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05000333/FIN-2018411-0230 June 2018 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedSecurity
05000333/FIN-2016001-0431 March 2016 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedUntimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Inoperable Secondary ContainmentThe inspectors identified a SL IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, following reasonable resolution of questions regarding the reliability of secondary containment differential pressure (d/p) instrumentation indications, FitzPatrick staff did not promptly report that, during a transfer from normal reactor building ventilation in service to the reactor building being isolated with the SBGTS in service, reactor building d/p briefly dropped below the TS required minimum value of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge and therefore caused the secondary containment system to be inoperable. As immediate corrective action, the event was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). The issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-05244 and CR-JAF-2015-05265. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2015004-0231 December 2015 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedUntimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of Inoperable Secondary ContainmentThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of when the need to do so should reasonably have been recognized, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, positive pressure in the secondary containment due to a previously unidentified equipment malfunction that occurred during transition between the reactor building being isolated and normal reactor building ventilation being in service was not promptly recognized as a condition that caused the single train secondary containment system to be inoperable and therefore to be reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. This issue was entered into the CAP as CR-JAF-2015-05244 and CR-JAF-2015-05265. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was an SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2014005-0131 December 2014 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedUntimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of a Secondary Containment System Functional FailureSeverity Level IV. The inspectors identified an SL IV NCV of Title10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the secondary containment system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of the occurrence, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, while restoring the normal reactor building ventilation (RBV) syste to service following maintenance, reactor building-to-ambient differential pressure droppe below the Technical Specification (TS) required minimum value of 0.25 inches of vacuum water gauge and therefore caused the secondary containment system to be inoperable. However, FitzPatrick staff did not promptly recognize this as a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. As corrective action, FitzPatrick staff reported the condition to the NRC in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) and entered it into the corrective action progra (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2014-06498. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the secondary containment system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. The inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter. Using Example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2014004-0130 September 2014 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Notify NRC Within 30 Days of Medical Changes for Licensed OperatorsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.74, Notification of Change in Operator or Senior Operator Status. Specifically, on three occasions, Entergy staff did not notify the NRC of a change in the medical status of a licensed operator within 30 days of learning of the diagnosis. These issues were entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2014-02227 and CR-JAF-2014-02304. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to notify the NRC of licensed operator medical status changes as described above within 30 days was a performance deficiency that was within Entergys ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. Because the issue had the potential to affect the NRCs ability to perform its regulatory function, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.4.d.1(b) from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a Severity Level IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation because Entergy staff did not communicate licensed operator permanent medical status changes within the 30 day reporting requirement for three licensed operators. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2013005-0131 December 2013 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedUntimely 10 CFR 50.72 Notification of a HPCI System Functional FailureThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, because unplanned inoperability of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system was not reported to the NRC within eight hours of when it should reasonably have been discovered, as required by 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Event or Condition that Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function. Specifically, identification that issues with two of the condensate storage tank (CST) level detectors that provide automatic transfer of the HPCI suction from the CSTs to the suppression pool would have caused this transfer to occur at less than the minimum CST level allowed by Technical Specifications (TSs) and therefore caused the HPCI system to be inoperable, was not promptly recognized as a condition reportable under 10 CFR 50.72. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-06344. The inspectors determined that the failure to inform the NRC of the HPCI system inoperability within eight hours in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process; in that, a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2013002-0331 March 2013 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Obtain NRC Staff Review and Approval Prior to Changing the TS Definition of a Core QuadrantThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.59, Changes, Tests, and Experiments, because Entergy personnel implemented a change to the technical specification (TS) definition of core quadrant without prior review and approval by the NRC staff in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1)(i). Specifically, Entergy staff changed the definition of core quadrant in Revision 5 of Reactor Analyst procedure RAP-7.1.04C, Neutron Instrumentation Monitoring During In-Core Fuel Handling, which allowed operators to interpret what constitute core quadrant boundaries, such that core alterations could be performed anywhere in the core provided any three source range (neutron) monitors (SRMs) were operable. As immediate corrective action to the task interface agreement (TIA) final response, FitzPatrick staff withdrew RAP-7.1.04C pending revision of the core quadrant definition. The inspectors verified that TS 3.3.1.2.2 had been satisfied during all core alterations that were performed during the 2010 and 2012 refueling outages, using the standard definition of a