Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateSiteIdentified byTitleDescription
05000287/FIN-2018003-0330 September 2018 23:59:59OconeeSelf-revealingMain Steam Relief Valve As-Found Lift Pressure Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsA self-revealed SL IV NCV of TS 3.7.1, Main Steam Relief Valves (MSRVs), was identified when a routine lift pressure test revealed that two of sixteen main steam relief valves were higher than allowed by TS SR 3.7.1.1 for a duration that was longer than the conditions TS required action completion time.
05000269/FIN-2018003-0130 September 2018 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Maintain the Effectiveness of the Emergency PlanThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50.54(q)(2), for the licensees failure to maintain the effectiveness of the Oconee Nuclear Station (ONS) Emergency Plan (E-Plan). Specifically, from December 2014 until January 2018, the licensee failed to perform an adequate 10 CFR 50.54(q) evaluation for their E-Plan when a corresponding change was made to their Protective Action Recommendation (PAR) Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure (EPIP).
05000269/FIN-2018003-0230 September 2018 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 60 Day Notification of an Actuation of an Emergency AC Power SourceAn NRC identified SL IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required 60-day notification. Keowee Hydro Unit 2 automatically started on May 7, 2018, following an electrical lockout of the Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 startup transformer.
05000269/FIN-2018002-0230 June 2018 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Coordinate a No-later-than Arrival Time for the Shipment of a Category 2 Quantity of Radioactive MaterialThe inspectors identified aSeverity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 37.75(b) when the licensee failed to coordinate a no-later-than arrival time for a Category 2 shipment of radioactive material. Specifically, the licensee failed to recognize that a package of primary resin contained a Category 2 quantity of Cobalt-60 prior to shipment, and therefore failed to arrange a no-later-than arrival time with the receiving licensee.
05000287/FIN-2016002-0430 June 2016 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Make a Non-Emergency Eight Hour Notification of a Loss of Safety FunctionAn NRC-identified Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required non-emergency eight hour notification for a loss of the emergency AC power path function. On December 7, 2015 Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 experienced a loss of the emergency AC power path function for approximately 21 minutes. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as NCR 01981762 and will evaluate their internal reportability procedures regarding the time of discovery. The failure to make an eight hour non-emergency report for a loss of the emergency AC power path function per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function and was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. This violation was assessed using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy, revised February 4, 2015. Using the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72, the issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation. In accordance with IMC 0612, because this violation involved traditional enforcement and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation.
05000269/FIN-2014005-0131 December 2014 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Update FSAR for Mode 4 LOCAAn NRC identified Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e), "Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports," was identified for the licensees failure to update the final safety analysis report (FSAR) after the licensee adopted the improved technical specifications (ITS). The licensee adoption of ITS introduced the possibility of a Mode 4 loss of cooling accident (LOCA), which was an accident of a different type than previously evaluated in the FSAR. The licensee initiated PIP O-15-00260 in order to determine future corrective actions. Continued non-compliance does not present an immediate safety concern because the inspectors assessed this as a very low safety significant issue. The licensees failure to update the FSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function and was dispositioned using traditional enforcement. Specifically, a failure to update the UFSAR challenges the regulatory process because it serves as a reference document used, in part, for recurring safety analyses, evaluating license amendment requests, and in preparation for and conduct of inspection activities. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation per Section 6.1.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, revised July 9, 2013, because the lack of up-to-date information has not resulted in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The NRC Enforcement Policy also requires disposition of findings in the significance determination process, which determined the finding was not more than minor. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation.
05000269/FIN-2014007-0630 June 2014 23:59:59OconeeLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor, shall update periodically, the FSAR originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. This submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the FSAR. Contrary to the above, since December 6, 2012, after updating the UFSAR to reflect the new licensing basis under NFPA-805, several items applicable to the Fire Protection System were incorrectly removed. Traditional enforcement was applicable because the violation could impact the regulatory process, and was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the lack of up-to-date information did not result in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP O-13-09302.
