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05000341/FIN-2017003-0130 September 2017 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Satisfy 10 CFR 50.73 Reporting Requirements for Primary Containment Isolation Valve ActuationsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of the NRCs reporting requirements Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part50.73(a)(1), Licensee Event Report (LER) System. The licensee failed to submit a required LER or provide a telephone notification within 60 days after discovery on March 24, 2017, of a condition that resulted in the invalid actuation of containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program to evaluate the cause for its failure to satisfy the reporting requirements and to identify appropriate corrective actions.Subsequently, the licensee made a telephone notification on July 14, 2017 to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System to report the event (Event Notice 52859).Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance based on No answers to the more-than-minor screening questions. In accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to report as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). No cross-cutting aspect is associated with this traditional enforcement violation because the associated performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance and therefore not a finding.
05000341/FIN-2016004-0331 December 2016 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Satisfy 10 CFR 50.73 Reporting Requirements for Loss of LOP Instrumentation and AC Electrical Power Safety FunctionsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of the NRCs reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Licensee Event Report System. The licensee failed to submit a required Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days after discovery on September 16, 2016, of an operation or condition which was prohibited by the plants TSs and an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The inspectors concluded the licensee failed to satisfy the applicable regulatory reporting requirements due to unwarranted delay in evaluating conditions from the event with respect to compliance with the TSs and reporting requirements. The licensee subsequently submitted LER 05000341/2016-009-00, Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable Due to Open Circuit on Loss of Power Instrumentation, on December 20, 2016, to report the event. The licensee entered this issue into its CAP as CARD 16-30164. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance based on No answers to the more-than-minor screening questions. In accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to report as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). No cross-cutting aspect is associated with this traditional enforcement violation because the associated performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance and therefore not a finding.
05000341/FIN-2016001-1231 March 2016 23:59:59FermiLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationTitle 10 of the CFR, Paragraph 50.72(a)(1)(ii) requires, in part, that the licensee shall notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of those non-emergency events specified in Paragraph (b) that occurred within three years of the date of discovery and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3) requires, in part, that the licensee shall notify the NRC as soon as practical and in all cases within eight hours of the occurrence of any of the applicable conditions. Moreover, 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in Paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B)(2) lists general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple MSIVs. In addition, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) requires, in part, that the licensee submit an LER for any event of the type described in this paragraph within 60 days after the discovery of the event and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) requires, in part, that the licensee report any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in Paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). Paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B)(2) in 10 CFR 50.73 lists general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple MSIVs. Contrary to the above: 1. The licensee failed to notify the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System of a non-emergency event specified in Paragraph (b) within eight hours of an event on September 14, 2015. The event involved the valid manual and automatic actuation of the primary containment isolation logic for multiple MSIVs. 2. The licensee failed to submit a required LER within 60 days after discovery of an event on September 14, 2015. The event involved the valid manual and automatic actuation of the primary containment isolation logic for multiple MSIVs. Violations of 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. In accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to make a report to the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). The licensee entered this violation into its CAP as CARD 16-20564.
05000341/FIN-2016001-0331 March 2016 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Satisfy 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 Reporting Requirements for Loss of RPS Trip Safety FunctionsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of the 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1), Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Licensee Event Report (LER) System. Specifically, the licensee failed to make a required 8-hour non-emergency notification call to the NRC Operations Center after discovery of a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function to shut down the reactor on February 21, 2015, and on January 6, 2016 (two separate occurrences). In addition, the licensee failed to submit a required LER within 60 days after discovery of the event on February 21, 2015. Subsequently, the licensee made an 8-hour notification call on February 25, 2016 to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System to report the two events (Event Notices 51755 and 51756). On March 2, 2016, the licensee updated Event Notices 51755 and 51756 to include an additional reporting criterion. The licensee submitted LER 05000341/2015-008-00, Turbine Stop Valve Closure and Turbine Control Valve Fast Closure Reactor Protection System Functions Considered Inoperable Due to Open Turbine Bypass Valve, on March 29, 2016, to report the February 2015 event. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program to evaluate the cause for its failure to satisfy the reporting requirements and to identify appropriate corrective actions. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was of minor significance based on No answers to the more-than-minor screening questions. However, in accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). No cross-cutting aspect is associated with this traditional enforcement violation because the associated performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance and therefore not a finding.
05000341/FIN-2016001-0531 March 2016 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Satisfy 10 CFR 50.73 Reporting Requirements for a Condition Prohibited by the Plants Technical SpecificationsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Licensee Event Report (LER) System, for the licensees failure to submit a required LER within 60 days after the discovery of an event on July 28, 2015, that was reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by the plants Technical Specifications. The condition involved the licensees failure to complete required actions for an inoperable ultimate heat sink reservoir and for both emergency diesel generators in one division inoperable within the allowed completion times. The licensee subsequently submitted LER 05000341/2015-009-00, Condition Prohibited by Technical Specification Due to Missed Entry into LCO (Limiting Condition for Operation) Condition, on March 31, 2016, to report the event. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program to evaluate the cause for its failure to satisfy the reporting requirements and to identify appropriate corrective actions. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was of minor significance based on No answers to the more-than-minor screening questions. However, in accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to report as required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). No cross-cutting aspect is associated with this traditional enforcement violation because the associated performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance and therefore not a finding.
05000341/FIN-2016001-1031 March 2016 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Satisfy 10 CFR 50.72 and 10 CFR 50.73 Reporting Requirements for Primary Containment Isolation Valve ActuationsThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1), Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors, and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), Licensee Event Report (LER) System. Specifically, the licensee failed to make a required 8-hour non-emergency notification call to the NRC Operations Center and also failed to submit a required within 60 days after discovery of a condition that resulted in the valid actuation of containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system on September 13, 2015, and September 14, 2015 (two separate occurrences). Subsequently, the licensee made an 8-hour notification call on February 27, 2016 to the NRC Operations Center via the Emergency Notification System to report the events (Event Notice 51391, third update). The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program to evaluate the cause for its failure to satisfy the reporting requirements and to identify appropriate corrective actions. Consistent with the guidance in IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix B, Issue Screening, dated September 7, 2012, the inspectors determined the performance deficiency was of minor significance based on No answers to the more-than-minor screening questions. However, in accordance with Section 6.9.d.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was categorized as Severity Level IV because the licensee failed to report as required by 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(ii) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). No cross-cutting aspect is associated with this traditional enforcement violation because the associated performance deficiency was determined to be of minor significance and therefore not a finding.
05000341/FIN-2015301-0130 September 2015 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedInadequate Examination Security on a Simulator ResetTitle 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 55.49, Integrity of examinations and tests, states, in part, that a licensee shall not engage in any activity that compromises the integrity of any application, test, or examination required by this part. The integrity of a test or examination is considered compromised if any activity, regardless of intent, affected, or, but for detection, would have affected the equitable and consistent administration of the test or examination. Contrary to this, the licensee failed to clean a marked-up hard card prior to a job performance measure (JPM) during administration of the operating tests. To correct this issue, the licensee initiated corrective action CARD number 15-26003. Additionally, a replacement JPM was administered to the applicant affected by the compromised JPM. The failure of the licensees staff to ensure that previously used examination materials were not available for an applicant during the initial examination administration was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was evaluated through the traditional enforcement process because it impacted the ability of the NRC to perform its regulatory oversight function. This resulted in assignment of a Severity Level IV noncited violation because it involved a non-willful compromise of examination integrity and is consistent with Section 6.4.d of the NRC Enforcement Policy.
05000341/FIN-2009010-0131 December 2009 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Provide Complete Information to the NRC which Impacted Licensing Decisions.On August 13, 2009, during performance of a self-assessment, the licensee identified that two American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Standard requirements for physical examinations of licensed operators were no longer being administered by Fermi medical personnel. Specifically, olfactory and tactile testing were deleted by a procedure change that was implemented in May 1999. Because the issue affected the NRC=s ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process. Although licensed operators were subsequently tested and found to have passed the olfactory and tactile tests, this failure had regulatory significance because the incomplete and inaccurate information was provided under a signed statement to the NRC and impacted numerous licensing decisions. This was preliminarily determined to be an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information. No cross cutting aspect was identified for the finding due to the age of the performance deficiency (e.g., 1999)
05000341/FIN-2005012-0130 June 2005 23:59:59FermiNRC identifiedFailure to Perform a 10CFR50/54(q) Review to Determine if Changing the Augmentation Process for the Station Nuclear Engineer Decreased the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) when the process for timely augmentation of on-shift staff was changed for the station nuclear engineer (SNE) position without performing a review to determine if the change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan. The inspectors determined this change decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan and that the licensee did not obtain prior NRC approval contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance in that changes were made to the emergency response organization augmentation process which were not recognized and corrected by the organization.