core quadrant. Entergy staff entered this issue into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-HQN-2013-00034. The inspectors determined that Entergy staffs implementation of a redefinition of core quadrant prior to its review and approval by the NRC staff as specified in 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1)(i) was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergy staffs ability to foresee and correct. Because this was a violation of 10 CFR 50.59, it was considered to be a violation that potentially impedes or impacts the regulatory process. Therefore, this violation was characterized using the traditional enforcement process. The violation was determined to be more than minor in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Manual, Section 7.3.E.6, because there was a reasonable likelihood that the change to the definition of what constituted a core quadrant boundary would require Commission review and approval prior to implementation. Additionally, the inspectors noted that, in accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, Issue Screening, the underlying performance deficiency would screen as more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, potentially inadequate SRM coverage during refueling operations could affect the TS bases function to provide early indication of unexpected subcritical multiplication that could be indicative of an approach to criticality. NRC Enforcement Manual Section 7.3 provides guidance to assess 10 CFR 50.59 violations through the significance determination process (SDP). In this case, the inspectors determined the violation could be evaluated using the SDP in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Checklist 7, BWR Refueling Operation with RCS Level Greater Than 23 Feet. The finding affected the Reactivity Guidelines attribute that assumes existing core alteration TS are being met. Since this attribute does not require quantitative assessment, the finding was screened as Green in accordance with Section 3.3, Mitigation Capability. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, Section 6.1.d.2, this violation was categorized as SL IV because the issue was evaluated by the SDP as having very low safety significance (Green). The finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency did not occur within the past three years and therefore was not reflective of present performance.
05000333/FIN-2013002-0131 March 2013 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER for a for a Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the HPCI System Safety FunctionThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, because failure of an isolation valve in the high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system torus suction line to fully open on demand caused the automatic suction swap function to be inoperable, but this condition was not reported to the NRC as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(v) within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. Specifically, while this condition existed, an automatic suction swap from the condensate storage tanks (CSTs) to the torus would not have gone to completion, but rather would have stopped with both suction paths open. Depending on whether or not HPCI was running at the time, this would either result in air entrainment in the HPCI pump suction, causing a loss of HPCI, or an increase in suppression pool level due to drainage from the CSTs. However, this condition was not reported to the NRC as a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function per 10 CFR 50.73(a)(v) within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. This issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-01768. The inspectors determined that the failure to submit an LER within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a safety system functional failure was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.73 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2013002-0231 March 2013 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER for a Condition Prohibited by TS 3.0.4The inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, because a violation of technical specification (TS) 3.0.4 for a reactor mode change being made from Mode 4 to Mode 2 without satisfying the TS required conditions for alignment of the containment air dilution and standby gas treatment (SGT) systems in Mode 2 was not reported to the NRC within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. Specifically, in Modes 1, 2, and 3, TS surveillance requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.1 allows the 20-inch and 24-inch primary containment vent and purge valves to be open for inerting, deinerting, pressure control, or other reasons provided that valve 27MOV- 120 in the full flow line to the SGT system is closed. This is to ensure that there would be no damage to the SGT filters if a loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) were to occur with the vent and purge valves open. However, on November 24, 2012, operators transitioned the reactor from Mode 4 to Mode 2 while the 20-inch and 24-inch containment vent and purge valves, and valve 27MOV-120, were open. This condition was not reported to the NRC within 60 days of when it should reasonably have been discovered. As immediate corrective action, FitzPatrick staff entered the issue into the corrective action program as condition report (CR)-JAF-2013-01097. The inspectors determined that the failure to submit an LER within 60 days in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a violation of site TSs was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined that the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel failed to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.73 when information that the report was required had been reasonably within their ability to have identified. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2012301-0130 June 2012 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedNRC Not Notified of a Licensed Operator\'s Change in Medical StatusThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV NCV of 10 CFR 50.74, Notification of Change in Operator or Senior Operator Status. Specifically, Entergy did not notify the NRC within 30 days of discovering a change in medical condition for a licensed operator. Subsequently, Entergy submitted a notification for the operator on February 15, 2012, and entered the issue into their corrective action program (CR-JAF-2O12-00576). The inspectors determined that Entergy\'s failure to notify the NRC within 30 days of discovering the change in medical condition for the licensed operator was a performance deficiency that was within Entergy personnel\'s ability to foresee and correct and should have been prevented. The inspectors determined that traditional enforcement applies, as the issue had the potential to impact the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function. The significance of the associated performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. This issue is similar to violation example 6.4\'d.1 (a) in the NRC Enforcement Policy for a Severity Level lV violation because it involves noncompliance with medical requirements where the operator did not perform the functions of a licensed operator while having the potentially disqualifying medical condition.
