Semantic search
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
| Discovered date | Reporting criterion | Title | Event description | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ENS 52245 | 16 September 2016 13:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Hydraulic Fluid (Fish Oil) Spill | At 0858 (EDT) on September 16th, 2016, approximately 3 ounces of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was spilled in front of the Unit Two Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid (fish oil) was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit Two trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC, under RAL 11.8.2.a, was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0913 (EDT). Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department intends to retract the report to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection based on the fluid remained within the Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake Structure. The licensee has notified the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, the NRC Resident Inspector, and will notify the Lower Alloways Creek Township. |
| ENS 52073 | 8 July 2016 10:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Oil Spill | Oil reported in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent after the start of 3rd circulating water pump. The source of the oil is believed to be from oil entrained in the discharge canal from oil leak previously reported in EN#52045. One circulating water pump was removed from service to mitigate the source. The United States Coast Guard Response Center, and the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. James A. Fitzpatrick Control Room was notified of the issue at 0645, off site agencies were first notified at 0743. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA. |
| ENS 52045 | 27 June 2016 01:15:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to an Oil Spill | The United States Coast Guard reported an oil sheen in the vicinity of the station's circulating water system effluent. Investigation by station personnel has not determined the source. The circulating water pumps were secured to mitigate the potential source. The United States Coast Guard response Center, and New York State Department of Environmental Conservation have been notified. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, FEMA.
The source of the oil sheen has been identified. The source, main turbine lubricating oil, has been stopped and cleanup efforts are underway. Notified R1DO (Gray), DOE, EPA, USDA, HHS, and FEMA. |
| ENS 50039 | 16 April 2014 13:08:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Minor Hydraulic Oil Spill in the Delaware River | At 0908 EDT on April 16th, 2014, approximately one pint of hydraulic fluid was spilled into the Delaware River in front of the Unit One Circulating Water System (CWS) Intake trash racks at the Salem Generating Station. The spill of hydraulic fluid was caused by a leak from the crane used to rake debris from the Unit One trash racks. The crane was stopped and the leak terminated at the time of discovery. The oil was cleaned up by onsite personnel at 0930 EDT. Nuclear Environmental Affairs Department determined a 4 hr report to the NRC under RAL 11.8.2.a. was warranted due to the 15 minute notification to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection at 0922 EDT. Additionally, a report of the spill was made to the National Response Center at 1034 EDT. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 49824 | 12 February 2014 17:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Circulating Water Discharge Monitor Out of Service | At 1113 CST on February 12, 2014, R-21 Circulating Water Discharge Monitor failed during routine surveillance testing and was declared nonfunctional. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two Emergency Action Levels (EALs) - NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications - when out of service. This results in a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability while R-21 is out of service. This is a reportable condition in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). There are no radioactive leaks that will impact the Circulating Water System as evidenced by normal readings on R-21 prior to its failure. In addition all other liquid effluent radiation monitors that monitor releases to the Circulating Water Discharge are in-service and have normal readings. Corrective maintenance is in progress and will continue until the monitor is returned to service. Maintenance will not result in the unplanned release of radioactivity to the environment and will not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 49507 | 6 November 2013 06:58:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | R-21 Circulating Water Discharge Radiation Monitor Planned Outage | When transferring power supplies to a non-safety related cooling tower bus for planned outage maintenance, R-21, the Circulating Water Discharge Radiation Monitor was removed from service at 0058 (CST) and returned to service at 0111 (CST). There is no installed backup for R-21 which has an emergency response function to provide indication of gaseous liquid effluent release to the environment. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. This resulted in a loss of emergency assessment capability while R-21 was out of service. There are no radioactive leaks that impact the Circulating Water System. