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05000369/FIN-2018003-0130 September 2018 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Adequately Document the Basis for a Change to the Emergency PlanThe inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50.54(q)(3), for changes made to the McGuire Nuclear Station (MNS) Radiological Emergency Plan (E-Plan) that failed to demonstrate the changes would not reduce the effectiveness of the E-Plan. Specifically, the licensee did not provide an adequate analysis to determine that the removal of specific procedure references was not a reduction in effectiveness of the MNS E-Plan
05000369/FIN-2018002-0130 June 2018 23:59:59McGuireLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThis violation of very low safety significant was identified by the licensee and has been entered into the licensee corrective action program and is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2 of the Enforcement Policy. Violation: NAC-Magnastor Certificate of Compliance 1031, Amendment 2, Technical Specifications SR 3.1.1.2 requires, in part, that the transportable storage canister (TSC) be backfilled with helium in the range of 0.694-0.802 g/liter prior to transport operations. Contrary to the above, on June 4, 2018, the licensee transported Magnastor cask 45 to the independent spent fuel storage installation pad with the TSC backfilled to approximately 0.85-0.89 g/liter due to the use of out of tolerance flow meters during backfilling operations. Significance/Severity Level: The inspectors determined that traditional enforcement is applicable for this NCV as it involved requirements pertaining to ISFSI operations and therefore the reactor oversight process is not applicable. The NCV was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation as it did not involve willfulness, was identified by the licensee, and was determined to be of minimal safety significance as the over fill of helium did not exceed any design parameters of the TSC during the transport operations.Corrective Action Reference: This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as NCR 2211048, Potentially Exceeding Magnastor Helium Density Upper Range.
05000370/FIN-2015004-0131 December 2015 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Report Unit 2 Unplanned Valid Auxiliary Feedwater Actuation in Mode 4An NRC identified Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was identified for the licensees failure to make a required NRC event notification within eight hours for an unplanned valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater (CA) system. The unplanned valid actuation occurred during main turbine and main feedwater pump safety injection (SI) train trip function testing with Unit 2 in Mode 4 on October 7, 2015. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program and subsequently reported this CA actuation to the NRC on October 15, 2015. The failure to submit an event notification to the NRC within eight hours of occurrence of an unplanned valid CA system actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was a performance deficiency (PD). Since the failure to submit an event report within the time requirements may impact the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function, this PD was dispositioned under the traditional enforcement process and was determined to be a SL IV violation. Because this SL IV violation was not repetitive or willful, and did not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this violation.
05000369/FIN-2013008-0231 December 2013 23:59:59McGuireLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 50.71(e) requires, in part, that each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor, shall update periodically, the FSAR originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. This submittal shall include the effects of all changes made in the facility or procedures as described in the FSAR. Contrary to the above, since November 30, 2012, the site failed to include updates related to a modification that changed the actuation of the containment spray system from automatic to manual. Traditional enforcement is applicable because the violation could impact the regulatory process, and was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because the lack of up-to-date information did not result in an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIPs M-13-08057, M-13-08607, and M-13-08684.
05000369/FIN-2013002-0231 March 2013 23:59:59McGuireLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationTS 3.6.3 required that each containment isolation valve be operable in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. TS 3.6.3, Condition A, specified if one containment isolation valve is inoperable, the flow path must be isolated within 4 hours and verified isolated once per 31 days. Contrary to the above, from November 2, 2012, to November 4, 2012, with Unit 2 in Mode 4, manual containment isolation valve 2NV-1053 was inoperable and the licensee failed to isolate the flow path within 4 hours. This violation was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the small size of the piping and that a control room air-operated valve (i.e., 2NV-840) located downstream of 2NV-1053 could have been used to isolate the penetration. This violation was documented in the licensees CAP as PIP M-12-09347.