05000333/FIN-2012002-0131 March 2012 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER Revision for a Condition Prohibited by TS Associated with the HPCI SystemThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, because a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1.G for the condition of the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) and reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) systems being simultaneously inoperable was not reported to the NRC within 60 days of discovery. After this was identified by the inspectors, the issue was entered into Entergys corrective action program (CAP) as CRJAF- 2011-04779. Entergy subsequently submitted Revision 1 to LERs 05000333/2010-005- 00 and 05000333/2011-001-00. The inspectors determined that the failure to revise LER 05000333/2010-005-00 within 60 days to include the violation of TS 3.5.1.G in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50.73 was a performance deficiency that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Because the issue impacted the regulatory process, in that a violation of site Technical Specifications was not reported to the NRC within the required timeframe, thereby delaying the NRCs opportunity to review the matter, the inspectors evaluated this performance deficiency in accordance with the traditional enforcement process. Using example 6.9.d.9 from the NRC Enforcement Policy, the inspectors determined the violation was a SL IV (more than minor concern that resulted in no or relatively inappreciable potential safety or security consequence) violation, because Entergy personnel did not make a report required by 10 CFR Part 50.73. In accordance with Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0612, Appendix B, traditional enforcement issues are not assigned cross-cutting aspects.
05000333/FIN-2011003-0130 June 2011 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedUFSAR Emergency Bus Voltage Not Updated, Consistent with Current Plant ConditionsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level lV (SL lV) NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50,71(e) because FitzPatrick personnel did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with information consistent with plant conditions. Specifically, FitzPatrick personnel did not remove reference to or correct information in UFSAR Section 8.6.6.c, Emergency Bus Voltages When Operating From the Reserve Source, to reflect current plant conditions with regard to the listed maximum voltage capable of being produced at the emergency bus from the reserve source during a low load condition. This issue was considered within the traditional enforcement process because it had the potential to impede or impact the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory functions. FitzPatrick issued condition report (CR) CR-JAF-2011-03023 to address the UFSAR discrepancy. The inspectors concluded that the violation was more than minor because the longstanding and incorrect information in the UFSAR had a potential impact on safety and licensed activities. Excessive voltage on an emergency bus can result in equipment damage, or loss due to the actuation of protective devices such as overcurrent fuses. Similar to Enforcement Policy Section 6.1, example D.3, the inspectors determined the violation was of SL lV because the erroneous information not updated in the UFSAR was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
05000333/FIN-2010002-0131 March 2010 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Submit an LER for a Condition Prohibited by TS Associated with HPCIThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation (NCV) because Entergy did not provide a written report to the NRC within 60 days after discovery of the event as required by 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, for a condition which was prohibited by Technical Specification (TS) 3.5.1, Emergency Core Cooling Systems - Operating. In January, 2009, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system did not pass postmaintenance testing, as a result of the failure of the HPCI system turbine stop valve 23HOV- 1, to stroke open within the required time. Entergy personnel documented the condition in CR-JAF-2009-0350. The inservice test (IST) opening time for 23HOV-1 had previously exceeded the correct acceptance criteria which should have resulted in declaring the HPCI system inoperable. The inspectors determined that this condition met the criteria for reporting under 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(i)(8) in that the condition was not allowed by the plants TSs. Entergys corrective actions included initiating CR-JAF-2009-03964, submitting LER 05000333/2009008-00 on January 11, 2010, and providing additional guidance for their staff on licensee event reporting requirements. This violation involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Supplement I, Reactor Operations, example 04 which states, A failure to make a required LER; the NRC determined that this violation could potentially impact the regulatory process and is more than minor and categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the corrective action program component because Entergy personnel did not properly evaluate the condition reporting criteria. (P.1 (C
