|Start date||Site||Identified by||Title||Description|
|05000219/FIN-2018001-01||31 March 2018 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Untimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the No. 2 Emergency Diesel Generator||The inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. Specifically, on October 9, 2017, Exelon determined that the No. 2 emergency diesel generator was inoperable for longer than the allowed outage time, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. Exelon did not submit an LER for this event until January 3, 2018|
|05000219/FIN-2015008-01||30 June 2015 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Use of an Analytical Method to Determine the Core Operating Limits Without Prior NRC Approval||The NRC identified a Severity Level lV non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.9.1.f.2 in that Exelon did not obtain NRC approval prior to using a specific analytical method to determine the core operating limits. Specifically, Exelon used an analytical method (TRACG04P) to determine the core operating limits (the average power range monitor protection settings which were identified in the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR)); however, that particular analytical method was not previously reviewed and approved by the NRC prior to Exelons use. Exelon submitted a corrective action issue report (IR) to evaluate the condition (IR2482042). The team determined that Exelon did not comply with TS 6.9.1.f.2 requirements in that Exelon used an analytical method to determine the core operating limits without prior NRC approval. The team determined that this was a performance deficiency that was within Exelons ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, the team evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using the Enforcement Manual, the team characterized the violation as Severity Level IV because the underlying analytical method required NRC approval prior to use. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor within the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP), the team did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Section 07.03.c.|
|05000219/FIN-2015001-03||31 March 2015 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Incomplete 50.72 and 50.73 Reports Associated with Secondary Containment Integrity||The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.9(a) in that Exelon did not provide complete information in reports submitted per 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, a licensee event report (LER) submitted on November 18, 2014, did not discuss a separate, partially opened secondary containment door that was discovered during the same time frame, which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of secondary containment, and therefore was required to be discussed in the original LER. Exelon entered this issue into their corrective action program as IR 2440641. Planned corrective actions include revising the original LER to add a discussion of the partially opened secondary containment door. The inspectors determined that not providing a complete report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.9(a) is a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelons ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory oversight function, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with Section 2.2.2.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency identified with the reporting aspect of the event is a Severity Level IV violation because it is of more than minor concern with relatively inappreciable potential safety significance and is related to findings that were determined to be more than minor issues. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, this issue was not assigned a cross-cutting aspect.|
|05000219/FIN-2012012-01||31 December 2012 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Failure to provide complete and accurate decommissioning status reports||During an NRC investigation completed on November 22, 2011, and a supplemental investigation completed on October 10, 2012, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.75(a) establishes requirements for indicating to the NRC how a licensee will provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for the decommissioning process and states that for power reactor licensees, reasonable assurance consists of a series of steps as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (e), and (f) of 10 CFR 50.75. 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2) states, in part, that power reactor licensees shall report at least every 2 years on the status of its decommissioning funding for each reactor or part of a reactor that it owns; and, that the information in this report must include, at a minimum, the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). 10 CFR 50.75(b)(1) states, in part, that for a holder of an operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, financial assurance for decommissioning shall be provided in an amount which may be more, but not less, than the amount stated in the table in paragraph (c)(1) adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in paragraph (c)(2). 10 CFR 50.75(c)(1) states the minimum amount required to demonstrate reasonable assurance of funds for decommissioning by reactor type and power level. 10 CFR 50.75(c)(2) requires, in part, that an adjustment factor be applied, which is based on escalation factors for labor and energy, and waste burial. 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2005, March 31, 2006, March 31, 2007, and March 31,2009, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) provided information on the status of its decommissioning funding that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, when it submitted the decommissioning funding status (DFS) reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75. Specifically, the March 31, 2005, March 31, 2007, March 31, 2006, and March 31, 2009, DFS reports stated that the decommissioning funds estimated to be required for each of the reactors, as listed in the report, were determined in accordance with 10 CFR 50.75(b) and the applicable formulas of 10 CFR 50.75(c). However, in multiple instances, the amount reported was a discounted value that was less than the minimum required amount specified by 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). This is a Severity Level IV violation.|
|05000219/FIN-2012002-04||31 March 2012 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Failure to Ensure Licensed Operators Met License Conditions for Medical Examinations||The inspector identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 55.21, Medical Examination, for two licensed reactor operators failing to have a medical examination by a physician every two years. This violation was identified by an NRC inspector May 25, 2011 and Exelon entered it into their corrective action program and performed the medical examinations on the two reactor operators. The inspectors determined that the failure to perform the biennial medical examinations for two licensed reactor operators in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelons ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that the medical conditions of two licensed operators were not reviewed and reported to the NRC, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.4.d.1 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspector determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Exelon personnel did not perform the medical examinations required by 10 CFR 55.21. The finding was of very low safety significance because during the time period when the physicals were required to be performed, neither operator had stood watch, and when the physicals were administered on June 2, 2011, all requirements were met. No changes to the conditions on either operators license were necessary following their physicals. In accordance with Inspection Manual chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.|
