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05000321/FIN-2014005-0231 December 2014 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to report degraded fire penetration seals per 50.72 and 50.73The NRC identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) Licensee Event Report System for failure to report unanalyzed conditions that significantly degraded plant safety. Specifically, the licensee failed to notify the NRC upon discovery of reportable degraded conditions in the control building that could have resulted in the loss of both Unit 1 safe shutdown paths in the event of a postulated fire. The violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 870626. Failure to report an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety as required by 10 CFR Part 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR Part 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B) was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD potentially impeded or impacted the regulatory process and was evaluated using traditional enforcement in accordance with Section 6 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Failure to make a report required by 10 CFR Part 50.72 or 10 CF Part 50.73 is identified in example 9 of Section 6.9.d as a Severity Level IV violation. Crosscuttin aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000321/FIN-2013007-0131 December 2013 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Update the UFSAR Following a Change in Neutron Fluence Calculation MethodologyThe inspectors identified an NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) for the licensees failure to update the UFSAR following the change in methodology used to calculate reactor vessel neutron fluence. Specifically, the licensee did not completely update the UFSAR to reflect the change in fluence calculation methodology from the General Electric methodology to the Radiation Analysis Modeling Application (RAMA) methodology described in BWRVIP-114-A, BWR Vessel and Internals Project, RAMA Fluence Methodology Theory Manual. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as condition report (CR) 744853. The inspectors determined that the failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was greater than minor because the failure to provide complete licensing and design basis information in the UFSAR could result in either the licensee making an inappropriate licensing interpretation or the NRC making an inappropriate regulatory decision based on incomplete information in the UFSAR. This performance deficiency was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because failing to update a UFSAR had the potential to adversely impact the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function. The performance deficiency was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy (dated July 9, 2013), Section 6.1.d.3. Since this issue was dispositioned using traditional enforcement, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation.
05000321/FIN-2012005-0231 December 2012 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Degraded Primary Safety Barrier in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73The NRC identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), when the licensee failed to provide an 8-hour event notification and a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days to the NRC for the plant being in a condition that caused a principal safety barrier to be seriously degraded, after a cracked weld was discovered in the reactor coolant system boundary on March 13, 2012. The licensee generated CR 557188 to document the failure to provide the required notification and report to the NRC. Failure to report a seriously degraded principal safety barrier as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) was a performance deficiency. Using the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency involved a violation that could have impacted the regulatory process, therefore, this violation was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 or 50.73 is a Severity Level IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000321/FIN-2012008-0130 September 2012 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Degraded Primary Safety Barrier per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A)The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A), for the licensees failure to provide an 8-hour event notification to the NRC for the plant being in a condition that caused a principal safety barrier to be seriously degraded. The licensee generated condition report 489079 to document the failure to provide the required 8-hour notification. The team determined that the failure to report a seriously degraded principal safety barrier as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) was a performance deficiency. Using the guidance of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the team determined the performance deficiency involved a violation that could have impacted the regulatory process, therefore, it was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 is a Severity Level IV violation. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations.
05000321/FIN-2011005-0131 December 2011 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to identify all the applicable reporting codes when submitting an LERAn NRC-identified Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, was identified when the licensee failed to include all applicable reporting codes on licensee event report (LER) 2- 2011-001, Primary Containment Isolation Penetration Exceeded Overall Allowable Technical Specification Leakage Limits. Specifically, the circumstances identified in LER 2-2011-001 met the conditions to be reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material, but was not. The licensee issued a revision to LER 2-2011-001 to correct this violation. This violation was entered into the licensees corrective action program as CR 371298. Failure to identify all the applicable reporting codes when submitting an LER to the Commission is a performance deficiency. Because this violation was determined to have the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors reviewed the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this finding was a Severity IV violation based on example 6.9.d.10., which states, A failure to identify all applicable reporting codes on a Licensee Event Report that may impact the completeness or accuracy of other information (e.g., performance indicator data) submitted to the NRC. No cross-cutting aspect was assigned, because traditional enforcement violations are not screened for cross-cutting aspects.
05000321/FIN-2008005-0131 December 2008 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Report a Reportable ConditionA NRC-identified violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, was identified when the licensee did not recognize the loss of all three main control room (MCR) air handling units (AHUs) was a reportable condition. Consequently, the licensee failed to make an eight hour report as required by 10 CFR 50.72 and submit a licensee event report (LER) within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. This violation does not apply to Unit 1 because it was in a refueling outage and the AHUs were not required to be operating. This violation has been entered into the licensees CAP as CR 2008111957. Failure to recognize the loss of the MCREC system safety function was reportable is a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function of event assessment. The inspectors determined this finding was a SL IV violation because the failure to report this condition did not substantively impact the Agency\'s regulatory responsibilities and the Agency would not have responded in a significantly different manner had the information been properly reported. This finding had the cross-cutting aspect of evaluating for reportability in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (P.1(c)) because the licensee evaluated reportability only for the entry into TS LCO 3.0.3. (Section 4AO5)
05000321/FIN-2006013-0130 June 2006 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedImplementation of Change Which Decreased the Effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24A Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified for failure to comply with the emergency plan change requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). A change involving removal from the Emergency Plan of the licensees methodology for determining offsite Protective Action Recommendations (PAR) decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan, Version 24, without prior NRC approval. The finding was evaluated using the NRCs Enforcement Policy because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. This finding is more than minor because it involved deletion from the licensees Emergency Plan of most of the substantive information addressing emergency planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10). The finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment and notification
05000321/FIN-2004004-0130 September 2004 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 EvaluationThe inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR). As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.
05000321/FIN-2001002-0131 March 2001 23:59:59HatchNRC identifiedFailure to Document Issues10 CFR 50.73.b requires, in part, that Licensee Event Reports (LER) shall contain a brief abstract describing the major occurrences during the event, including all component or system failures that contributed to the event and significant corrective action taken to prevent recurrence. In addition, the LER shall contain a narrative description of the cause of each component or system failure, the effect of each failed component, and operator actions that affected the course of the event, including procedural deficiencies that contributed to the event Contrary to the above, on February 16, 2001, Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-321/00- 02: Reduction in Reactor Feedwater Flow Results in Automatic Reactor Shutdown on Low Water Level, dated February 25, 2000, did not contain all information as required by 10 CFR 50.73.b. Specifically, the LER did not contain the significant complications encountered with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system failure, the cause of the RCIC system failure, or the effect of the RCIC system failure on the event. The LER did not identify several unsuccessful attempts to restart the RCIC system after the RCIC turbine tripped on high reactor water level following a reactor trip. The LER also did not document certain operator actions that affected the course of the event involving the RCIC system, including an operating procedure that allowed the operator to restart the RCIC system turbine by opening the Trip and Throttle valve with the steam supply valve full open and the turbine control system demanding maximum speed. This method of restarting the tripped RCIC system contributed to repetitive overspeed trips of the RCIC turbine during the event. In addition, the LER did not contain a description of the significant corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence of the RCIC system failure.