05000333/FIN-2009005-0331 December 2009 23:59:59FitzPatrickLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe following violation of very low safety significance Severity Level IV was identified by Entergy and is a violation of NRC requirements which meet the criteria of Section VI of the NRC Enforcement Policy, NUREG-1600, for being dispositioned as a NCV. 10 CFR Part 72.212 (b)(I)(ii) requires, as a condition of general license under the provisions of 10 CFR Part 72.210, that a licensee register use of each ISFSI cask with the NRC no later than 30 days after using that cask to store spent fuel. This requirement is also contained in Entergys procedure, MP-019.07, MPC Transfer and Hi-Storm Movement. Contrary to this requirement, two multi-purpose canisters (MPCs) were placed into service for greater than 30 days without notification to the NRC. Cask 10, location 10, (MPC 221, Hi-Storm 307) was placed into service on July 14,2009. Cask 11, location 7 (MPC 222, Hi-Storm 309) was placed into service on JUly 27,2009. Entergy identified the issue on September 18, 2009 and generated CR-JAF-2009-03243. Entergy subsequently provided formal notification to the NRC on September 21, 2009. Traditional enforcement applies because a failure make a required report to the NRC in a timely manner has the potential to impact the NRCs ability to perform its statutory mission. This violation was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation (Very Low Safety Significance) consistent with Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I.D. of the NRC Enforcement Policy. This finding is in Entergys CAP as CR-JAF-2009-03243
05000333/FIN-2009002-0231 March 2009 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailed to Submit an LER For a Condition Prohibited by TX Associated With EDG Fuel Oil SupplyThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, non-cited violation (NCV) because Entergy did not provide a written 60-day report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.73 relative to a condition which was prohibited by Technical Specifications (TS) 3.8.3. Specifically, on several occasions between September 2006 and July 2007 the volume for either the A or B fuel oil storage tanks (FOST) was such that there was an insufficient quantity of fuel oil to provide a seven day fuel oil supply for the associated emergency diesel generator (EDG) as required per Technical Specifications. Entergy personnel, in determining past reportability, improperly credited the associated fuel oil day tank towards the seven day supply and erroneously concluded on September 18, 2007, that the issue was not reportable. Entergys corrective actions included initiation of CR-JAF-2008-04323 and issuance of licensee event report (LER) 2009-001, Inadequate Engineering Calculation Results in Insufficient Inventory in EDG Fuel Oil Storage Tanks. In addition, Entergy revised applicable procedures to ensure the fuel oil storage tanks contain adequate fuel oil inventory to remain in compliance with the TS. This violation involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Supplement I, Reactor Operations, example D4 which states, A failure to make a required LER; the NRC determined this violation is more than minor and categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution related to the evaluation component because Entergy personnel did not properly consider the TS basis and, therefore, did not properly evaluate the reportability for the EDG FOSTs. (P.1(c
05000333/FIN-2008004-0230 September 2008 23:59:59FitzPatrickSelf-revealingFailure to Make a Written Report of a Non-Conforming Condition Relative to an NRC-Approved PackageA self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR Part 71.95 was identified because Entergy did not provide a written report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR Part 71.95 relative to a non-conforming condition involving the shipment of a NRC-approved package. Entergy was informed that a package it shipped to EnergySolutionsTM Barnwell Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility was found to be in non-conformance with the applicable Certificate of Compliance for the package upon receipt, Entergy did not report the condition to the NRC within 60 days of the occurrence, as required. Failure of Entergy to report the condition, as required by 10 CFR Part 71.95, constitutes a performance deficiency in that the issue is the result of Entergy not meeting a regulatory requirement that was reasonably within Entergys ability to foresee and correct, and should have been prevented. Entergy entered this issue into the corrective action program as condition report (CR)-2008-02772. This violation involved a failure to make a required report to the NRC and is considered to impact the regulatory process. Such violations are dispositioned using traditional enforcement process instead of the Significance Determination Process. Using the Enforcement Policy Supplement IV Transportation, example D4 which states, a noncompliance with shipping papers, marking, labeling, placarding, packaging or loading not amounting to a Severity Level I, II, or III violation; the NRC determined this violation is categorized as a SL IV Violation. The Enforcement Policy Supplement I Reactor Operations examples D3, D4, and D5 are similar to this issue, in that they discuss examples of failures to make required reports for more than minor events, which are also categorized at Severity Level IV. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution related - corrective action program, because Entergy performed an insufficient evaluation of a non-conforming condition associated with an NRC-approved package to assure the matter was properly classified, prioritized and evaluated relative to reportability. (P.1(c)) (Section 4OA2)
