effectiveness of the plan. Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EAL HU6, Revision 13, which indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner. The violation affected the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without NRC approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program and revised the EAL basis to restore compliance. The finding was more than minor using IMC 0612, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the performance deficiency was a finding. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspector determined that the finding had a very low safety significance because the finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green finding because it involved one Unusual Event classification Due to the age of this issue, it was not determined to be reflective of current licensee performance and therefore a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding.
05000277/FIN-2010009-0130 June 2010 23:59:59Peach BottomSelf-revealingInaccurate Personnel History Questionnairea former contract outage employee at Peach Bottom deliberately failed to disclose on a Personal History Questionnaire (PHQ), a previous, non-nuclear employment from which he had been terminated for a positive FFD test, in order to gain unescorted access (UA) to Peach Bottom. As a result of the investigation, the NRC determined that, on September 8, 2008, the contract employee did fail to disclose his prior employment with the non-nuclear company on the PHQ, and also failed to provide information about the positive FFD test. However, after considering the information developed during the investigation, the NRC concluded that it did not have sufficient evidence to conclude that the individuals failures were deliberate. Nonetheless, as a result of these failures by the contract employee, Exelon granted the individual UA to Peach Bottom from September 11, 2008, until September 28, 2008. Exelon learned of the individuals positive FFD in August 2009, when the contract employee attempted to gain UA to Progress Energys Crystal River Nuclear Generating Plant 3 (Crystal River) Although the contract employee did not enter any Vital Areas at Peach Bottom and also did not perform work on any safety-related equipment during the time he was granted access, the contract employees actions caused Exelon to be in violation of NRC requirements, specifically: 1) 10 CFR 50.9, which states in part that information required by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects; and, 2) 10 CFR 73.56(c) and Section 9.1 of the Peach Bottom Physical Security Plan, both of which state, in part, that the licensees access authorization program must provide high assurance that the individuals who are granted unescorted access are trustworthy and reliable. Although Exelon was unaware of the contract employees omission of information regarding the positive FFD test, Exelon is responsible for the adequacy of its Physical Security Plan and background checks to identify past actions and appropriately evaluate the trustworthiness and reliability of applicants for UA. (This item was also discussed in Inspection Report 2010-004.)
05000277/FIN-2009005-0431 December 2009 23:59:59Peach BottomLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe Reload 16, Cycle 17, Revision 4, mid-cycle Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)was prepared and approved between November 21 and 26, 2008. This COLR revision was issued for implementation on March 12, 2009, and was submitted to the NRC by a letter from P. B. Cowan to the U.S. NRC, Issuance of Proprietary and Non-Proprietary COLRs, dated October 1,2009. TS 5.6.5.d, COLR, states, in part, the COLR, including any mid-cycle revisions or supplements, shall be provided upon issuance for each reload cycle to the NRC. Contrary to the above, between its issuance on March 12,2009, and its submittal on October 1,2009, the Reload 16, Cycle 17, Revision4, mid-cycle COLR was not provided in a timely manner to the NRC nor upon its issuance. This issue was documented in the CAP as IR 970608. Traditional enforcement applies since this was a violation that potentially impeded or impacted the regulatory process. This was considered a non-cited Severity Level IV violation since the untimely submittal did not have a material impact on licensed activities
05000277/FIN-2008405-0131 March 2008 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identifiedExtent of Condition and Corrective Action Program Usage for Operator Watch Standing Issues. (Section 4OA2.2)On September 10, 2007, representatives of WCBS-TV (New York City) contacted the NRC stating that they possessed videotapes of inattentive security officers at the Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station (PBAPS). Based upon this information, the NRC Region I Regional Administrator directed implementation of enhanced inspection oversight of security activities by the resident inspectors at PBAPS, and verbally informed Exelon management of the information received. Exelon commenced an internal investigation based upon this information. On September 19, 2007, WCBS-TV shared the videotapes with the NRC staff, which viewed the videos and determined that the situation warranted an Augmented Inspection. An Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) completed an inspection at PBAPS from September 21 through 28, 2007. The team concluded that Exelons prompt compensatory measures and corrective actions in response to the videotaped inattentive security officers at PBAPS were appropriate and ensured the stations ability to satisfy the Security Plan. However, the team determined that the security officer inattentiveness affected the defense-in-depth strategy, and that security force supervisors were not effective in ensuring unacceptable behavior was promptly identified and corrected. The AIT inspection results were published on November 5, 2007 in NRC Inspection Report 2007404 (ADAMS accession number ML073090061). On October 4, 2007, Exelon sent a letter to the NRC Region I Regional Administrator (ML072850708) which described their completed actions and initiatives to address the issues identified by the AIT. These initiatives included terminating the current security contract with their contractor and transitioning to a proprietary security force. Exelon also described plans to complete a root cause analysis of the security officer inattentiveness, identify corrective actions, and perform safety conscious work environment (SCWE) surveys of the Peach Bottom Security organization. On October 19, 2007, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter (CAL) to confirm Exelons commitments to assure that security officers remain attentive at all times while on duty (ML072920283). Exelon completed their root cause analysis in October 2007 and identified several causal factors related to the security officer inattentiveness issues and specific corrective actions to address the causal factors. One of the corrective actions was to perform a systematic SCWE assessment of all work groups at PBAPS (including the Security work group) based on an integrated review of information from the PBAPS Corrective Action Program (CAP), Employee Concerns Program (ECP), publicly available