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05000286/FIN-2018002-0130 June 2018 23:59:59Indian PointSelf-revealingReactor Pressure Boundary Leakage Due to Weld Failure in Reactor Vessel Head Penetration #3A self-revealing Severity Level IV NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.13.a, Reactor Coolant System Operational Leakage, was identified when Entergy operated the reactor in Mode 1 with pressure boundary leakage for a period of time longer than the allowable limiting condition of operation. Specifically, a leak in the J-weld around reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head penetration #3 occurred during the last operating cycle and was not identified until after the reactor was shutdown for a refueling outage.
05000247/FIN-2017001-0331 March 2017 23:59:59Indian PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 72.150 states, in part, that the licensee, applicant for a license, certificate holder, and applicant for a CoC shall prescribe activities affecting quality by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstance and shall require that these instructions, procedures, and drawings be followed. Entergy established requirements in 2-DCS-008-GEN, Unit 2 MPC Loading and Sealing Operations, to load pre-selected fuel assemblies per the approved loading pattern using 2-SOP-17.12, Spent Fuel Handling Machine and Spent Fuel Pit Operations, and Attachment 14, Fuel Movement Requirements. Attachments 4 (MPC Cross Section) and Attachment 12 (MPC Bridge/Trolley Coordinate) were provided in the procedure as references to orient the DCS crew as to the specific cell within the MPC where spent fuel bundles are to be placed. Contrary to the above, on January 24, 2017, IPEC DCS crew failed to follow 2-DCS-008-GEN. Specifically, instead of using the approved Attachment 4 from 2-DCS-008-GEN, the DCS crew used an MPC diagram provided by email from reactor engineering causing the initial bundle to be placed in cell F-5 rather than cell A-2. Traditional enforcement violations are not assessed for cross-cutting aspects Because the issue involved ISFSI operations, consistent with the guidance in Section 2.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Informed by the significance determination process, IMC 0609, Appendix A, Exhibit 3, Barrier Integrity Screening Questions, this violation was determined to be Severity Level IV. Because this violation was of very low safety significance and was entered into Entergys CAP as CR-IP2-2017-00356, this violation is being treated as an NCV, consistent with Section 2.3.2.a of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
05000247/FIN-2016004-0531 December 2016 23:59:59Indian PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified Violation10 CFR 55.53(e) requires, in part, that to maintain active status, a licensee shall actively perform the functions of an operator or senior operator on a minimum of seven 8-hour shifts or five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter and that if a licensee has not been actively performing the functions of an operator or senior operator, the licensee may not resume activities authorized by a license issued except as permitted by 10 CFR 55.53(f). 10 CFR 55.53(f) requires, in part, that before resumption of licensed functions, an authorized representative of the facility licensee shall certify that: 1) the licensees qualification and status of the licensee are current and valid; and 2) that the licensee has completed a minimum of 40 hours of shift functions under the direction of an operator or senior operator as appropriate and in the position to which the individual will be assigned. Contrary to the above, between July 2, 2016, and July 5, 2016, Entergy did not properly ensure that the qualifications and status of an SRO was current and valid, regarding the SRO meeting the minimum of seven 8-hour or five 12-hour shifts per calendar quarter. Specifically, the SRO stood watch as a control room supervisor in July 2016 while having stood only four of the five required 12-hour proficiency watches in a creditable position in the prior quarter. In the prior quarter, the SRO stood watch as a shift technical advisor and field support supervisor. These watches are not creditable toward the proficiency requirement. The SRO was removed from shift and was properly reactivated as required by 10 CFR 55.53(f). This issue was entered in Entergys CAP as CR-IP2-2016-04440. Corrective actions taken included counseling of the SRO and the auditor. To prevent reoccurrence, a software fix was implemented to check the proficiency status of operators when logging into their shift. This violation was assessed using the traditional enforcement process because it involved an operator license condition that was not met, which impacts the NRCs regulatory process. Although this violation is similar to a Severity Level III example in the NRC Enforcement Policy, based on the circumstances surrounding the issue including a verification that there were no operational errors as a result of the violation, the issue was evaluated as a Severity Level IV.
