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05000410/FIN-2016001-0431 March 2016 23:59:59Nine Mile PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationEight-hour reports. If not reported under paragraphs (a), (b)(1), or (b)(2) of this section, the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any of the following: (v) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material. Contrary to the above, from April 2, 2014, until October 5, 2015, Exelon failed to submit an EN to the NRC within 8 hours upon discovery on a condition which could have prevented the safety function of a SSC needed to control the release of radioactivity on April 2, 2014, at 11:20 a.m. Specifically, secondary containment being declared inoperable due to both airlock doors being open at the same time in Mode 5 with an OPDRV in progress. The inspectors reviewed the violation using IMC 0612 Appendix B, Issue Screening, and the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation impacted the regulatory process so traditional enforcement applies. Comparing this violation to the examples in the NRC Enforcement Policy Chapter 6, the violation matches Severity Level IV Example 6.9.d.9, a licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC did not rely upon the information to make any regulatory decisions and the error did not result in increased scope or effort of NRC inspections. Compliance was restored when Exelon submitted LER 05000410/2014-007-01, Secondary Containment Inoperable due to Simultaneous Opening of Airlock Doors, to correct the public record and inform the NRC. Exelon staff entered the issue into its CAP.
05000410/FIN-2016001-0531 March 2016 23:59:59Nine Mile PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe holder of an operating license under this part shall submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event. (v) Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (C) Control the release of radioactive material. Contrary to the above from June 2, 2014, until October 5, 2015, Exelon failed to submit an LER notification to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of a condition which could have prevented the safety function of a SSC needed to control the release of radioactivity on April 2, 2014 at 11:20 a.m. Specifically, secondary containment being declared inoperable due to both airlock doors being open at the same time in Mode 5 with an OPDRV in progress. The inspectors reviewed the violation using IMC 0612, Appendix B and the NRC Enforcement Policy. This violation impacted the regulatory process so traditional enforcement applies. Comparing this violation to the examples in the NRC Enforcement Policy Chapter 6, the violation matches Severity Level IV Example 6.9.d.9, a licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The NRC did not rely upon the information to make any regulatory decisions, and the error did not result in increased scope or effort of NRC inspections. Compliance was restored when Exelon submitted LER 05000410/2014-007-01 to correct the public record and inform the NRC. Exelon staff entered the issue into its CAP.
05000220/FIN-2013005-0331 December 2013 23:59:59Nine Mile PointSelf-revealingInadequate DSC Welding Procedure to Control and Monitor Hydrogen ConcentrationsA self-revealing Severity Level IV NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified when CENG personnel did not ensure that hydrogen concentrations were being properly monitored and maintained during welding on dry shielded container (DSC) #12 on August 14, 2013. Specifically, site procedure S-MMP-ISFSI-004, DSC Sealing Operation, Revision 00201, provided inadequate direction for the control of purging and hydrogen monitoring calibration, set-up, and operation. This caused an undetected loss of DSC purge and a failure of the hydrogen monitor, ultimately resulting in a hydrogen deflagration in DSC #12. CENG staff generated CR-2013-006840 to address the hydrogen deflagration. Corrective actions included: (1) reducing water level in the DSC by 1100 gallons during welding operations to reduce the amount of hydrogen generation; (2) installed dual hydrogen monitors off the vent line to provide redundant indication; (3) required the performance of local hydrogen monitoring at the weld joint prior to commencing welding; (4) reconfigured the location of the hydrogen monitors; (5) ensured hydrogen monitors were properly configured, including the use of the low flow differential pressure switch setting in a helium environment; and (6) adjusted the alarm settings on the hydrogen monitors. The inspectors determined that CENG personnels failure to provide adequate instructions, procedures, and drawings to ensure that hydrogen concentrations were being properly monitored and maintained in accordance with 10 CFR 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, during welding of DSC #12 on August 14, 2013, was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within CENG staffs ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. As a result, a hydrogen deflagration occurred. The failure to properly monitor and maintain hydrogen concentrations had the potential to damage the DSC and spent fuel within the DSC. Because the issue involved independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) operations, consistent with the guidance in Section 2.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using Example 6.3.d. from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation. The hydrogen deflagration ultimately did not result in the damage to fuel; however, the failure to properly monitor and maintain hydrogen concentrations had the potential to damage the DSC and spent fuel within the DSC. Because the violation involved the traditional enforcement process and was not associated with ISFSI support programs conducted under a 10 CFR 50 license, the inspector did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B.