|05000219/FIN-2012002-05||31 March 2012 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||Licensee-identified||Licensee-Identified Violation||10 CFR 50.74, Notification of Change in Operator or Senior Operator Status requires that the licensee shall notify the appropriate Regional Administrator within 30 days of the following in regard to licensed operator or senior operator: permanent disability or illness, as described in 10 CFR 55.25. Contrary to the above, Exelon failed to notify the Region I Regional Administrator of medical conditions associated with two Reactor Operators within 30 days of the conditions being identified by medical personnel. Specifically, one reactor operator had a change in diagnosis and medication March 9, 2011; however, he did not report the change to the Exelon medical staff until October 12, 2011, during his biennial medical examination. Exelon staff notified the NRC of the change November 9, 2011. Another Reactor Operator notified Exelon medical staff of a change to his medication on March 22, 2011; however, Exelon medical staff did not report the change to the NRC until January, 2012. The inspector determined that Exelons failure to ensure that licensed operators met the license conditions associated with medical testing was a performance deficiency that was within Exelons ability to foresee and correct. The inspector determined that Traditional Enforcement applies, as the issue impacted the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function because the NRC relies upon accurate certification by the licensees medical examiner to ensure all licensed operators meet the medical conditions of their license. Specifically, it impacted the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function since the NRC would have placed no solo restrictions on the reactor operators licenses 7 months and 10 months earlier. The inspector determined this finding to be of very low safety significance (SL IV) due to the following mitigating factors: at no time did either reactor operator stand watch unsupervised, no errors were made by either reactor operator during the time period when the license restrictions should have been implemented and both operators took all medication as prescribed. The performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of Inspection manual chapter (IMC) 0612, appendix B, Issue Screening. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.|
|05000219/FIN-2011503-01||30 September 2011 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||(Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL Basis Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plan without Prior NRC Approval||The inspector identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for failing to obtain prior approval for an emergency plan change which decreased the effectiveness of the plan. Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EAL HU6, Revision 13, which indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner. The violation affected the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without NRC approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program and revised the EAL basis to restore compliance. The finding was more than minor using IMC 0612, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the performance deficiency was a finding. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspector determined that the finding had a very low safety significance because the finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green finding because it involved one Unusual Event classification Due to the age of this issue, it was not determined to be reflective of current licensee performance and therefore a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding.|
|05000219/FIN-2011002-03||31 March 2011 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Failure to Administer Post Event Fitness for Duty Testing||The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV, non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 26.31 (c) (3) and Exelon procedure SY-AA-102-202, Testing For Cause, for failure to administer post-event drug and alcohol testing after a potential substantial degradation of the level of safety of the plant occurred on December, 23,2010. Additionally, the inspectors identified that the licensee failed to administer a post event fatigue assessment per 10 CFR 26.211 (aX3) and Exelon procedure LS-AA-1 19-1001, Fatigue Management. Specifically, the inspectors identified that on December, 23, 2010, the licensee failed to conduct post-event drug and alcohol testing, and fatigue assessments of the operators whose human error caused a reactor scram during a reactor startup. Upon identification, the licensee entered this issue into the CAP. The inspectors determined that the finding involved traditional enforcement because Exelon did not perform 10 CFR 26.31 post event fitness for duty (FFD) testing and 10 CFR 26.211 post event fatigue assessments. lf a licensed operator had tested positive, Exelon would have had to report this to the NRC per 10 CFR26.719 (2xii). Exelon\'s failure to perform the required testing had the potential to impact the NRC\'s ability to take action against individual licensed operators, which impacted the regulatory process. In accordance with Section 6.14, Fitness for Duty, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the NRC determined that the safety significance of this violation met the SL lV criteria because the situation, per example 3 of a SL lV violation, was a matter with more than a minor safety or environmental significance.|
|05000219/FIN-2009007-01||30 June 2009 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Trunnion Room Door/Secondary Containment Temporary Modification||The team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, in that, Exelon did not obtain a license amendment for a change in the facility that involved a change to the technical specifications (TS). Specifically, Exelon implemented a temporary modification that changed the secondary containment boundary, but was prohibited by TS requirements, without first obtaining the necessary license amendment. In response, Exelon entered the issue into the corrective action program for evaluation. Current compliance with TS was not challenged since the temporary modification was restored as of November 15, 2008. The violation is more than minor because the change that required the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation would have required NRC review and approval prior to implementation. Because this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, it was considered to be a violation that potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process. Therefore, this violation was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. Comparing this item to the examples in NUREG 1600 (Enforcement Policy), Supplement I, this finding is similar to Item D.5, Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 that result in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance (i.e., Green) by the SDP. This is an example of a Severity Level IV violation. The team determined the violation to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not adversely impact shutdown mitigation capabilities and did not result in a loss of control. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision-Making Component, because Exelon did not use conservative assumptions in decision making during the safety evaluation performance and review. Specifically, Exelon did not consider the TS requirements and UFSAR and TS bases when performing and reviewing a safety evaluation that permitted a configuration that was not authorized by TSs. (IMC 0305, Aspect H.1(b))|
|05000219/FIN-2005006-03||30 June 2005 23:59:59||Oyster Creek||NRC identified||Failure to Perform an Adequate 10 CFR 50.59 Analysis (ESW Overboard)|
The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 Changes, Tests, and Experiments, requirements for the failure to perform an adequate safety evaluation of a change to the facility. Specifically, the safety evaluation did not evaluate the potential for a new type of malfunction of an installed liner associated with the 30-inch overboard discharge line on the emergency service water (ESW) system.
This finding was addressed using traditional enforcement since it potentially impacts or impedes the regulatory process in that a required 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was not adequate. This is contrary to the regulatory process that allows licensees to make changes without a license amendment provided that licensees comply with 10 CFR 50.59 process. The finding is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change could have required Commission review and approval prior to implementation. However, the finding has been evaluated as very low safety significance (Green) because the liner was subsequently determined to have not have introduced a new malfunction that would impact on the ESW system.