05000333/FIN-2006003-0130 June 2006 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Provide Required Medical ReportThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.74(c), in that, on multiple occasions, Entergy had not reported that licensed operators were taking prescription medications to control potentially disqualifying medical conditions. Once brought to the licensees attention, this issue was promptly added to their corrective action program. The corrective actions included an extent of condition review by Entergys medical department and subsequent submission of the required reports to the NRC. The inspectors determined that Entergys failure to report potentially disqualifying medical conditions in accordance with 10 CFR 50.74(c) is a performance deficiency. The inspectors also determined that this issue was within Entergys ability to foresee and prevent. In addition, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement applies because failure to report to the NRC potentially disqualifying medical conditions of operators impacts the NRCs regulatory function. The inspectors determined that the finding was Severity Level IV using the NRCs Enforcement Policy and Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process (SDP). Specifically, it involved the failure to report the use of medication to control potentially disqualifying medical conditions in greater than 20 percent of the records reviewed
05000333/FIN-2000011-0430 September 2000 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Take Immediate Corrective Actions And/Or Actions to Prevent RecurrenceA Severity Level IV, Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was identified regarding four examples of ineffective corrective actions. The ineffective corrective actions were associated with the failure to perform a 50.59 review for operation in single element level reactor water level control versus three element, a repetitive runback of the reactor recirculation pumps, inappropriate resolution to a missed PMT associated with the reactor recirculation pump motor generator system, and a repetitive trip of a reactor protection system electrical protection assembly breaker. These examples of ineffective corrective actions were determined to be more than minor because they indicated an adverse performance trend. This violation was not subjected to a cornerstone significant determination process, and is, therefore, a no color finding, in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0610*, Appendix E.
05000333/FIN-2000011-0230 September 2000 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Identify Conditions Adverse to QualityA Severity Level IV, Non-Cited Violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was identified associated with three examples of failure to promptly identify problems. Specifically, two opportunities were missed to identify a degraded condition with the safety related flow indication for the residual heat removal service water system (RHRSW); NYPA failed to identify conflicts between operating and surveillance test procedures for flow rate limitations; and NYPA failed to identify an adverse trend with the performance of core spray automatic start timers. These examples of promptly failing to identify conditions adverse to quality were determined to be more than minor because they indicated an adverse performance trend. The failure to promptly identify deficiencies was not subjected to a cornerstone significant determination process, and is, therefore, a no color finding in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0610*, Appendix E.
05000333/FIN-2000011-0330 September 2000 23:59:59FitzPatrickNRC identifiedFailure to Evaluate Conditions Adverse to Quality (Ders) for OperabilityA Severity Level IV, Non-Cited Violation of FitzPatrick Technical Specifications was identified due to three failures to perform adequate operability determinations during the evaluation of deficiency documents, as required by the administrative procedures. Specifically, the operability determination for the RHRSW degraded flow indication did not consider the inconsistency between the procedures regarding maximum pump flow; an operability determination was not conducted when it was determined that post-maintenance testing (PMT) was not performed after the reactor recirculation pump motor generator (RRP-MG) over-speed stops were adjusted; and the initial indications of a problem with the ground detection for the RHR control power monitoring relay were not evaluated with respect to operability, and the subsequent operability evaluation was inadequate; further evaluation resulted in NYPA declaring the relay inoperable. These examples of inadequate operability evaluations were determined to be more than minor in that they indicated an adverse performance trend. The failure to perform adequate operability evaluations was not subjected to a cornerstone significant determination process, and is, therefore, a no color finding, in accordance with NRC Manual Chapter 0610*, Appendix E.