05000369/FIN-2011003-0130 June 2011 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Notify the NRC of a Situation Related to Public Health and SafetyAn NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600. The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations
05000369/FIN-2011003-0230 June 2011 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER for a Valid RPS ActuationAn NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensees failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations
05000369/FIN-2011002-0531 March 2011 23:59:59McGuireLicensee-identifiedNoneTS 5.4.1.a stated that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in RG 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A, February 1978. RG 1.33, Rev. 2, Appendix A recommended procedures for maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment. Contrary to the above, from initial plant licensing to April 29, 2010, the licensee failed to establish an adequate procedure for performing maintenance on safety-related equipment. Procedure MP/0/A/7300/052, On-line Oil Sampling of Components With Oil Sample Valves, did not contain adequate instructions for reseating of the 1A NS pump motor lower bearing sight glass which resulted in the 1A NS train being inoperable for greater than allowed by TS LCO 3.6.6. This violation was determined not to be greater than very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment or involve an actual reduction in the function of hydrogen ignitors. This condition was placed in the licensees CAP as PIP M-10-3332.
05000369/FIN-2011002-0231 March 2011 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between unitsAn NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval. This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000369/FIN-2011002-0431 March 2011 23:59:59McGuireLicensee-identifiedNoneTechnical Specification 5.4.1.a required, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities recommended in Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, Section 7 listed Radiation Surveys as an activity that should be covered by written procedures. Duke Health Physics procedure HP/2/B/1006/024, Revision 11, Refueling Outage Controls and Surveillance, Enclosure 5.3, required a daily dose rate survey of the 1202 Area located in the auxiliary building. Contrary to the above, on October 7, 2006, written procedures recommended in RG 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, were not implemented in that a daily dose rate survey of the 1202 Area was not performed as required by Duke Procedure HP/2/B/1006/024, Enclosure 5.3. A Lead Radiation Protection Technician became aware of the missed radiation survey, falsified the contents of a different radiation survey, and submitted the falsified document on October 10, 2006. The underlying technical issue screened as a minor violation using IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, in that the proper radiological controls were established and radiological conditions existed such that the dose to an uninformed worker was not likely to exceed an unplanned dose greater than 10 millirem. The violation did not rise to the level of the SL-IV Health Physics examples from Section 6.7 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. However, the NRC determined that the violation should be classified as a SL-IV violation because of the willful aspects involved. This violation is being treated as a NCV in accordance with Section 2.3.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified and reported the violation to the NRC, was an isolated act of an individual in a low-level position without management involvement, and the licensee took significant remedial action. This condition was documented in the licensees CAP as PIP M-08-2975.
05000369/FIN-2011002-0131 March 2011 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval. This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000369/FIN-2010004-0230 September 2010 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR For New EDG Tripping FunctionsA NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee failed to update the UFSAR following a modification that installed new protective functions for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs). This violation is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-10-05718 This performance deficiency was considered as traditional enforcement because not having an updated UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 10 CFR 50.59 evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function such as license amendment reviews and inspections. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R17
05000369/FIN-2010003-0330 June 2010 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedIllegal Drugs Inside the Protected Area and Failure to Report the EventBy letter dated June 2, 2010, the NRC issued a Confirmatory Order to Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke Energy) McGuire Nuclear Station to resolve an issue involving an incident that occurred in October 2008, in which a contract employee introduced and used an illegal drug inside the Protected Area at the McGuire Nuclear Station. This behavior was observed by another contract employee who failed to report it as required by procedure. The NRC closed two apparent violations associated with the occurrence and characterized the issue as one violation of 10 CFR Part 26, with a significance of Severity Level IV.
05000369/FIN-2010002-0131 March 2010 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to adequatley update the UFSAR for FPP documents incorporated by referenceThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e)for the Fire Protection Program (FPP) documents that were incorporated by reference. This issue is in the licensee=s corrective action program as Problem Investigation Process Report (PIP) M-10-0655. The licensee intends to either provide the required updates to the referenced documents or incorporate the FPP directly into the UFSAR. The updated information for the UFSAR was important because it identified the elements of the FPP, fire hazards analysis, and safe shutdown analysis that are a portion of the basis for the FPP. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue is not minor because not having an updated portion of the UFSAR hinders the licensees ability to perform adequate 50.59evaluations and can impact the NRCs ability to perform adequate regulatory reviews for license amendments and inspections. Consequently, it can have a material impact on licensed activities. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation in Supplement I of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. This violation was not screened for associated cross-cutting aspects because it dealt with traditional enforcement.
