Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateSiteIdentified byTitleDescription
05000352/FIN-2012012-0131 December 2012 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedFailure to provide complete and accurate decommissioning status reportsDuring an NRC investigation completed on November 22, 2011, and a supplemental investigation completed on October 10, 2012, a violation of NRC requirements was identified. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, the violation is listed below: 10 CFR 50.75(a) establishes requirements for indicating to the NRC how a licensee will provide reasonable assurance that funds will be available for the decommissioning process and states that for power reactor licensees, reasonable assurance consists of a series of steps as provided in paragraphs (b), (c), (e), and (f) of 10 CFR 50.75. 10 CFR 50.75(f)(2) states, in part, that power reactor licensees shall report at least every 2 years on the status of its decommissioning funding for each reactor or part of a reactor that it owns; and, that the information in this report must include, at a minimum, the amount of decommissioning funds estimated to be required pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). 10 CFR 50.75(b)(1) states, in part, that for a holder of an operating license under 10 CFR Part 50, financial assurance for decommissioning shall be provided in an amount which may be more, but not less, than the amount stated in the table in paragraph (c)(1) adjusted using a rate at least equal to that stated in paragraph (c)(2). 10 CFR 50.75(c)(1) states the minimum amount required to demonstrate reasonable assurance of funds for decommissioning by reactor type and power level. 10 CFR 50.75(c)(2) requires, in part, that an adjustment factor be applied, which is based on escalation factors for labor and energy, and waste burial. 10 CFR 50.9(a) states, in part, that information provided to the Commission by a licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Contrary to the above, on March 31, 2005, March 31, 2006, March 31, 2007, and March 31,2009, Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon) provided information on the status of its decommissioning funding that was not complete and accurate in all material respects, when it submitted the decommissioning funding status (DFS) reports pursuant to 10 CFR 50.75. Specifically, the March 31, 2005, March 31, 2007, March 31, 2006, and March 31, 2009, DFS reports stated that the decommissioning funds estimated to be required for each of the reactors, as listed in the report, were determined in accordance with 10 CFR 50.75(b) and the applicable formulas of 10 CFR 50.75(c). However, in multiple instances, the amount reported was a discounted value that was less than the minimum required amount specified by 10 CFR 50.75(b) and (c). This is a Severity Level IV violation.
05000353/FIN-2012008-0130 June 2012 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER Revision for Conditions Prohibited by TS Associated with the HPCI and RCIC SystemsThe inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, because violations of Technical Specifications (TS) 3.5.1 and 3.0.3 for the condition of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and RCIC systems being simultaneously inoperable were not reported to the NRC within 60 days of discovery. After this was identified by the inspectors, the issue was entered into Exelons Corrective Action Program (CAP) as IR 1377559. The inspectors determined that the failure to revise Licensee Event Report (LER) 05000353/2011-003-00 within 60 days of initial issuance on July 21, 2011 to include the violations of TS 3.5.1 and 3.0.3 in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.73 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelons ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a violation of Technical Specifications was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe and the NRCs opportunity to review the matter in its entirety was delayed, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency was a SL-IV violation, because Exelon personnel did not make a report required by 10 CFR Part 50.73. The significance of the associated performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, and the inspectors determined it to be minor because it was not similar to Appendix E examples, was not a precursor to a significant event, did not cause a performance indicator (PI) to exceed a threshold, did not adversely affect cornerstone objectives, and if left uncorrected would not have lead to a more significant safety concern. As such, no ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.
05000352/FIN-2012002-0131 March 2012 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi) NotificationThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.72(b)(2)(xi) because the NRC Operations Center was not notified via the Emergency Notification System (ENS) within four hours of a reportable event related to the health and safety of the public and protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies was made. Exelon did make a courtesy notification to the NRC resident inspection staff. However, Exelon did not formally report, to the NRC Operations Center, the notification of other government agencies regarding an abnormal radioactive liquid release, from the Limerick Generating Station common cooling tower blow down line on March 19, 2012. Inspectors performed system walkdowns and conducted an event follow-up inspection on March 20, 2012 to assess the impacts of the overflow event. This deficiency was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process since the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRCs ability to carry out its regulatory mission. The deficiency was evaluated using the criteria contained in Section 6.9(d)(9) of the NRCs Enforcement Policy and determined to meet the criteria for disposition as a SL IV NCV. Exelon took immediate corrective actions pertaining to the abnormal release, including suspension of effluent releases via the cooling tower blow down line and initiation of actions to evaluate the cause and preclude recurrence, as well as the conduct of public dose calculations. Additionally, upon identification by the NRC that the issue was reportable, Exelon subsequently reported the event to the NRC Operations Center on April 11, 2012. Exelon also entered this issue into its corrective action program (IR 1347829). This violation involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Section 6.9, lnaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example (d)(9), which states, A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73, the NRC determined that this violation is more than minor and categorized as a SL lV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process with no underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation.