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. * * * RETRACTION AT 1155 EST ON 12/2/13 FROM WAYNE EPPEN TO DANIEL MILLS * * * Based on further reviews of plant drawings and discussion with the Radiation Monitor System Engineer, R-21 was not inoperable when power supplies were transferred to the non-safety related Cooling Tower Bus. While R-21 was logged out of service during the transfer on November 6, 2013, it did not lose power and was not out of service. R-21 did not lose the ability to provide continuous monitoring of discharge canal effluent or monitoring in the event of an unplanned radiological release. Our defense in depth strategies are relied upon to take actions to protect the health and safety of the public. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Duncan). |
| ENS 49259 | 9 August 2013 15:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), Loss of Emergency Preparedness | Radiation Monitor Out of Service | During the performance of SP (Surveillance Procedure) 1027.2A, NMC Radiation Monitor Train A Calibration, Radiation Monitor R-21, Circulating Water Discharge Radiation Detector failed the source test point three times and was removed from service. R-21 has an emergency response function to provide indication of gaseous or liquid effluent release to the environment. This monitor has no compensatory measure that will allow timely classification of two NUE (Notification of Unusual Event) and Alert classifications when out of service. This is a priority 1 activity to repair the monitor. The repair activity is continuous and is in progress. There are not radioactive leaks that impact the Circulating Water System. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 49137 | 20 June 2013 11:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Sulfuric Acid Spill Requiring Offsite Notification | In the owner controlled area, the plant has a tank of sulfuric acid (93% concentration, UN # 1830) for chemical control of the Circulating Water system used in the non-safety related electrical power production portion of the plant. At 0600 (CDT), a routine inspection of the tank found acid within the berm surrounding the tank. A leak was discovered in the berm and sulfuric acid leaked onto the surrounding area and nearby drainage ditch. The quantity of leaked acid has been estimated to be 120 gallons. The source of the leak has been determined to be a pipe on the tank and it has been isolated with a closed valve. The tank level has been stable for 4 hours. The leaked acid is contained within approximately 70 linear feet of the (limestone) ditch and has not left the site. On-site operations and chemistry personnel are neutralizing the acid with soda ash and a tanker truck was contracted to arrive on site this morning to empty the acid tank contents until a repair can be accomplished. The leak was discovered at 0600 and isolated about 0630 CDT. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 49067 | 24 May 2013 17:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Intake Barrier Being Struck by Oil Tanker | At 0835 CDT, the Entergy Transmission Operations Center notified the Waterford 3 control room that a crude oil tanker had struck the dolphins at the cooling water intake structure on the Mississippi River. There were 4 out of 5 dolphins damaged, with 3 of these having substantial damage. The dolphins are hard structures anchored around the cooling water intake structure (which provide) protection from river traffic. Waterford 3 operations was unaffected by this event and thermal power remains at 100%. The intake structure, including the Circulating Water System, was unaffected by this event. Possible near-term effects of the event are a loss of protective barrier between river traffic and the intake structure due to the physical damage to the dolphins and hazards to navigation due to the loss of the dolphin lights. At 1230 CDT, the United States Coast Guard was notified of this event in accordance with Waterford 3 procedures. This notification is subsequent to the notification of the United States Coast Guard per 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 48828 | 18 March 2013 21:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Radioactive Release Onsite | On March 18, 2013, at approximately 1605 CDT, the station commenced notification of the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality and other offsite governmental agencies that traces of radioactive contaminants were found at the site of an underground pipe leak on station property. This leak could potentially contain tritium and cobalt-60, and is believed to have been contained on the plant site. The leakage path has been isolated. The station is currently starting up following a refueling outage. In October 2012, water was found leaking from the ground and accumulating in a ditch near the station's sewage treatment plant. The initial investigation concluded that the source of the leak was domestic water, based on pH sample results, known buried piping in the area, and the fact that the sewage treatment plant operates intermittently. During the recent refueling outage, which started on February 16, it was noted that the leak had stopped. Testing of the potentially affected piping found that the leak was not domestic water, but