05000269/FIN-2014007-0330 June 2014 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR with Current Battery Testing StandardsThe team identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to include in the latest Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) changes made to the sites licensing bases with respect to station battery testing made during the Technical Specification conversion to Integrated Technical Specifications. Specifically, the UFSAR did not identify the standards by which the testing was conducted. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program as problem identification program report O-14-2338 and planned to include the omitted battery testing standards to the UFSAR during an upcoming update cycle. The team dispositioned the performance deficiency using the traditional enforcement process because failing to update the UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1.d.3 as the lack of up-to-date information did not result in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, no cross-cutting aspects are assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000269/FIN-2013003-0130 June 2013 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Timely Report Required InformationAn NRC- Identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit a timely and complete Licensee Event Report (LER). The LER submittal did not contain the required narrative section and did not meet the 60 day report requirement. There are two examples of this violation. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP. The licensee submitted the LERs to restore compliance. The licensees failure to submit LERs within 60 days of the date of discovery and with all required information as require by 10 CFR 50.73 is a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was assessed using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors determined the significance of this violation was a Severity Level IV violation using Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Cross cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000269/FIN-2013003-0230 June 2013 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Make Required 8-Hour ReportAn NRC-Identified SL IV non-cited violation for failure to make an 8-hour report as required by 10 CRF 50.72 was identified. The licensee failed to report an inadequate heat load analysis and design that impacted emergency power equipment. The issue was entered into the licensees CAP. The licensee completed the 8-hour report to restore compliance. The licensees failure to submit an 8-hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Cross cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000269/FIN-2012005-0131 December 2012 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR to Include Non-Safety Related Equipment Credited for Accident MitigationAn NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with information developed in response to Generic Letter (GL) 83-28. The UFSAR was not updated to indicate all nonsafety structures, systems, and components (SSCs) used for mitigation of FSAR Chapter 15 events. The licensee initiated corrective actions to update the UFSAR. The failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was evaluated using traditional enforcement because the failure to update the UFSAR hinders the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1.d.3 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000269/FIN-2009002-0131 March 2009 23:59:59OconeeLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) requires that conditions prohibited by TSs be reported to the NRC via a LER within 60 days of the discovery of the event. Contrary to this requirement, the licensee did not report the failure of multiple MSRVs to pass their pressure lift tests, a condition prohibited by TSs, to the NRC via a LER within 60days of the discovery of the event. The MSRVs failed the lift tests in October 2006on Unit 1, April 2007 on Unit 2, and October 2007 on Unit 3. The licensee identified the missed reports while investigating the failure of multiple Unit 2 MSRVs to pass their lift pressure test on October 24, 2009. The inspectors determined this licensee identified finding was a Severity Level IV NCV in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, section IV.A.3., due to the failure to make required LERs following the failed tests, because the licensee knew of the information to be reported, but did not recognize that a report was required to be made. These prior events were also described in LER 05000270/2008002-00. The event is captured in the licensees corrective action program as PIP O-08-06525
05000269/FIN-2005003-0230 June 2005 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedImplementation of a Change to Emergency Action Level 4.7.U.2.1 which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency PlanA Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for implementing a change which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without prior NRC approval, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The change involved Emergency Action Level 4.7.U.2.1 classification of Natural Disasters, Hazards and Other Conditions Affecting Plant Safety The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. This finding has greater than minor significance in that the change extends the event time allowed prior to appropriate emergency classification of a natural disaster which could adversely affect the performance of both onsite and offsite emergency actions. The finding was determined to be a non-cited Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
05000269/FIN-2001006-0131 March 2001 23:59:59OconeeNRC identifiedInadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluation Associated with Revising UFSAR Section 3.2.2 to Remove the Spent Fuel Pool as a Suction Source for a High Pressure Injection Pump After Certain Tornadoes10 CFR 50.59 (a)(1) (as revised January 1, 1999) states in part, that the licensee may make changes in the facility as described in the safety analysis report without prior Commission approval, provided the proposed change does not involve an unreviewed safety question (USQ). 10 CFR 50.59 (a)(2) states, in part, that a proposed change involves an USQ if the probability of occurrence or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the safety analysis report may be increased The Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) Section 3.2.2, System Quality Group Classification, states, in part, that a sufficient supply of primary side makeup water is assured during a tornado initiated loss of offsite power by several sources. Included in these sources is a high pressure injection (HPI) pump taking suction from the spent fuel pool (SFP) UFSAR Section 3.2.2 further states that protection against a tornado is an Oconee design criterion, and that capability is provided to safely shut down all three units, in that, after a tornado, normal shutdown systems will remain available or alternate systems will be available to allow shutdown of the plant Contrary to the above, on August 28, 2000, the licensee completed a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation to revise UFSAR Section 3.2.2 and delete the SFP as a suction source for the HPI pump after certain tornadoes, thereby increasing the probability of the malfunction of equipment important to safety. This resulted in an USQ for which the licensee did not have prior Commission approval.