05000352/FIN-2011503-0130 September 2011 23:59:59LimerickNRC identified(Traditional Enforcement) Changes to EAL Basis Decreased the Effectiveness of the Plan without Prior NRC ApprovalThe inspector identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) for failing to obtain prior approval for an emergency plan change which decreased the effectiveness of the plan. Specifically, the licensee modified the Emergency Action Level (EAL) Basis in EAL HU6, Revision 13, which indefinitely extended the start of the 15-minute emergency classification clock beyond a credible notification that a fire is occurring or indication of a valid fire detection system alarm. This change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan by reducing the capability to perform a risk significant planning function in a timely manner. The violation affected the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function because it involved implementing a change that decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan without NRC approval. Therefore, this issue was evaluated using Traditional Enforcement. The NRC determined that a Severity Level IV violation was appropriate due to the reduction of the capability to perform a risk significant planning standard function in a timely manner. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program and revised the EAL basis to restore compliance. The finding was more than minor using IMC 0612, because it is associated with the emergency preparedness cornerstone attribute of procedure quality for EAL and emergency plan changes, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Therefore, the performance deficiency was a finding. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, the inspector determined that the finding had a very low safety significance because the finding is a failure to comply with 10 CFR 50.54(q) involving the risk significant planning standard 50.47(b)(4), which, in this case, met the example of a Green finding because it involved one Unusual Event classification Due to the age of this issue, it was not determined to be reflective of current licensee performance and therefore a cross-cutting aspect was not assigned to this finding.
05000352/FIN-2010007-0131 December 2010 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedFailure to Update UFSAR Consistent With Plant Conditions as RequiredThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SLlV) NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.71 (e) in that Exelon failed on multiple occasions to revise the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with information consistent with plant conditions. Specifically, Exelon personnel failed to incorporate four previously identified UFSAR inconsistencies into the September 2010 UFSAR update as required. The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71 (e) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Exelon\\\'s ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRC\\\'s ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.1.d.3 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SLiV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because the information that was not updated in the UFSAR was not used to make an unacceptable change in the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the NRC
05000352/FIN-2009007-0230 June 2009 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedLead maintenance technician deliberately falsified clearance and tagging recordsTitle 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, requires, in part, that information required by statute or by the Commissions regulations, orders, or license conditions to be maintained by the licensee shall be complete and accurate in all material respects. Exelon Procedure OP-MA-109-101, Step 13.2.5.2 states, The Lead Worker or First Line Supervisor shall perform the Worker Tagout per the Worker Tagout Clearance Form. Step 13.2.7.5 states that when the work is complete, the Lead Worker or First Line Supervisor shall complete the Worker Tagout Clearance Form and return it to the workgroup Supervisor to be retained/recorded in the work package. Contrary to the above, between January and July 2007 and in February 2008, a lead maintenance technician, when documenting worker tagouts on Worker Tagout Clearance Forms, created information maintained by the licensee that was not complete and accurate in all material respects. Specifically, the lead maintenance technician falsified Worker Tagout Clearance Forms by forging the initials of qualified maintenance technicians, indicating that they had conducted the clearance and tagging activities when, in fact, the activities had been performed by unqualified contractors.