was actually coming from the sewage treatment plant effluent line. It was determined that the constant leakage seen in October 2012 was due to a failed check valve in the effluent line. This check valve is designed to prevent backflow from the main condenser circulating water system blow-down line. The failed check valve was allowing water from the blow-down line to flow backwards into the sewage plant effluent line and out of the breach. The leak had stopped because the circulating water system blow-down line was shut down at the start of the refueling outage. Discharges from the liquid radwaste system also flow into the blow-down line at a point upstream of the connection to the sewage plant effluent line. During planned discharge of liquid radwaste, some of the diluted radioactive water was thus able to leak out on the ground. Samples of the dirt in the area of the leak obtained on March 17 found detectable levels of cobalt 60. No water is available to perform tritium analysis. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition requiring notifications to local and state governmental agencies in accordance with the NEI 07-07 Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative. The leak path has been isolated. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47481 | 28 November 2011 14:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification of Unplanned Acidic Solution Discharge | During the regeneration of the Unit 2 full flow condensate polishing demineralizer (FFCPD) resin, 5 percent sulfuric acid briefly overflowed from the bermed area. The majority of the acid went into the floor drains in the FFCPD area and then to the turbine building sump system. An estimated quantity of 2 gallons of sulfuric acid was released into the storm drains that discharged into the circulating water system. The quantity released was well below the reportable quantity. The fire department and environmental/hazmat team were contacted and responded. Precautionary notifications were made by SCE to: - California Emergency Management Agency - San Diego Dept. of Environmental Health. The cause of the leak has been corrected and no additional discharge is anticipated. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47353 | 19 October 2011 09:28:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip on Loss of Condenser Vacuum | On October 19, 2011, at 0528, Unit 1 was manually tripped due to rising condenser backpressure. All (Control Element Assembly) CEAs fully inserted into the core. Decay Heat Removal is from Main Feedwater and Steam Bypass to the Main Condenser. The cause of the rising backpressure was an unplanned trip the Circulating Water Pump 1A1, which degraded the Circulating Water System performance. At the time of the trip, an additional Circulating Water Pump 1A2 was secured for planned maintenance. The cause of the Circulating Water Pump 1A1 trip is under investigation. This event is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the Reactor Trip. The plant is stable at normal operating temperature and pressure. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 47178 | 22 August 2011 19:13:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Rising Condenser Backpressure | On August 22, 2011 at 1513 (hrs. EDT), Unit 1 was manually tripped due to rising condenser backpressure. All CEAs fully inserted into the core. Decay heat removal was initially from main feedwater and steam bypass to the main condenser. The cause of the rising back pressure was an influx of jellyfish into the intake structure, degrading the circulating water system performance. Subsequent to the manual trip, the 1B Main Feedwater Pump was manually secured due to a leak on the pump casing. The 1A Main Feedwater Pump subsequently tripped due to low suction pressure after manually securing the 1B Condensate Pump, per procedure. Decay heat removal was transitioned to atmospheric dump valves and auxiliary feedwater. Unit 2 is in Mode 1, currently at 70 % power. Unit 2 power is being reduced from 100% in response to the influx of jellyfish. This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for the reactor trip. During the transient, no primary or secondary relief valves lifted. Offsite power is stable and the plant is in its normal shutdown electrical line-up with power being supplied from offsite. There is no known primary-to-secondary leakage. The cause of the 1A Main Feedwater Pump trip is under investigation. Unit 2 remained at 70% reactor power before and after the event. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
On August 22, 2011 an abnormal fish kill of at least 1000 lbs was observed in the combined unit's intake canal. The cause of the fish kill was related to an unusually large sustained influx of jellyfish into the intake canal. Per the plant's environmental permit, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission (FWCC) was notified at 1627 EDT. This non-emergency notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi) due to the notification of the FWCC. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46627 | 20 February 2011 00:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notifiection Due to Inadvertent Chemical Discharge | At 1920 (EST) on 2-19-11, a chemistry technician notified the Shift Manager that more than the expected amount of Sodium Bisulfite was inadvertently added to the Circulating Water System discharge. The Spill Prevention Control & Countermeasures (SPCC) Plan was referenced for required actions. 