05000220/FIN-2013002-0331 March 2013 23:59:59Nine Mile PointNRC identifiedFailure to Submit a Required Licensee Event ReportThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) in that Unit 1 inappropriately retracted an event notification report (ENR) and subsequently failed to make the required licensee event report (LER) for a valid actuation of the HPCI system. Specifically, Constellation inappropriately retracted ENR number 48477, an 8-hour notification for a valid HPCI actuation and failed to submit an LER within 60 days of discovery of the actuation. Constellation entered this issue into their CAP as CR-2013-001859. The inspectors determined that the inappropriate retraction of a notification required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and failure to make a required event report in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(4) were performance deficiencies that were reasonably within Constellations ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Because this issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated these performance deficiencies in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor, the inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, issued September 7, 2012.
05000220/FIN-2012005-0431 December 2012 23:59:59Nine Mile PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR Part 55.53(i) requires as a condition of a license, that the licensee (licensed operator) shall have a biennial medical examination. Contrary to the above, for approximately three hours on December 14, 2012, a licensed Unit 2 Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) filled the dayshift control room supervisor role without having a fully completed biennial medical examination. The SROs previous medical examination was completed November 3, 2010 and his latest medical examination should, therefore, have been completed in November 2012. Although the SRO had successfully completed the physical testing portion of the medical examination on September 19, 2012, the examination was not complete in that it still required review and approval of the licensed medical practitioner, who was not available on that day. The licensed operator did not realize his physical was incomplete and the qualification matrix, used to track whether operators meet conditions of their licenses, identified the operator as meeting all requirements to assume licensed duties. Accordingly, the SRO did not identify this deficiency prior to assuming the shift on December 14, 2012. Approximately three hours into the shift, other station personnel performing a paperwork verification of annual examination completion identified that the SRO had not completed his required biennial medical examination. The SRO was immediately relieved of watch standing duties, and his physical was subsequently completed on December 17, 2012. No disqualifying medical conditions were identified. NMPNS promptly entered the issue into its corrective action process as CR-2012- 011258 and CR-2012-011261 and initiated a root cause investigation. An extent of condition review determined that medical physical examinations for all other Nine Mile Point licensed operators were completed within the required periodicity.
05000220/FIN-2010008-0131 December 2010 23:59:59Nine Mile PointNRC identifiedDeliberately Failing to Use a Whole Body Contamination monitor When Exiting the Radiologically Controlled AreaThe actions of the non-licensed operator violated Nine Mile Point Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 5.4.1, which caused Constellation to be in violation of its license conditions and NRC requirements. This section states, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the following activities: the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Section 7.e of Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, lists procedures for radiation protection contamination control and radiation protection - personnel monitoring. Licensee procedure GAP-RPP-O1, Radiation Protection Program, Revision 01900, Section 3.5.2.d states, in part: To control personnel contamination, Radiation Protection should establish and maintain personnel monitoring areas at various locations throughout the RCA, and at exits from the RCA, as determined by RP Supervision. Personnel shall monitor themselves for contamination upon exiting the RCA and other RCAs as specified by RP Supervision, in a WBCM. Contrary to the above, on April 15,2010, Constellation identified that a non-licensed operator exited the RCA without first monitoring himself for contamination in a WBCM. Specifically, the non-licensed operator admitted he exited the RCA without using the WBCM in order to avoid a long line waiting to use the monitor. Later, when attempting to leave the site, the operator alarmed a portal monitor, due to contamination on his clothing. Although Constellation was initially unaware that the non-licensed operator exited the RCA without using the WBCM, Constellation is responsible for the actions of its employees. Because you are responsible for the actions of your employees, and because the violation involved deliberate misconduct, the violation was evaluated under the NRC\\\'s traditional enforcement process as set forth in Section 2.2.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. After considering the low level of contamination found, that no contamination left the site, and the violation was not repetitive, the NRC has categorized it at Severity Level lV in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into Nine Mile Point\\\'s corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a non-cited violation (NCV), consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy (NCV 05000410/2010008-01, Deliberately Failing to Use a Whole Body Contamination Monitor When Exiting the Radiologically Controlled Area). The current NRC Enforcement Policy is included on the NRC\\\'s website at http.//www.nrc.qov; select About NRC, Regulation, Enforcement, then, Enforcement Policy