05000369/FIN-2009004-0130 September 2009 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Adequately Update the UFSAR for Emergency Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank RequirementsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR50.71(e) for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)for a license amendment to the emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank requirements. The licensee intends to revise the UFSAR to reflect the licensing basis described in the license amendment and is developing procedural guidance for cross connecting the fuel oil storage tanks. This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The inspectors used the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I, to determine that the issue was more than minor because not including the new licensing basis for the safety-related fuel oil storage tanks in the UFSAR would have a material impact on licensed activities associated with this equipment. This issue was considered a Severity Level IV violation because the inaccurate information was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility. No cross-cutting aspect was identified.
05000369/FIN-2009003-0330 June 2009 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Correct Ultimate Heat Sink Licensing Basis Document InaccuraciesA non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for failing to adequately identify and correct ultimate heat sink licensing basis document inaccuracies. The finding is more than minor because the failure to have an accurate description of the ultimate heat sink (UHS) in the licensing basis documents had a material impact on licensed activities. In addition, an accurately defined UHS is necessary to adequately assess plant modifications, operability determinations, and technical specification entry conditions. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation because the NRC determined the standby nuclear service water pond met the requirements of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.27 in the Safety Evaluation Report (SER) and it does not result in a condition evaluated as having low to moderate, or greater safety significance (i.e., white, yellow, or red). This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of corrective action (P.1(c)) in the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate this issue such that the resolutions addressed all the causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.
05000369/FIN-2009002-0231 March 2009 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Adequately Describe the Load Squencer Function in the FSARThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.34(b)(2) for failing to include in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) a description and analysis of the separate accelerated sequencer function that loads the safety-related equipment onto the safety-related emergency A.C. power system buses using different criteria than the committed sequencer function described in the UFSAR. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to have a description of the accelerated sequencer function in the UFSAR had a material impact on licensed activities, in that any modifications to safety-related systems, such as the modification that removed the seal-in function from the control room chiller digital control system, would need to consider the interaction with the accelerated sequencer (in addition to the separate committed load sequencer) to ensure that risk significant equipment, as modified, would function as analyzed. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement, because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, because the occurrence of the control room chiller failing to start(after being dropped by the accelerated load sequencer) when required by the committed load sequencer function during testing, had very low safety significance. This issue has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate corrective action in the area of problem identification and resolution P.1.(d). This aspect was chosen because the licensee recognized, as documented in a January 12, 2007 letter to the NRC, that there were content problems with the UFSAR and was in the process of trying to correct it. However, the inspectors could not find any completed interim corrective action documented in the licensees corrective action program that would alert/caution UFSAR users that compensatory actions were needed in order to perform adequate evaluations such as for operability, reportability, or 10 CFR 50.59.The licensee intends to add the accelerated sequence function to the UFSAR and install seal-in functions for the affected load blocks in the accelerated sequence
05000369/FIN-2008005-0331 December 2008 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Control a Locked-High Radiation Area BarrierThe inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.2 for the licensees failure to control access to a locked-high radiation area (LHRA). Specifically, on September 30, 2006, a contract radiation protection technician (RPT) left the reactor head inspection stand LHRA barrier unlocked and unguarded from approximately 5:05 to 5:21 a.m. Dose rates as high as 10 rad/hr at 30 cm and 4 rad/hr general area were present inside the reactor head stand LHRA. The significance of the violation was assessed using traditional enforcement because it involved willfulness (EA-08-268). The safety significance of this violation was determined to be SL IV because the finding did not involve a situation with a substantial potential for exposure in excess of applicable limits and was a matter with more than a minor safety, health, or environmental significance. Although this violation involved willfulness, it was dispositioned as an NCV in accordance with Section IV.A.1 of the Enforcement Policy because the licensee identified the violation and promptly discussed it with regional health physics inspectors, the violation involved the acts of a low-level individual, the violation appears to be the isolated action of the employee without management involvement, and significant remedial action commensurate with the circumstances was taken by the licensee. The finding was documented in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-06-4479. (Section 4OA5.2
