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05000315/FIN-2017002-0730 June 2017 23:59:59CookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationTitle 10 CFR 50.71(e) required that the UFSAR be updated to assure that the latest information developed was in the UFSAR. In AR 2010 4194, Unit 1 and Unit 2 Small Break Loss of Cooling Accident (SBLOCA) Analyses, the licensee identified the March 2007 Unit 1 SBLOCA analysis had not incorporated into the UFSAR and was not included in the October 2008 UFSAR update provided to the NRC. The inspectors determined the failure to update the UFSAR by incorporating the newest SBLOCA analyses was contrary to 10 CFR 50.71e. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC IMC 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Policy. Violations of 10 CFR 50.71(e) are disposed using the traditional enforcement process because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. The inspectors reviewed Section 6.1.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined this violation was Severity Level IV because the licensees failure to update the UFSAR as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) had not yet resulted in any unacceptable change to the facility or procedures. The inspectors determined the performance deficiency was minor in that failure to update the UFSAR was not willful; did not impact a performance indicator; was not a material condition issue which could lead to a more significant safety issue, and did not impact the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objectives .
05000315/FIN-2017002-0430 June 2017 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Report Deficiencies as Required by 10 CFR 50.46SL IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Violation of 10 CFR Part 50.46, Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light -Water Nuclear Power Reactors. Specifically, the licensee failed to report the effects of the errors in the 5 LBLOCA Evaluation Model for the Unit 1 emergency core cooling systems. The inspectors determined that the failure to estimate and report the errors in the LB LOCA analyses were contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.46 and was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be minor because the failure to report was not willful, did not impact a performance indicator, was not a material condition issue which could lead to a more significant safety issue, and did not impact the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objectives. The inspectors determined the failure to report was a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 6.9 of the Enforcement Policy. A cross -cutting aspect was not assigned since the performance deficiency is minor.
05000315/FIN-2016003-0430 September 2016 23:59:59CookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe following violation of very low significance (Green) or Severity Level IV was identified by the licensee and is a violation of NRC requirements which meets the criteria of the NRC Enforcement Policy for being dispositioned as an NCV. The licensee identified a finding and NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 for the failure to properly evaluate modifications to the facility. Specifically, Evaluation 2010001600 failed to addresses each of the changes associated with proposed changes to the UFSAR to incorporate revised analysis to control room and offsite radiological dose consequences for the design bases accident. While preparing a revision to evaluation 2010001600, the preparer noted numerous discrepancies which were documented in AR 201214068. Because of the complex nature of the revisions and licensing history of Cooks dose consequence analysis, the licensee determined use of the 50.59 process would not resolve the discrepancies in the current license bases and concluded the appropriate corrective action would be preparation and submittal of a license amendment to fully implement alternate source term as part of the D. C. Cook license. The licensee has submitted the license amendment request and it is now approved. The inspectors determined that the failure of the licensee to demonstrate via the 50.59 process that the change to the licensee could be made without prior NRC approval was a performance deficiency. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, August 2016, changes made contrary to 10 CFR 50.59 impact the agencys ability to regulate and warrant enforcement. Examples provided in this Enforcement Policy stipulate that an associated SDP finding of very low safety significance would result in a Severity Level IV finding. The inspectors did not identify any physical changes to the facility based on the changes made to the UFSAR nor any other changes suitable for review in the SDP. Therefore, the inspectors determined there was no associated ROP finding and the issue was a Severity Level IV violation of 50.59. 10 CFR 50.59 requires in part, that a licensee must obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change if it would result in a departure from a method described in the UFSAR used in establishing the design bases or in the safety analysis. Contrary to this requirement on February 25, 2010, evaluation 20100016 accepted changes to the UFSAR that affected methodologies for control room and offsite dose that departed from methods described in the UFSAR. Because the licensee identified this issue in AR 201214068 and took corrective actions to submit a license amendment and is Severity Level IV, the inspectors conclude that this issue may be disposed as a licensee identified NCV.