05000286/FIN-2015002-0330 June 2015 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedIncomplete 50.73 Report Associated with Failures of Main Steam Safety ValvesThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.9(a); in that, Entergy did not provide complete information in a report submitted per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B). Specifically, a Licensee Event Report (LER) submitted on April 27, 2015, which reported three MSSV test failures (MS-46-2, MS-45-4, MS-47-4) that occurred on February 27, 2015, did not discuss the failure of MSSV 46-3, which also failed its TS as-found lift setting test and was declared inoperable on March 22, 2015. MSSV 46-3 was inoperable for greater than its TS allowed outage time, which is a condition prohibited by TSs, and therefore is required to be reported to the NRC. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the Traditional Enforcement process. In accordance with Section 2.2.2.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency identified with the reporting aspect of the event is a Severity Level IV violation, because it is of more than minor concern, with relatively inappreciable potential safety significance and is related to findings that were determined to be more than minor issues. Specifically, this issue is related to a more than minor corrective action finding, which is documented in Section 1R22 of this report. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, this traditional enforcement issue is not assigned a cross-cutting aspect.
05000247/FIN-2014403-0131 December 2014 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedSecurity
05000247/FIN-2014404-0130 June 2014 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedSecurity
05000247/FIN-2013012-0131 December 2013 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailure to Submit a Required 10 CFR 50.73 ReportThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) for failure to make a required report to the NRC. Specifically in 2008, a section of essential service water piping was identified to be below the American Society of Engineers (ASME) code case N 513 minimum pipe wall thickness to ensure structural integrity was maintained and therefore, the system was determined to have been inoperable. This condition existed longer than the technical specification allowed system outage time for essential service water. Therefore, this should have been reported in 2008 as operations in a condition prohibited by technical specifications under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) within 60 days of the date of discovery. Entergy entered the issue into their corrective action program as CR-IP2-2013-4346 and completed corrective actions to discuss the 2008 event as part of a licensee event report 247-2013004 submitted on November 12, 2013 for leaks in the same system discovered in September 2013. The inspectors determined that the failure to submit a notification required by 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) is a performance deficiency which was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation. The information in the 10 CFR 50.73 report that was not submitted would not have adversely impacted any regulatory decisions by the NRC. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, inspectors did not assign a cross-cutting aspect to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B.
05000247/FIN-2012003-0230 June 2012 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedAn LER for an Inoperable Main Steam Safety Valve Was Not Submitted When RequiredThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV, NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because Entergy personnel did not provide a written licensee event report (LER) to the NRC within 60 days of identifying during testing that MS-46D, main steam line safety valve, was inoperable and in a condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specification (TS). Entergy personnel adjusted the valves lift setpoint to within the TS operability limit, repaired and tested the valve before plant startup. Entergy staff entered this issue into the CAP as CR-IP2-2012-3320 and CR-IP2-2012-4153. The inspectors determined that the failure to provide a written LER within 60 days was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. This violation involved not making a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example (d)(9), the NRC determined this violation is more than minor and is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process with no underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation.
05000286/FIN-2012002-0131 March 2012 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailed to Submit an LER for a Single Cause of Two Auxiliary Boiler Feedwater Trains InoperableThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV, NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), because Entergy personnel did not provide a written Licensee Event Report (LER) to the NRC within 60 days of identifying a single condition which caused two trains of auxiliary feedwater (AFW) to become inoperable. The safety-grade nitrogen backup to instrument air in the auxiliary boiler feed pump (ABFP) room is designed to provide 30 minutes of motive force to air operated AFW valves in the event that non-safety-related instrument air is lost. The discharge flow control valves (FCVs) for the ABFPs are designed to fail full open on a loss of all air pressure in order to ensure AFW is provided to the steam generators for decay hea removal. However, with the FCVs full open, the motors for 31 and 33 motor-driven ABFPs could reach an overcurrent condition, which, if coincident with degraded bus voltage, could cause the motor circuit breakers to trip open approximately 400 seconds from breaker amptector actuation. To protect the pump motor circuit breakers from possible trip while the nitrogen system is not available, and ensure AFW operability, a dedicated operator is required to be stationed locally to provide manual control of the FCVs if instrument air is lost. However, on October 11, 2011, Entergy personnel caused two trains of AFW to become inoperable for 45 minutes when they isolated the nitrogen backup system to instrument air during maintenance and did not station a dedicated operator as a compensatory measure. This issue was entered into Entergys CAP as CR-IP3-2012-00394. This violation involved not making a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure t Make a Required Report, example (d)(9), which states A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73, the NRC determined this violation is more than minor and is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process with no underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation. (Section 1R15.1)