17 additional gallons of Sodium Bisulfite was discharged to surface waters of Lake Michigan. This amount of Sodium Bisulfite is less than the reportable quantity of 417 gallons per the SPCC Plan. However, since it was released to surface water (Lake Michigan), a notification to the District Water Quality Division (DWQD) was made at 2020 (EST) by the site's Senior Environmental Specialist (SES). The DWQD requested that additional notifications be made to state (Pollution Emergency Alert System - PEAS) and local (911 operator) agencies. PEAS was notified at 2020 (EST) by the SES and Van Buren County dispatch (911) was notified by the Control Room staff at 2047 (EST). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46247 | 13 September 2010 13:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification for Discharge of 200 Gal Untreated Sanitary Water | At 0900 (EDT) this morning, Seabrook Station experienced leakage of approximately 200 gallons of untreated sanitary water to the storm drain system, which discharges to the circulating water system. Since Seabrook is not authorized to discharge untreated sanitary water, this event has been reported to the town of Seabrook and will be reported to the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Services and the Environmental Protection Agency. The preliminary apparent cause of the leak was a failure of the sanitary lift station discharge pumps to start automatically, which resulted in untreated sanitary water overflowing into the storm drain system. The leak was stopped by restarting the sanitary lift station discharge pumps. This event is being reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) for an event related to the protection of the environment for which notification to other government agencies has been or will be made." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46176 | 15 August 2010 15:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Discharge of Amertap Neoprene Balls Into Waterway | During the performance of TP-1539, Unit 1 Amertap ball check on 8/15/10 at 0933, it was discovered that approximately 1300 balls could have been lost to the environment via the external circulating water system from the #12 Amertap Ball System. The Xcel Energy environmental service informed the plant that reports were made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency at 1050 CDT on 8/15/10 and the Minnesota State Duty Officer at 1045 CDT on 8/15/10. The Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council will be notified. The #12 Amertap Ball System is shutdown and will remain out of service until repairs are completed. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46162 | 9 August 2010 13:12:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Loss of Condenser Tube Cleaning (Amertap) Balls | During the performance of TP-1539, Amertap Ball Check on 8/08/2010 at 1326 (CDT), it was discovered that (about) 1400 balls could have been lost to the environment (Mississippi River) via the External Circulating Water System from the 11 Amertap Ball System. The Xcel Energy Environmental Service informed the plant that reports were made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency on 8/09/2010 at 0817 and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer on 8/09/2010 at 0812. The Prairie Island Indian Community Tribal Council was notified. The 11 Amertap Ball System is shutdown and will remain out of service until repairs are completed. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 46103 | 16 July 2010 20:41:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Scram Due to Unisolable Circulating Water System Leak | At approximately 1641 EDT on July 16, 2010, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station Unit 1 reactor was manually scrammed due to a large unisolable circulating water system leak in the main condenser area. Attempts to isolate the source of the leakage were unsuccessful. During these attempts, reactor operators lowered reactor power from approximately 90% to about 39%. Based on rising water level in the condenser area and unsuccessful isolation of the source of the leakage, Operations decided to shut down the plant. The reactor operator placed the mode switch in shutdown. All control rods (fully) inserted. Reactor water level lowered to -28 inches causing Level 3 (+13 inches) isolations. The Operations crew subsequently maintained reactor water level at the normal operating band using RCIC. No steam relief valves opened. The main steam isolation valves were manually closed and the circulating water system was shut down. Pressure control was initiated using HPCI in the pressure control mode. All safety systems operated as expected. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. Actions to isolate and investigate the cause of the circulating water system leakage are underway. Unit 2 continued power operation. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, and will be issuing a press release. |