05000315/FIN-2015004-0331 December 2015 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Evaluate the Adverse Effects of TRM Section DeletionThe inspectors identified a Severity Level (SL) IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1), Changes, Tests, and Experiments, with an associated finding of very low safety significance (Green), for the licensees failure to perform a written safety evaluation that provided the bases for the determination that the removal of Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Section 8.4.3, ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components did not require a license amendment. TRM Section 8.4.3 directed the implementation of the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program for ASME Class 1, 2, and 3 components and directed actions if nonconformances were discovered. The licensee had received a violation in 2014 for removing the same requirement via a 50.59 Evaluation. The inspectors reviewed the corrective actions for the previous violation. The licensee had restored the section via guidance to operators, revised the wording of the TRM section, and then subsequently deleted the section from the plants current licensing basis again via the 50.59 Screening process. The inspectors determined the licensee had incorrectly referenced NRC inspection guidance dealing with the operability of components when providing a basis for the deletion. Further, the operability determination process could result in less restrictive actions being taken for some degraded ASME components as compared to the TRM requirements. Therefore, the change should have received a 50.59 Evaluation. The licensee entered the issue into their CAP. The issue was more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone. Specifically, a series of changes (which ultimately resulted in the deletion of TRM Section 8.4.3) had an adverse effect on component reliability given that required actions to address nonconformances within the ISI program were removed. In addition, violations of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.59 are disposed using the traditional enforcement process in addition to the SDP because they are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. The associated traditional enforcement violation was determined to be more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine if the changes would have ultimately required NRC prior-approval. The finding screened as Green, or very low safety significance, because there was no actual known loss of functionality of components. The traditional enforcement violation was categorized as SL IV because the associated finding screened as Green in the SDP. The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not take effective corrective action to address the issue. Specifically, the licensee received a previous finding for not evaluating the adverse effects of deleting TRM Section 8.4.3. As part of the corrective actions, the licensee revised and then deleted the TRM section; however, the resulting adverse effects were not recognized nor subsequently evaluated (P.3).
05000315/FIN-2015003-0430 September 2015 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedChanges to Minimum 60-Minute Emergency Responder Staffing Without Prior ApprovalThe inspectors identified a finding of very-low safety significance with an associated Severity Level IV (SL-IV) NCV of Title 10, Code of Federa Regulations (CFR) 50.54(q)(3) and 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4) related to a staffing change in the licensees Emergency Plan that reduced the effectiveness of the Plan, which was made without prior NRC approval. Specifically, in March 2004, the licensee made changes to wording in the Donald C. Cook Emergency Plan that allowed two Radiation Protection (RP) Technician positions to be augmented by staff that were not qualified RP Technicians. This issue was placed in the licensees CAP and was corrected by revising the Emergency Plan to the approved augmented staffing minimum. The finding was of more than minor significance because it was associated with the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, a failure to evaluate changes to the Emergency Plan as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(3) resulted in unacceptable changes made to the plan that decreased its effectiveness without prior NRC approval as required by 10 CFR 50.54(q)(4) and reduced the licensees capability to perform an emergency planning function in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was of very low safety significance because it was a failure to comply that did not result in a loss of the planning standard function. In accordance with Section 6.6.d of the NRC Enforcemen Policy, this violation was categorized as SL-IV because it involved the licensees ability to meet or implement a regulatory requirement not related to assessment or notification such that the effectiveness of the Emergency Plan decreases. The inspectors concluded that because the performance deficiency involved a change to the licensees Emergency Plan in March 2004, this issue would not be reflective of current licensee performance and no cross-cutting aspect was identified. (Section 1EP4.b.1) Violations of very low safety or security significance or SL-IV that were identified by th licensee have been reviewed by the NRC. Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensees CAP. These violations and CAP tracking numbers are listed in Section 4OA7 of this report.