05000286/FIN-2011002-0231 March 2011 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER for a Condition Prohibited By TS Associated With 31 Battery Charger InoperabilitySL IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), because Entergy personnel did not provide a written Licensee Event Report (LER) to the NRC within 60 days of identifying a condition which was prohibited by plant Technical Specifications (TS) 3.8.4, DC Sources- Operating. On October 13, 2010, Entergy personnel identified the 31 battery charger (BC) had low and non-adjustable float voltage during the weekly battery inspection surveillance. That the same day, the 31 static inverter unexpectedly and automatically transferred to its alternate power source, and the installed spare battery charger was subsequently placed in service. Entergy staff completed an apparent cause evaluation (ACE) for this event on November 1, 2010. In the ACE, Entergy staff documented their determination that the 31 battery charger had been incapable of performing its safety function and classified the issue as a maintenance rule functional failure because the 31 battery charger had failed to provide reliable output voltage. Subsequent to the inspectors' questioning, Entergy personnel performed a past operability review and determined that the 31 battery charger was inoperable and left in service for 8 hours and 27 minutes, thus exceeding the TS AOT of two hours. Based on this review, Entergy personnel concluded that the condition met the criteria for reporting under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B) and that a 60-day report was required to have been submitted to the NRC. Entergy's completed corrective actions included the initiation of CR-IP3-2011-00092, and the performance of a past operability review. Planned corrective actions include the submittal of a licensee event report (LER) to the NRC. This violation involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Section 6.9, Inaccurate and Incomplete Information or Failure to Make a Required Report, example (d)(8), which states A licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73, the NRC determined that this violation is more than minor and categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process with no underlying technical violation that would be considered more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation.
05000247/FIN-2010008-0130 June 2010 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedUFSAR Section 5.1.3.12, Cathodic Protection, not updated consistent with current plant conditionsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SLlV) NCV of 10 CFR 50.71 (e) because Entergy personnel did not revise the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR) with information consistent with plant conditions. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not remove reference to or correct information to reflect current plant conditions related to systems described as having cathodic protection consistent with UFSAR Section 5.1.3.12, Cathodic Protection. Entergy personnel identified that the UFSAR was inconsistent with current plant conditions in 2005. However, the corrective action to resolve the discrepancy was not completed. Entergy issued CR-IP2-2010-03512 to address the UFSAR discrepancy. This issue is considered within the traditional enforcement process because it has the potential to impede or impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory functions. The inspectors used the Enforcement Policy, Supplement I - Reactor Operations, to evaluate the significance of this violation. The inspectors concluded that the violation is more than minor because the longstanding and incorrect information in the UFSAR had a potential impact on safety and licensed activities. Similar to Enforcement Policy Supplement I, example D.6, the inspectors determined the violation was of SLiV (very low safety significance) since the erroneous information not updated in the UFSAR was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor impacted a licensing or safety decision by the NRC. The inspectors determined there was a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the component area of corrective action effectiveness. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not implement adequate actions in a timely manner to update the UFSAR to be consistent with plant conditions.
05000247/FIN-2009005-0131 December 2009 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedIncomplete Licensed Operator Medical ExaminationsAn NRC-identified Severity Level IV Violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information was identified because Entergy submitted inaccurate medical information for licensed operators. The inspectors identified submittals to the NRC were inaccurate due to the omission of a tactile test (test performed to ensure that operators can distinguish among various shapes of control knobs and handles by touch) from the required licensed operator medical examinations. The inspectors determined that Entergy's medical physician did not adequately test all licensed operators (both initial and renewal licensees) in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21 and 10 CFR 55.33 with respect to ANSI/ANS-3.4 1983. However, Entergy had submitted medical information, as required by 10 CFR 55 for licensed operators and applicants that stated the testing had been performed satisfactorily. Following identification of the issue, Entergy entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR-IP3-2009-04487) and completed corrective actions to develop and administer an appropriate test. The inspectors noted that all licensed operators passed this new test and no new license conditions were required. Entergy's failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC could have resulted in an incorrect licensing action and is a performance deficiency because the licensee is required to comply with 10 CFR 50.9. Because this violation of 10 CFR 50.9 is considered to be a violation that potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process, it is dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The finding was more than minor because documents which provided the information to the NRC were signed under oath by the company medical physician and the Site Vice President.