| ENS 45853 | 18 April 2010 18:00:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Loss of Condenser Tube Cleaning (Amertap) Balls | During the auto shutdown process of TP 1539, Amertap Ball Check, an equipment malfunction occurred when the ball catching flap did not auto reposition to the 'catch' position. This resulted in a loss of amertap balls to the external circulating water system. The quantity of balls lost to the environment is unknown but could potentially be the entire quantity of 1500 balls. The Xcel Energy Environmental Service informed the plant that a report will be made to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency during business hours on 4/19/2010. The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. A news release is not planned. The Amertap system is out of service until repaired. The licensee will also be notifying the Prairie Island Indian Nation and Goodhue County, MN of this incident. |
| ENS 45841 | 14 April 2010 21:20:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notifications Due to Fish Kill and Chemical Release | The licensee notified the State of Minnesota Department of Natural Resources and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) at 1620 CDT of a fish kill that occurred during a change to the plant circulating water system. Approximately 300-400 fish were found dead in the discharge canal during inspections related to a Zebra Mussel Treatment in progress. The fish included carp, green sunfish, bluegill, carpsuckers, and gizzard shad. The cause appears to be related to temperature changes in the canal as the external circulating water system was manipulated to achieve the 82-84 deg (F) condenser inlet temperatures needed for the treatment and a reduction in plant blowdown flow to the river required by the site discharge permit. The dead fish were contained in discharge canal due to a net that was deployed on Monday in preparation for zebra mussel treatment conducted today (treatment started at 1030 am). Fish in the discharge canal have been dead for 12 to 24 hours. The fish kill is unrelated to the zebra mussel treatment mulluscide addition and did not extend to state waterways. During the Zebra Mussel treatment, detectable mulluscide was found at the sluice gates to the Mississippi River at 1607 and the chemical addition was stopped The chemical is normally neutralized by addition of clay prior to reaching the sluice gates. The 1607 and 1620 samples at the sluice gates showed 0.6 ppm and 0.8 ppm of CL-2005 mulluscide and the 1730 sample had returned to non-detectable. The plant notified the Minnesota Department of Emergency Management of the chemical release at 1856, event number 110570. The MPCA will be notified during business hours tomorrow. A news release is not planned. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45347 | 13 September 2009 19:43:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation | Automatic Reactor Trip Following Turbine Trip for Loss of Condenser Vacuum | The SONGS Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped from approximately 94% power at 1243 PDT due to loss of turbine load caused by lowering main condenser vacuum. Prior to the reactor trip, personnel were attempting to conduct a heat treat on Unit 2. During this evolution, Gate 5 in the main circulating water system was being repositioned when it stopped moving at 45 percent. This resulted in a recirculation and subsequent increase in circulating water temperature, a lowering main condenser vacuum, a loss of load on the main turbine, and an associated automatic reactor trip. All rods inserted on the automatic reactor trip and the electric grid is stable. This event report is being made under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) as a valid Reactor Protection System actuation. Decay heat is being removed via normal feedwater to steam generators steaming through the condenser bypass valves to the main condenser. At the time of this event, SONGS Unit 3 was operating at approximately 99% power. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 45330 | 6 September 2009 23:05:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notification Due to Loss of Amertap Balls | Xcel environmental notified the State of Minnesota duty officer of the loss of approximately 1200 Amertap balls from the Unit 1 circulating water system. The Amertap balls are made of foam and are used for condenser tube cleaning. No further actions or notifications are required. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| ENS 44336 | 4 July 2008 00:45:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(a)(1)(i), Emergency Class Declaration | Sodium Hypochlorite Leak | At 1945 Point Beach declared a UE based on HU 3.1, 'Report or detection of toxic or flammable gases that has or could enter the site area boundary in amounts that can affect NORMAL PLANT OPERATIONS.' This Emergency Action Level (EAL) was entered based on a confirmed Sodium Hypochlorite tank leak to the tanks diked area. The leak is located below the current tank level and will continue to drain to the dike until equilibrium level is reached. The dike is designed to contain the entire tank contents. There are no signs of any leakage outside of the dike. The vapors in the immediate area are not significant at this time and extra ventilation has been provided by opening an overhead roll up door in the area. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified. The sodium hypochlorite is used in the screen house to chlorinate the service water and circulating water systems to eliminate Zebra Mussels. The concrete diked area is designed to contain the entire contents of the tank.