05000315/FIN-2014003-0230 June 2014 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedMissed Event NotificationThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV non-citied violation of 10 CFR 50.72, Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Reactors, for the licensees failure to make required event notifications within the specified time following the discovery of a condition which required an event report. Specifically, a member of the public informed the Berrien County Dispatcher about a sounding siren. The dispatcher notified the site; however, the license failed to notify the NRC. Because of the age of this issue; the licensee did not make a late report. Since 2012, the licensee has conducted training regarding notifications for alarming sirens. The inspectors determined that the licensees failure to submit an event notification within the required time was a violation of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). Since the failure to submit a required event report may impact the NRCs ability to regulate, the violation was evaluated using Section 2.2.4 of the NRCs Enforcement Policy. Per the enforcement policy, this violation was of Severity Level IV. The inspectors concluded the reactor oversight process aspects of the finding were minor; therefore there is no cross-cutting aspect.
05000315/FIN-2014007-0131 March 2014 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Evaluate the Adverse Effects of TRM Section DeletionThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1), Changes, Tests, and Experiments, and an associated finding of very low safety significance (Green) for the licensees failure to perform a written safety evaluation that provided the bases for the determination that the deletion of Technical Requirement Manual, Section 8.4.3, ASME Code Class 1, 2, and 3 Components, did not require a license amendment. Specifically, the licensee did not evaluate the adverse effects of the change. The licensee entered this issue into their Corrective Action Program and initiated corrective actions to implement compensatory measures in accordance with the deleted section of the Technical Requirement Manual. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would become a more significant safety concern. In addition, the associated traditional enforcement violation was more than minor because the inspector could not reasonably determine that the changes would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) based on the inspectors review of corrective action documents associated with non-conforming conditions related to structural integrity of ASME components generated since the TRM removal. Specifically, the inspectors used the two most bounding cases for the evaluation and determined the issues did not result in the loss of operability or functionality, represent a loss of system and/or function, represent an actual loss of function exceeding the Technical Specification allowed outage time, or represent an actual loss of function of non-Technical Specification equipment designated as high safety significant in accordance with the licensees Maintenance Rule Program. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not take effective corrective actions to address the issue. Specifically, the licensee identified that they had not evaluated the adverse effects of deleting Section 8.4.3 of the Technical Requirement Manual and, as a result, they performed a 50.59 evaluation. However, the evaluation did not address these adverse effects.
05000315/FIN-2013004-0830 September 2013 23:59:59CookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationContrary to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) requirements to report, within four hours, any event related to the health and safety of the public for which notification to other government agencies has been made, on April 19, the licensee failed to make the required notification within the four hour requirement. At 2350 on April 18, 2013, the Berrien County 911 Dispatcher notified the licensee that an emergency siren in the nearby Warren Dunes State Park was alarming. Four local citizens had called the dispatcher regarding the siren. The licensee confirmed that the siren should not be activated and took action to silence the siren. Initially, the licensee concluded that the siren actuation was not reportable because the site did not plan to issues a press release and believed the single siren would have minimal impact to the local population. The following day, the licensee reviewed the circumstances surrounding the siren and concluded that 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) applied and a four hour report should have been made. NUREG-1022 includes as an example that an Emergency Notification System notification is needed if county governments are informed of an actuation by concerned members of the public. The licensee made the notification at 1230 on April 19, 2013. The inspectors concluded that the failure to make the required four hour notification was a performance deficiency. Because the violation impacted the regulatory process, in that the licensee failed to make a required report on time, the inspectors assessed the performance deficiency using traditional enforcement. The inspectors concluded that the finding was a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, which includes a failure to make a report required by 10 CFR 50.72 as an example of a SL IV violation. The licensee entered the condition into the CAP as AR 2013-5949. Corrective actions included clarifications to licensee procedures to prevent similar occurrences. On September 19, a similar event occurred and the licensee made the report on time. Because the licensee self-identified the condition, entered the condition in the corrective action program and took action to address the causes, the inspectors concluded that the issue could be addressed as a licensee identified non-cited violation.
