Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateSiteIdentified byTitleDescription
05000336/FIN-2015007-0230 June 2015 23:59:59MillstoneNRC identifiedFailure to Provide 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation for Interim Action Associated with Implementation of Operability Determination ProcedureThe team identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, in that Dominion failed to perform a written evaluation to provide the bases for determining whether a change to the facility required a license amendment. Specifically, the team identified that contrary to 10 CFR 50.59, Dominion failed to properly evaluate operator compensatory actions to refill an oil bubbler on the C reactor building component cooling water (RBCCW) pump that was leaking oil at a rate that would have prevented the pump from meeting its design basis 30-day mission time. The team identified that contributing to this performance deficiency was that station procedure OP-AA-102, Attachment 1, Immediate Operability Determination Guidelines, Step 7.c., associated with the evaluation of oil and coolant leakage in order to establish operability for this type of degraded condition, incorrectly instructs the Dominion staff that the use of compensatory actions is acceptable without performing a formal operability determination. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.1, the team used IMC 0609 to inform the severity of this 10 CFR 50.59 violation. Per IMC 0609, the team determined that the finding required a detailed risk evaluation due to actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The Region I SRA identified that because the finding involved the C RBCCW pump function to run for its mission time, the only accident events adversely impacted are the LLOCA sequences. The condition was conservatively modeled assuming an exposure period of one year with the C RBCCW pump failure to run basic event set to True. The resultant change in risk was estimated at mid E-8, or very low safety significance (Green). The dominated risk sequences involve a LLOCA with the failure of the remaining RBCCW pumps due to common cause. Since the estimated risk increase was less than 1E-8, no additional evaluation of external events contribution or change in LERF was required. Accordingly, per Section 6.1.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the severity of the violation of 10 CFR 50.59 was determined to be Severity Level IV, as it resulted in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance (Green) by the Significant Determination Process (SDP). There is no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation as cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement evaluations.
05000336/FIN-2013003-0430 June 2013 23:59:59MillstoneLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationOn March 19, Dominion received laboratory results for the A train CREFS charcoal filter sample on Unit 3 that had been taken on March 13. The results indicated that the methyl iodide penetration for the charcoal sample was 4.46 percent, which exceeded the TS requirement of 2.5 percent. Dominion determined that the A CREFS had been inoperable from March 13 to March 21, which exceeded the seven day allowed outage time. Because Dominion could not recognize the inoperability of the A CREFS until after the charcoal test results were available they did not take actions contrary to the requirements of TS 3.7.7. Traditional enforcement applies in accordance with IMC 0612, Sections 0612-09 and 0612-13, and Enforcement Policy Section 2.2.4.d, because the inspectors did not identify an associated performance deficiency. The inspectors determined this to be a SLIV violation of TS 3.7.4 in accordance with Enforcement Policy Section 6.1.d. This condition is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by TS and as a result Dominion submitted LER 05000423/2013-004-00 and entered the issue into their CAP as CR508567.