05000247/FIN-2009005-0431 December 2009 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedTransient Combustibles Stored on the ISFSI padAn NRC-identified Severity Level IV, NCV of 10 CFR 72.212(b)(2)(ii), was identified because Entergy personnel did not evaluate a change to the written evaluation described in its Holtec Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) prior to implementing the change. Specifically, inspectors identified that Entergy personnel were storing combustible material on the Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) pad which was contrary to the Holtec UFSAR and the Entergy 72.212 Evaluation Report which stated that transient combustibles will not be stored on the ISFSI pad. Following the inspectors' questions, Entergy personnel determined the required evaluation in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48(c) was not performed. Entergy personnel entered the issue into their corrective action program and verified that all combustibles had been removed from the pad. The Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) was not used for this finding because inspections of ISFSI activities are covered under NRC Manual Chapter 2690 and are not incorporated in the reactor safety cornerstones in the ROP's Significance Determination Process (SOP). It was determined that the failure to evaluate a change to the written evaluation required by 10 CFR 72.212 using the requirements of 10 CFR 72.48(c) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergy's ability to foresee and prevent. The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation based on Supplement VI, Example 0.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. A cross-cutting aspect was not assigned since the performan.ce deficiency was not applicable to evaluation in accordance with the ROP.
05000286/FIN-2009005-0131 December 2009 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedIncomplete Licensed Operator Medical ExaminationsAn NRC-identified SL IV Violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and accuracy of information was identified because Entergy submitted inaccurate medical information for licensed operators. The inspectors identified Entergy submittals to the NRC were inaccurate due to the omission of a tactile test (test performed to ensure that operators can distinguish among various shapes of control knobs and handles by touch) from the required licensed operator medical examinations. The inspectors determined that Entergy\\\'s medical physician did not adequately test all licensed operators (both initial and renewal licensees) in accordance with 10 CFR 55.21 and 10 CFR 55.33 with respect to ANSI/ANS-3.41983. However, Entergy had submitted medical information, as required by 10 CFR 55 for licensed operators and applicants that stated the testing had been performed satisfactorily. Following identification of the issue, Entergy personnel entered the issue into the corrective action program (CR-IP3-2009-04487) and completed corrective actions to develop and administer an appropriate test. The inspectors noted that all licensed operators passed this new test and no new license conditions were required. Entergy\\\'s failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC could have resulted in an incorrect licensing action and is a performance deficiency because the licensee is required to comply with 10 CFR 50.9. Because this violation of 10 CFR 50.9is considered to be a violation that potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process, it is dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The finding was more than minor because documents which provided the information to the NRC were signed under oath by the company medical physician and the Site Vice President. Because there was no evidence that operators mis-operated equipment due to omitted tactile tests, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (SL IV).The applicability of cross-cutting aspects related to the performance deficiency of this finding will be determined after NRC review of Entergy\\\'s response to the Notice of Violation
05000286/FIN-2008002-0331 March 2008 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailure to Report Under 10 CFR 50.72(B)(2)(V), the Loss of Pressurizer HeatersThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) because Entergy did not report the loss of the 31 backup pressurizer heater group. Entergy submitted a licensee event report and entered the issue into their corrective action program. This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process since the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRCs ability to carry out its regulatory mission. The failure to report was entered into Entergy\'s corrective action program as CR-IP3-2008-00879, and Entergy is currently drafting a licensee event report regarding this event. Since this violation has been characterized as a Severity Level IV violation, and has been entered into Entergys corrective action program, it is being treated as a non-cited violation in accordance with Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, in that Entergy did not make risk significant decisions using a systematic process. Specifically, the Unit 3 current licensing and design bases contained the necessary information to reach an appropriate decision regarding compliance with applicable regulations. (H.1.(a)
05000286/FIN-2007003-0230 June 2007 23:59:59Indian PointLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe following Severity Level IV violation was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG 1600, for being dispositioned as a non-cited violation. Prior to administering the 2006 initial licensed operator NRC examination, Entergy informed the NRC that regulations and guidelines regarding examination security may not have been followed. Specifically, a training supervisor was directing training to be conducted for examination topics that were not previously covered during the applicants training. After receiving this report, the NRC, in parallel with Entergy, conducted an investigation to determine the nature and extent of the issue. The NRC determined that the extent of the compromise was ultimately limited to two questions on the written examination and one job performance measure (JPM). To ensure the integrity of the written examination, these two questions and twenty three others were removed from the examination. These questions were replaced with other randomly selected test items that were provided by the NRC. The compromised JPM was replaced. Based upon the replaced