05000352/FIN-2009007-0130 June 2009 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedLead maintenance technician deliberately permitted unqualified contractors to open breakers and hang clearance tagsLimerick Generating Station Technical Specifications 6.8, Procedures and Programs, requires, in part, that written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained covering the applicable procedures recommended in Appendix A of Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, February 1978. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, recommends administrative activities, including equipment control (i.e. locking and tagging), be covered by written procedures. Exelon Procedure OP-MA-109-101, Clearance and Tagging, Revision 6, Section 13, Worker Tagout Process, Step 13.1.3 states, Personnel using worker tagout tags shall be qualified in the clearance and tagging process. Contrary to the above, between January and July 2007 and in February 2008, the licensee failed to implement a procedure required by Technical Specification 6.8 when worker tagout tags were used by personnel at Limerick Generating Station who were not qualified in the clearance and tagging process. Specifically, a lead maintenance technician with oversight responsibilities for a contractor group deliberately permitted unqualified contractors to open breakers and hang worker tagout tags
05000352/FIN-2009002-0231 March 2009 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain License Amendment for TS Bases ChangeThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Test, and Experiment, for failing to obtain a Technical Specification (TS)license amendment for a change made to the TS Bases concerning offsite power source operability. Changes made to TS Bases 3/4.8.1 required a change in the TS, because the change caused the bases to be in direct conflict with the requirements of TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.8.1, AC Sources Operating, through the application of associated TS surveillance requirements. Exelon entered this issue into the CAP and issued night orders to operators which required declaring an offsite power supply inoperable when an offsite power supply feeder breaker became unavailable to an emergency bus. Because this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, it was considered to be a violation which potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process. Therefore, such violations are characterized using the traditional enforcement process. In this case, the licensee failed to perform an adequate safety evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 because the approved change to the technical specification basis was in conflict with the TS surveillance requirements. This change required prior approval from the NRC before its implementation. Comparing this item to the examples in NUREG 1600, Supplement I, Reactor Operations, this finding is more than minor because NRC approval would have been required. The inspectors completed a Significance Determination Review using NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. Using the Phase I Screening worksheet the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function for greater than the TS allowed outage time. Comparing this item to the examples in NUREG 1600, Supplement I, this finding is similar to Item D.5, Violations of10 CFR 50.59 that result in conditions evaluated as having very low safety significance(i.e., Green) by the SDP. This is an example of a Severity Level IV violation. Since the TS Bases change was made in 2000, the inspectors determined that this finding was not reflective of current licensee performance and, therefore, did not have a cross-cutting aspect
05000352/FIN-2003004-0330 September 2003 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedDID Not Perform a 10 CFR 50.54(Q) Review Resulting in Removal of a Provision Without Prior NRC ApprovalThe inspector identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) because the licensee decreased the effectiveness of its emergency plan in one area by removing a provision to provide volunteer bus drivers to two school districts within the 10 mile Emergency Planning Zone for evacuating students during a radiological event. The change was implemented without NRC approval Changing emergency plan provisions without prior NRC approval impacts the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function and is therefore processed through traditional enforcement as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000 (65 FR 25388). According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this finding was determined to be a SL IV violation because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. This NCV was also determined to have very low safety significance since Exelon had maintained a list of volunteers that would have been able to perform the function if needed.
05000352/FIN-2003004-0430 September 2003 23:59:59LimerickNRC identifiedDID Not Retain a Record of the 10 CFR 50.54(Q) Review of the Deleted Portions of the Emergency PlanThe inspector identified a SL IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q). During the implementation of a new Standard Emergency Plan, Exelon did not retain a record that determined whether a decrease-in-effectiveness had or had not occurred when Exelon generated the new Standard Emergency Plan that deleted portions of the previous Combined Limerick/Peach Bottom Emergency Plan Changing emergency plan provisions without documentation impacts the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function and is therefore processed through traditional enforcement as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy, issued May 1, 2000 (65 FR 25388). According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this finding was determined to be a SLl IV because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification.
05000352/FIN-2003006-0131 March 2003 23:59:59LimerickNRC identified10CFR50.54(Q) Violation for Decreasing the Effectiveness of the Plan by Changing Eals That Address Toxic Gas Without Prior NRC ApprovalThe licensee changed its emergency action level schemes such that there would e a reduction in declarable events as the emphasis shifted from personnel safety to equipment status. The changes were determined to be a decrease in the effectiveness of the emergency plans. Decreases in the effectiveness of an emergency plan must receive NRC review prior to implementation. The changes were implemented without NRC approval. The finding was determined to be more than minor as its significance was related to the impact it would have on the mobilization of the emregency response organization and preclude offsite agencies from being aware of adverse conditions on site. The licensee accepted the NRC's position and entered this issue into its corrective action program (Condition Report 139997) and will change the emergency action levels back to the original wording. The implementation of the changes which decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plans, without NRC review, is being treated as a non-cited violation consistent with Section VI.A. of the Enforcement Policy, issued on May 1, 2000 (65 FR 25388). (NCV 50-277; 50-278/03-008-01 and 50-352;50-353/03-006)