05000336/FIN-2013003-0330 June 2013 23:59:59MillstoneNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) Report for a Major Loss of EmergencyAssessment Capability for Stack Radiation MonitorThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the failure to make the required initial notification to the NRC within eight hours of a major loss of monitoring capability. On April 16, Dominion declared the main station stack radiation monitor inoperable but did not report this to the NRC until the inspectors questioned the control room operators on April 18. Dominion evaluated the condition and made the required notification (NRC event report number 48941) on April 18, 2013, and entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as CR512007. The inspectors determined that Dominion did not notify the NRC of a major loss of emergency assessment capabilities event in the time required by 10 CFR 50.72. The inspectors determined the finding was subject to traditional enforcement because Dominions failure to make a required report could potentially impact the NRCs regulatory function. This finding is similar to the one described in NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.9.d(9), A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73, which corresponds to Severity Level IV. In accordance with guidance contained in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports , Section 07.03, cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000336/FIN-2010004-0230 September 2010 23:59:59MillstoneNRC identifiedFailure to Perform an ASME Code-compliant Radiographic Examination on a Class 1 Weld on the Unit 2 \'A\' RCP Seal Cooler PipingThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, NCV of 10 CFR 50.55a(2)( c)( 1) and 10 CFR 50.55a(3), when Dominion did not perform an ASME Code compliant radiographic examination for a leak in a Class 1 weld on the Unit 2 \'A\' RCP seal cooler piping before returning the system to service. Dominion was out of compliance with 10 CFR 50.55a(2)(c)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(3), and Section III of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Code between July 24, 2009, and November 10,2009. The NRC granted verbal relief from the 10 CFR 50.55a(2)(c)(1), 10 CFR 50.55a(3), and the ASME Code requirements on November 10, 2009. Subsequently, the relief request was approved, in writing, by the NRC on April 26, 2010. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, Section 1-2, this finding had the potential to impact the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because Dominion verbally informed the NRC on July 17, 2009, that they would repair the affected component in accordance with ASME Code requirements. However, due to Dominion\'s misinterpretation of the ASME Code, Dominion did not subsequently inform the NRC of its inability to meet Code requirements (i.e. perform a Code compliant radiographic examination of the affected weld) before returning the plant to service. As a result, Dominion\'s actions had impeded the NRC\'s ability to evaluate and determine the efficacy of the licensee\'s actions. The issue was characterized as Severity Level IV because it is similar to the example provided in the NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.1.d.2, in that, it involved a violation of NRC requirements that resulted in a condition evaluated as having very low safety significance (i.e., Green) by the Significance Determination Process (SDP). The inspector determined that this issue had a crosscutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Decision Making component, because Dominion did not use conservative assumptions in their decision making when they concluded that Code relief from the NRC would not be necessary to accomplish the repair. (H.1 (b))
05000336/FIN-2010003-0330 June 2010 23:59:59MillstoneNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72 (b )(3)(v) Report for an Inoperable Unit 3 Secondary ContainmentThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v); in that, Dominion failed to make a timely 10 CFR 50.72 eighthour report to the NRC for a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented secondary containment from fulfilling its safety function. On May 27, 2010, operations personnel found both sets of the auxiliary and service building tunnel exhaust dampers open which could have prevented secondary containment from fulfilling its safety function. Operations declared secondary containment inoperable, closed the auxiliary building tunnel exhaust dampers to restore operability, and initiated a 10 CFR 50.72 report. The inspectors determined that Dominion\\\'s failure to make a 10 CFR 50.72 eight-hour report to the NRC regarding the inoperable secondary containment as a condition that could have prevented it from fulfilling its safety function was a performance deficiency. The inspectors determined that traditional enforcement applied, since the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I - Reactor Operations, Example D.4, a failure to make a required Licensee Event Report (LER) is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-culling aspect in the Human Performance cross-culling area, Decision Making component, because Dominion did not use conservative assumptions in their decision-making when they could not demonstrate that secondary containment would have fulfilled its safety function (H.1(b)).
05000336/FIN-2009004-0530 September 2009 23:59:59MillstoneLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR Part 50.54(q), Conditions of licenses, states in part, The nuclear power reactor licensee may make changes to these plans without Commission approval only if the changes do not decrease the effectiveness of the plans and the plans, as changed, continue to meet the standards of 50.47(b) and the requirements of Appendix E to this part. Contrary to this requirement, Dominion\\\'s replacement of the dedicated site fire brigade with designated personnel with collateral duties was not evaluated for a possible decrease in effectiveness of the Emergency Plan. This change impacted the Emergency Plan in that it facilitated the EMT position not being staffed on multiple occasions. Therefore, Dominion should have performed a 50.54(q) screening to evaluate the potential impact to the Emergency Plan. The finding is licensee-identified because it was discovered by Dominion during an audit in 2008. Upon identifying the issue, Dominion entered the issue into their corrective action program as CR 08-00691. The deficiency was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process since the failure to screen the organizational change could adversely impact the NRCs ability to carry out its regulatory mission. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program this finding is being treated as a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q).