JPM, the nature of the operating examination, and the security arrangements, the NRC did not consider the operating examination to be compromised. The examination was determined to be valid and was administered. The investigation continued to gather information to support potential enforcement actions. Following the administration of the examination, the NRC further investigated the personnel and events surrounding this issue and determined that the training supervisor had misinterpreted NRC guidance regarding what was, and what was not, appropriate activities for a person in his position. Regardless of his understanding, and although his actions were identified and corrected prior to the administration of the examination, the NRC concluded that the supervisors actions were a violation of NRC requirements as stated below. NRC regulations prohibit facility licensees from engaging in any activity that could compromise the integrity of any examination required by 10 CFR 55, \"Operator\'s Licenses.\" This finding was determined to be more than minor because the failure to administer an equitable and consistent licensed operator qualification examination had the potential to cause a credible impact on safety since operators could have been considered for licensing without demonstrating an adequate level of knowledge. This finding was considered as traditional enforcement because the issue had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to make a licensing decision to permit individuals to operate the controls of a nuclear power plant. This finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV non-cited violation because no willfulness was involved, it was not repetitive, it was entered into the licensees corrective action program, and the licensee notified the NRC of this issue. 10 CFR 55.49, \"Integrity of Examinations and Tests,\" states in part that, applicants, licensees, and facility licensees shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected, the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. This includes activities related to the preparation and certification of license applications and all activities related to the preparation, administration, and grading of the tests and examinations required by this part. Contrary to the above, Entergy developed and submitted the 2006 Initial Licensed Operator Qualification Examination for NRC review and approval and then subsequently engaged in training activities in a manner which compromised the integrity of the examination. The training activities in question occurred in late August 2006 and throughout September 2006 in the weeks leading up to the examination which was originally scheduled for the weeks of October 23 and 30, 2006. These training activities were identified by the licensee and reported to the NRC. Subsequent investigations by the NRC during the weeks of October 10 through December 15, 2006, determined that a compromise, and thus a violation, had occurred. Entergy provided focused training on examination test items just before the examination was to be administered, thereby undermining the ability of the NRC to infer adequate mastery of the necessary knowledge and abilities for making a licensing decision. Entergy entered this issue into their corrective action program (CR IP3 2006-02786 and 03108) and immediately initiated a root cause investigation. Entergys investigation made a determination regarding the extent of the compromise, which corresponded to the results of an independent investigation conducted by the NRC. Because the issue was placed in the corrective action program and compliance was restored before the examination was administered and because the issue was not repetitive nor willful, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV non-cited violation, consistent with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
05000286/FIN-2005005-0431 December 2005 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72(B)(3)(XIII) NotificationA non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) was identified for not formally reporting a siren system problem that occurred on August 5, 2005. The inspectors noted the short duration of the siren system problem, the fact that the NRC was informally notified, that back-up route alerting was available, and also that the capability to actuate the sirens via a manual siren initiation method was not lost. Subsequent to this event, the licensee implemented corrective actions to formalize the manual siren system actuation method. Notwithstanding these circumstances, a formal notification to the NRC was required, because the normal processes for actuation of the sirens were not available, and the licensee did not have formal procedures for, and had limited experience with, a potential alternate siren actuation method This deficiency was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process since the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRCs ability to carry out its regulatory mission. The inspectors evaluated the severity of this violation using the criteria contained in Supplement I - Reactor Operations and Section VI.A.1 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy and determined that this finding met the criteria for disposition as a non-cited violation.
05000247/FIN-2005005-0731 December 2005 23:59:59Indian PointNRC identifiedFailure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72(B)(3)(XIII) NotificationA Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) was identified for not formally reporting a siren system problem that occurred on August 5, 2005. The inspectors noted that the duration of the siren system problem was short, the NRC was informally notified, the process for back-up route alerting was available, and the capability to actuate the sirens via a manual siren initiation method was not lost. Subsequent to this event, Entergy implemented corrective actions to formalize the manual siren system actuation method. Notwithstanding these circumstances, a formal notification to the NRC was required, because the normal processes for actuation of the sirens were not available and Entergy did not have formal procedures for, and had limited experience with, the manual siren initiation method. This deficiency was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process since the failure to make a required report could adversely impact the NRCs ability to carry out its regulatory mission. Because this finding is of very low safety significance and has been entered into the corrective action program, it is being treated as an NCV.