Semantic search

Jump to navigation Jump to search
 Start dateSiteIdentified byTitleDescription
05000354/FIN-2016003-0230 September 2016 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedUntimely Submittal of an LER for a Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety FunctionThe Inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SLIV) NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) for because PSEG did not submit a Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days of an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at any time within 3 years of the date of discovery. Specifically, while performing an in-service retest of the HPCI system, the turbine tripped on overspeed shortly after startup due to low spring force on the overspeed assembly reset spring. This condition allowed the overspeed tappet to trip the turbine without an actual overspeed condition present, rendering the system inoperable and unable to automatically initiate and inject at rated flow within 35 seconds as required per TSs and the design basis, thus preventing the fulfillment of a safety function. PSEGs corrective actions included documenting the missed LER in the corrective action program (CAP) in notification (NOTF) 20741046, and submitted LER 05000354/2016001-00 under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) on October 04, 2016. The inspectors evaluated this issue using the traditional enforcement process because the performance deficiency had the potential to impede or impact the NRCs regulatory process. Specifically, the failure to submit an LER under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D) within 60 days of an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function at any time within 3 years of the date of discovery could impact the NRCs regulatory process. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with IMC 0612 and the Enforcement Manual; violations of 10 CFR 50.73 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors reviewed Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this violation was a Severity Level IV violation because PSEG did not submit the LER as required by 10 CFR 50.73 did not cause the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake substantial further inquiry. The performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and no associated ROP finding was identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, this traditional enforcement issue is not assigned a cross-cutting aspect.
05000354/FIN-2016002-0330 June 2016 23:59:59Hope CreekLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationAccording to 10 CFR 50.74, each licensee shall notify the NRC within 30 days of a change in an operators or senior operators status including termination of any operator or senior operator. Contrary to this requirement, in NOTF 20727574, PSEG identified that Hope Creek staff did not notify the NRC of the resignation of a licensed reactor operator. The licensed reactor operator resigned on November 12, 2015, but PSEG did not notify the NRC of the change in status until May 9, 2016. This issue meets the criteria for a SL IV violation because the May 9, 2016, notification did not result in increased inspection activities or cause the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position.
05000354/FIN-2015003-0130 September 2015 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedInaccurate Information Provided to the NRC in License Amendment Request for Service Water Bay Watertight DoorsThe inspectors identified a severity level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 10.50.9(a), Completeness and Accuracy of Information, for PSEGs failure to provide accurate and complete information in a license amendment request regarding technical specification (TS) 3.7.3 Flood Protection. This information was material to NRC because it was used, in part, as the basis for the approval and issuance of a license amendment to remove the Unit 2 service water intake structure (SWIS) watertight doors from TS flood protection requirements. PSEGs corrective actions include reinstatement of the Unit 2 watertight doors in the technical requirements manual (TRM) flood protection requirements. Additionally, since the inaccurate license change request submittal in 1998, PSEG implemented LS-AA-117, Written Communications, which requires that all license amendment requests and documents submitted to the NRC under oath and affirmation shall receive a Technical Verification Team review. The Technical Verification Team review consists of a page-by-page review of the subject document that identifies and validates all statements of fact, assumptions, data inputs and calculations which could alter the conclusions reached in the document. The inspectors evaluated this issue using the traditional enforcement process because the performance deficiency had the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Specifically, this violation impacted the regulatory process in that the inaccurate information was material to the NRCs determination that there was reasonable assurance the proposed removal of the Unit 2 SWIS bay watertight doors from the Hope Creek TSs would not result in plant operations that would endanger the health and safety of the public. The inspectors concluded that had the information been complete and accurate at the time provided, it likely would have resulted in a reconsideration of this regulatory position. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency identified is a Severity Level IV violation, because: the risk associated with an external flooding event at Hope Creek is very low (less than 10-8 per year), the flood protection TS requirement has been changed to a TRM requirement, and the procedure revision to HC.OP-AB.MISC-0001, Acts of Nature, ensured that all of the SWIS exterior doors would be closed during high river water level conditions. The performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, and no 4 associated ROP finding was identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, this traditional enforcement issue is not assigned a cross-cutting aspect.
05000354/FIN-2015002-0230 June 2015 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedFailure to Request a Generic Fundamentals Examination Waiver for a Senior Operator License ApplicantDuring a review of recently issued operator licenses, the NRC identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50.9 associated with the licensees failure to request a Generic Fundamentals Examination (GFE) waiver for a Senior Operator License applicant. Compliance was restored on May 4, 2015, when the licensee submitted a letter to the NRC which provided additional information concerning the issue. The Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) applicant had completed classroom instruction and successfully passed a licensee administered GFE on August 16, 2013, and had passed an NRC prepared GFE when previously licensed as a reactor operator at another utility. The applicant met the requirements to request a waiver to sit for the exam and would have been granted a waiver if it had been requested. The inspectors determined that traditional enforcement applied to this performance deficiency (PD), as the issue impacted the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. Specifically, the NRC relies upon the licensee to ensure all license applicants have completed the preparation requirements of NUREG-1021. The PD was determined to be Severity Level IV because it fits the SL-IV example of Enforcement Policy Section 6.4.d.1.a, Violation Examples: Licensed Reactor Operators. This section states, Severity Level IV violations involve for example ...cases of inaccurate or incomplete information inadvertently provided to the NRC that does not contribute to the NRC making an incorrect regulatory decision as a result of the originally submitted information. Because the applicant met the requirements for a waiver and the waiver would have been granted if it had been requested, the performance deficiency did not cause the NRC to make an incorrect regulatory decision. The performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.