Because the issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy. This issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. Further, this problem was isolated to one 30-minute responder position and was not indicative of a functional problem with the emergency response organization augmentation process. Corrective actions included discussions with the SNEs that it was no longer acceptable to remotely activate the 3-D Monocore program to respond to an emergency at the plant instead of responding to the control room and that response to the control room was required within 30 minutes of the declaration of an emergency at the plant. In addition, the Emergency Call Out System test forms were revised to remove the option for the SNE to activate the software remotely in lieu of responding to the control room.

05000341/FIN-2003010-0231 December 2003 23:59:59FermiNRC identified10 CFR 50.54(Q) Violation for Decreasing the Effectiveness of the E-PLAN by Changing Eals That Address Toxic Gases Without Prior NRC Approval

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified that the licensee changed its standard emergency action level (EAL) scheme on December 19, 2000, for those events related to toxic gas releases for Unusual Event and Alert classifications. The inspectors determined these changes decreased the effectiveness of the emergency plan, and the licensee did not obtain prior NRC approval, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q).

Because the issue affected the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process as specified in Section IV.A.3 of the Enforcement Policy. According to Supplement VIII of the Enforcement Policy, this issue was determined to be a Severity Level IV violation because it involved a failure to meet a requirement not directly related to assessment and notification. Further, this problem was isolated to two EALs and was not indicative of a functional problem with the EAL scheme. Because the licensee has entered this issue into its corrective action program it is being treated as a Non-Cited Violation. (Section 1EP4)