05000315/FIN-2013002-0331 March 2013 23:59:59CookLicensee-identifiedLicensee-Identified ViolationThe licensee identified a violation of 10 CFR 50.9, completeness and accuracy of information, for submitting a revised Emergency Action Level (EAL) scheme that was inaccurate in a material respect. While implementing the scheme, the licensee identified that CA7 and CS7 require indication of vessel level that is below the lowest measurement capability of installed instrumentation. Due to system configuration, NLI-1000, the reactor vessel level full range instrument, cannot measure below a level of 612.8 feet. This creates a condition where the instrument would indicate that vessel level remained at 612.8 even though inventory might be well below 612.8. Without that information, entry into CA7 or CS7 may not occur. After identifying the error, the licensee determined that a change to the EAL to conform to the as-configured plant could not be made without prior NRC approval. The licensee also discussed the condition with the NRC staff and provided a letter on October 26, 2012, regarding the error. The inspectors reviewed the information provided by the licensee and concluded that because the NRC approved the EAL and correction would require NRC approval, the erroneous information was material to the NRC and was a violation of 10 CFR 50.9. The inspectors reviewed the Enforcement Manual and Enforcement Policy and concluded that since the inaccurate information was identified after it was relied on to be accurate to approve the EAL scheme, enforcement action was warranted. Because the violation did not conform to any examples of Severity Level 1 through III, and there were no willful aspects, the inspectors determined that the violation was of Severity Level IV. Because the licensee identified the error, the inspectors concluded that the violation could be treated as a licensee identified NCV. The inspectors reviewed the issue under the Reactor Oversight Process and concluded that since the licensee had not implemented the inaccurate EALs and the EAL scheme in effect remained viable, there was no Reactor Oversight Process aspect to the issue.
05000315/FIN-2012005-0231 December 2012 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedNot Reporting the Use of CPAP Devices by Licensed OperatorsAn NCV of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, was identified due to the submittal of inaccurate medical information for a licensed operator. The submittal to the NRC was inaccurate because it certified that the operator had been medically examined and had met all medical qualifications, when in fact, a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) did not disclose that he had been prescribed a therapeutic device to treat sleep apnea. The licensee entered the issues into the corrective action program (CAP). The licensee\'s corrective actions included amending the SRO licensee to include the restriction related to use of a medical device. The SRO was unaware that being prescribed a therapeutic device for treatment of sleep apnea in March 2010 was a condition requiring reporting. The licensee submitted medical information associated with relicensing the SRO in March 2012 that was incomplete and incorrect for the SRO. Because violations of 10 CFR 50.9 are considered to be violations that potentially impede or impact the regulatory process, they are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. In accordance with the Enforcement Policy, the inspectors concluded that the violation was a Severity Level IV because the SRO met ANSI/ANS 3.4 criteria but failed to report a condition that required an amended license. The licensees failure to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC impacted the regulatory process because it resulted in an incorrect licensing action and is a performance deficiency. This is a minor ROP issue since the non-disclosure of a medical condition for a licensed operator did not result in an adverse impact on plant operation. Since there is no ROP Finding, there is no cross-cutting aspect associated with this violation.