05000354/FIN-2015008-0231 March 2015 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedFailure to Submit a Licensee Event Report for a Condition Prohibited by Technical SpecificationsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) because PSEG did not provide a written Licensee Event Report (LER) to the NRC within 60 days of identifying a condition prohibited by the plants technical specifications (TS). Specifically, PSEG personnel did not submit a 50.73 report for the inoperability of the B Filtration, Recirculation and Ventilation System (FRVS) recirculation fan that exceeded its TS allowed outage time. PSEG entered this issue into the corrective action program as notification 20678572. Planned actions include submitting an LER and performing a causal evaluation. Because the failure to submit a required LER impacts the regulatory process, this violation was evaluated using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy, dated July 9, 2013. The issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the example listed in Section 6.9.d.9, a licensee fails to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 10 CFR 50.73. The inspectors reviewed the issue for reactor oversight process significance and concluded there was no associated finding. Because this violation involves the traditional enforcement process and does not have an underlying technical violation that would be considered more-than-minor, a cross-cutting aspect is not assigned to this violation in accordance with IMC 0612.
05000354/FIN-2014404-0230 June 2014 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedSecurity
05000354/FIN-2014404-0130 June 2014 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedSecurity
05000354/FIN-2010005-0231 December 2010 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedInadequate 10 CFR 50.59 Safety EvaluationThe inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, for PSEG\'s failure to perform an adequate safety evaluation for an approved design change involving primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs). Specifically, the safety evaluation did not identify the impact of a design change that increased the allowable closing stroke times of several PCIVs, which resulted in more than a minimal increase in the potential radiological consequences of an accident. PSEG\'s corrective actions included blocking procedure changes that incorporated the design change and implementing a new design change to return the PCIV stroke times back to their original design values. Violations of 10 CFR 50.59 potentially impede or impact the regulatory process and are, therefore, dispositioned using the NRC Enforcement Policy. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, the performance deficiency was more than mi or because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors performed a Phase I screening of the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 0609.04,Table 4a, Barrier Integrity cornerstone. The issue screened as Green, because there was no actual open pathway in the physical integrity of the primary containment and because the design change, although approved for implementation, was not actually incorporated into station procedures. Therefore, the violation is categorized as Severity Level IV in accordance with Section 6.1.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The underlying finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, because the station did not provide proper supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors. Specifically, engineers, supervisors, and managers did not properly oversee contractor engineering products, including performing a rigorous technical review of the products for a design change, that resulted in an inadequate 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation.
05000354/FIN-2008005-0131 December 2008 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedUntimely Licensee Event Report for Reportable Conditions Associated with the CREF SystemThe inspectors identified a non-cited, Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for a failure to submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days after the discovery of an event requiring a report. On April 22, 2008, PSEG determined that both trains of the control room emergency filtration (CREF) system were inoperable, which is reportable as a loss of safety function of a system that is designed to mitigate the consequences of an accident. Additionally, operators entered Technical Specification 3.0.3 and commenced a plant shutdown, which is reportable as a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications. PSEG did not submit an LER for this event until October 17, 2008. PSEGs corrective actions included revising the applicable procedure for assessing whether an LER is required. Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report an event in a timely manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I.D of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, because PSEG did not properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality for reportability. Specifically, PSEG did not correctly evaluate the reportability of both trains of CREF being inoperable. As a result, PSEG failed to submit an LER in a timely manner. (P.1(c)) (Section 4OA3
05000354/FIN-2005004-0430 September 2005 23:59:59Hope CreekNRC identifiedUntimely License Event Report for the A' CREF SubsystemThe inspectors identified that PSEG did not submit a licensee event report to document the A control room emergency filtration system was inoperable for greater than seven days on two occasions in February 2005, a condition that is prohibited by Technical Specifications. The finding was determined to be a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System. PSEGs corrective actions included reinforcing procedure requirements to screen equipment problems for reportability Traditional enforcement applies because a failure to report a safety event in a timely manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. This finding was reviewed by NRC management because the finding was related to traditional enforcement. The review determined the finding to be a Severity Level IV violation consistent with Supplement I.D of the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding is not suitable for Significance Determination Process evaluation because it did not have an actual impact on the initiating events, mitigating systems, or barrier integrity cornerstone.