NRC allegation statistics, and SCWE surveys. The NRC conducted an AIT follow-up inspection from November 5 through 9, 2007, to review Exelons root cause analysis report and their planned corrective actions. The inspectors concluded the corrective actions were appropriate. With regard to the security officer inattentiveness issue, the AIT follow-up inspection identified a finding regarding Exelons failure to maintain the minimum required number of available security officer responders and an associated failure to implement an effective behavior observation program. The AIT follow-up inspection determined that the finding was related to SCWE because it involved security supervisors who did not encourage the free flow of information related to raising safety concerns, and who did not respond to security officer safety concerns in an open, honest, and non-defensive manner. The NRC determined the finding was of low to moderate safety significance (White). This was documented in a subsequent letter to Exelon dated February 12, 2008 (ML080440012). The AIT follow-up inspection results were issued in NRC Inspection Report 2007405 (ML073550590) dated December 21, 2007. Region I determined that Exelons actions to address the PBAPS inattentive security officer issues and their plans to transition to a proprietary security force warranted additional inspection and oversight beyond that specified in the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) baseline inspection program. On November 28, 2007, the Regional Administrator recommended, through a Deviation Memorandum to the NRCs Executive Director for Operations (EDO), that PBAPS warranted additional inspection resources (ML073320344). One additional inspection activity was to conduct inspections of Exelons efforts to address SCWE issues, including a review of the results of SCWE surveys conducted at the site. The EDO approved this request on November 28, 2007. Consistent with the planned corrective actions from their root cause evaluation, Exelon arranged for a third party to conduct a survey of the SCWE at PBAPS. The survey was in the form of a series of questions provided to the staff in January 2008. The survey was completed and the results provided to Exelon in February 2008. A separate SCWE survey of the security organization was also conducted during November 2007. Exelon utilized the survey results to complete a self-assessment of the SCWE at PBAPS. In accordance with the NRC Action Matrix Deviation Memorandum, this inspection was conducted onsite from March 24 though 28, 2008, to review Exelons self-assessment of the PBAPS SCWE, including a review of the results of their SCWE survey. Other completed Deviation Memorandum activities included a security organization performance monitoring inspection (ML080720038) and a root cause corrective action evaluation (ML081090161).
05000277/FIN-2004003-0330 June 2004 23:59:59Peach BottomLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 55.25 requires in part, that the facility licensee notify the Commission within 30 days of discovery, that a licensed operator has been diagnosed with a permanent physical condition that adversely affects the performance of assigned operator job duties, so that the Commission can make a determination of the licensed operators medical fitness. Contrary to this requirement on March 20, 2003, the facility licensee identified that a licensed operator underwent a medical procedure in December 1998 that should have been reported to the NRC. This issue was of very low safety significance because upon review of additional information provided by the facility licensee, the NRC physician determined that a restriction would not have been required because the licensed operator would have been able to perform licensed responsibilities without impairment. This failure to report medical information to the NRC impacted the regulatory process, and therefore, is classified at Severity Level IV.
05000277/FIN-2003004-0430 September 2003 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identifiedInadequate Emergency Plan Change Documentation, 10 CFR 50.54(Q)The inspector identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q). During the implementation of a new Standard Emergency Plan, Exelon did not retain a record that determined whether a decrease-in-effectiveness had or had not occurred when Exelon generated the new Standard Emergency Plan that deleted portions of the previous Combined Limerick/Peach Bottom Emergency Plan. Changing emergency plan commitments without documentation impacts the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function and is, therefore, processed through traditional enforcement as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000 (65 CFR 25388). According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
05000277/FIN-2003008-0131 March 2003 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identified10 CFR 50.54(Q) Violation for Decreasing the Effectiveness of the Plan by Changing Eals That Address Toxic Gas Without Prior NRC ApprovalSeverity Level IV. The licensee changed its emergency action level schemes such that there would be a reduction in declarable events as the emphasis shifted from personnel safety to equipment status. The changes were determined to be a decrease in the effectiveness of the emergency plans. Decreases in the effectiveness of an emergency plan must Page 7 of 8 receive NRC review prior to implementation. The changes were implemented without NRC approval. The finding was determined to be more than minor as its significance was related to the impact it would have on the mobilization of the emergency response organization and preclude offsite agencies from being aware of adverse conditions on site. The licensee accepted the NRC's position and entered this issue into its corrective action program (Condition Report 139997) and will change the emergency action levels back to the original wording. The implementation of the changes which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plans, without NRC review, is being treated as a non-cited violations consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy, issued on May 1, 2000 (65 FR 25388).
05000277/FIN-2000013-0131 December 2000 23:59:59Peach BottomNRC identifiedN/AThe team identified a non-cited Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 55.31(a)(4) because an operator license application was submitted to the NRC in August 1999 with incorrect information. The application was incorrect because it indicated that the individual completed all required training even though the emergency preparedness portion of his required training was not completed until May 2000 (approximately eight months after the individual had been licensed) When evaluating this issue according to NRC Manual Chapter 0610*, Appendix B, it did involve extenuating circumstances in that the issue potentially impacted the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The teams evaluation of the apparent cause indicated a problem between the emergency preparedness and operator training organizations, and limited to one individual. The issue was documented in PECOs corrective action program as Performance Enhancement Program Issue I0012084. (Section 4OA2.a)