05000369/FIN-2008003-0130 June 2008 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Update the FSAR to Reflect Those Portions of RN Shared Between UnitsThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to include information related to those portions of the nuclear service water (RN) system that are shared between Units, as reflected in License Amendments issued for both Units on January 4, 1988. This issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the designation of which portions of the RN system were shared between units, as described in the License Amendments, was material to the NRCs review of the licensees response to Generic Letter 91-13, Request for Information related to the Resolution of Generic Issue 130, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi- Unit Sites. The licensees response revealed that they had procedures that allowed sharing of the RN discharge, which was specifically designated as not shared in Figure 7-1 of the Technical Specifications. As such, the UFSAR could not be relied upon to determine the shared portions and their safety implications. However, the inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of thorough evaluation in the area of problem identification and resolution (P.1.(c)). (Section 1R11.1
05000369/FIN-2007005-0531 December 2007 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Follow Procedure During Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Performance TestFailure to Follow Procedure During Residual Heat Removal (ND) Pump 1B Performance Test (PT). As described in NRC Inspection Report 05000369,370/2006007, this concerned a failure to follow procedures during performance of a TS required PT for ND pump 1B. Specifically, steps in completed procedure PT/1/A/4204/001B were signed by an individual that was not qualified to sign the steps, the individual signed steps as completed that were not performed, and the individual designated a non-conditional step as being not applicable (N/A). On January 30, 2007, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) completed an investigation pertaining to URI 05000369/2006007-04. Based on a review of the OI investigation, the NRC determined that a violation of NRC requirements occurred. The Severity Level IV violation was cited in an OI letter dated July 17, 2007 (NOTICE OF VIOLATION, EA-07- 130). For administrative purposes this violation (VIO) is designated as VIO 05000369/ 2007005-05, Failure to Follow Procedure During Residual Heat Removal Pump 1B Performance Test. The inspectors have reviewed the licensees August 16, 2007, response to the Notice of Violation and subsequent corrective actions. Because the results of PT/1/A/4204/001B were not affected by the procedural non-compliance and appropriate corrective actions have been taken, URI 05000369/2006007-01 and VIO 05000369/2007005-05 are closed.
05000369/FIN-2007004-0130 September 2007 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Perform a Written Safety Evaluation for a Change to the FacilityThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59 for removing the approved seismic qualification methodology (WCAP-8110, supplement 9) from the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) without performing a written safety evaluation. This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07-5016. The failure to perform a written safety evaluation for changes made to the facility as described in the UFSAR is more than minor because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change requiring a 10 CFR 50.59 written safety evaluation would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(2). This likelihood is based on the November 21, 1974, NRC Safety Evaluation Report for WCAP-8110 Supplement 9, which stated the WCAP is considered an accepted methodology to demonstrate the continued adequacy of ice retention characteristics of the ice baskets when used as a reference for license applications. Removal of this approved methodology from the licensing basis would constitute a change in methodology and would require NRC review and approval. This issue was treated as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance
05000369/FIN-2007004-0230 September 2007 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Promptly Correct a Condition Adverse to QualityThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.172 for failing to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality associated with not performing 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on five previous revisions of 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations for the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI). This issue is in the licensees corrective action program as PIP M-07- 4321. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to promptly correct and perform 10 CFR 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 10 CFR 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its 3 Enclosure regulatory function. It was characterized as a severity level IV violation because it was evaluated as not having greater than very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of timely correct action in the area of problem identification and resolution