05000315/FIN-2012004-0430 September 2012 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedInadequate Procedures for Implementation of Annulus Cooling to Remain in a Analyzed Thermal ConditionA Severity Level IV NCV of very low safety significance of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 72.150, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified by the inspectors for the failure of the licensee to have procedures in place to ensure that the design basis peak fuel cladding temperature limit would not be exceeded during dry cask canister processing operations. The licensee took appropriate actions prior to conducting evolutions that may have challenged these limits. This has been documented in the licensees corrective action program as Action Request (AR) 2012-9676. Consistent with the guidance in Section 2.2 of the NRC Enforcement Manual, Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSIs) are not subject to the Reactor Oversight Process enforcement and, thus, traditional enforcement will be used for these facilities. Therefore the violation was dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process using Section 2.3 of the Enforcement Policy. The violation was determined to be of more than minor significance using IMC 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, Example 3i, since the bounding conditions for the analyzed thermal condition was not reflected in the procedures to perform the port cap repair. Specifically, the licensees lack of evaluation did not ensure spent fuel cladding temperatures during canister processing operations would remain less than Spent Fuel Storage and Transportation Interim Staff Guidance-11, Cladding Considerations for the Transportation and Storage of Spent Fuel, safety limits. The inspectors determined that that the violation could be evaluated using Section 6.5.d.2 of the NRC Enforcement Policy, as a Severity Level IV violation, in that the licensee failed to establish, maintain, or implement adequate controls to ensure that the replacement of the port cap was performed under conditions bounded by a thermal analysis that ensured the integrity of the fuel would be maintained during the repair. Because the finding is associated only with traditional enforcement, there is not an associated cross-cutting aspect.
05000315/FIN-2008502-0131 March 2008 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Properly Report ANS PI DataThe inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50.9, Completeness and Accuracy of Information, when licensee personnel failed to properly report data associated with the Alert and Notification System (ANS) performance indicator (PI) for the second quarter of 2004 and subsequently failed to inform the NRC of the incorrect information after it was identified during a root cause evaluation for a similar event in 2007. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612 and the Enforcement Manual. Specifically, had the licensee properly submitted the ANS data, the PI would have been categorized as White for the second quarter of 2004; therefore the data was inaccurate in a material respect. As part of the licensees immediate corrective actions, this issue was entered into the corrective action program. In addition, the inspectors determined that the finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance since the licensee failed to evaluate and report the erroneous data due to non-conservative decision-making (H.1(b)). (Section 02.06)
05000315/FIN-2007006-0131 December 2007 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedLack of Safety Evaluation for Ice Condenser Operation with Insufficient Ice Fusion TimeThe inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1) associated with the licensee\'s failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for operation of the plant with less than the design basis time allotted for ice condenser ice basket fusion. Specifically, the licensee failed to properly interpret design and licensing basis requirements associated with protection against external events (i.e., seismic) and as a result did not perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation for plant operation with ice baskets that had less than the design basis time allotted for ice fusion. The licensee performed an evaluation of past operability and determined that the ice condenser would have continued to perform its pressure suppression function even with additional ice fall from the potentially unfused ice baskets. Because this issue affected the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function, the violation was reviewed under the traditional enforcement process; however, the underlying technical issue was evaluated using the Significance Determination Process. The violation was determined to be of more than minor significance because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation would not have ultimately required NRC prior approval. The inspectors reviewed the Seismic, Flooding, and Severe Weather Screening Criteria screening questions in Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations and determined that Question No. 3 was applicable. The violation was of very low safety significance because the finding did not involve the total loss of a safety function identified by the licensee through Probabilistic Risk Assessment, Individual Plant Examination of External Events or similar analysis, that contributes to external event initiated core damage accident sequences. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting area component related to this finding.