At 0646 (CDT) on 7/4/08 Point Beach terminated the UE that was declared at 1945 CDT on 7/3/08, based on HU 3.1. The leaking Sodium Hypochlorite tank and leak control dike have been drained and the over flow leak control area cleaned. The hazard no longer exists and the area has been released to normal access. The licensee informed State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Kozak), EO (Brown), IRD (Gott), FEMA (Canupp) and DEHS (Inzer). |
| ENS 41496 | 15 March 2005 22:30:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | Kewaunee Plant Design for Flooding Events May Not Mitigate the Consequences of Piping System Failures | The following was provided by the licensee: While reviewing Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) memorandum regarding Task Interface Agreement (TIA), TIA 2001-02,'Design Basis Assumptions For Non-Seismic Piping Failures at Prairie Island Plant,' Kewaunee staff determined that the Kewaunee plant design for flooding events may not mitigate the consequences of piping system failures. As a minimum, and as a consequence of assuming failure of non-seismically qualified piping systems as prescribed in the TIA, water has been assumed to collect in the turbine building from a circulating water system piping failure that would result in substantial damage to Engineered Safeguards (ESF) and Safe Shutdown (SS) plant equipment, most notably electrical equipment. As a consequence of high water level in the turbine building, water could flow into the ESF equipment rooms that contain the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps, Emergency Diesel Generators and both the 480 volt and 4160 volt electrical switchgear. Water is assumed to flow into the equipment rooms by way of leakage past non-water-tight doors and the plant's unchecked floor-drain system. The expected water levels In the safeguards and electrical equipment rooms are assumed to increase to the point of causing multiple trains of both ESF and SS equipment to be unavailable to safely shutdown the plant. Kewaunee's primary mitigation strategy to combat flooding events is to recognize the event and initiate manual actions to open doors/ barriers. Opening the barriers to flooding directs the water out of the turbine building through the safeguards equipment rooms and returns it to the lake. Normally the manual actions would be expected to be performed before water level accumulates to a point of causing equipment damage. However, under the seismic failure assumptions, water levels are assumed to accumulate faster than the plant's ability to identify and react in order to assure protection of equipment required to initiate and complete a safe plant shutdown. Coincidental to the condition being reported, the plant had recently implemented additional precautionary measures to combat internal flooding events that lesson the significance of the condition being reported. Temporary pumping equipment, temporary sandbag barriers and additional personnel have been staged to minimize the consequences of previously questioned flooding events. Furthermore, a number of plant equipment design changes are being processed to further improve Kewaunee's defenses against internal flooding events. However, given the event being reported, the full scope of any additional actions is still to be determined. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. |
| ENS 40994 | 27 August 2004 13:50:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), Notification to Government Agency or News Release | Offsite Notifications Made to Spillage of Phosphonic Acid | 15 gallon spill of blulab 7016 acid anti-scalant (used for Circulating Water System) of which 5 gallons was caught in a bucket and approximately 10 gallons spilled of which 1 or 2 gallons ended up into the lake. Licensee notified the National Response Center and the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality. The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee. |
| ENS 40754 | 15 May 2004 16:54:00 | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS System Actuation 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), System Actuation | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Diver Entangled in Intake Crib | A Unit 2 manual reactor trip was initiated when the control room was notified that a diver was entangled in the intake crib. Divers were being used to inspect the intake crib, install buoys, and the fish deterrent system. The diver's umbilical cord became snagged and attempts to free it were unsuccessful. The Unit 2 circulating water system was secured to aid in removing the diver from the water. The diver still had breathing air available during the transient. The diver was subsequently removed from the water unhurt. Plant systems functioned as required, including the Reactor Protection and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. There was no Emergency Core Cooling System actuation. Note: The condenser was unavailable because circulating water was secured. This caused a loss of condenser vacuum and its use as a heat sink. The atmospheric steam dumps are currently being used for heat removal from the steam generators. The circulating water system was subsequently restored to service. This event is reportable pursuant to 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical and 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), PWR auxiliary feedwater system. All control rods inserted into the core. The electrical busses are in a normal shutdown line up. The licensee notified the NRC Resident inspector. |