05000369/FIN-2006004-0230 September 2006 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Adequately Correct UFSAR Deficiencies for the SsfA non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for failing to take adequate corrective action for the last Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) which did not include all the important information for the standby shutdown facility (SSF), the subject of two previous NCVs. The UFSAR did not include that the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump suction condenser circulating water makeup source was isolated by two dc power-operated valves which open automatically on low pump suction pressure, even though it was important information to demonstrate required system power source and suction supply diversity. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3240. This finding is more than minor because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and had a material impact on licensed activities. The inadequate UFSAR information had been used in a 10 CFR 50.59 screening that resulted in not performing a safety evaluation when required, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement and was characterized as a Severity Level IV. The failure to adequately update the UFSAR for the SSF was the subject of two previous violations (NCVs 05000369,370/2004003- 02, and NCV 05000369,370/2005004-01 for untimely corrective action). The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
05000369/FIN-2006004-0430 September 2006 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Perform 72.48 Evaluations for 72.212 ChangesAn NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 72.212 was identified for failing to evaluate changes to the written evaluations required by 72.212(b)(2) using the requirements of 72.48(c). Even though licensee procedure NSD 211, 10 CFR 72.48 Process, required that one be performed, the licensee had not performed any 72.48(c) evaluations for any changes to the 72.212(b)(2) written evaluations for the NAC-UMS casks or the TN-32 casks since the requirement was included in the rule (5 revisions). This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3729. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to perform 72.48(c) evaluations on any changes to 72.212 written evaluations had a reasonable likelihood that the changes could require NRC review and approval. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function and was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation.
05000369/FIN-2006004-0330 September 2006 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Adequately Update the UFSAR for Station BlackoutAn NRC-identified NCV was identified for failure to adequately update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) for the station blackout rule (10 CFR 50.63) implementation. Some station blackout (SBO) mitigating equipment described in the submitted information and analysis have been changed, and because they were not contained in the UFSAR, were not evaluated under 10 CFR 50.59 for their effect on station blackout mitigation, to determine whether prior NRC approval was needed. This finding is in the licensees corrective action program as Plant Investigation Process (PIP) M-06-3244. The finding is more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities. The missing UFSAR information identified the systems and methodology used to combat a station blackout as described in the station blackout rule. This issue was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This issue was considered to meet the criteria for a severity level IV violation. The cause of the finding is related to the crosscutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate similar problems such that the extent of condition was considered and the cause resolved to prevent recurrence.
05000369/FIN-2005004-0230 September 2005 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR for CaprmsA non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) related to inclusion of the license amendment request safety analysis information pertaining to the use of alternative instrumentation and procedures in place of seismic qualification for the Containment Atmosphere Particulate Monitors (CAPRMs) The issue was greater than minor because the failure to include in the UFSAR the alternative methodology for RCS leakage detection after a seismic event with unqualified CAPRMs, as described in the licensees safety analysis, was material to the acceptability of the license amendment requests. The inspectors found no subsequent changes made to the facility that were based on the erroneous information in the UFSAR section. Consequently, this issue was considered to meet the criteria of a severity level IV violation. This finding involved the crosscutting aspect of Problem Identification and Resolution.
05000369/FIN-2005002-0831 March 2005 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Condition Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsA non-cited violation was identified by the inspectors for failure to report a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications related to past inoperability for main steam isolation valve 1SM-1, as required by 10 CFR 50.73. Based on the very low safety significance of the technical issue, this violation is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation under the NRC Enforcement Policy, Supplement I.
05000369/FIN-2004005-0330 September 2004 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain a License Amendment Prior to Implementing a Design Change to the Facility Associated with the Auxiliary Feedwater SystemA non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor. This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
05000369/FIN-2004005-0230 September 2004 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain a License Amendment Prior to Implementing an Unreviewed Safety Question Associated with the Nuclear Service Water SystemThe inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non- seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation.
05000369/FIN-2004003-0231 March 2004 23:59:59McGuireNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR - (Two Examples)The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-indepth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures. The inspectors identified an additional example of a previously identified non-cited violation (05000369,370/2004003-02) for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e). Specifically, the inspectors noted a failure to resolve an UFSAR discrepancy with the Design Basis Document regarding feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements could have an impact on future stroke time tests and subsequent performance of the isolation valves. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.