05000220/FIN-2011009-0131 December 2010 23:59:59Nine Mile PointNRC identifiedIntentional Failure to Follow ProcedureOn Friday, March 5,2010, the SE received information indicating that a charcoal sample taken from an NMP #11 R8EVS charcoal filter had failed its two-year required surveillance test (ST). The sample did not meet the minimum value for radioactive methyl iodide removal specified in NMP Technical Specifications (TS). As a result, in accordance with the TS, the NMP1 R8EVS train should have been declared inoperable and the plant should have promptly entered the seven day TS limiting condition of operation (LCO) action statement. In addition, in accordance with 10 CFR 50, App. 8. Criterion XVI and site procedures, the SE should have immediately notified his supervision of the failed ST, since it constituted a condition adverse to quality. However, the SE deliberately decided to not inform his supervision of the failed ST until Monday, March 8, 2010. The SE later admitted his failures to Constellation during the internal Constellation investigation into this matter, and the SE also cooperated with NRC investigators during the NRC 01 investigation. Because licensees are responsible for the actions of their employees and because the violation involved deliberate misconduct, the violation was evaluated under the NRC\\\'s traditional enforcement process as set forth in Section 2.2.4 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation is considered to be of very low safety significance because NMP returned the #11 RBEVS train to service on March 9, 2010, which would have been within the required seven day timeframe even if the LCO had been appropriately entered on March 5, 2010, Therefore, the NRC has characterized the violation at Severity Level (SL) IV, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The violation is being cited in the Notice in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, because the violation involved the acts of an SE who with the operability information he possessed, was in a position with responsibilities that were directly related to the oversight of licensed activities, Constellation\\\'s corrective actions included: 1) replacing the subject NMP #11 RBEVS charcoal, ensuring the #11 RBEVS train successfully passed the ST, and then returning the system to service on March 9, 2010; 2) taking appropriate disciplinary action against the involved SE and, 3) conducting training for all SEs regarding following requirements and not engaging in deliberate misconduct.
05000220/FIN-2009003-0230 June 2009 23:59:59Nine Mile PointNRC identifiedOperator Failure to Obtain Senior Reactor Operator Permission Prior to Changing Reactor PowerA cited violation (VIO) of Unit 1 Technical Specification (TS) 6.4, Procedures, was identified when a Reactor Operator (RO) and a Chief Reactor Operator (CRO) failed to notify the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) of an over power event and manipulated reactor power without CRS approval or direction. Specifically, the RO deliberately manipulated the controls to increase power without the approval or direction of a senior reactor operator (SRO); the CRO and RO manipulated the controls to decrease power without the approval or direction of an SRO when power exceeded the megawatt-thermal license limit; and, the CRO deliberately failed to immediately report the over power and down power events to Operations management. The violation, absent willfulness, would be considered a minor violation because it did not impact the safe operation of the reactor, in that, the over power condition was minimal (100.03 percent for approximately one hour). However, the NRC considered the violation to have been more significant than minor because it involved willfulness, and therefore, the NRC has classified the violation at Severity Level (SL) IV, in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy.
05000220/FIN-2002009-0130 September 2002 23:59:59Nine Mile PointNRC identifiedInaccurate Reporting of Performance Indicator DataA Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR Part 50.9(a) (Completeness and Accuracy of Information), dispositioned as a non-cited violation, was identified for failure to report the correct unavailability hours associated with the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system. The information submitted to the NRC by the licensee in the first quarter of 2001, to fulfill requirements of the NRC Performance Indicator Program, was not correct. Specifically, while performing testing on the HPCI system on April 21, 2001, the systems controller was found inoperable. The licensee reported no unavailability hours related to this fault because the system was not required to be operable, due to the plant configuration, during the test period This is contrary to the requirements of the program in which the fault exposure time (the time between last successful operation of the system and determination of the fault) must be accounted for in the unavailability report. This finding is more than minor because the actual unavailability hours of the HPCI system changed the NRC Performance Indicator color from Green to White. As a result the licensees mitigating systems cornerstone did not properly reflect its status as a degraded cornerstone for 9 months. Additionally, the performance of a Supplemental Inspection by the NRC related to the controller failure was not conducted until 16 months after the occurrence. (Section 02.01.1.c)