05000315/FIN-2007005-0130 September 2007 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Comply with TS 3.5.2, ECCS - OperatingThe inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 3.5.2. Both Unit 2 residual heat removal discharge header safety valves failed pressure lift testing during the Unit 2 Cycle 16 refueling outage. A common cause (i.e., bonding of the disc and seating surfaces caused by the formation of an oxide film on the disc and seat) was identified for the two failed pressure lift tests. The two failed pressure lift tests resulted in two inoperable emergency core cooling system trains for greater than the Technical Specification allowed outage time. No performance deficiency was associated with this event because appropriate maintenance and testing had been performed in accordance with the regulatory requirements. Therefore, cross-cutting aspects were not assessed. Both valves were replaced during the refueling outage. The violation was reviewed under the traditional enforcement process; however, the underlying technical issue was evaluated using the Significance Determination Process. The violation was of more than minor significance because it was related to the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the passive safety function of the piping system would not have been protected from an over-pressure condition. The violation was of very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in an actual loss of system safety function, and was not risk-significant due to external event initiators
05000315/FIN-2007003-0331 March 2007 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedFailure to Submit a Required Licensee Event ReportThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1). The licensee failed to submit a required Licensee Event Report within 60 days after discovery of an event requiring a report. The licensee failed to correctly evaluate the failure of two Unit 2 Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system pressure relief valves, which affected the operability of both trains of the RHR system. This was reportable as a condition prohibited by the plant\'s Technical Specification and as an event where a single cause resulted in two independent trains becoming inoperable in a single system designed to remove residual heat and mitigate the consequences of an accident. The licensee implemented several corrective actions to address a potential adverse trend in correctly identifying and evaluating the reportability of plant events, including additional training for selected operations, regulatory affairs, and plant engineering department personnel. This finding was of more than minor significance because the NRC relies on licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in the regulations and the Technical Specification in order to perform its regulatory function. Because this issue affected the NRC\'s ability to perform its regulatory function, it was evaluated with the traditional enforcement process. Consistent with the guidance in Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I, Paragraph D.4, of the NRC Enforcement Policy, this finding was determined to be a Severity Level IV NCV. Although this NRC identified violation was repetitive, the inspectors concluded that it was not due to inadequate corrective actions for the previous violation. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not correctly evaluate the two safety valve test failures with respect to the reporting requirements in 10 CFR 50.73. (IMC 0305, P.1(c))
05000315/FIN-2005007-0130 September 2005 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedIntroduction of Manual Action in Station Blackout Response ProcedureA finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors associated with a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59(d)(1). The issue involved an inadequate evaluation under 10 CFR 50.59 with respect to introduction of a new manual action in place of a previously automatic action. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action system and the licensee prepared a new evaluation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59 This finding was assigned a significance level of very low safety significance based on management review. The violation was categorized as Severity Level IV based on the underlying technical issue for the finding having screened out as having very low significance using the Phase 1 worksheet of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations.
05000315/FIN-2004002-0331 March 2004 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedUnplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal Performance Indicator Reporting FailureThe inspectors identified a Severity Level IV Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.9 because the licensee failed to accurately report two Unit 2 reactor trips in the performance indicator for Unplanned Scrams with Loss of Normal Heat Removal, which resulted in the performance indicator crossing the Green-to-White threshold. The licensee subsequently counted the reactor trips in the performance indicator The inspectors concluded that this issue was not suitable for evaluation by the Significance Determination Process; however, it was reviewed using the guidance in Section IV of the NRC Enforcement Policy because the licensee's failure to accurately report performance indicator data impacted the NRC's ability to carry out its statutory mission. The inspectors reviewed Supplement VII of the NRC Enforcement Policy and determined that this issue was a Severity Level IV Violation.
05000315/FIN-2003006-0430 June 2003 23:59:59CookNRC identifiedDeliberate Failure to Follow Radiation Protection RequirementsSeverity Level IV Violation. On May 16, 2003, the NRC issued a Notice of Violation to the licensee associated with an incident that occurred at the D. C. Cook Nuclear Power Plant on January 28, 2002. The incident involved an employee of the Framatome Corporation, a contractor at the D. C. Cook plant, that failed to follow the instructions of a radiation protection technician and subsequently failed to immediately exit the work area in the Unit 2 Containment Building when the employee's electronic dosimetry alarmed. The NRC Office of Investigations investigated the matter and concluded that the individual deliberately failed to follow radiation protection requirements Since the violation was determined to be deliberate, the NRC did not assign a significance to the violation using the Significance Determination Process. In accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," NUREG-1600, the violation was categorized at Severity Level IV.